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ABSTRACT
The online publication of images of children and their subsequent use has the potential
to cause harm to a child who is a subject of such an image. Indeed, the publication and
distribution of photographs or video clips has been found to be one of the most impactful
forms of bullying.1 Even outside a cyberbullying context, however, this thesis argues that
two important aspects of a child’s social and emotional development — namely their self‐
esteem and the development of relationships — can be harmed by the unwanted online
publication or subsequent use of an image of that child. In particular, this thesis argues
that an image subject can be harmed by the online publication of an image or its use even
where the publication or use is not ill‐intentioned and regardless of whether or not the
image can be described, objectively, as harmful. In view of this, the thesis examines the
extent to which the current Australian legal framework, as well as existing social norms,
the architecture of the internet and the market, are sufficient to address the problem of
the unwanted online posting of an image of a child or its subsequent use. After concluding
that the current status quo does not sufficiently address the problem, and having argued
that Australia’s commitments to children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of
the Child obliges it to do more, the thesis argues that Australian law should be reformed
to give children greater control over their image in the online environment than they
currently enjoy. Possible legal responses that would give children greater control over
their image are then considered and evaluated, and one particular response is
recommended. The need for further research and for a multi‐faceted approach to the
problem highlighted in this thesis is identified.

1

Peter K Smith et al ‘An Investigation into Cyberbullying, its Forms, Awareness and Impact, and the
Relationship between Age and Gender in Cyberbullying’ (Research Brief No RBX03‐06, University of London,
July 2006).
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
I

CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

The central issue with which this thesis is concerned is encapsulated in the following
submission made by the New South Wales (‘NSW’) Commission for Children and Young
People, describing the input it had received from youth on the issue of unauthorised
photography:
Young people suggested to the Commission that a person being photographed should
consent to how the photograph should be used. They said that people should have some
control over how they are represented on the internet, in the media, or through other
forms of mass communication, such as mobile phones.1

This purpose of this thesis is to examine the issue of the publication and use of images
(photographs and videos) when, from the perspective of an image subject who is a child
or a young person, that publication or use is unwanted. Specifically, it will argue that
young people should indeed have some control over how they are represented on the
internet, and certainly more control than they currently do have.2 This thesis will also
argue that the unwanted online publication of images or unwanted use of online images
of children poses a risk to their development and that, in order to fulfil its commitments
to children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC’),3 Australia
should do more, by way of a regulatory response, to address this risk.
II

BACKGROUND

The broader issue of the unwanted capture and publication of images of children has been
considered recently in the context of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s review of
Australian privacy law and practice.4 In its final report, For Your Information, released in
2008, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) notes that ‘[t]he taking of
photographs and other images of children and young people without consent has raised
significant concerns in recent times’ and that many of those concerns have arisen as a
result of the use of mobile or digital technology.5 Further the ALRC has expressed the view
that existing laws in Australia do not sufficiently protect an individual’s privacy interests
1

New South Wales (‘NSW’) Commission for Children and Young People, Submission to SCAG Discussion
Paper, Unauthorised Photographs of the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues, October 2005, 3 [5.2].
2
The thesis will confine itself, however, to examining the online publication of images and use of online
images rather than the broader question of how young people are represented through various other
mediums.
3
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into
force 2 September 1990) (‘CRC’).
4
Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice,
Report No 108 (2008).
5
Ibid, vol 3, 2571 [74.141].

7

in relation to the publication of images.6 The unwanted online publication of images was
also the subject of an earlier report by the former Standing Committee of Attorneys
General (‘SCAG’)7 and has recently been considered in the context of concerns over
children’s safety, arising from the proliferation of ‘harmful online content’.8 In its report
into cyber‐safety, the Joint Select Committee on Cyber‐Safety (‘JSCCS’) observed that the
topic of photo sharing ‘is frequently raised in broader public discussion’ and ‘illustrates
complexities and nuances of the online environment’.9 According to the JSCCS, the
decision of young people to share photographs of others online raises important issues
about ‘how posting photos of others can create additional concerns of permission,
ownership and the ability to control one’s personal information’.10
Various media reports have highlighted some of the most shocking stories of young
people suffering due to the publication or threatened online publication of images of
themselves. One example, discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, is that of Amanda
Todd. Amanda Todd was a Canadian teen who in a video posted before she took her own
life described how she was blackmailed into exposing herself online and then suffered
from bullying after her pictures were posted on Facebook.11 Another example is that of
the so‐called ‘ADFA Skype Sex Scandal’ of 2011, where a young Australian female cadet
training at the Australian Defence Force Academy (‘ADFA’) was, unbeknown to her, filmed
having sex with a male cadet who simultaneously broadcast the images, via Skype, to a
number of other army cadets. In a victim impact statement, read out in court, the former
female cadet said that she ‘became nothing more than “that Skype slut”’.12
There are many examples of online image sharing which, although not as extreme as those
referred to above, are potentially problematic. One 16 year old respondent to the JSCCS’s
‘Are you Safe?’ survey observed as follows:

6

Ibid. See also NSW, Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Remedies for the Serious Invasion of Privacy
in New South Wales, Report, 3 March 2016, 57 [4.12]; South Australian Law Reform Institute, A Statutory
Tort for Invasion of Privacy, Report no 4, March 2016, 15.
7
SCAG, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues, Discussion Paper (2005).
SCAG became the Standing Council on Law and Justice (formerly SCAG). That Council, and the former
Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management were replaced by a single council, the Law, Crime
and Community Safety Council, in 2013: Attorney‐General’s Department, Australian Government, Law,
Crime and Community Safety Council < https://www.ag.gov.au/About/CommitteesandCouncils/Law‐Crime‐
and‐Community‐Safety‐Council/Pages/default.aspx>.
8
Department of Communications (Cth), The Coalition’s Policy to Enhance Online Safety for Children,
September 2013; Department of Communications (Cth), Enhancing Online Safety for Children – Public
Consultation on Key Election Commitments, January 2014.
9
JSCCS, Parliament of Australia, High Wire Act: Cyber‐Safety and the Young, Interim report (June 2011).
10
Ibid 238–9 [7.122].
11
‘Man Charged in Netherlands in Amanda Todd Suicide Case’, Europe, BBC News (online), 18 April 2014
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐europe‐27076991>.
12
Ewan Gilbert, ‘ADFA Skype Sex Scandal “Destroyed My Life”: Victim’, ABC News (online), 14 October 2013
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013‐10‐14/adfa‐skype‐sex‐cadet‐linked‐to‐second‐scandal/5020704>.
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I havnt been on Facebook for about 3 months but every time when I logged on their would
be someone fighting with someone on someones wall or status — stupid photos put up
on purpose. for example if a girl was at a party and might of been sitting in a position and
a camera just so happened to take an awkward shot of her underwear or something —
this event is totally innocent but the person who uploads this photo onto the internet is
an idiot — this happens a lot. photos which at the time are accidental or the subject might
not even know are being taken are being put up on the internet for everyone to see. And
what girl wants photos of their underwear all over the internet. this example happens
alllllooooottt!13

In other cases, the online sharing of an image may cause distress even if it reveals nothing
awkward, intimate, embarrassing or private. For example, in its 2005 report on
Unauthorised Photographs and Ancillary Privacy Issues14 SCAG observed that ‘the issue of
unauthorised photographs on the Internet was highlighted … when a number of
unauthorised photographs of children were posted on voyeuristic websites’.15 Although
the photographs themselves were innocent (mostly depicting schoolchildren involved in
sporting activities), the context of their use caused ‘distress to those involved’.16
The potential for the unauthorised use of images to cause harm is, in the preceding
examples, fairly self‐evident. However, it is argued in this thesis that the existence of an
image of a child in the online environment, where its existence is unwanted by the image
subject, can nevertheless be problematic, even if both the image itself and the context of
its use can be described as ‘benign’. It will be argued that the unwanted online existence
of an image of a child or young person poses a risk of harm at a developmental level to
the child who is the subject of that image. This is not least because the lack of control as
to how an image is used can result in low self‐esteem on the part of the image subject and
has the potential to impact detrimentally on an individual’s relationships and their sense
of ‘relatedness’ with (or sense of being connected to) others.
Where an image is such that a reasonable person would find its online publication
unacceptable and offensive, legal mechanisms might be available to the image subject to
secure the withdrawal of the image from publication. Nevertheless, there are
acknowledged gaps in Australian law. As noted by SCAG in reference to a number of
specific situations involving the unauthorised capture or publication of photographs,
‘there were few, if any, avenues of redress available to victims of unauthorised
photographs posted on the internet.’17 Where legal avenues are available, practical
considerations such as the cost and complexity of pursuing legal action can militate
against the practical utility of such actions, particularly where the would‐be plaintiff is a
13

JSCCS, above n 9, 239 (quoted as written in original).
SCAG above n 7.
15
Ibid 5 [7].
16
Ibid 6 [13].
17
Ibid 6 [17]. See also NSW, Standing Committee on Law and Justice, above n 6; South Australian Law Reform
Institute, above n 6, 15.
14
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child. Non‐legal avenues of redress may also be open to an image subject in respect of the
unauthorised online publication of an image. Where an image is published on a social
media site, for example, many site operators have in place complaint mechanisms and will
remove images that do not comply with their terms and conditions.18 However, the
efficacy of these mechanisms is sometimes questioned.19
If the availability of or access to formal and informal avenues of redress in relation to
offensive or objectively harmful images is limited, avenues of redress in relation to images
that would likely be regarded as ‘benign’ is almost entirely lacking. In relation to such
images there is an almost total absence of legal or formal avenues of redress; and informal
mechanisms, it would seem, prove largely unsatisfactory in effecting the removal of such
images.20
Drawing on research into child development, self‐presentation and the developmental
implications of computer mediated communication, this thesis argues that an important
factor giving rise to the risk or materialisation of developmental harm in relation to the
unwanted online publication of images is the insufficiency of control on the part of image
subject over the capture, publication, dissemination and use of their image. That the
Australian Government should do more, in terms of direct regulation, to give children
greater control over the publication and use of images of themselves online is the central
proposition of this thesis. This proposition is advanced as a partial response to the

18

In the case of Facebook, for example, the company reserves the right to remove content that offends its
terms at its discretion, although it places itself under no obligation to do so. The Facebook Terms of Use
provide as follows: ‘We can remove any content or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it
violates this Statement or our policies’: Facebook, ‘Terms of Service’ (30 January 2015)
<https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms> term 5(2). Content will offend Facebook’s terms if, among other
things, it is pornographic, or explicitly sexual and involves a minor, or if it involves abusive behaviour
Facebook,
‘Community
Standards’
targeted
against
an
individual:
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards>.
19
See, eg, Matthew Keeley et al, Research on Youth Exposure to, and Management of, Cyberbullying
Incidents in Australia: Part B – Cyberbullying Incidents Involving Australian Minors, the Nature of the
Incidents and How They Are Currently Being Dealt With (SPRC Report 10/2014) Sydney: Social Policy
Research Centre, UNSW, Australia, 86. See also JSCCS, above n 9, 242; the speech made by Senator Bilyk
during the second reading debate on the Enhancing Online Safety for Children Bill 2015, where the senator
quoted from an email sent by the CEO of Twitter to her Executive Team, in which he wrote: ‘We suck at
dealing with abuse and trolls on the platform and we’ve sucked at it for years. It’s no secret and the rest of
the world talks about it every day. We lose core user after core user by not addressing simple trolling issues
that they face every day. I’m frankly ashamed of how poorly we’ve dealt with this issue during my tenure
as CEO. It’s absurd. There’s no excuse for it. I take full responsibility for not being more aggressive on this
front’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 March 2015, 1037 (Catryna Bilyk). See also South
Australian Law Reform Institute, above n 6, 49 noting that: ‘The Law Society of South Australia was
particularly concerned with the ineffectiveness of industry self‐regulation in relation to handling digital
content complaints’.
20
For example, during a High School Forum conducted as part of research for the JSCCS report into cyber‐
safety, ‘an extremely low percentage’ of students indicated that approaching friends to request them to
remove unwanted images was a successful strategy: JSCCS, above n 9, 241, [7.129].
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problem that the insufficiency of control by children over the online publication of images
of themselves gives rise to the risk of developmental harm.
In arguing for this proposition, this thesis will examine some of the risks to children and
young people posed by the online publication of images of themselves, and the
significance of ‘control’ over image from a developmental perspective. It will consider
these risks in the context of Australia’s obligations to children under the CRC and will also
consider more generally whether Australia’s commitment to children’s rights requires
more to be done to protect the rights of children with regards to the unwanted online
publication of images of children or their subsequent use. Finally, the research will
evaluate a number of law reform options that could address these risks, to a greater or
lesser extent.
The focus of this research is primarily on situations where an individual’s image has been
initially placed online by another. However, some of the risks of harm outlined in Chapter
Two can also arise when an individual has uploaded their own image to the internet,
where the image is then republished or used in a way that is not wanted. An example of
this might be the use for commercial purposes of an image that a person has uploaded of
themself to a social media site (where commercial use would not have been intended).
In order to provide some background to this research, the following sections consider
issues that have been raised in relation to the unwanted use or posting of images in the
context of cyberbullying, privacy and control over personal information.
A

Images and Cyberbullying

As mentioned above, concerns over the online publication of images of children have
been raised in the context of recent Australian law reform inquiries21 and governmental
discussion papers.22 The ALRC’s 2008 report For Your Information noted that the
consequences of the online posting of images without the consent of the image subject
‘can include bullying, ridicule, embarrassment and generally an invasion of privacy.’23 A
recent discussion paper on enhancing children’s online safety recognised that the posting
of ‘embarrassing or harmful’ photographs and videos might itself constitute cyberbullying
where that is defined as ‘any communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass
or cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means to support
severe, repeated and hostile behaviour.’24 The Interim Report of the JSCCS, published in
21

See, eg, ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4; NSW Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’), Invasion of
Privacy, Report No 120 (2009); Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), Privacy Law: Options for Reform,
Information Paper (2001); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18
(2010).
22
SCAG above n 7; Department of Communications (Cth), Enhancing Online Safety for Children – Public
Consultation on Key Election Commitments, January 2014.
23
ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 3, 2328 [69.114].
24
Department of Communications (Cth), above n 22, 3 referring to a particular definition of cyberbullying
used by the authors of a study into cyberbullying in Australia and published in the International Journal of
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2011, refers to a number of common forms of cyberbullying behaviour, which include
‘sending out humiliating photo or video messages, including visual pornography and
sharing videos of physical attacks on individuals (sometimes called “happy slapping”).’25
The impact of bullying, including cyberbullying, on children has been the subject of a
number of studies and might be considered reasonably well documented,26 albeit that the
need for further research has been recognised.27 Although cyberbullying can take many
forms, of which the online posting of images and videos of a person is just one, research
has shown that images and video clips are perhaps the most impactful form of
cyberbullying.28
Even where the online posting or use of videos and images of a person does not in itself
constitute cyberbullying, it can lead to bullying, including cyberbullying.29 As has been
observed by the JSCCS, ‘[c]yber‐bullying is made easier once a young adult makes
herself/himself vulnerable by, for example, posting or sending inappropriate photos to
others … or by posting personal photos on Facebook.’30 This observation holds true in
situations where the photograph is posted not by the image subject themself, but by
another person. Moreover, it is submitted that a photograph need not reveal anything
particularly personal or inappropriate for it to be used as a basis for others to engage in
hurtful or bullying behaviour. As was observed by one of the respondents to the JSCCS’s
‘Are you Safe?’ survey, ‘my brothers face book is the worst, he has 300+ friends and they
all pick on the fat and ugly people just cause of the way they look.’31
B

Images, Privacy and Control

Other concerns around the online posting of images of children relate to the extent to
which that posting causes harm to the image subject’s privacy interests. The ALRC’s 2008
report For Your Information noted that some stakeholders had ‘highlighted the need to
safeguard the safety and privacy of children from people with no legitimate purpose for

Children’s Rights: Aashish Srivastava, Roger Gamble & Janice Boey, ‘Cyberbullying in Australia: Clarifying the
Problem, Considering the Solutions’, International Journal of Children’s Rights (2013) 21, 27.
25
JSCCS, above n 9, 70 [3.36].
26
See generally, Justin W Patchin and Sameer Hinduja, ‘Cyberbullying and Self‐Esteem’ (2010) 80(12) Journal
of School Health 614; Robert Didden et al, ‘Cyberbullying Among Students with Intellectual and
Developmental Disability in Special Education Settings’ (2009) 12(3) Developmental Neurorehabilitation
146. For research referred to, see, eg, Robin M Kowalski et al, ‘Bullying in the Digital Age: A Critical Review
and Meta‐Analysis of Cyberbullying Research among Youth’ (2014) 140 (4) Psychological Bulletin 1073,
1114–15.
27
Liberal‐National Coalition, The Coalition’s Discussion Paper on Enhancing Online Safety for Children,
November 2012, 11 noting that cyberbullying is one of the many areas where further research would be
valuable.
28
Robert Slonje and Peter K Smith, ‘Cyberbullying: Another Main Type of Bullying?’ (2008) Scandinavian
Journal of Psychology 147, 149.
29
JSCCS, above n 9, 136 [4.48]
30
Ibid 70 [3.39].
31
Ibid 80 [3.55] (quoted as written in original).
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taking and publishing photos’.32 The ALRC stated that there are ‘valid concerns that there
are some types of capture and publication of images which may not be criminal in nature
but still affect an individual’s privacy interests.’33
Young people themselves have expressed their concerns over the online publication of
images of themselves by others. Over 40% of the young Australians who participated in
research conducted in 2007 reported that photos and videos had been posted to the
internet without their consent.34 A submission by the Youthlaw organisation to the ALRC
2008 inquiry into Australian privacy law and practice noted that it had received a number
of complaints from young people in relation to the posting of photographs of themselves
on the internet without their consent.35 The ALRC also observed that:
Despite acknowledging the difficulties associated with the permanent removal of website
content, most young people considered that an individual should be able to have a
photograph removed from a website if he or she did not consent to its posting. This was
seen as a suitable remedy to the unauthorised publication of a person’s image, and was
considered to be more practical than putting laws in place to prevent the initial posting.36

A participant in a High School Forum held to inform the JSCCS’s report, framed the issue
of online photo sharing in terms of control:
It is interesting that, when a school takes a photo of you, it has to have permission and it
is the same everywhere. But a friend can put it up and you can ask them to take it down,
but they do not have to because it is on their profile. So even if you do not like that photo
and you want them to take it down, they can say no.37

The fact that young people desire control over information about themselves is also
implicit in some of the decisions they make about their own personal information. For
example, a study among American teenagers found that most users of social networking
sites choose to set their profile to private and that young people are actively managing
their personal information and making important judgements about what information to
share and what to keep back.38 Livingstone found that teenagers using social networking
sites described ‘thoughtful decisions about what, how and to whom they reveal personal
information, drawing their own boundaries about what information to post and what to

32

ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 3, 2327 [69.113].
Ibid 2331 [69.122].
34
Ibid 2225, [67.12].
35
ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 1, 457, [11.14].
36
Ibid vol 3, 2234 [67.43].
37
JSCCS, above n 9, 239 [7.124].
38
Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, ‘Teens, Privacy and Online Social Networks’ (Report, Pew Internet
and American Life Project, 18 April 2007). Nevertheless, at least in the Australian context, research has also
shown that older teenagers are more likely than those in the 12–15 age group to set their social media
accounts to ‘private’: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report no 123 (2014) 40 [2.54].
33
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keep off the site’.39 Research commissioned by the Australian Communications and Media
Authority (‘ACMA’), reported in 2009 that ‘privacy controls are considered important in
providing children and young people with the choice to protect themselves, regardless of
whether they actually use them.’40 This desire on the part of young people for control over
what happens to personal data may be indicative of a broader trend. Graux et al have
observed that ‘the ability to control what happens to personal data seems to be perceived
as a valuable norm by most netizens already.’41
Against this, concerns have arisen about the perceived ‘over‐sharing’ of personal
information by young people.42 As Raynes‐Goldie explains ‘[a] common theme in both
journalistic and academic coverage of online privacy to date has centred on the seemingly
ignorant privacy attitudes and activities of young SNS [social network site] users.’ In
contrast to Livingstone’s conclusions referred to above, research conducted among
American teenagers found that a ‘notable number of teens also engage in online practices
that may have the potential to compromise their safety online’.43 Research carried out by
ACMA in 2009 found that
[p]urposeful divulgence of personal details such as passwords was commonplace.
Sometimes personal information was divulged without an understanding of the potential
consequences of disclosure (for example, posting information about going on holiday and
not realising that this could give an unintended recipient information about their
whereabouts).44

The fact that, on the one hand, children appear to value ‘privacy’ but, on the other, post
information that might compromise them in the future has been referred to as the
‘privacy paradox’.45 Whether the discrepancy between attitudes towards ‘privacy’ and
behaviour is in fact a paradox depends, in part, on one’s concept of privacy. If privacy is
understood in terms of control over personal information, or the extent to which others
have access to one’s personal information — as many privacy theorists have argued it
should be46 — then there is arguably no paradox at all. In other words, to the extent that
39

Sonia Livingstone, ‘Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers’ use of social
networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self‐expression’ (2008) 10(3) New Media & Society 393, 403.
40
Australian Communications and Media Authority (‘ACMA’), ‘Click and Connect: Young Australians’ Use of
Online Social Media: 01 Qualitative Research Report’ (July 2009) 9.
41
Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos and Peggy Valcke, ‘The Right to be Forgotten in the Internet Era’ (2012) 11 ICRI
Working Paper, 4 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174896> 6.
42
See, eg, ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 3 2238 [67.61]; Katherine Sarah Raynes‐Goldie, Privacy
in the Age of Facebook: Discourse, Architecture, Consequences (PhD Thesis, Curtin University, 2012) 72.
43
Amanda Lenhart et al, ‘Teens, Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites’, (Report, Pew Internet and
American Life Project, 9 November, 2011) 7, 8.
44
JSCCS, above n 9, 8.
45
Raynes‐Goldie refers to this term as having been coined by Barnes: Raynes‐Goldie, above n 42, 4.
46
See, eg, Alan F Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head, 1967) 7; Irwin Altman, The Environment and
Social Behaviour: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory and Crowding (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1975)
18; Ernest Van Den Haag, ‘On Privacy’, in J Ronald Pennock and J W Chapman (eds) Nomos VIII: Privacy
(Atherton Press, 1971) 149, 149 and Anita L Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society
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privacy entails having control or choice over ‘when, how and to what extent’47 information
about oneself is communicated to others, a choice to reveal even personal or
compromising information may be seen as fully congruent with one’s privacy interests
remaining intact. The revelation of one’s personal information by others, on the other
hand, may be regarded as an invasion of one’s privacy. Others have explained the so‐
called privacy paradox by arguing that youth are not unconcerned about privacy, but
recognise that they may need to ‘trade off’ privacy in order to reap the benefits of
disclosure and publicity,48 or at least that they recognise that there are both benefits and
(privacy) risks relating to the use of social media and that they seek to balance these in
their disclosures.49 As Livingstone puts it: ‘The point is that teenagers must and do disclose
personal information in order to sustain intimacy, but they wish to be in control of how
they manage this disclosure.’50
It has been said that, among the younger generation at least, the privacy discourse is being
reframed as a discourse around control and self‐determination, rather than as a discourse
around the more traditional notion of privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’.51 However,
while young people appear to be concerned about controlling what of their own
information they reveal and to whom, they may be less concerned over what information
they reveal about others. Certainly this is borne out by research conducted in 2008 on a
random sample of 2423 public MySpace profiles created by adolescents. The research
found that while just over 5% of profiles contained photographs of the profile owner in
swimsuits or underwear, nearly 16% of profiles showed images of friends or others in
swimsuits or underwear.52 Although research conducted by the JSCCS found that most
young people expressed the belief that it was inappropriate to post photographs of others
without permission, comments received from survey participants revealed that the

(Roman & Littlefield, 1988) 7 both as cited in Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California
Law Review 1087, 1103 (FN 71 and 72 respectively).
47
Referring to Westin’s definition of privacy as ‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’: Westin,
above n 46, 7.
48
Zeynep Tufecki, ‘Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online Social Network
Sites’ (2008) February Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 20, 33; Sonja Utz and Nicole C Kramer,
‘The Privacy Paradox on Social Networking Sites Revisited: the Role of Individual Characteristic and Group
Norms’ (2009) 3(2) Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 1, 2.
49
Livingstone, above n 39, 403; JSCCS, above n 9, 8: ‘Often young people choose to be open and expressive.
The option of protecting their privacy online often falls by the wayside in favour of wanting to stand out to
others online.’
50
Livingstone, above n 39, 403.
51
For example, Facebook founder and CEO, Mark Zukerberg, told a conference in 2010 that social norms
around privacy are changing and that ‘[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people’. See Bobby Johnson, ‘Privacy No
Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder’, The Guardian (online), 11 January 2010,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook‐privacy>.
52
Sameer Hinduja and Justin W Patchin, ‘Personal Information of Adolescents on the Internet: A
Quantitative Content Analysis of MySpace’ (2008) 31(1) Journal of Adolescence 125, 135.
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practice of others posting images of them online was nevertheless an issue. One survey
participant made this general observation:
Photos, I believe are a contentious issue because people freely put up photos on social
networking sites like Facebook without permission and pretty much assume that if you
are in a photo you give permission for a large amount of people to see you.53

Concerns held by young people about the posting of images of themselves online by
others seem to be attributable in part to the fact that the image, regardless of its nature,
has been posted without the image subject’s consent.54 In its 2005 inquiry into
unauthorised photography and ancillary privacy issues, SCAG considered a number of
factors about the use of photographs that cause harm to the image subject. Although the
nature of the image and the context of its use, among others, were common factors
causing harm to image subjects, another common factor identified by SCAG was the ‘lack
of control over one’s own image in terms of both the taking of the photograph and the
use to which it is put.’55 It is worth repeating here the extract from a submission made by
the NSW Commission for Children and Young People to SCAG, which was referred to at
the beginning of this chapter:
Young people suggested to the Commission that a person being photographed should
consent to how the photograph should be used. They said that people should have some
control over how they are represented on the internet, in the media, or through other
forms of mass communication, such as mobile phones.56

A fundamental question stemming from this observation, and examined in this thesis, is
whether young people should have control over how they are represented on the internet
through the medium of images (whether photographic or video). If that question is
answered in the affirmative, it gives rise to further questions as to how much control
young people should have and what form that control should take. If the use or
publication of unwanted images of children and young people is to be regulated, what is
it that makes such use or publication worthy of regulation,57 and what form should that
regulation take?
This thesis seeks to answer those questions. However, before clarifying further the
research objectives and the specific research questions that will be addressed, it is
necessary to clarify and explain the scope of the thesis.

53

JSCCS, above n 9, 239 [7.123].
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III

SCOPE

The focus of this thesis is on the online publication of images of children and young
people. In this work, the term ‘images’ (unless otherwise stated) refers to images that are
photographic or videographic in nature, regardless of the medium in which the image is
captured or stored and of whether or not the image has been altered or manipulated.
However, this thesis does not apply to other forms of representation of likeness, such as
portraits, drawings, sculptures and so forth.
References in this work to children and young people is to those who are under 18 years
old, consistent with the definition of a ‘child’ under the CRC.58 However, the term ‘young
person’ or ‘young people’ is frequently used to better represent older children.59
A discussion as to why this research focuses on images, as opposed to other forms of
information, is set out below. Justification is also given below for focusing only on online
publication, and for focusing specifically on children and young people.
A

Images

Images, whether in photographic or moving form,60 have a certain undeniable power.
They are a vehicle for creating impact, hence the familiar adage that a ‘picture is worth a
thousand words’. Tushnet writes that images are more vivid and engaging than words,
‘decreasing our capacity to assess images critically because we are more involved in
reacting to them’,61 and that images have the ability to ‘persuade without seeming to
persuade’.62 Research into cyberbullying has consistently found that images are the most
impactful form of cyberbullying:63 one of the reasons given for this by those who
experience cyberbullying being the ‘concreteness effect’ of an image. Images of people in
the context of stories of war and struggle are powerful because they put a human face on
tragedy and can succeed in permeating public consciousness in a way that words often
fail to. Referring to the photograph Tomako Is Bathed by Her Mother, depicting a child
58

CRC art 1 provides that ‘a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.’
59
The ALRC’s 2008 Report into Australian Privacy Law and Practice uses the term ‘child’ for those under 13
and the term ‘young person’ to refer to those over 13: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 3, 2221
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born with congenital disease caused by mercury pollution in Japan, Gross et al quote an
archivist expressing his view that the photograph ‘has done more to raise world
consciousness about the effects of pollution than any other image and continues to play
a vitally needed educational function.’64 But even photographs of the relatively mundane
can engage the onlooker. As Baroness Hale commented in the case of Campbell v MGN
Ltd (discussed further below), referring to the supermodel Naomi Campbell, ‘[s]he makes
a substantial part of her living out of being photographed looking stunning in designer
clothing. Readers will obviously be interested to see how she looks if and when she pops
out to the shops for a bottle of milk.’65 Lord Hope, in his judgment in Campbell, also
recognised that images attract the reader in a way that words do not. In response to
arguments that publication of photographs was necessary to add credibility to the facts
revealed in a news story about Naomi Campbell, Lord Hope commented that ‘[t]he
decision to publish the photographs suggests that greater weight was being given to the
wish to publish a story that would attract interest rather than the wish to maintain its
credibility.’66
Perhaps the power of images lies in the fact that they appear to evidence reality, or truth,
in a way that drawings, paintings and words do not. Again, this notion is captured by a
familiar adage: ‘the camera never lies’. Despite this, there are abundant examples of
images being manipulated in order to create a particular impression or effect on the
audience. For example, Time magazine ran an image of O J Simpson with his skin darkened
on its cover, and Newsweek ‘bestowed digital orthodontia’ on an image of septuplet
mother Bobbi McCaughey.67 In the US, two schoolgirls were arrested for stalking after
creating a fake Facebook page and posting to it photographs of a minor. The photographs
had been doctored so that the subject’s face appeared superimposed on a naked body.68
A respondent to the JSCCS’s ‘Are you Safe?’ survey reported that: ‘[s]trangers went out of
their way to insult a girl repeatedly on the social networking site, Tumblr. Manipulating
photos of her using Photoshop and making them embarrassing and humiliating for the
girl.’69
Images are not only a means of conveying impact, but a means of conveying information
(even misinformation).70 Campbell concerned an action brought by the supermodel
64
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Naomi Campbell in relation to the publication in the press of a number of articles revealing
that she was a recovering drug addict and receiving treatment for that addiction. The
articles also contained photographs of the supermodel leaving meetings of a support
group for recovering addicts. The photographs had been taken covertly, by a
photographer employed by a newspaper, for the specific purpose of capturing images of
Ms Campbell. Baroness Hale observed that ‘[p]ublishing the photographs contributed
both to the revelation and to the harm it might do’71 due to the fact that a photograph
not only adds impact to the accompanying text, but adds to the information given in those
words.72 This point was also made in Campbell by Lord Nicholls who observed that ‘[i]n
general photographs of people contain more information than textual description. That is
why they are more vivid. That is why they are worth a thousand words.’73
Digital images, moreover, often contain embedded information not observable on the
face of the image itself. As is noted in Facebook’s Data Use Policy:
We collect the content and other information you provide when you use our Services,
including when you sign up for an account, create or share, and message or communicate
with others. This can include information in or about the content you provide, such as the
location of a photo or the date a file was created.74

Images posted online can be linked to information about the image subject — such as
where an image is tagged with an individual’s name. Moreover, a digital or online image
can be used to construct new information, for example, where face recognition
technology is used to identify the image subject, or applied to create a ‘face print’ of the
image subject that can be used to identify them from future images. Given the metadata
associated with certain images, and the fact that images can be used to create new
information (such as face prints), images are potentially very valuable to an organisation.
In fact, the photographs on Facebook have been described as its ‘most vital assets’.75 The
increasing sophistication of face recognition technology may result in new applications of
that technology which increase its commercial value. For example, an advertising agency
in the US has recently announced that it is finalising testing of technology that uses face
reproduction in a publication with a widespread readership.’ The judge allowed this imputation to go to the
jury which found that that imputation was conveyed by the photograph (and that it was defamatory): David
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recognition to automatically identify people captured on cameras installed in shops.76
Individuals then receive notifications via their smartphones of customised deals in their
location. The identification of individuals captured on cameras is made possible through
the use of face recognition technology.77 There are also non‐commercial uses of face
recognition technology and metadata associated with images. Face recognition can be
used by governments and organisations to verify identities for the purpose of security78
and law enforcement.79 The value of metadata (which can include but is not limited to
data ascertainable from images) was highlighted by Malcolm Turnbull during the
introduction of metadata retention legislation into the Australian Parliament in 2014:
Access to metadata plays a central role in almost every counter‐terrorism, counter
espionage, cyber security, organised crime investigation … It is also used in almost all
serious criminal investigations, including investigations into murder, serious sexual
assaults, drug trafficking and kidnapping.80

Apart from the existing commercial and security uses of images (or the information that
they convey or give rise to), there is an ‘ever‐present risk that photographs and face prints
could be used in the future in ways not currently envisaged.’81 Images are not only a rich
source of information about the image subject, then, but also a unique source of
potentially very valuable information.
Aside from what they convey, images might also be considered powerful because of what
they appropriate. Photographs capture moments in time — they capture people in poses,
76
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expressions and situations that may only have been fleeting but which are then preserved,
possibly indefinitely, in the form of a photograph or video:
Photographs are refugees from their moment … Through photographs we have a radical
fragment cut off from the unlimited flux. We can have alertness without mind. A
perfection of looking without effort …82

In its discussion paper on unauthorised photographs, SCAG observed that ‘while a person
might be comfortable presenting themselves in a particular way on a beach, a photograph,
which facilitates a permanent image, provides a broader context for those images’83 and
may allow for ‘ongoing objectification of the subject, and therefore ongoing harm.’84
Westin has described the impact of being photographed, filmed or subject to surveillance
in terms of individuals no longer being able to ‘merge into the “situational landscape”’,85
and in Douglas & Ors v Hello! Ltd & Ors the court described photographs as a particularly
intrusive means of invading privacy.86
One commentator has described the camera as ‘a machine [that] … “takes” what is put in
front of it. It captures its subject without further judgement.’87 The idea that photographs
take something of or even from their subject is underpinned by the notion that one’s
image is ‘an essential attribute of the human persona, reflecting one’s soul and
uniqueness.’88 That view was expressed by the French legal scholar Fougerol in 1913:
Human physiognomy, a mysterious and quasi‐divine thing, incarnates not only what we
like best, what we appreciate most: the external visible form, but it also permits to the
thoughts, deprived of any shape, to exteriorize themselves according to the desires of
men … This physiognomy … reflects the soul and distinguishes the man from his fellow‐
man …89

Similar sentiments were expressed by the European Court of Human Rights (‘EctHR’) in
Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, a case involving a photograph taken of a new‐born Greek
baby without the consent or knowledge of the parents.90 The EctHR expressed the view
that a person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality as it
‘reveals the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her
peers.’91 According to the court, the right to protection of one’s image is one of the
82
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essential components of personal development and ‘presupposes the right to control the
use of that image.’92 In a like vein, Ravanas’s description of the moral prejudice occasioned
by an unwanted photograph was cited by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of
Aubry v Éditions Vice‐Versa:
The camera lens captures a human moment at its most intense, and the snapshot ‘defiles’
that moment. The privileged instant of personal life becomes the ‘this object image
offered to the curiosity of the greatest number’. A person surprised in his or her private
life by a roving photographer is stripped of his or her transcendency and human dignity,
since he or she is reduced to the status of a ‘spectacle’ for others … This ‘indecency of the
image’ deprives those photographed of their most secret substance.93

Legal protection of a person’s image is traditionally stronger in civil law jurisdictions.94 In
France the right to one’s image is regarded as a species of personality right that has
‘emerged from the shadow of the right to privacy.’95 In Germany, a general right of
personality is recognised in the Civil Code and the German Constitution, and includes the
right to one’s image — that is the right to decide ‘whether and under what conditions
others may take one’s photograph.’96 In Aubry, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the right to one’s image is an aspect of the right to privacy under the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, the court found that because the right to
privacy guaranteed under the Charter was designed to protect a sphere of individual
autonomy — that is ‘the control each person has over his or her identity’97 — that right
must include the ability to control the use made of one’s image, where the image subject
is recognisable.98 In certain civil law jurisdictions, there is also some support for one’s
likeness in general, or one’s image in particular, to be regarded as a form of property
right.99
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In the US context, the right to publicity has traditionally been formulated as a right to
protect against commercial exploitation of one’s image, and is thus seen as functioning to
protect or further a person’s economic interests.100 Haemmerli, however, has argued that
the right to publicity should be reformulated as a property right that can protect a
person’s moral interests.101 She argues that ‘property is inseparably associated with one’s
“personhood”’ and that there is ‘no reason why a person should not and every reason
why a person should be able to claim a property right in the use of his/her objectified
identity’:
if one’s own image, for example, is treated as an object capable of ‘being yours or mine’,
why should it not be claimed by the person who is its natural source? To the extent it is
available as some person’s property — and if viewed as an object, it must be so available
— its source would seem to have the strongest claim. That claim would also necessarily
be prior to others’ in both temporal and qualitative terms. The connection between a
person and her physical characteristics is innate. It therefore logically precedes that of any
particular physical manifestation of the image or any manipulation of it by others. This is
essentially a first‐occupancy argument, based on the idea that a person is first to ‘arrive’
at his own persona and thus at objectifications of it.102

The innate connection, referred to by Haemmerli, between a person and their physical
characteristics might explain why many individuals believe they have a strong moral claim
to the way their persona is represented, or objectified, by way of an image. Moral claims
to one’s image (or the way one is represented) are often asserted regardless of whether
the capture or use of the image is experienced as a violation of a ‘right to privacy’, or
whether it manifests in physical, mental or emotional harm. The idea of a ‘moral claim’
over how we are represented, visually, may go some way to explaining why the unwanted
use of one’s image can be experienced as a violation of one’s autonomy — as will be
discussed in Chapter Two. It may also explain why people feel, among other things,
‘violated’ and ‘hurt’ upon being photographed, or discovering photographs of themselves
being published without their knowledge and consent.103
In summary, then, this thesis focuses on images, as opposed to other forms of
information, because images have a peculiar impact beyond other types of personal
information; they are capable of creating interest and are often perceived as representing
‘truth’ or ‘reality’, even though they can be manipulated to misrepresent the truth. Images
form a rich and unique source of information about the image subject and capture
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particular moments in time, or a series of moments, but form an often permanent record
that can then be used to replay that moment out of context. There is an innate connection
between a person and his or her ‘self’ such that images can be regarded as communicating
something about the image subject beyond how he or she looks. This innate connection
can give rise to a sense of moral entitlement to the way in which one’s representation is
used. It is for all of these reasons that, as is argued in Chapter Two, the publication of
images of children gives rise to the risk of developmental harm beyond that posed by the
publication of other types of information about a child and which make images deserving
of special consideration.
B

Images and the Internet

The inherent power of an image is greater still when that image is disseminated through
print or audio‐visual media. As long ago as 1890, Warren and Brandeis, in their seminal
paper ‘The Right to Privacy’, wrote that ‘numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house‐tops”.’104 More recently, in Peck v United Kingdom,105 images of a man caught on
CCTV camera attempting to commit suicide by cutting his wrists later published in
newspapers and on television were the subject of a legal action in the EctHR.106 The court
was of the view that the images resulted in the relevant moment ‘being viewed to an
extent which far exceeded any exposure to a passer‐by or to security observation … and
to a degree surpassing that which [he] could possibly have foreseen.’107 The internet,
however, provides a broader context for images than even print and broadcast media.
The EctHR in its decision in Von Hannover v Germany has warned that ‘increased vigilance
in protecting private life is necessary to contend with new communication technologies
which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data.’108 More recently, the ECtHR
has made the following observations about the internet:
The Court has held that the Internet is an information and communication tool particularly
distinct from the printed media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit
information. The electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, is not and
potentially will never be subject to the same regulations and control. The risk of harm
posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of
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human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly
higher than that posed by the press.109

The ubiquity of the internet and the level of exposure afforded by online publication
means that an image that in the past may have resided in relative obscurity can now
potentially be viewed by millions for an indefinite period of time. The size or potential size
of the audience where an image is posted on the internet is one of the reasons that online
images are considered such an impactful form of cyberbullying.110 The potential for such
a large audience can, as noted by the Law Commission of New Zealand, cause distress
even where the image itself is not inherently intimate or embarrassing.111 There are also
frequent reports of home videos posted on video sharing sites such as YouTube going
‘viral’ and being viewed and shared by thousands. What may have been intended as an
amusing (or embarrassing) video to be viewed by friends and acquaintances has, in fact,
been viewed by strangers on all sides of the planet.112 Unwanted online publication of an
image or its subsequent use can therefore result both in access by unwanted audiences113
as well as a sense of fear, on the part of the image subject, of access by unwanted
audiences.114
Aside from the fact that the internet provides such a broad context for images (a factor
that has been termed ‘scaleability’115), online publication raises concerns about the
permanence, or persistence, of information. As the Hon. Michael Kirby once said: ‘in the
age of the internet, stories that once would have been wrapping the fish and chips and
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been forgotten a few weeks or months or years later, are preserved forever.’116 In a similar
vein, de Andrade has observed that ‘[w]hat we post on the internet becomes a kind of
tattoo attached to ourself, hard and cumbersome to remove.’117 According to Tufecki, the
persistence of online information ‘shifts the temporal boundaries such that the audience
can now exist in the future.’118 Numerous concerns have been expressed about the
consequences of the persistence of online information. Allen has argued that people have
a ‘legitimate moral interest in distancing themselves from commonplace misfortunes and
errors’ and that without the ability to escape the past, feelings can be hurt and lives
ruined.119 Particular concerns have been expressed, in this regard, about the future
consequences of the perceived ‘over‐sharing’ of personal information by or about
children and young people and the future impact of youthful indiscretion.120 Mayer‐
Schönberger has argued that memory impedes the ability of individuals to change: ‘by
recalling forever each of our errors and transgressions, digital memory rejects our capacity
to learn from them, to grow and to evolve.’121 In this sense, forgetfulness is ‘seen as
fundamental to the development of self and identity, as well as to the capacity of
individuals to make effective decisions.’122 Others express concerns not only about the
future impact of the persistence of information but also about the present consequences
of that persistence. Blanchette and Johnson have argued that the fear of persistent
information may cause individuals to behave differently and hesitate to act or speak
authentically.123
Other concerns about the persistence of digital memory relate to what is presently
unknown.124 Thus, as Graux et al have pointed out ‘[e]specially in today’s information
society, it is practically impossible to predict all (negative) consequences of the use of
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personal data. And even if one can foresee a few, they tend to be abstract, distant and
uncertain.’125
Aside from what has been described as the ‘iron memory’ of the internet,126 other aspects
of the architecture of the internet give cause for concern. Those aspects include the fact
that information, once online, can be indexed, searched and combined with other
information about a particular individual. As Viviane Reding, European Commission Justice
Commissioner, has observed: ‘The Internet has an almost unlimited search and memory
capacity. So even tiny scraps of personal information can have a huge impact, even years
after they were shared or made public.’127 The capabilities of search engines to link
together even ‘tiny scraps’ of personal information was at issue in the case of Google Spain
SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja
González.128 Here the European Court of Justice noted that the inclusion of links in a
search page following a search against an individual’s name allowed internet users to
obtain, through the list of results
a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on
the internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his
private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or
could have been only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a more or less
detailed profile of him.129

According to the New Zealand Law Reform Commission, concerns about the online
posting of images may be accentuated by the development of face recognition search
engines and the linking, or tagging, of images with names and other data about the image
subject.130 Indeed Facebook has recently been subject to scrutiny by European privacy
regulators131 and subject to public criticism132 for setting as the default position the
automatic scanning and tagging of photographs using face recognition software. One of
the consequences of the advances in facial recognition technology was illustrated in an

125

Graux, Ausloos and Valcke, above n 41, 12.
Bert‐Jaap Koops, ‘Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the Right to be
Forgotten in Big Data Practice’ (2011) 8(3) SCRIPTed 1, 2 <https://script‐ed.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2011/12/koops.pdf>.
127
Vivian Reding, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age’ (Press Release, Speech/12/26, 24 January 2012), 5.
128
(Case C‐131/12, 13 May 2014) [2014] QB 1022 (European Court of Justice) 1074 (‘Google’).
129
Google (Case C‐131/12, 13 May 2014) [2014] QB 1022 (European Court of Justice) 1074, [80].
130
Law Commission (New Zealand), above n 111, 133 [6.40].
131
‘Germany reopens Facebook facial recognition probe’, BBC News (online), 16 August 2012
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology‐19274341>.
132
Christopher Williams, ‘Facebook facial recognition system criticised’, The Telegraph (online), 8 June 2011
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8563464/Facebook‐facial‐recognition‐system‐
criticised.html>.
126

27

experiment conducted by researchers from Carnegie‐Mellon University.133 The
researchers asserted that a combination of publicly available Web 2.0 data (such as
photographs posted to Facebook), cloud computing, data mining, and face recognition
software was ‘bringing us closer to a world where anyone may run face recognition on
anyone else, online and offline — and then infer additional, sensitive data about the target
subject, starting merely from one anonymous piece of information about her: the face.’134
The broader consequences of this experiment for privacy and security are manifold.135 In
an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Google CEO Eric Schmidt was quoted as saying:
‘I don't believe society understands what happens when everything is available, knowable
and recorded by everyone all the time’, and went on to predict that young people may in
the future automatically be entitled to change their name to ‘disown youthful hijinks
stored on their friends’ social media sites’.136 However, as Acquisti et al point out, it is one
thing to change one’s name but quite another to change one’s face.137
The online environment also provides opportunities for individuals to post information
about others, including images, while remaining anonymous. The JSCCS notes that the
ability to remain anonymous may encourage young people to behave online in a way that
they would not behave offline
because anonymity affords them the opportunity to act on any anti‐social impulses that
might otherwise be tempered in public. Children, in particular, are ‘more likely’ to bully in
the online environment because they are able to hide their identities. Those who are
bullied physically and feel powerless go online feeling totally empowered.138

Aside from the fact that anonymity may encourage behaviour online that would not have
been indulged in offline, there is also the fact that the audience for online information is,
for the large part, anonymous. This unknown audience may add to the harm suffered by
an image subject when an image is published or shared online without that person’s
authorisation.139 One reason for this is that it is difficult for a person to manage an
audience, or to tailor the impressions they create for a particular audience, when that
audience is unknown and potentially quite diverse. In turn, this gives rise to the potential
for ‘bad impressions’ to be created and maintained that can affect a person’s job
prospects and their own self‐esteem. This is explored further in Chapter Two. Another
133
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reason may be that where an audience for a particular image is unknown, an image
subject is likely to be more fearful of who might see the image, and how they might
react.140
Another distinctive feature of information in an online environment is identified by boyd
as ‘replicability’. That is, content can easily be duplicated and ‘altered in ways that people
do not easily realize’.141 The ease with which content can be duplicated makes it more
difficult to determine the authenticity and source of the information.142
Online publication of personal information, including images, therefore raises particular
concerns due to the persistence, scaleability, searchability and replicability of online
information, as well as the potential for anonymity on the part of those posting, viewing,
sharing and using the personal information of others. In addition, the internet presents
unique challenges to regulators. While the internet might no longer be properly described
as entirely ‘borderless’,143 it nevertheless represents a new realm and, according to Lessig,
‘demands a new understanding of how regulation works’, an understanding that ‘compels
us to look beyond the traditional lawyer’s scope — beyond laws, or even norms. It requires
a broader account of “regulation”, and most importantly, the recognition of a newly
salient regulator.’144 That newly salient regulator is the architecture of the internet or, in
Lessig’s terms, its ‘code’.145
The choice of focus for this research, being images published online, should not be taken
to suggest that the conclusions made about the risk of developmental harm, or the
proposed solutions, can or should apply only to online images. Some of these findings may
well be relevant to the publication of images more broadly. Certainly in terms of the risk
of developmental harm, the challenges of other modes of dissemination and publication
— such as the sending of images from one mobile phone to another — are very real.146 In
addition, images published in one medium (for example, in a newspaper) are also very
often published in an online medium simultaneously, or subsequently. Moreover, in terms
of law reform options that could address the risks associated with the capture or
publication of images, many have cautioned about the need to adopt a technology‐neutral
approach in order to ‘future proof’ any such reforms in the face of advances in technology
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and practice.147 On the other hand, it is suggested here that for all the reasons identified
above, the internet poses unique threats and challenges due, in most part, to its
architecture. A focus on online publication, therefore, allows the researcher to consider
and address these peculiar problems and threats, not least among which are the
challenges of regulating this new realm.148 Finally, a focus on online publication allows
research to address the source of what has been described as ‘understandable anxiety’
about the future in a networked world. As Chris Kelly, former Chief Privacy Officer at
Facebook, once observed:
I think we’re at an interesting time in the history of the world when a lot of things that
weren't recorded or captured in any form are being captured [and shared] — and people
are understandably nervous about that.149

C

Children and Young People

The focus of this research is on children and young people under the age of 18 years. One
of the reasons for focusing on children is that particular concerns have been raised around
the capture and use of images of children and young people without their consent. These
concerns have, in large part, been attributed to the increasing use in mobile or digital
technology.150 The issue of unauthorised capture and use of images of children has given
rise to concerns about children’s safety,151 as well as their privacy.152 Children and young
people themselves have expressed their desire for control over personal information, as
noted above, and have expressed a view that they are particularly concerned about the
practice of the taking of unauthorised photographs that focus on a person or a small group
without the consent of the image subject/s.153 Australia’s obligations under the CRC
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require due weight to be given to the views of children in accordance with the age and
maturity of the child.154
In so far as the unwanted online publication of images of children, or their subsequent
use, gives rise to the risk of developmental harm, as is argued in Chapter Two, children
must be considered especially vulnerable because much formative development,
particularly in relation to identity and self‐concept, occurs during childhood and
adolescence.155
Children are also vulnerable to the risk of harm posed by the unwanted online posting of
images of themselves, or their subsequent use, due to their level of interaction with and
immersion in the online environment.156 A report by ACMA in 2009 observed that for
young people in their high school years, the use of online social media sites in particular
plays an important role in ‘self‐expression, “fitting‐in”, chatting with people they know
and also people they do not necessarily know offline.’157 Commenting on the place of
user‐generated social media services158 in the lives of teenagers, ACMA notes that these
services
play a large role in teenagers’ efforts to conform to group norms and culture, and develop
and maintain social currency. These services allow teenagers to keep up with topics of
conversations at school, and to feel they are part of the mainstream teenage culture, as
there is a general perception that all teenagers are on at least one of the social networking
services.159

Given that children are such avid users of the internet, and teenagers such avid users of
social networking sites, the potential for a photograph or video of a child or young person
to be uploaded, shared or used online, without their permission, is significant. As noted
above, research conducted in 2007 found that 40% of the young Australians who
participated reported that photos and videos had been posted to the internet without
their consent.160 The need for particular focus to be directed towards the issues arising
from and risks posed by the online posting of images of children and young people is
reflected in the observation made by EU Kids Online in its submission to Committee on
the Rights of the Child’s 2014 Day of General Discussion on Digital Media and Children’s
Rights: ‘[w]hile younger children have fewer resources to cope with online risk, they are
also more willing to turn to parents for help. Meanwhile, teenagers face particular risks
154
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and they may struggle alone, so they need particular support.’161 EU Kids Online also
cautions the need for policymakers to be ‘continually alert to new risks that affect
children, especially arising from peer‐to‐peer contact.’162 It has also been observed that
the internet is ‘largely blind to age, treating children and adults equally.’163
Children may also be more vulnerable than adults to photographs being captured of them,
and subsequently used. As noted by the NSW Children’s Commissioner:
Children … are more likely to have fewer concerns than adults about their privacy in public
and be more trusting of someone wishing to take their photograph. Children and young
people are used to obeying adults or being required to obey adults, for example, in school
or family settings. Therefore, they are less likely to question or challenge an adult they
don’t know who is taking a photograph of them. The risk that photographs may be used
in an exploitative or offensive way is possible and clearly not in their best interests.164

Hughes has advanced two reasons that justify examining children’s position vis‐a‐vis a
right of privacy separately from that of adults.165 Firstly, Hughes suggests that children
have different privacy needs at different stages of their development and may have
different needs to adults.166 Secondly, the child’s right to privacy ‘tends to clash with more
rights and interests than an adult’s right of privacy’, not least because there are a number
of actors in child privacy cases, including the child’s parents.167 In terms of the particular
issues surrounding the unauthorised capture or use of images, it is suggested that Hughes’
observations are apt. While Hughes is referring to privacy in general, rather than the issue
of the unauthorised capture and use of images specifically, the unauthorised capture and
use of images is often treated as a privacy issue, and can certainly be conceptualised as
such by reference to control or access based definitions of privacy.168 In terms of rights
more generally, Livingstone and O’Neill have remarked that there has been only partial
progress made in supporting children’s rights online and that in debates about the
governance of information and communication technologies the interests of children
‘figure unevenly and can prove surprisingly contentious.’169
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IV

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

The research proposes that Australian law should be reformed to give children greater
control over their image in the online environment than they currently enjoy. In that
context, the following questions will be addressed:
1. Why do children need greater control over their image in the online environment than
they currently enjoy under Australian law?
2. What is the justificatory basis for a legal response to address the need for children to
have greater control over their online image than they currently enjoy and what form
could that response take?
In answering the first research question, this research has the following objectives:
(1) To critically evaluate research relating to the effect on child development of the
unwanted publication or use of an image, particularly where the image is published
online.
(2) To identify the extent to which the legal and regulatory framework in Australia gives
children the ability to control the use or publication of their image, particularly in the
online context. To meet this objective by considering:
(a) The extent to and way in which the legal and regulatory framework extant in
Australia governs the publication or use of images in general, and images of
children in particular, specifically in the online context.
(b) The extent to which legal remedies facilitate the withdrawal of an image from
publication.
(c) Practical issues regarding access to formal legal mechanisms by children and
young people in so far as these issues can be expected to impact upon the
control a child or young person actually has.
(3) To consider the extent to which non‐legal mechanisms give children the ability to
control the use or publication of their image, particularly in the online context. To
meet this objective by:
(a) Considering the extent to which the reporting mechanisms of internet content
hosts170 provide for the removal of images of a child at the behest of the image
subject, or in response to a request on their behalf.
(b) Identifying social norms extant in Australia, as well as market conditions and
the architecture of the internet, that govern the publication of images in
general, or their subsequent use, and images of children in particular.
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(4) To consider the issue of unwanted online publication of images of children, or their
subsequent use, from a child rights perspective, taking into account Australia’s
commitments under the CRC.
In answer to the second research question, and taking into account the findings in relation
to the first, this research has the following objectives:
(5) To consider why a legal response to the problem of insufficient control by children and
young people over their online image is required.
(6) To establish the justificatory basis for a legal response to the problem of insufficient
control by children and young people over their online image.
(7) To identify and critically evaluate a number of law reform options.
V

FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHOD

The overarching framework of the research is reform‐oriented. Reform‐oriented research
has been described as research ‘which intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules
and which recommends changes to any rules found wanting.’171 This framework is
appropriate given that this thesis advances as its central proposition that the Australian
Government should do more, in terms of direct regulation, to give children greater control
over the publication of images of themselves online. The perspective adopted in this
research is rights‐based: specifically it adopts the perspective of children’s rights. In
adopting this perspective the research is theoretical in the sense that it seeks to argue
children’s rights as a conceptual basis of the proposed reforms.172
An evaluation of the adequacy of existing rules necessitates a description and analysis of
those existing rules. To this extent, and to meet the second research objective in
particular, the research adopts a traditional doctrinal approach involving the ‘systematic
exposition of legal doctrine’173 based upon analysis and critical evaluation of both primary
and secondary legal sources. The doctrinal method is also utilised in providing an analysis
and interpretation of certain provisions of the CRC.
This thesis also presents a number of hypothetical case studies, detailed in Chapter Four.
These have been designed to provide a context‐focused application of the law, thereby
drawing out some of the complexities of and illustrating some of the gaps in the current
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legal and regulatory framework around publication of images or their subsequent use,
particularly in the online environment. The studies are either built around images of
children and young people that are publically available on the internet, or based upon
real‐life occurrences reported through the media. Thus, although they are hypothetical,
the case studies are based on reality and therefore intended to be realistic examples of
the kinds of uses to which images of children and young people could be and have been
put. Chapter Four explains in more detail the purpose of using these case studies and the
function such use serves, as well as the case study design.
Any reform‐oriented research is predicated upon identification of the reason or reasons
that existing rules are found wanting. This thesis suggests that the existing rules are
wanting because they do not provide children with sufficient control over the online
publication of their image, nor its subsequent use; an insufficiency that gives rise to a risk
of developmental harm. In developing that argument, this thesis undertakes a critical
analysis of non‐legal sources in the broad fields of child development and social
psychology. Many of the sources reviewed here are written from a constructivist
sociological perspective, which is further explained in Chapter Two. However, in selecting
and analysing those sources, this thesis deliberately avoids adopting any single discipline
or perspective. Rather, the research draws upon and extrapolates from a range of findings
relevant to the developmental implications of the use of images within computer
mediated communication and social interaction. This objective approach is designed to
draw upon the insights of these other disciplines in order to better identify the problem
and inform the solution.
The goal of reform‐oriented research is to propose reforms where existing rules are found
wanting. In fulfilling that goal, the broader social, environmental, economic and political
context cannot be overlooked. While this research certainly does not aim to describe,
understand or even take into account all of these factors, it recognises that the prevailing
context at the time of researching is one that takes a cautious approach to law reform per
se, as a policy option.174 At the time of writing, all policymakers in Australia are required
to consider the regulatory impact of their policies by preparing a Research Impact
Statement (‘RIS’) in respect of every policy proposal submitted at a federal level that is
designed to introduce or abolish regulation.175 The Australian Government’s Guide to
Regulation sets out seven RIS Questions that policymakers much address, namely:
1. What is the problem you are trying to solve?
2. Why is government action needed?
3. What policy options are you considering?
4. What is the likely net benefit of each option?
5. Who will you consult about these options and how will you consult them?
174
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6. What is the best option from those you have considered?
7. How will you implement and evaluate your chosen option?176
The research in this thesis is broadly organised around the first four of these questions
and also aims to make tentative conclusions as to question six (‘What is the best option?’)
and to highlight some considerations around means of implementation (question seven).
In so doing, the research aims to align itself with policy research. Policy research has been
described as research that is ‘focused on helping policymakers to solve social problems’
by providing useful recommendations after having submitted to scrutiny all possible
actions for resolving the problem.177 Policy research is, essentially, pragmatic.178 In the
context of this thesis, while this research is reform‐oriented, the need for a legal response
through law reform (government action) is not accepted as a given but is, instead,
explained and justified. With these RIS Questions in mind, the early chapters of this thesis
seek to identify the problem. The thesis then moves on to consider why government
action is needed and finally to set out and evaluate a number of policy options. A more
detailed outline of this thesis is set out in the following section.
VI

THESIS OUTLINE

A

Chapter Division

A brief summary of the main issues considered in each chapter follows. The chapters are
grouped under headings to show how they relate to the first four and penultimate RIS
Questions identified above.
1 What is the Problem You are Trying to Solve?
Chapter Two
Chapter Two addresses research objective (1) by critically evaluating research relating to
the risks to child development posed by the unwanted use or publication of images of
children, particularly where images are published online. In particular, this chapter
considers the potential impact of the unwanted online publication of an image of a child,
or its subsequent use, upon the image subject’s self‐esteem, their relationships and their
sense of ‘relatedness’ (connection to others).
Chapter Three
Chapter Three reviews the current legal and regulatory environment in Australia relating
to the online publication of images of children. The chapter also considers the extent to
which the reporting mechanisms of internet content hosts and the co‐regulation of the
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internet in Australia provide for the removal of images of a child at the behest of the image
subject, or in response to a request on their behalf. This chapter addresses research
objectives (2)(a) and (b) and objective (3)(a).
Chapter Four
Building on the previous chapter, Chapter Four presents a number of hypothetical case
studies relating to the online publication of images of children, or the subsequent use of
such images. In doing so it aims to better illustrate the extent to which the legal and
regulatory framework discussed in Chapter Three will govern the publication of images in
specific situations. The use of hypothetical cases is designed, among other things, to assist
in drawing distinctions between ‘law‐in‐the‐books’ and ‘law‐in‐action’.179 This chapter
addresses research objectives (2)(a) and (b) and to a lesser extent (c), as well as research
objective (3)(a).
2 Why is Government Action Needed?
Chapter Five
Chapter Five begins by noting that there are significant gaps in Australian law, identified
in the preceding two chapters, in terms of providing individuals with control over the
capture and use of their image by others. For children and young people these gaps are
significant given the potential impact on development, outlined in Chapter Two, as a
result of the unwanted online posting of images, or their subsequent use. This chapter
considers whether a legal response is required to address the issue of the unwanted
posting of images online or their subsequent use and, if so, what might be a justificatory
basis for that response. The former question is approached by considering Lessig’s four
‘modalities’ that regulate cyberspace: law, norms, the market and the architecture of the
internet. In so doing, it addresses research objective (3)(b). The chapter then moves on to
consider Australia’s commitment to the CRC and certain rights under it, arguing that the
CRC requires Australia to do more to give children control over the unauthorised online
publication of their image. In this respect, the chapter addresses research objective (4).
Taken as a whole, this chapter addresses research objectives (5) and (6).
3 What Policy Options are you Considering, What is the Likely Benefit of Each and
Which is the Best Among Those Considered?
Chapter Six
Working from the proposition established in Chapter Five that Australia should do more
to give children greater control over the unauthorised online publication of their image,
Chapter Six presents various policy options that could be considered in order to address
the problem that insufficiency of control leaves children vulnerable to developmental
179

W Michale Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner and Andre R Willard, ‘The New Haven School: A Brief
Introduction’ (2007) 32(587) The Yale Journal of International Law 587, 589.
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harm. The key benefit of each option — namely the extent to which it is likely to be
effective in solving the problem with which this thesis is concerned — is assessed in order
to conclude that only one of the options, a take‐down scheme in relation to images of
children, is likely to be at all effective. That option is then evaluated in more detail, taking
into account both costs and benefits (as described in that chapter). This chapter addresses
research objectives (2)(c) and (7).
Having addressed the RIS Questions noted above this thesis will end with a concluding
chapter.
Chapter Seven
This chapter provides a brief summary of and description of the key findings from the
research and offers a number of recommendations, before finishing with a concluding
statement.
VII SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
The unauthorised use of image is an issue of public concern,180 one which has attracted
government attention181 and one in respect of which there are acknowledged gaps in
Australian law.182 The ALRC has recommended the development of social protocols in
relation to the capture and use of image183 but, as noted by Howard Becker in relation to
a discussion on the ethics of image use, ‘a system without sanctions fails to deter precisely
those who most need deterring’184 This research is significant in that it addresses the
difficult question of how Australian law might develop a system that gives children greater
control over the use of their image, in an environment that presents particular issues
around jurisdiction and enforcement. Although this research will focus primarily on online
images of children, and their subsequent use, and will adopt a children’s rights
perspective, many of the findings will be likely to have broader application. Some or all of
the reforms proposed may be applicable to all members of the community and, in some
cases, may apply to images published in an offline context.
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ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 3, 2326–7 [69.106]–[69.109], and see 2224–5 [67.11 and
67.12]. See also ‘Calls Made to Raise Facebook Age Limit’, Lawyers Weekly (online), 21 July 2011
<http://lawyersweekly.com.au/blogs/top_stories/archive/2011/07/21>,noting the concern expressed by
some parents that images being uploaded by their children to Facebook may be prejudicial to their future
career prospects.
181
See generally ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4; SCAG above n 7; NSWLRC above n 21; VLRC above
n 21; VLRC, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010). In relation to New Zealand see, generally, Law
Commission (New Zealand), above n 111. In relation to the United Kingdom, see ‘MoD Facebook Generation
Warning’, BBC News (online), 25 June 2008, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7473818.stm>.
182
ALRC, For Your Information, above n 4, vol 1, 453 [11.1].
183
Ibid, vol 3, 2334 [69.135].
184
Howard S Becker, ‘Foreword: Images, Ethics, and Organizations’ in Larry Gross, John Stuart Katz and Jay
Ruby (eds), Image Ethics in the Digital Age, (University of Minnesota Press, 2003) xi, xvi.
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Further, it is submitted that the question of control of an image in a non‐commercial
context will become increasingly significant as technology continues to progress and to
affect individuals in ways as yet unimagined.185 As noted in a recent Issues Paper released
by the Australian Government, ‘[c]ommunity concern about the right to and protection of
privacy is growing as new technologies change the way we interact with business,
government, and each other.’186 A focus on the right to development under the CRC is
significant in the context of the concerns expressed by non‐governmental organisations
that the lack of comprehensive CRC protections in Australian domestic law has resulted in
laws and policies relating to children being developed in the absence of a rights‐based
framework.187
In Australia most academic discourse on and legal or policy consideration of the subject
of image use primarily occurs within two contexts. Firstly, it is considered in the context
of celebrity image or commercial exploitation of image and whether or not Australia
should introduce a property style right of image.188 Secondly, discussions around the non‐
commercial unauthorised use of images tend to be conflated with and thus limited by
broader discussions on privacy.189 The ALRC and SCAG have both touched briefly on the
question of whether subjects in photographs or video footage should have rights to an
image in a non‐commercial context that would not require the subject to establish, as a
threshold requirement, a reasonable expectation of privacy.190 However, neither
institution explores these questions in depth. This research will therefore make an original
contribution to knowledge by considering the subject of image use in Australia from
outside of the privacy or property discourse.
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Yves Poullet and J Marc Dinant, ‘The Internet and Private Life in Europe’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan
Richardson (eds), New Dimensions of Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press) 60, 64. See also Acquisti,
Gross and Stutzman, above n 133.
186
Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘A Commonwealth
Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy’, Issues Paper (September 2011).
187
Child Rights Taskforce, ‘Listen to Children: 2011 Child Rights NGO Report Australia’ (2011).
188
For example, in considering whether their proposed statutory cause of action for serious invasion of
privacy should incorporate use of a person’s image or likeness without consent (‘appropriation’), the ALRC
referred with approval to the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Australian Broadcasting
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42] (‘Lenah’): ‘[w]hilst objection possibly may
be taken on non‐commercial grounds to the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, the plaintiff’s
complaint is likely to be that the defendant has taken the steps complained of for a commercial gain’.
Accordingly, the ALRC suggests that it may be more appropriate to regulate appropriation of image in a
commercial context by introducing a right of publicity or by extending the passing off action, see ALRC, For
Your Information, above n 4, vol 3, 2566 [74.122]. Academic papers discussing the property nature of image
rights in Australia include Zapparoni, above n 100.
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See, eg, SCAG, above n 7, 7 [21], where it is noted that ‘[c]entral to the issue of unauthorised photographs
on the Internet is the balance between privacy expectations on one hand, and freedom of expression on
the other.’
190
See, eg, Ibid, 28 [128], which concludes that, by analogy to certain provisions in Dutch copyright law, the
central idea of a person’s reasonable interests in respect of an image could be protected in Australia in a
form outside of copyright law.
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This research will also make an original contribution to knowledge by focusing specifically
on the effect on children and child development of the unwanted online posting of
images, or their subsequent use, and linking that research back to the right to
development in the CRC. There is a growing body of literature as to the effect of
cyberbullying on a child’s development and, as noted above, the unwanted online posting
of images of children, or the unwanted use of online images, can constitute cyberbullying
in certain circumstances. However, as noted in Chapter Two, studies on cyberbullying do
not typically distinguish between the effects on an individual image subject of the bullying
behaviour, on the one hand, and the effects that are attributable to the continued online
availability or accessibility to others of a particular image of that child, on the other. This
is significant because while laws that seek to address behaviour — such as laws relating
to harassment, or the sharing of indecent or offensive images — might provide for
removal of an image, many such laws cannot be invoked at the behest of the image
subject. Moreover, private law remedies for harm often fail altogether to provide for the
removal of an image or where they do so will in practice be of little utility due to issues of
cost, complexity and the length of time needed to achieve a resolution.
There is a general lack of research on the specific developmental implications relating to
the unwanted online publication of an image of a child, and this is true whether or not the
image in question can be described as ‘offensive’, ‘harmful’ or ‘benign’. This research does
not attempt to fill the gap in empirical findings relating to the potential developmental
implications of the online publication of images of children and young people. However,
it does attempt to present an initial and original perspective on the potential
developmental harm attendant upon the unwanted online publication of images of
children and young people. It does this by drawing together some of the strands arising
from the extant literature and findings in relation to self‐presentation (visual and non‐
visual) and the developmental implications of computer mediated communication.
This thesis also makes an original contribution to knowledge by constructing a number of
hypothetical case studies and by evaluating some law reform options recently proposed
by the Australian Government and the ALRC, as well as advancing and evaluating another
reform option against particular criteria. Central to this evaluative exercise is a
consideration of the extent to which those reforms present a balanced, workable and
practical solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned: namely that children
have insufficient control over the online publication of images of themselves, which leaves
them vulnerable to developmental harm.
VIII CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has set out the purpose of this thesis, and its central proposition. The
overarching purpose of this thesis is to examine the issue of the publication and use of
images (photographs and video) when, from the perspective of an image subject who is a
40

child or a young person, that publication or use is unwanted. The issue is considered in
the context of a number of concerns that have been raised about problematic image
sharing practices on the internet. These concerns have been raised by young people
themselves and by the media, as well as by concerned parents, interest groups, law
reform commissions and government inquiries. The central proposition of this thesis is
that the Australian Government should do more, in terms of direct regulation, to give
children greater control over the publication and use of images of themselves online.
The chapter has set out a number of research questions and specific objectives related to
the overarching issues, which are designed to inform and support the central proposition.
The chapter has also explained why the scope of the research is limited to images of
children and young people that are published online.
The following chapters seek to demonstrate why the unwanted online publication of
images of children and young people, or the unwanted use of online images, is
problematic. Later chapters will highlight the need for government action and will offer
some suggestions for law reforms that can, at least in part, address the problem. The
following chapter seeks to illustrate why the unwanted publication of images online is
problematic by providing a critical evaluation of research relating to the effect of such use
or publication on child development.
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CHAPTER TWO –THE IMPACT OF IMAGES ON CHILD
DEVELOPMENT
I

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter describes some of the potentially detrimental effects on a child’s
development of the unwanted online publication or use of an online image of that child.
The focus of the discussion is on two fundamental aspects of a child’s social and emotional
development, namely self‐esteem and the development of relationships. This chapter
partly addresses the first research question of this thesis: Why do children need greater
control over their images in the online environment than they currently enjoy under
Australian law?
Part Two of this chapter identifies and discusses the significance of some of the gaps in
the research on images and harm. It also advances two propositions. The first is that an
image subject can be harmed by the online publication of an image or its use even where
the publication or use is not ill‐intentioned. The second is that detriment can occur
regardless of whether or not the image can be described, objectively, as harmful. These
propositions are relevant because the regulation of online publication and sharing of
images is generally dependent on identifying unlawful (and, therefore, often intentional)
behaviour, or upon identifying material that can be described, objectively, as ‘harmful’. If
the propositions are supported, this, in turn, supports a central argument of this thesis:
that young people should have more control than they currently have over how they are
represented on the internet
Part Three then sets out the framework and research method adopted in the remainder
of the chapter. Parts Four and Five contain the substantive discussion of the potential
developmental implications for an individual of the unwanted online publication of an
image of that individual, or its subsequent use. Part Four focuses on an individual’s self‐
concept and the importance of and influences upon self‐esteem in a developmental
context. It discusses the phenomenon of impression management and how control by an
image subject over visual images of themselves is central both to managing impressions
and to an individual’s sense of autonomy and relatedness. Part Five discusses the role of
relationships in development and the impact on an individual’s relationships of the
decisions others make to publish images of that individual. Part Six of the chapter
considers whether, despite the risks of developmental harm outlined in Parts Four and
Five, the online posting or sharing of an image might in fact have positive developmental
implications for an image subject who is a child. The final part of this chapter summarises
the discussion, seeks to show how the preceding discussion supports the two propositions
advanced in Part Two, and draws some initial conclusions.
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II

IMAGES AND HARM: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

The publication or sharing of an image of another has been recognised as a form of
harassment or victimisation, which, in some circumstances, might also amount to
bullying.1 Although there is no universally accepted definition of bullying,2 it is commonly
agreed that there are four constituent elements, namely intention, aggression, power‐
imbalance and repetition.3 Harassment, or victimisation, is usually considered to possess
the same elements as bullying, absent the element of repetition.4 The definitional
elements of bullying and harassment are squarely focused on the behaviour of an
individual perpetrator (the bully) rather than upon the impact of behaviour on the victim.5
Literature on bullying and harassment involving the use of images variously describes the

1

Amanda Lenhart, referring to work by Nancy Willard, distinguishes — in the online context ‐ between
harassment and bullying on the basis that the latter involves repetition and a power imbalance between
victim and perpetrator: Amanda Lenhart, ‘Cyberbullying: What the Research is Telling Us’ (Speech delivered
at the Youth Online Safety Working Group, Washington DC, 6 May 2010). Cf Peter K Smith, Cristina del Barrio
and Robert S Tokunaga, ‘Definitions of Bullying and Cyberbullying’ in Sherri Bauman, Donna Cross and Jenny
Walker (eds) Principles of Cyberbullying Research: Definitions, Measures, and Methodology (Taylor and
Francis, 2012) 26, 30, who observe that not all forms of bullying involve harassment but that all harassment
is bullying. Nevertheless, this suggests that the criterion of repetition (discussed below) is not a prerequisite
of finding bullying.
2
Smith, del Barrio and Tokunaga, above n 1. See also Colette Langos, Cyberbullying, Associated Harm and
the Criminal Law (PhD Thesis, University of South Australia, 2013) 19.
3
Julian J Dooley, Jacek Pyżalski and Donna Cross, ‘Cyberbullying versus Face‐to‐Face Bullying: A Theoretical
and Conceptual Review’ (2009) 217(4) Journal of Psychology 182, 182. Others note three definitional
elements to bullying, conflating aggression and intention: see, eg, the papers referred to in Robin M
Kowalski et al, ‘Bullying in the Digital Age: A Critical Review and Meta‐Analysis of Cyberbullying Research
among Youth’ (2014) 140 (4) Psychological Bulletin 1073, 1109. For further discussion on the definition of
bullying see Donna Mathewson Mitchell and Tracey Borg, ‘Examining the Lived Experience of Bullying: A
Review of the Literature from an Australian Perspective’ (2013) 31(2) Pastoral Care in Education: An
International Journal of Personal, Social and Emotional Development 142, 145–6. In the context of
cyberbullying (as to the definition of which see Robin M Kowalski et al, at 1073; Langos, above n 2): there
have been discussions as to whether all elements, particularly that of repetition, are applicable. Menesini
et al note that the literature has not yet established if repetition has to be a criterion for the definition:
Ersilia Menesini, Annalaura Nocentini and Pamela Calussi, ‘The Measurement of Cyberbullying: Dimensional
Structure and Relative Item Severity and Discrimination’ (2011) 14(5) Cyberpsychology, Behaviour and Social
Networking 267, 269. See, also, Dooley, Pyżalski and Cross at 182–3, noting that ‘[a] single aggressive act
such as uploading an embarrassing picture to the Internet can result in continued and widespread
humiliation for the victim. Whereas the aggressive act is not repeated the damage caused by the act is
relived through ongoing humiliation.’ See also Robert Slonje and Peter Smith, ‘Cyberbullying: Another Main
Type of Bullying?’ 2008 (49) Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 149, 154.
4
Lenhart, above n 1.
5
Although Vandebosch and Van Cleemput argue that to be considered ‘true’ cyberbullying the bully’s
actions must not only be intended to hurt, but must be perceived by the target as hurtful: Heidi Vandebosch
and KatrienVan Cleemput, ‘Defining Cyberbullying: A Qualitative Research into the Perceptions of
Youngsters’ (2008) 11(4) Cyber Psychology & Behaviour 499, 499.
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nature of those images as ‘embarrassing’,6 ‘humiliating’,7 ‘hurtful’,8 ‘harmful’9 and so on.10
What exactly it is that makes an image embarrassing, humiliating, hurtful, harmful and so
forth, and from whose perspective this is judged, is not made clear. It is, however, implicit
in the discussion or use of the descriptive terms referred to that there is something about
what is portrayed, something objectively discernible, that makes the image embarrassing,
humiliating, hurtful, harmful and so on. There are also references in the literature to
incidents of bullying that take the form of images accompanied by text. Kowalski et al
refer to one example of a girl who created a social media page about other girls in her
class whom she perceived to be promiscuous. Pictures of these classmates, to which the
girl added derogatory comments, were posted by the girl to her social media page.11
Another example is given by Hinduja and Patchin who tell of a Facebook profile page
where the user behind the page juxtaposed images of people and animals and compared
their features.12 In cases such as this, the image itself might be ‘benign’ or ‘anodyne’; it is
the addition of the text that transforms the image into a vehicle for the perpetrator’s
aggression and ill‐intent.13

6

CCSO Cybercrime Working Group, ‘Cyberbullying and the Non‐consensual Distribution of Intimate Images’
(Report to the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Justice and Public Safety, Canada,
2013), 4; Slonje and Smith, above n 3, 153; Megan Price and John Dalgleish, ‘Cyberbullying: Experiences,
Impacts and Coping Strategies as Described by Australian Young People’ (2010) 29(2) Youth Studies Australia
51, 55; Sherri Gordon, ‘8 Ways Kids are Using Instagram to Bully’ on About Health, About.Com (4 June, 2014)
<http://bullying.about.com/od/Cyberbullying/fl/8‐Ways‐Kids‐Are‐Using‐Instagram‐to‐Bully.htm>.
7
Langos, above n 2; JSCCS, Parliament of Australia, High Wire Act: Cyber‐Safety and the Young, Interim
report (June 2011), 70.
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Slonje and Smith, above n 3, 153.
9
Tass Sakellariou, Annemarie Carroll and Stephen Houghton, ‘Rates of Cyber Victimization and Bullying
among Male Australian Primary and High School Students’ (2012) 33 School Psychology International 533,
539; Christine D MacDonald and Bridget Roberts‐Pittman, ‘Cyberbullying among College Students:
Prevalence and Demographic Differences’ (2010) 9 Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences 2003, 2003.
10
Images have also been described in literature on bullying as ‘sexual’ (Langos, above n 2, 56) defines a
sexual image as one which depicts the subject engaging in a sexual act); JSCCS, above n 7, 137 [4.52]: refers
to the practice of sexting whereby individuals send nude or semi‐nude images to one another, which images
are sometimes later distributed to a wider and unintended audience); ‘intimate’ (Langos, at 56) defines an
intimate image as one that depicts the subject’s genital or anal area, or using the toilet). See generally CCSO
Cybercrime Working Group, above n 6; ‘defamatory’ (Price and Dalgleish, above n 6, 51); ‘degrading’
(Langos, at 38); ‘derogatory’ (Langos, at 59): Langos classes derogatory images of an identifiable subject as
a form of denigration. Although she does not define what makes an image ‘derogatory’, she gives as an
example the manipulation of a photograph such that the image subject’s bottom appears bigger than it
actually is: Langos, at 59; ‘rude’ (Dorothy W Grigg, ‘Definitional Constructs of Cyber‐bullying and Cyber‐
aggression from a Triangulatory Overview: A Preliminary Study into Elements of Cyber‐bullying’ (2012) 4(4)
Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research 202, 206) and ‘private’(Qing Li, ‘Cyberbullying in High
Schools: A Study of Students’ Behaviours and Beliefs about this New Phenomenon’ (2010) 19 Journal of
Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 372, 374).
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Robin M Kowalski, Susan P Limber and Patricia W Agatston, Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age
(Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2012) 13.
12
Sameer Hinduja and Justin W Patchin, Bullying beyond the Schoolyard: Preventing and Responding to
Cyberbullying (Corwin, 2nd ed, 2009) 57.
13
See, also, Michael Zhang, ‘Teen Arrested for Bullying Others Using Hurtful Instagram Photos’ on PetaPixel
(1 February 2013) <http://petapixel.com/2013/02/01/teen‐arrested‐for‐bullying‐others‐using‐hurtful‐
instagram‐photos/>: a US teen has been arrested for bullying others using hurtful Instagram photos. It is
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The Australian Government’s cyber‐safety report has referred to the ‘public humiliation’
that may be experienced by victims of bullying ‘seeing images of themselves posted on an
online platform’.14 Nevertheless, literature on bullying and victimisation devotes
surprisingly little attention to examining the differential impact upon victims of the
various forms of bullying or victimisation, including that which takes the form of the
distribution and sharing of images.15 In 2014 Kowalksi et al published a critical review and
meta‐analysis of cyberbullying research among youth. Their analysis encompassed a vast
array of international literature on the topic, reviewing over 250 books, academic papers
and other resources on cyberbullying. None of those resources had as their primary focus
the impact of bullying or victimisation occurring by way of the publication or distribution
of images of the victim.16 However, a few of those papers did specifically consider the
impact upon victims of different forms of bullying, including, in some instances, bullying
involving the publication and distribution of images of another.17 Slonje and Smith found

unclear what the photographs actually depicted (and whether they could be described as inherently
embarrassing or humiliating and so forth) but certainly the captions added to the photographs were hurtful
(an example given in the article is the addition of the caption ‘drunken fool’ to one photograph). The teen
was, it is reported, charged with harassment.
14
JSCCS, above n 7, 98 [3.97].
15
A factor recognised by Vera Slavtcheva‐Petkova et al who note that ‘[i]n terms of identifying what types
of harm are associated with cyber‐bullying, only around a quarter of the articles explicitly operationalize the
concept of harm. The remainder either define cyber‐bullying as involving harm or assume cyber‐bullying
equals harm. A clear picture of the negative impacts associated with the different contexts or manifestations
of cyber‐bullying is therefore difficult to form’: Vera Slavtcheva‐Petkova, Victoria Jane Nash and Monica
Bulger, ‘Evidence on the Extent of Harms Experienced by Children as a Result of Online Risks: Implications
for Policy and Research’ (2015) 18(1) Information, Communication & Society 48, 55–6.
16
Kowalski et al, above n 3.
17
Ibid. The sources referred to in Kowalski et al included approximately 90 that had (as their primary focus)
the measurement or prevalence of cyberbullying; victims’ experiences of cyberbullying; drivers or
modalities of bullying; the difference between cyberbullying and traditional bullying and the impact on
victims of bullying. Of those papers, a number specifically recognised that bullying could occur by way of
the distribution or publication of images of the victim. However, only those papers specifically mentioned
in this section considered the impact of images as a specific modality of cyberbullying. Although Kowalski et
al reviewed literature on cyberbullying, it is apparent that a number of those studies involving surveys of
victims of bullying did not confine their results to those experiencing bullying, as opposed to victimisation
or other ‘harmful’ behaviour. For example, a number of surveys that aimed to establish the prevalence of
bullying in general, or the prevalence or impact of particular types of bullying, provided operational
definitions of cyberbullying that did not necessarily contain all or even any of the four definitional elements
accepted by most academics (and referred to above). Thus, for example, in a survey carried out by
MacDonald and Roberts‐Pittman on the prevalence and demographics of cyberbullying among college
students, the definition of cyberbullying provided to participants was ‘sending or posting harmful or cruel
text or images using the Internet or other digital communication devices’: MacDonald and Roberts‐Pittman,
above n 9. None of the definitional elements (intention, aggression, power‐imbalance or repetition) are
included in the above definition. See also Qing Li, above n 10. As such, it may be that several reports of the
prevalence of image sharing as a form of cyberbullying actually reflect the subjective experiences of image
subjects (their own view that images were embarrassing, humiliating, hurtful, and so on) rather than an
experience that would be objectively defined as bullying or victimisation. As has been noted by Staude‐
Müller et al, ‘many very stressful incidents can be found in which these [cyberbullying] criteria are either
not met or cannot be ascertained’: Frithjof Staude‐Müller, Britta Hansen and Melanie Voss, ‘How Stressful
is Online Victimization? Effects of Victim’s Personality and Properties of the Incident’ (2012) 9(2) European
Journal of Developmental Psychology 260, 261.
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that the publication and distribution of photographs or video clips was one of the most
impactful forms of bullying.18 These findings were later corroborated by research
undertaken by Menesini et al, who found that picture or video clip bullying had the highest
impact factor for both males and females.19 Dooley et al suggested that the uploading of
an embarrassing image to the internet might result in ‘continued and widespread ridicule’
for the victim and ‘significant and long‐lasting social emotional harm’.20 Other researchers
have found that the misuse of picture or video material, along with threats of concrete
injury and the revelation of secrets, was more stressful for teenage victims than other
forms of victimisation, such as receiving insults or sexual harassment.21
Slonje and Smith report three reasons given by participants in their bullying study for
rating the impact of pictures and videos so highly. The first reason given is the large
audience size when a picture or video is placed online; the second is the concreteness
effect, the effect of actually seeing the photograph or video;22 and the third is the fear of
not knowing who had seen the picture or video in question.23 Menesini et al likewise
suggest that one of the reasons for pictures and videos rating highly in terms of severity
is the ‘public nature of the acts showing the victim in some intimate, embarrassing, or
hurtful situations.’24 Dooley et al posit that it is the permanence of images online that
contributes to the impact on the victim of bullying conducted through pictures or
images,25 while Straude‐Müller et al suggest that the posting of photographs or videos
online entails the crossing of a boundary between virtual space and real space, which can
be particularly stressful for the victim.26 Research conducted by Brighi et al found that
students who reported having experienced ‘reputational attacks’ via videos on YouTube
(among other things) scored lower in terms of self‐esteem and loneliness compared to
victims who did not experience a reputational attack.27 What is notable about all of these
observations is that they relate to the impact on the victim of the publication or
18

Peter K Smith et al ‘An Investigation into Cyberbullying, its Forms, Awareness and Impact, and the
Relationship between Age and Gender in Cyberbullying’ (Research Brief No RBX03‐06, University of London,
July 2006).
19
Menesini, Nocentini and Calussi, above n 3, 268. But, cf Allison Schenk’s findings that there were no
statistically significant differences in the impact on a cyberbullying victim by virtue of the form the bullying
took, whether through the internet, picture/video messaging or masquerading: Allison Schenk, Impact of
Cyberbully Victimization among College Students (Masters’ Thesis, Morgantown, West Virginia, 2011) 40.
20
Dooley, Pyżalski and Cross, above n 3,183.
21
Frithjof Staude‐Müller, Thomas Bliesener and Nicole Nowak Cyberbullying und Opfererfahrungen von
Kindern und Jugendlichen im Web 2.0 [Cyberbullying and Children and Adolescents’ Victimization
Experiences in Web 2.0] (2009) 54 Kinder‐ und Jugendschutz in Wissenschaft und Praxis 42–7 cited in Staude‐
Müller, Hansen and Voss, above n 17, 262.
22
Slonje and Smith, above n 3, 153.
23
Ibid.
24
Menesini, Nocentini and Calussi, above n 3, 272.
25
Dooley, Pyżalski and Cross, above n 3, 183.
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Staude‐Müller, Hansen and Voss, above n 17, 262.
27
Antonella Brighi et al, ‘Self‐Esteem and Loneliness in Relation to Cyberbullying in Three European
Countries’ in Qing Li, Donna Cross and Peter K Smith (eds) Cyberbullying in the Global Playground: Research
from International Perspectives (Blackwell Publishing, 2012) 32, 49–50.
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distribution of the image in question, rather than to the impact on the victim of the
behaviour giving rise to the publication or distribution. This is significant because it
suggests that the negative impact on an image subject of the online publication and
distribution of images can arise even where that publication or distribution does not
constitute bullying or victimisation.28 As such, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
negative implications of the online posting and distribution of images of another can occur
even absent any deviant or ill‐intended behaviour at all. That is, it is the nature of the
image, the forum of publication, the potential audience and the fact that images are such
an impactful form of communication (as discussed in Chapter One) that are key in terms
of how the posting and distribution of an image affects the image subject.
There is a significant body of literature concerning the developmental implications of
bullying and cyberbullying more generally. For example, Patchin and Hinduja’s study of
Middle School students in the United States found that students who experienced
cyberbullying (whether as a victim or perpetrator) had significantly lower self‐esteem than
those who had little or no experience of cyberbullying.29 Cyberbullying has also been
linked to increased tobacco, alcohol and drug use, as well as to a number of negative
effects on both mental and physical health, and to other detrimental outcomes.30
However, research on bullying generally does not delve into any developmental
implications for victims of specific forms of bullying, including bullying that takes the form
28
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Developmental Disability in Special Education Settings’ (2009) 12(3) Developmental Neurorehabilitation
146, 149–50 reporting a link between online victimization and low self‐esteem and between bullying and
depressive feelings.
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overview of extant literature on the impact of cyberbullying (among other things) is contained in Kowalski
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adolescent health and wellbeing see Paul Best, Roger Manktelow and Brian Taylor, ‘Online Communication,
Social Media and Adolescent Wellbeing: A Systematic Narrative Review’ (2014) 14 Children and Youth
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Psychology Review 1; Megan A Wood, William M Bukowksi and Eris Lis, ‘The Digital Self: How Social Media
Serves as a Setting that Shapes Youth’s Emotional Experiences’ (2016) 1(2) Adolescent Research Review 163.
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of the publication or distribution of images of the victim. Even outside of the context of
studies on bullying or victimisation, there is a dearth of literature considering the
developmental implications for an image subject of the online existence or distribution of
images, where that is unwanted.31 The paucity of research in this area is somewhat
surprising given that there has been fairly extensive research on the issue of self‐
presentation in the online context (that is, presentation of oneself by oneself, rather than
presentation of a person by another).32
The gaps in research as to the impact on an image subject of the online publication and
use of images are significant. This is not least because, as will be discussed in more detail
in Chapter Three, the regulation of images in the online environment generally depends
upon identifying unlawful behaviour (whether that is cyberbullying, harassment, stalking,
the creation and distribution of offensive material or child pornography and so on) rather
than harmful material. Legislation recently enacted by the federal government does seek
to provide children with a means to secure the removal of online content, including
images, which amounts to cyberbullying material targeting an Australian child.33 Here the
emphasis is more upon the nature of the material rather than the behaviour giving rise to
it. However, as will become apparent throughout this thesis, even this legislation does not
provide a remedy for an image subject merely because of the effect upon that subject of
the image being available online, or subsequently used in a particular way.34 Accordingly,
an understanding of the potential developmental implications of the online publication
31

Besmer and Lipford refer to this lack of research: Andrew Besmer and Heather Richter Lipford, ‘Moving
Beyond Untagging: Photo Privacy in a Tagged World’ (2010) Chi ’10: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference
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further study: Andrew Smock, ‘Self‐Presentation on Facebook: Managing Content Created by the User and
Others’ (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association,
Singapore, 22–26 June 2010) 1, 3. Litt et al refer to their research on information presented about
individuals by others as ‘foundational’ and note that there are many more questions to be answered: Eden
Litt et al, ‘Awkward Encounters of an “Other” Kind: Collective Self‐Presentation and Face Threat on
Facebook’ (2014) CSCW ’14 Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative
Work and Social Computing 449, 459.
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Albeit that even in this context research on the visual aspects of self‐presentation (presentation of self
through the medium of photos and images) is fairly limited. The literature on self‐presentation is discussed
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and use of images of children and young people can assist in determining whether the
current regulatory framework around images of children in the online environment —
detailed in Chapter Three — is sufficient to protect children from the risk of
developmental harm. Moreover, it has been recognised at a governmental level that
further research on the ‘impact of the “social media lifestyle” on children and how to
address any negative consequences’ is necessary.35
An exploration of the potential developmental harms relating to the visual representation
of children by others in the online environment is also important in order to bring a
different perspective to some of the concerns that have been raised in relation to the
issue of the unwanted posting of images. These concerns, noted in Chapter One, are
sometimes presented as entailing privacy interests; yet there are real difficulties in
conceptualising privacy and, more to the point, in determining which interests should
properly be regarded as privacy interests. As Hughes has observed ‘[a] rounded
understanding of privacy cannot be found in a purely legal or philosophical “definition”:
it is necessary to draw upon the insights of other disciplines, and a core weakness in much
privacy scholarship has been the failure to do so.’36 That is not to say that the unwanted
online publication of images or their subsequent use should necessarily be understood as
a privacy issue — only that a broader understanding of the developmental implications of
such publication and use might serve to better illuminate the interests at stake.37
Moreover, as is discussed further in Chapter Five, under the CRC, children not only have a
right to privacy but also have a right to development.38 Understanding when optimal
development may be compromised, therefore, is a prerequisite to Australia being able to
fulfil its obligations to children under the CRC.
III

FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH SCOPE

This chapter suggests a number of implications for child development of the online
posting and sharing of images of children. Therefore, it is necessary to begin by
considering how development is understood within child development theory. Child
development theory holds that development is multi‐faceted. Development is typically
divided into three broad domains — physical development, cognitive development, and
social and emotional development.39 However, it is important to remember that although
development occurs across different domains, development does not occur within any
domain in isolation.40 Thus, development within any given domain can impact on
35

‘Liberal‐National Coalition, The Coalition’s Discussion Paper on Enhancing Online Safety for Children,
November 2012, 11.
36
Kirsty Hughes, ‘A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law’ (2012) 75(5)
The Modern Law Review 806, 806.
37
See, further, the discussion in Chapter Five, Part B, The Convention on the Rights of the Child (Right to
Privacy).
38
CRC art 6(2).
39
Laura E Berk, Infants, Children, and Adolescents (Allyn and Bacon, 4th ed, 2002) 5–6.
40
Sandra Smidt, The Developing Child in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2006) 2–3.
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development in any other domain. For example, cognitive development can impact upon
social and emotional development and so on. Indeed, as Affolter writes, it has been
relatively recently acknowledged that emotional wellbeing has an important influence on
physical health, cognitive performance and pro‐social competence and that, in turn,
emotional wellbeing is implicated in the creation of socio‐politically stable societies and
nations.41
While recognising that development occurs across and between various domains, the
main focus of this chapter is on the domain of social and emotional development.
Specifically, this chapter focuses on particular aspects of social and emotional
development: namely the development of self‐concept and self‐esteem, and the
development of relationships. These aspects of development have been selected because
they are frequent themes in child development literature around which a discussion of
social and emotional development issues are organised, at least from middle childhood
onwards.42 Moreover, these aspects of development are also implicated in what have
been described as the main developmental goals to be achieved by the end of
adolescence: identity formation, autonomy, intimacy and the development of the sexual
self.43 However, it is acknowledged that these aspects of development are only ‘part of
the picture’ and cannot present a holistic perspective on development even within a single
domain.44
A number of commentators emphasise that development must be viewed in a historical
and cultural context.45 For the purposes of this chapter, however, the basic question as to
whether optimal child development is threatened by the unwanted publication of images
of children, specifically in the online environment, is considered within the Australian
context as it exists at the time of writing. That is not to say, of course, that the Australian

41
Friedrich W Affolter, ‘Socio‐Emotional Enablement and the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2015)
13 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 379, 379.
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Online: Perspectives on Privacy and Self‐Disclosure in the Social Web (Springer, 2011) 221, 224 (citing Butako
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within child development include the psychodynamic perspective, the behavioural perspective, the
cognitive perspective, the contextual perspective and the evolutionary perspective — see, eg, Robert S.
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context represents a unitary or even a unified cultural perspective, nor that within that
context there is any accepted belief about what constitutes optimal development.
For many young people in Australia the internet is an increasingly important, integrated
and integral part of their daily lives46 and research has established that the internet in
general, and social media in particular, can affect views of the self and the body.47
Accordingly, researchers have become increasingly interested in the developmental
implications of computer‐mediated communication and the way in which impressions are
managed in the online environment. Marwick notes that in relation to the development
of identity in the context of online media and communication, most work has focused on
impression management.48 Impression management refers to the means or processes by
which individuals seek to control the impressions that others form of them.49 As noted by
Leary and Kowalski, ‘the impressions people make on others have implications for how
others perceive, evaluate and treat them, as well as for their own view of themselves.’50
Accordingly, impression management is implicated in the development of self and
identity, and has implications for a person’s self‐concept and self‐esteem, as well as the
way in which a person relates to others and, in turn, the development and quality of
relationships.51 Impression management is influenced by self‐presentation, which has
been described as a vital skill that must be learned and practised during childhood and, in
particular, adolescence.52 The internet clearly provides numerous opportunities for
individuals to engage in self‐presentation and impression management,53 including
through the medium of images (whether of themselves or others), as well as opportunities
for social interaction. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is a growing body of literature
devoted to exploring the ways young people present themselves online, including through
image selection. What is surprising, however, is the relative dearth of literature focusing
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on implications for an individual of the online posting of images of themselves by others,
or the subsequent use of such images. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to present an initial
perspective on the potential developmental harms attendant upon the online publication
of images of children and young people. It does so by extrapolating from the extant
literature and findings in relation to impression management and self‐presentation (visual
and non‐visual) and some of the developmental implications of computer mediated
communication.
Given that the main focus of this chapter is on the domain of emotional and social
development, the chapter predominately examines literature from the broad field of
social psychology, and focuses specifically on literature relating to impression
management. Social psychology has been defined as ‘the scientific investigation of how
the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual,
imagined or implied presence of others.’54 By studying behaviour, social psychologists
seek to gain an insight into underlying psychological, cognitive and even neuro‐chemical
processes that drive behaviour.55 A vast range of different topics fall within the sphere of
social psychology, amongst which is the topic of impression management,56 often referred
to synonymously as self‐presentation,57 and usually approached from the symbolic
interactionist perspective of social psychology.58
In order to focus on the social‐psychological perspectives of the posting and sharing of
images online, this chapter deliberately avoids delving into the vast philosophical
literature that explores some of the same issues discussed here. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that the philosophical literature often touches upon issues of development and
the correlation between information sharing, privacy and relationships.59
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Much of the research referred to in this chapter does not relate specifically to children or
young people. A number of developmental implications arising from the unwanted
publication of online images, or their subsequent use, can occur regardless of whether
the image subject is a child or an adult. Nevertheless, that research can be related back
to a child development context by noting the special significance of these developmental
implications for children and young people, given that childhood and adolescence is a
crucial time for the achievement of important developmental goals (as explained further
below). Moreover, while impression management is implicated in the ways people
present themselves and thus in the development of self‐identity, impression management
is only one aspect of the process of forming that self‐identity — broader issues and
processes relating to the formation of self‐identity go beyond the scope of this chapter.
The developmental risks discussed in this chapter are not always limited to situations
where an image is published or shared without the consent of or against the wishes of the
image subject. Indeed, these implications are not always confined to situations in which
others have published the image: they can arise, for example, as an unintended
consequence of an image being available or shared online by the image subject themself.
As such, this chapter intentionally refers to the ‘unwanted’ online publication of an image
or the ‘unwanted’ sharing of an online image. The word ‘unwanted’ includes but is not
limited to situations where the publication of the image on the internet has been made
without the consent of or against the wishes of the image subject. It also includes but is
not limited to situations in which the image subject originally published the image online
(for example, by uploading it to their own social media site) but does not support the way
in which it has been subsequently used, or subsequently regrets the decision to post it
online and wishes to withdraw it from publication.
This chapter does not aim to fill any of the gaps in the empirical research relating the
developmental implications for children of the unwanted online publication and sharing
of images of children. However, it extrapolates from the extant literature and findings in
relation to impression management and self‐presentation (visual and non‐visual) and
some of the developmental implications of computer mediated communication to argue
in support of the two propositions advanced at the beginning of the chapter. To reiterate,
the first proposition is that the non‐consensual or unwanted online publication or
distribution of an image of a child can have a detrimental impact on that child’s
development, even where the posting or sharing of the image is not ill‐intentioned. The
second proposition is that detriment can occur regardless of whether or not the image
can be described, objectively, as harmful.
IV

SELF‐CONCEPT AND SELF‐ESTEEM

This part of the chapter begins by considering the meaning and importance of self‐esteem
in child development and some of the factors that influence self‐esteem. Following on
54

from that, the relationship between autonomy and self‐esteem is explained. It is noted
here that an individual’s self‐esteem may be affected by the extent to which they are able
to control the presentation of self and regulate interpersonal boundaries.
A

The Meaning and Importance of Self‐Esteem

In developmental literature the development of self‐concept and self‐esteem is often
considered key to the construction of ‘identity’. Identity has, in turn, been described as
one of the key developmental goals of adolescence.60 One’s self‐concept has been
described as the way one perceives oneself, the ‘picture’ that one has of oneself61 or the
knowledge one has about oneself.62 The developmental importance of self‐concept is
captured by Burns in the following summary:
Many contemporary psychologists … ascribe to the self concept a key role as a factor in
the integration of personality, in motivating behaviour and in achieving mental health.63
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Self‐esteem, in turn, is often considered to be the evaluative aspect of self‐concept:64 It
has been variously defined as constituting the ‘judgments we make about our own worth
and the feelings associated with those judgments’65 and the ‘level of global regard one
has for the self as a person.’66 In terms of the significance of self‐esteem to development
(particularly, but not exclusively, within the domain of social and emotional
development), a positive correlation has been established between a low level of self‐
esteem and health problems and mood disturbances,67 including anxiety and
depression.68 Research has also established a link between low self‐esteem and certain
negative emotions such as shame, guilt69 and a tendency to suffer embarrassment.70 By
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contrast, a positive correlation has been found between high levels of self‐esteem and
resilience,71 and between higher levels of self‐esteem and overall wellbeing. MacDonald
and Leary, referring to some of the numerous studies on self‐esteem, observe that
compared with people who score low on measures of trait self‐esteem, people who score
higher tend to be happier and less depressed, to have more friends, to be more satisfied
with their interpersonal relationships, to worry less about being rejected, to conform less,
to work harder on difficult tasks, to feel less lonely, are less likely to abuse alcohol, and to
be less prone to a variety of psychological problems.72

Other researchers have established that self‐esteem is significantly related to ‘affect’ (or
‘mood’73), especially to depression,74 and that low self‐esteem may even be a risk factor
in suicide.75 In relation to adolescents in particular, low levels of self‐esteem have been
related to anxiety76 and ‘strongly associated’ with substance abuse.77 Boden et al observe
that self‐esteem is
often implicated in the development of adolescent behaviour, with high self‐esteem
serving as a source of resiliency or positive adaptation. Conversely low self‐esteem has
been implicated in the development of a wide range of maladaptive responses to the
issues of adolescence.78
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Further, people with low self‐esteem have been found to have a lower sense of relational
value — their sense of how valued they are by others — which in turn often leads to
negative emotions as well as to a lack of motivation to repair such negative emotions.79
Importantly, low self‐esteem has also been linked to suicidal ideation and attempted
suicide in secondary students.80 Low self‐esteem was identified as a suicide risk factor in
the Western Australian Suicide Prevention Strategy 2009–2013.81 This is particularly
significant given that suicide is a leading cause of death among young people in Australia,
second only to motor vehicle accidents.82 In relation to Western Australian teenagers
(aged 13 to 17 years) suicide was in fact the leading cause of all deaths notified to the
Ombudsman under the office’s child death review function.83
In summary, self‐esteem is widely believed to exert a ‘pervasive and powerful impact’ on
human cognition, behaviour, emotion and motivation84 and is often described as a
psychological resource85 or as a ‘protective factor’ against psychological problems86 and
against suicide.87
Aside from the fact that self‐esteem is implicated in emotional, behavioural, cognitive and
even physical development, self‐esteem is also implicated in social development. Cooley
believed that the self is fundamentally a social construct that is formed by ‘casting one’s
gaze into the social mirror to ascertain the opinions of significant others toward the self.’88
Mead built upon Cooley’s insights to propose that individuals incorporate into judgements
about themselves a generalised conception of the extent to which others hold them in
regard.89 Charon has observed that of all propositions derived from the symbolic
79
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interactionist perspective of social psychology, the proposition that self‐esteem (or self‐
judgement) is related to the judgement of others is ‘the most empirically supported’ and
thus comes closest to a ‘simple causal relationship in the traditional … sense.’90
MacDonald and Leary prefer to explain the link between self‐esteem and certain
emotional, behavioural and cognitive phenomena by reference to sociometer theory.91
Sociometer theory posits that self‐esteem reflects the extent to which a person believes
themselves to have relational value — in other words the extent to which one feels valued
by important others.92 According to this theory, negative feelings associated with low self‐
esteem may provide feedback on the extent to which a person has low relational value,
thereby motivating behaviour that will redress this.93 According to the theory, self‐esteem
assumes an important role both in gauging one’s relational worth as well as in maintaining
or improving one’s relational value (thus, in how one relates to the outside world). As a
corollary of this, however, it has been found that high self‐esteem individuals tend to be
more socially confident than low self‐esteem individuals, with the likelihood that this
confidence will, in turn, lead to a wider range of social possibilities and a greater sense of
belonging.94 That individuals with low self‐esteem may feel less connected to social
networks is concerning because, as Forest and Wood observe, feeling interconnected is a
‘fundamental human motivation’ and because a strong social support network has been
found to be a factor in better mental and physical health.95
B

Influences on Self‐Esteem

1 Perceptions of How Others See Us
While it can be said that there is a widely accepted causal relationship between a person’s
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what that individual believes others think of them.96 Thus, while individuals may be
sensitive to even subtle social cues97 (and low self‐esteem individuals may be more
reactive to external self‐relevant cues98) it is possible for individuals to misinterpret social
cues. As Charon explains, even when others actually like us, we might interpret their
actions towards us as negative (or vice versa).99 It is our interpretation of what others
think that acts upon our self‐esteem.
Given that the views of others are taken as a reference point in forming self‐perception
and that a positive self‐judgement has been described as a fundamental human need,100
it is important for most people to create favourable impressions upon those with whom
they interact. Creating a favourable impression upon others is particularly important
where those others are considered ‘significant’.101 Research has found that the views of
peers are especially important to children and young people, and that peer disapproval
and rejection corresponds with a number of negative future emotional and behavioural
outcomes.102 Research also suggests that this concern with the appraisal of others
heightens throughout early and middle adolescence: in early adolescence individuals are
sensitive to the views of them held by significant others, whereas in middle adolescence
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they are ‘morbidly preoccupied’ with what others think.103 The adolescent preoccupation
with what others think is accompanied by conscious decisions about the way in which the
self is presented. Livingstone and Brake’s research describes teenagers’ fascination with
the presentation of self:
At the heart of the explosion in online communication is the desire to construct a valued
representation of oneself which affirms and is affirmed by one’s peers. Observation of
teenagers’ social networking practices reveals the pleasure they find in creating an online
‘project of the self’.104

Reinforcing this view, a number of researchers have found that the internet provides new
opportunities and tools for individuals to engage in self‐presentation and impression
management.105 Users of social networking sites have been found to ‘invest great effort
into managing an online identity that represents them in the best possible way’106 and
there is considerable support for Stern’s assertion that the internet presents an
opportunity for individuals to ‘put their best face forward’ and present ‘touched up’,
although not necessarily unrealistic, self‐presentations.107
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Self‐presentation in the online environment can take a number of forms including, though
of course not limited to, the way one presents one’s visual aspect or visual image.108 A
number of studies demonstrate that young people consciously select for online display
images of themselves in which they perceive themselves to look good, or which present
or affirm a particular desired‐for impression.109 Researchers have also found that gender
and personality type affects both the number of self‐images uploaded onto social
networking sites, as well as the type of images uploaded,110 and that young people use
photographs to express things that are important to them.111 More generally, visual cues
provided by an individual themself, as well as those provided by others, have been found
to play a significant role in the process of creating impressions of that individual in the
online environment.112
2 Self‐Esteem and Appearance
An individual’s appearance has been found to have significance for the way in which
others respond to that individual. Schlenker writes that attractive individuals are judged
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differently and treated differently by others, have more social power and feel better
about themselves.113 Citing a number of studies, Schlenker goes on to say that:
More attractive people find that audiences care more about their feelings, are more
persuaded by their words, model their behaviours, follow their leads, and conform more
to their presumed wishes.114

Nevertheless, the extent to which an individual’s self‐esteem is tied in with their
appearance (or their perception of how they appear to others) seems to depend on a
number of factors. Mikkola et al assert that adolescents live in a culture in which physical
appearance plays a ‘significant role’,115 and Harter has found that self‐evaluation of
appearance is ‘inextricably linked’ to overall self‐esteem.116 However, a number of studies
have found that certain individuals more than others stake their self‐esteem on their
appearance or, at least, on others’ evaluations of how they look.117 Further, while Siibak
found that both boys and girls believed that looks were an important factor in
popularity,118 a number of studies have found that females tend to be more dissatisfied
with their bodies than males119 and may be concerned about their appearance, or more
likely to tie their self‐worth to it.120 These findings have also been borne out in an
113
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Australian context. Western Australia’s Children’s’ Commissioner reports on a national
study of young people aged 15‐19 years, which found that body image was one of the top
three concerns raised by all young people, regardless of gender, but that young females
had higher levels than males of extreme concern in relation to body image.121
Given that an individual’s self‐esteem may be affected by the feedback received from
others,122 positive feedback in response to images of a particular individual (photographs
or videos) can be expected to boost that individual’s self‐esteem, whereas negative
feedback can be expected to have a detrimental impact on the subject’s sense of self‐
worth.123 This is indeed borne out in the findings of a number of studies.124 Nevertheless,
given that an individual’s sense of self‐worth may be shaped not by what others actually
think of them but what they believe others think of them, it is not necessary for feedback
to be received at all in order for an individual’s self‐esteem to be impacted. This idea is
best expressed by Cooley’s description of the ‘looking glass self’:
As we see our face, figure and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they
are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to
what we should like them to be, so in imagination we perceive in another’s mind some
thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends and so on, and are
variously affected by it.
A self‐idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our
appearance to the other person: the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and
some sort of self‐feeling, such as pride or mortification.125

Self‐evaluation of appearance and the ‘inherent’ need to create a favourable impression
may therefore explain why some individuals consciously select for online display (for
example, on their social media profile pages) photographs of themselves in which they
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believe themselves to look good.126 De Vries’s doctoral findings suggested that individuals
are aware of the importance of looking good on social network sites and that as a result
of using such sites are likely to invest in their appearance cognitively and behaviourally.127
She also speculates that it is possible that the focus on physical appearance in self‐
presentations on social networking sites might be an important factor in explaining
negative self‐views, such as increased body dissatisfaction.128 In turn, these body‐related
self‐views may lead to mental health problems, have an otherwise adverse impact on
wellbeing, and involve other detriments.129 Moreover, as de Vries has also pointed out,
body image is such an important aspect of adolescent development that ‘negative effects
experienced in adolescence may solidify and translate into bigger problems in
adulthood.’130
The problem, however, is that the choice as to whether or not to display a particular image
does not always reside in the hands of the image subject. As noted by Rui and Stefanone,
‘[d]eliberate image construction is becoming more difficult because of the increasing
number of information sources about individuals online’.131 Echoing that, and referring
specifically to the practice of people posting photographs of others online, as well as the
practice of ‘tagging’ people in photographs,132 Besmer and Lipford observe that people
have reduced control over their image and its reach, a fact that may lead to
embarrassment or humiliation.133 Moreover, it has been found that individuals who are
‘stigmatised’, such as those who are disfigured or overweight, are likely to want to self‐
present in a way that minimises the impact of the stigma on others’ impressions.134 While
these individuals may not be able to entirely conceal their stigma, they may try to avoid
disclosure or attempt to cover the stigma.135 Given that the stigmatised individual may
126
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already be susceptible to low self‐esteem,136 removing control over self‐presentation
from such an individual may have an even more destructive impact on the individual’s
self‐esteem than would otherwise be the case.
Further, it is important to consider that a photograph or video is, by its very nature, the
re‐contextualisation of a given moment in time: the moment has been transformed from
something fleeting, observable only by those present, into something that can be seen by
those who were not present and which can be observed repeatedly (possibly for ever).
Thus, an appearance‐conscious individual, cognisant only of their immediate audience
and the transient nature of the ‘moment’, may exercise less caution about how they
appear to others than they would do when aware that they are being photographed or
filmed. Foddy and Finighan have made the following observations that, while related to
traits of character or behaviour, are arguably pertinent to physical appearance:
It seems reasonable to assume that an individual will have less need to exercise identity
strategies when he is with his peers, status equals or intimates because after a time they
will develop enough mutual confidence or familiarity to enjoy idiosyncrasy credits. That
is, many behavioural quirks and idiosyncrasies may come to be seen as essentially non‐
threatening, incidental or insignificant to a long‐standing relationship.137

The fact that people may be comfortable presenting themselves in one context but not in
another was recognised in the Discussion Paper issued by SCAG entitled ‘Unauthorised
Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues’:
People present themselves differently in different public places. For instance, while a
person might be comfortable wearing and being seen in a swimsuit at the beach, they
might not be comfortable being seen in a swimsuit whilst shopping in a mall. While a
person might be comfortable in presenting themselves in a particular way at a beach, a
photograph, which facilitates a permanent image, provides a broader context for those
images.138

A similar point has been made by Westin who described the impact of being
photographed, filmed or subject to surveillance in terms of individuals no longer being
able to ‘merge into the “situational landscape”’.139 Moreover, given the affordances that
exist in the online space, images can take on a dynamic form: images can be re‐
136
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contextualised by the addition of text, tags and titles and can be shared across diverse
audiences. As Davies has written:
Online images can accrue cumulative meanings from their digital contexts. The process of
uploading images to specific Web spaces and thus re‐contextualising them invests original
artefacts with new meanings, transforming the original narrative or experience from when
they came, into new shared experiences, ones which develop meanings as a result of
participation and collaboration.140

3 Images, Impression Management and Self‐Esteem
Of course, images communicate more about a person than looks. Shim et al assert that
the posting of photographs has become ‘one of the most apparent components of identity
performance on profiles of social network sites’.141 Likewise, Suler believes images ‘give
expression to the unconscious dimensions of one’s character’ and can become a
‘representation’ that one builds of oneself.142 A number of other researchers have also
found that photographs involve identity statements, or identity claims.143 Indeed, it has
been established that those viewing images make judgements — accurate or otherwise
— not only about the image subject’s appearance, but about personality, perceived
abilities, popularity and happiness.144
Accordingly, self‐presentation or impression management, as it is carried on through the
medium of images of oneself, involves more than managing impressions as to how one
looks. It involves managing (or even creating) impressions about oneself in general, or
particular ‘desired for’ aspects of oneself.145 For example, in their research into the
choices made by young Indian Muslim women as to the photographs they uploaded to
140
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their social networking profiles, Mishra and Basu found that most respondents ‘seemed
to carry the responsibility of upholding the “honor” of their families, a requirement in
their offline life, to digital settings as well.’146
A number of scholars have described this online impression management by reference to
Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor.147 Goffman likened the way that individuals
present themselves in their social interactions to the way in which actors play roles — the
role‐playing may convince the audience but does not necessarily reflect the actor’s true,
authentic self.148 Individuals are thus ‘social actors’ and strategically manage the
impressions others form of them through this role‐playing.149 The dramaturgical
metaphor is extended by reference to what Goffman described as ‘front stage’ and ‘back
stage’ settings. As Hogan explains:
In the front stage, we are trying to present an idealized version of the self, according to a
specific role: to be an appropriate server, lecturer, audience member, and so forth. The
back stage, as Goffman says, is ‘a place, relative to a given performance, where the
impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of
course’.150

However, at times an individual’s identity claims can be challenged and the impression an
individual wishes to create can be compromised. This, in turn, can give rise to what some
have termed a ‘self‐presentational predicament’,151 and others have referred to as a ‘face
threat’.152 In relation to images specifically, a self‐presentational predicament can arise
because another person publishes or shares an image of the image subject that conflicts
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with the identity claims the individual has made or the impression the individual wishes
to ‘give off’. Smock has noted that the ability of others to contribute information in the
form of photographs to a profile owner’s site involves the possibility that this will
negatively impact on the self‐presentation work (and identity claims) of the profile
owner.153 Besmer and Lipford argue that the practice of tagging a user in a photograph
enables others to make decisions about the user’s boundaries, a practice that, they argue,
can have ‘devastating consequences’ if the representations conveyed by the image
conflict with any of the ‘fronts’ presented to the many social circles to which that user
belongs.’154 While not confined to the visual presentation of individuals by others, Litt et
al did find that the posting of information (including photographs) by others can influence
and challenge a person’s self‐presentational goals.155 They also concluded that these
threats were especially challenging when they occurred in the context of social network
sites.156
A tragic example of an individual’s desired‐for impression being challenged is the story of
Amanda Todd, recounted in Part Five below. Another much less extreme example is that
of a person who posts a photograph or video of another that the image subject themself
believes is particularly unflattering. In situations such as this, the publication or sharing of
the image can impact on an individual’s self‐esteem because the image does not portray
the image subject in the way that they wish to be seen by others. That is, the image gives
rise to a negative self‐judgement. An individual might fear, for example, that they will be
thought less of or rejected as a result of this unfavourable impression, regardless of
whether these consequences actually ensue. In this regard, Besmer and Lipford found that
respondents were often
keenly aware of individuals who they were concerned of seeing an unwanted photo of
them. These concerns were not about the public or strangers viewing their photos, but
instead about those who were already within their social circles. Family members such as
moms, dads, sisters, and brothers comprised most of the perceived threat. Extended
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family members and friends were also mentioned as well as employers and organizations
to which the participant belonged.157

Compounding the potential threat to individuals of others posting images that challenge
that individuals’ self‐presentation goals, research suggests that people are more
influenced by the presentation of a person made by others than they are by self‐
presentations. This outcome relates to the fact that other‐provided information is less
‘susceptible to manipulation’ (a factor referred to as warranting principle).158
Nevertheless, a self‐presentational predicament can even arise when images are
published by the image subject themself. Self‐published or self‐shared images can also
give rise to unintended consequences. An example of this is given by Mayer‐Schönberger
in the opening of his book Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age. Mayer‐
Schönberger tells how Stacey Snyder was denied her teaching certificate after posting a
photograph of herself dressed as a pirate on her MySpace page with the caption ‘drunken
pirate’. The photograph demonstrated what the university officials described as
behaviour ‘unbecoming of a teacher’.159 Another example occurred in 2008, when it was
157
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reported that over one hundred high school students in the United States had been
reprimanded and a number suspended from sporting or other extracurricular activities
after their school obtained photographs of the students partying. It seems that some of
the photographs may have been posted by the subjects themselves on their own
Facebook profiles, or had at least been published on the students’ own Facebook pages
with their permission.160 Such predicaments have the capacity to affect an individual’s
relationships (as outlined in Part Six below) or prospects and this can act back on that
individual’s self‐esteem. Self‐esteem may also be more directly affected, however, where
an individual adopts a negative self‐judgement as a result of the self‐presentational
predicament.
(a) Context Collapse
Referring to a number of articles that employ Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor to liken
online environments to performance spaces (or even to ‘backstage’ spaces),161 Hogan
argues that there is a key difference between the self‐presentations often advanced
online, particularly in social networking sites, and those advanced in face‐to‐face
interactions. The difference is that in the online environment the self‐presentation is
‘recorded’ (in other words, not live) and thus the nature of the self‐presentation has
changed from something ephemeral — a performance, bounded in time and space — to
something that continues to exist beyond the performance itself and that can be taken
out of its context.162 Importantly, then, a representation of self in the form of a recorded
photographs, given that her privacy settings were on ‘high’. See ‘Teacher Sacked for Posting Picture of
Herself Holding Glass of Wine and Mug of Beer on Facebook’, Daily Mail (online) 7 February 2011. Similarly,
in 2012 it was reported that a woman was fired from her position due to a photograph, posted on her own
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‘Fire Lindsay Stone’ set up to demand her resignation attracted more than 5,000 ‘likes’) that the woman’s
employer was forced to post its own statement on Facebook distancing itself from her actions: see Cavan
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presentation (such as a photograph or video) can be replayed to quite a different audience
and, potentially, to one it was not intended for.163 Reinforcing this point, Davsion’s
research led her to conclude that:
The stage of Social Media gives individuals the opportunity to present their Identity [sic]
to audiences, but the element of technology and misunderstanding of privacy settings can
blur the lines between onstage and backstage performances.164

The relaying of information about a person to an audience for which it was not intended
was recognised as potentially problematic by Goffman and has been widely accepted
subsequently.165 In the online environment the potential for information to be relayed to
an audience for which it was not intended is considerable. In the context of social
networking sites, where individuals often have links with members of different audiences
(family, friends, work colleagues, professional contexts), usually discrete audiences are
merged into one166 – a phenomenon that has been termed by some as ‘context
collapse’.167
This phenomenon of context collapse has been explored widely by researchers seeking to
discover how it affects both the self‐presentations individuals make in the online
environment, and the way in which their self‐presentations are received. For example,
Binder et al hypothesised that social networking sites could ‘bring social spheres into
conflict and lead to increased levels of social tension’.168 They concluded that individuals
might have to ‘uphold structural (offline) features of their networks that are ignored by
the technology.’169 Houghton et al, noting that the need to control the flow of personal
information into different types of relationships is ‘central to our social world’, argue that
managing social spheres becomes complicated in the online environment and that such
Trepte and Leonard Reinecke (eds) Privacy Online: Perspectives on Privacy and Self‐Disclosure in the Social
Web (Springer‐Verlag, 2011) 127, contrasting online and off‐line self‐presentations.
163
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complications may lead to privacy harms.170 Likewise, Rui and Stefanone found that
successfully managing online impressions grew more difficult as messages were broadcast
across wide networks171 where ‘groups within the macro network [were] likely to have
inconsistent expectations’ regarding how an individual presents themself.172
Related to the issue of context collapse, Bernstein et al found that people consistently
underestimated the audience size for content posted on social media.173 This finding led
Litt et al to suggest that if this is the case for the information people post about
themselves —where people generally can be expected to have some awareness of the
likely audience and actual knowledge of their privacy settings — the impact might be
greater in respect to postings of information about and photographs of another.174 Litt et
al’s own research findings bore out their hypothesis. The researchers concluded that:
The majority of other‐generated face threats described by our participants occurred
primarily because others had difficulty navigating and/or lacked motivation in
understanding the targets’ diverse audiences. They often shared information about the
target that may have been normative in one context or with one audience, but violated
another audience’s expectations … This resulted in many frustrating or difficult
experiences for our participants, who then had to deal with the face threat
consequences.175

The phenomenon of context collapse and the uncertainty of the current and future
audience of information available online can therefore make it more difficult for
individuals to manage impressions about themselves, particularly within a social media
environment. This is so whether those impressions originate from the individual themself
or from another. In turn, this can impact on an individual’s self‐esteem either directly
(because the perception of how they are seen by others, or how they might be seen,
impacts upon an individual’s self‐judgement) or indirectly (for example, as a result of
consequences for an individual’s relationships that flow from the impression that is
created). However, the impact on an individual’s self‐esteem of an unwanted or
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unfavourable impression is not a given — not least because an individual might
successfully adopt a strategy in response to such impressions.
(b) Strategies Used to Protect Oneself in Response to Other‐Presented Information
The issue of personal information about one person being revealed by another is neither
a recent phenomenon nor one that exists solely in the online sphere. In 1978 Baumeister
and Jones discussed one strategy employed by those whose self‐presentation goals (or
identity claims) were challenged by information released about them by others. They
found that such individuals compensated through the presentation of ‘enhanced
information’ not currently in the possession of the audience.176
A number of other researchers have considered the compensatory tactics adopted by
individuals whose self‐presentations are threatened by information posted by others.177
Schlenker explains that individuals may adopt any one of three ‘accounting strategies’ to
manage a self‐presentation predicament: they may defend their innocence, offer an
excuse, or seek to justify the relevant presentation.178 More recently, however, Smock has
found that in the context of Facebook, the affordances of the site present additional tools
for managing conflicting information, including the deletion by a user of information
posted to that user’s site (such as wall posts) and the un‐tagging of themselves in
photographs posted by others.179 Besmer and Lipford found that individuals routinely
untagged themselves in photographs that were considered ‘incriminating’ as well as
‘unflattering’.180 Smock termed as ‘substractive’ those strategies whereby users simply
removed information about themselves (or did what they could to remove access to
information or the ease with which they would be identified in information). In terms of
information presented by others on Facebook, these substractive strategies were,
according to Smock, more common than ‘repudiative strategies’ (or the ‘accounting
strategies’ referred to by Schlenker).181
The extent to which any given individual is motivated to take a self‐protective measure in
relation to the online publication of an unwanted image is likely to depend on a number
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of variables. For example, Forest and Wood found that individuals with low self‐esteem
placed a premium on the goal of self‐protection and may, as a result, seek to avoid or limit
self‐disclosure where possible.182 Conversely, Christofides et al found that people with
high self‐esteem were more likely to control their information, such as by utilising privacy
settings to protect their personal information on Facebook.183 Rui and Stefanone
suggested that gender, as well as the particular contingencies upon which an individual
stakes their self‐worth (for example, whether the individual is particularly motivated by
appearance) will impact upon the extent to and ways in which that person will adopt self‐
protective measures to combat an unwanted presentation of themselves by others.184
Regardless of motivation, however, the ability of a given individual to take any self‐
protective measures depends upon a number of factors. Firstly, it requires that individual
to be aware of the presentations made by others. Secondly, the nature of the presentation
and the means available to the individual to address their target audience will impact on
the person’s capacity to adopt a particular (or any) self‐protective measure. Finally, an
individual’s ability to manage and respond to the way in which they are presented by
others depends on variables such as age and education level.
To put the above in the context of images of a person posted online by another, in order
to take self‐protective measures in relation to an image, the image subject needs firstly
to be aware that the image exists. Secondly, the image subject needs to have the ability
to adopt a responsive strategy in relation to images of which they are aware. If images are
posted to a social networking site such as Facebook or MySpace, or a photo sharing site
such as Instagram, the image subject is more likely to be aware of the existence of the
image when the image subject also has an account with that social media provider.185 One
of the ways individuals can become aware of images of themselves is through the practice
of ‘tagging’. Where a person is tagged in a photograph on a social networking site, and
that person also has an account with the same social media provider, the person tagged
becomes aware of this. Ironically then, while photo tagging may be a means by which
photographs of oneself become available to an unintended audience, it is also a way in
which users become aware of what images of themselves exist. Although users are not
able to delete from another’s account photographs in which they are tagged, they are
able to review and remove the tags should they choose to do so.186 Besmer and Lipford
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found that among their survey participants, social networking users were well aware of
this benefit of photo tagging, with one posing the rhetorical question: ‘What if it’s [sic]
pictures out there that you’re not tagged in? How do you know that the picture is out
there?’187
Nevertheless, there are many individuals who do not participate in even the most popular
social networking sites,188 either because they choose not to or because they are actually
too young to do so. In order to join Facebook, for example, an Australian child should be
at least 13 years of age.189 Conversely, names can be attached to the depictions of any
individual in a photograph regardless of age, and this is something for which Facebook in
particular has attracted criticism.190 Therefore, individuals might not only be depicted in
an image on a social networking site, but might be identified by name in that image.
Unless the image subject is tagged in the photograph and has an account with the social
media provider, they will have no ability to remove the linking of that image with their
name, even assuming that they become aware of the existence of the image. Moreover,
there are a number of other online spaces where people can contribute images of others,
for example, YouTube. Because these sites do not have the same tagging affordances as
social network sites like Facebook, it is possible for individuals to be identified in images
but to remain unaware of the existence of the image in question or, where they are aware,
to have no ability to remove the linking of the image with their name.191
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Given the above, it is to be expected that younger children will find it more difficult to
adopt self‐protective strategies. Moreover, a person’s ability to manage impressions can
be affected by a relative lack of experience in manipulating or managing those
impressions, whether in the online or offline world.192 Moekotte et al conducted a study
of ‘at risk students’ and returning early school leavers.193 They found that although all
participants used social media,194 there was a great deal of hesitancy on their part to
engage with others online in a way that would enhance opportunities for social or
economic participation.195 Many of the participants expressed doubt that they even had
strong points that could be used for online self‐presentation,196 which might suggest that
such individuals are particularly vulnerable in the face of information presented about
them by others. A person’s ability to effectively manage online impressions of themselves
will also depend, to a large degree, on the extent to which they are familiar with
technology and the internet. Litt et al found, indeed, that when confronted by threats to
self‐presentation in the context of Facebook, those with greater skills in manipulating the
technology were better able to ameliorate the threats in question.197
Accordingly, the nature of the site to which an image is posted, as well as the age,
experience and skill set of the image subject, are likely to affect whether or not an image
subject is able to adopt substractive or repudiative strategies in relation to the image in
question. In turn, those individuals who lack the capacity to adopt a successful strategy in
response to a self‐presentational predicament, or an unfavourable impression, are
arguably more likely to experience low self‐esteem when faced with such a predicament
or impression.
C

Control Over Image as a Reflection of Relational Value and Autonomy

As discussed above, the extent to which a person is able to successfully manage
impressions of themself is likely to impact on their self‐esteem. This occurs because an
individual’s self‐judgement is influenced not only by what others think and how others
respond to them but by that individual’s own perception of the actual or likely responses
of others to the presentations of self that are made. Self‐esteem is maintained or even
raised when a person receives favourable responses or when they believe that they have
made a favourable impression on others. Self‐esteem is also maintained when the
impression put forward is consistent with a given identity claim that the individual has
made, or with a ‘front’ they wish to present to a particular audience. According to Altman,
however, the extent to which a person is able to regulate boundaries, or self‐
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presentations, can also provide more direct feedback on self‐worth by informing a person
about their relational value:
In one sense, the ability to regulate boundaries (and the failure or extreme cost in so
doing) provides a person with basic information regarding the social definition of the self,
i.e., it tells a person what the social world thinks of him as manifest in its behavior towards
him. If I see that I cannot regulate inputs from others or outputs to them when I desire to
do so, I am therefore provided with some important information about the social
environment and my ability to regulate it. If this happens with many people and in many
situations, i.e., I can seldom be private, then such information will contribute to how I
ultimately define myself as a person.198

In other words, the extent to which an individual can control access to themselves (and
by extension, personal information about themselves) is itself a source of feedback about
that individual’s relational value and, as such, may impact upon self‐worth or self‐esteem.
This is quite apart from and in addition to the consequences that may flow from a
particular failure to regulate boundaries or control information.
Reinforcing Altman’s view, and referring to other researchers’ findings, Valkenberg et al
note that control over one’s environment is one of the two most important predictors of
self‐esteem. They posit that online communication may provide adolescents with the
ability to control what they want others to know about them, as they can ‘create or modify
the presentation of themselves, and they can choose the pace, breadth and depth of self‐
disclosure’.199 However, as discussed in Section B of this Part, above, individuals in fact
have little control over the way in which others present them in the online context,
including by way of images of themselves that others might choose to upload and share.
There is the risk that individuals will be presented in a way that conflicts with their identity
claims and their desired‐for impressions. Compounding this lack of control is the nature
of the online environment itself. As was noted in Chapter One and as will be discussed in
Part Six below, information, including images, once online can remain so permanently and
can be catalogued, indexed, stored, linked to other information and often freely
reproduced without the control or even knowledge of the image subject.
As much as self‐presentation involves deciding what of oneself to present, it also involves
deciding what of oneself to keep back, and these decisions may be experienced as
volitional. Indeed, Livingstone has observed that for teenagers the decision as to what not
to say about themselves online is an ‘agentic act to protect their identity and their spaces
of intimacy.’200 Conversely, where images of one individual are posted by another, the
image subject may sense a loss of control or volition over the decision as to whether and
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how to present themselves. This is also significant because it has been found that people
have a universal and fundamental psychological need to feel, among other things, that
they are the authors and agents of their own behaviour (and thus self‐regulating or
autonomous).201
An established body of research has found that individuals who lack a subjective sense of
autonomy may experience lower wellbeing and non‐optimal functioning.202 A sense of
autonomy has been found to correlate closely with feelings of relatedness203 and to be
something that assists in the construction of a personal identity204 and emotional
functioning.205 A sense of having little control over life circumstances, conversely, has
been determined as a suicide risk factor.206 While there are numerous factors that
influence any given individual’s subjective sense of control, it would seem reasonable to
suggest that losing control over one’s image and thus one’s ability to define oneself may
contribute to an overall sense of not being in control of life circumstances. This is
particularly so if an image over which a person has no control presents them in a way that
they believe is unfavourable or which conflicts with an identity claim they have made vis‐
a‐vis the audience (or a section of it) who will have access to the image. The consequences
for an individual of loss of autonomy over an image is illustrated by the sad story of
Amanda Todd, who took her own life after being subjected to a long period of bullying.
The bullying, described in more detail in the section on relationships below, related to a
photograph of Amanda that had been placed online. Before her death, Amanda recorded
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a silent YouTube video, using a series of handwritten notes to tell her story. On one of
those notes (Figure 1, below) Amanda writes: ‘I can never get that photo back’. One the
next note she continues, ‘[i]t’s out there forever’.207

Figure 1: Still from YouTube video by Amanda Todd, recorded before she committed suicide
after a semi‐nude photograph of her was posted onto the internet208

D

Summary of Issues in this Part

This part of the chapter began by discussing the developmental significance of self‐
esteem. It was noted that there is a well‐documented and researched correlation
between high self‐esteem and a number of positive outcomes in terms of emotional
wellbeing, physical health, social interaction and behaviour. Conversely, there is
significant correlation between low self‐esteem and a number of problems, including
depression. Low self‐esteem has also been identified as a risk factor in suicide, including
youth suicide.
The link between appearance and self‐esteem was noted. It was suggested that where an
individual receives negative feedback or a negative response to their appearance in an
image, this may have a detrimental impact on that individual’s self‐esteem. This is
particularly the case if the individual’s self‐worth is especially contingent upon their
appearance. However, it was also noted that what acts upon an individual’s self‐esteem
is not only the way in which others actually respond to the individual, but that individual’s
perception of what others think or will think of them. Self‐esteem is, however, not only
linked to appearance but to the impressions one makes, or believes one has made, on
others. The centrality of the judgement of others (or the ‘generalised other’ as described
by Cooley) thus motivates individuals to engage in more or less conscious self‐
presentation, or impression management. Generally individuals seek to create favourable
(although not necessarily unrealistic) impressions of themselves as well as impressions
that are consistent with their various identity claims.
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Self‐provided personal information or other‐provided personal information, including
images, can result in a conflict with an individual’s identity claims or with their self‐
presentation goals (such as, in the context of images, where an image is incriminating or
unflattering). The potential for conflict to occur when information, including images, is
published or shared online may be greater than in a face‐to‐face context. This is due both
to the potential size of the audience and to the phenomenon known as ‘context collapse.’
Context collapse describes the fact that the boundaries between different audiences that
can be maintained in real life are more difficult if not impossible to maintain in the online
environment. Where there is a ‘collision of contexts’ or an individual’s self‐presentational
goals are otherwise challenged or compromised, this can provoke an unfavourable
response to the individual on the part of others (for example, the individual may be
teased, bullied, excluded and so forth). This response, in turn, may impact on the
individual’s self‐esteem. Moreover, self‐esteem can be affected because of an individual’s
self‐judgement about the way in which they are seen by others.
However, it must be stressed that a negative impact upon self‐esteem is not a given, not
least because individuals facing self‐presentation predicaments may successfully engage
in self‐protective behaviour to ‘repair the damage’. In the online context, the extent to
which an individual has the ability to engage in self‐protective behaviour depends on a
number of factors, including whether they have knowledge of the ‘compromising’
information and the affordances and privacy controls of the medium in which the image
is published (whether, for example, the individual has the ability to remove or request the
removal of pictures or tags). It also depends on the individual themselves; younger
children and early school leavers in particular may be less able to successfully employ self‐
protective behaviour. Moreover, every individual is different. Harter has suggested that
some individuals have a relatively stable level of overall self‐esteem, which may be
reasonably immutable to social feedback, whereas for others self‐esteem is more volatile
and subject to influence by the reactions of others.209
It has also been noted that an individual’s self‐esteem may also be affected more ‘directly’
by the extent to which that individual is able to control the presentation of self and
regulate interpersonal boundaries. Reference was made to Altman’s theory of privacy and
the suggestion that the ability (or otherwise) of an individual to control their interpersonal
boundaries, which includes the ability to manage impressions given off, provides
important information about that person’s relational value and, thus, acts back upon self‐
definition (and, by implication, self‐esteem). It was noted that a lack of control over
whether and how the self is presented may also contribute to an individual’s overall sense
of control over life, whereby a sense of little control is generally indicative of less than
optimal functioning and may also be a risk factor in suicide.
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V

RELATIONSHIPS

Whereas Part Four considered the impact on an individual’s self‐esteem of the online
publication and use of images, this part of the chapter considers the impact on
relationships of the unwanted online publication or use of images.
A

Relationships and Development

In so far as the goals of adolescence have been identified as identity formation, autonomy,
intimacy and the development of the sexual self,210 an individual’s relationship with others
is central to all of these goals. As discussed in Part Four above, the development of self‐
concept and self‐esteem is key to the construction of identity. Self‐concept is
fundamentally a social construct — the way one perceives oneself depends upon one’s
perceptions of the responses of others and the process of social interaction, and therefore
upon one’s relationships with others. Davis writes that ‘[p]eer relationships and the
context in which they are experienced become central to the identity formation process
during adolescence.’211 Davis also notes, however, that positive relationships with parents
also promote adolescents’ identity development.212 Autonomy refers to ‘young people’s
ability to feel, think and act independently’.213 Achieving the goal of autonomy involves
individuation — a gradual moving away from dependencies upon parents towards ‘more
mature relationships’, such as those with peers.214 Clearly then the formation of new
relationships and the changing nature of existing relationships are important facets of
autonomy. The development of friendships, sexual relationships and support networks in
general requires varying levels of intimacy.215 Intimacy has been said to depend on self‐
disclosure.216 Self‐disclosure, in turn, has been defined as ‘the act of revealing private
information to others’.217 Research has demonstrated that self‐disclosures in friendships
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precede self‐disclosures to romantic partners and that development of intimacy in
friendships may therefore serve to prepare young people for love relationships.218
The importance of positive relationships to all aspects of social and emotional
development is fairly self‐evident. Child development textbooks devote large sections to
a discussion of the influences and centrality of family, peer and other relationships.219
Asher and Parker argue that peer rejection has important implications for a child’s social
and emotional adjustment, both in the short and long term,220 and peer rejection has been
noted as a risk factor in suicide.221 By contrast, strong friendships and social support
networks may allow individuals to better cope with stresses222 and generally contribute
to positive mental health outcomes and general wellbeing.223 Having supportive social
relationships is also considered a protective factor against suicide.224
B

Relationships and Images

Self‐presentation and impression management are considered fundamental to the
construction and maintenance of personal relationships and to the smooth functioning of
social interaction.225 Images are one means by which impressions are created or upheld
and have been described as a ‘crucial tool’ in online self‐representation.226 Images of
oneself, of others or of places and things in one’s life are all common forms of self‐
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presentation.227 It has also been suggested that posting images online can contribute to
relationship maintenance228 and are a means of connecting with one’s offline social
group.229 Van Dijck has described digital images as a ‘new currency for social interaction’
and suggests that the circulation of such images between individuals and groups can
‘establish and reconfirm bonds’.230 However, as discussed above, the posting of images
that involve a conflict between an individual’s identity claims or a collision of the ‘fronts’
ordinarily presented to different audiences may entail social consequences. As Foddy and
Finighan observed:
Even the most intimate of friends are happy to remain ignorant of some of each other’s
habits and thoughts; in some cases this may be essential if they are to continue to relate
to each other comfortably. Thus, individuals will sometimes resist being ‘told’ certain
things about others with whom they have to interact. Parents and teachers often prefer
not to know about acts of deviance on the parts of their charges because this knowledge
could force them to take actions that might conflict with other goals they may have.231

Visual images, as with other information, provide ‘social cues’232 and have been shown to
bias the assessments of others.233 Where an individual is not in control of the publication
of images of themself, that individual is also not in control of the impressions or cues given
off by those images. In turn, this impact on the way that individual is judged by others; on
the social value that an individual perceives they have; as well as on an individual’s actual
social value. Pozzi observed that
many online relationships are anchored offline. In this respect, due to the anchoring of
online relationships to the offline, it becomes important to maintain synergy across
whatever identity claims are being made and maintain a consistent identity performance
across mediums.234

In line with Pozzi’s observations, Marder et al found that when users of social networking
sites believe that they are not appearing as they ought to be, there is the potential for
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‘relational tension and anxiety in social networks’.235 In terms of parental relationships,
research has shown that adolescents who experience trusting relationships with parents
are more likely to commit to a particular identity choice, which, in turn, enhances self‐
worth and social validation.236 Accordingly, the publication of an image of an adolescent
that conflicts with that adolescent’s identity claims vis‐a‐vis their parents may endanger
that level of trust and hence the relationship itself. This is significant even if the damage
to the parental relationship is short‐lived, given that positive parental relationships have
been shown to impact the quality of adolescents’ friendships.237 In terms of peer
relationships, Davis refers to the fact that during their peer interactions, adolescents
‘develop and reinforce shared norms, such as distinct language use, clothing style, music
preferences’, which they use as ‘identity markers’ and to reinforce a sense of belonging
with those who share their interests and values.238 Accordingly, the publication of an
image of an adolescent that does not conform to one or more of those norms might
negatively impact upon that shared sense of belonging.
A striking example of the impact that a video can have on an individual’s relationships and
social networks is that of Amanda Todd. Amanda Todd was a Canadian teenager who took
her life at the age of 15.239 In a video recorded shortly before her death and using a series
of hand‐written messages to tell her story (see Figure 2 for an example), Amanda
explained that in seventh grade she and her friend would use a webcam to meet and talk
to new people.

Figure 2: Still image from Amanda Todd's YouTube video240
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Amanda was persuaded to expose her breasts online to a man she had never met in
person. That stranger captured a photograph of her and threatened to show it to people
she knew. Amanda describes how she received a message on Facebook from the stranger
saying ‘if you don’t put on a show for me I will send your boobs’. She also explains that
the man ‘knew my address, school, relatives, friends, family names’. One year, during
Christmas break, Amanda received a knock on the door at 4am from the police informing
her that her photograph had been sent to everyone. As a result Amanda developed
anxiety, depression and a panic disorder and got involved in drugs and alcohol. She moved
school but the stranger managed to track her down and find out the names of her new
friends. He made a Facebook page using the photo of her breasts as her profile picture.
Amanda tells how she then lost all of her friends ‘again’ and that nobody liked her, judged
her and called her names. Later Amanda was attacked outside school and the attack was
filmed and posted on Facebook. Following the attack, Amanda attempted suicide but was
taken to hospital and recovered. Despite moving schools yet again, Amanda tells that she
continued to be bullied online. She ends the video ‘I’m stuck … whats left of me now …
nothing stops. I have nobody … I need someone.’ 241 Just over four weeks after posting the
video Amanda was found dead.242
Another example of the impact that the posting of images online can have on an
individual’s relationships is that of Ghyslain Raza who, as a 14‐year‐old, made a video of
himself ‘clumsily’ imitating a Star Wars Jedi Knight.243 The video was posted onto the
internet by his classmates, without Ghyslain’s knowledge, and was consequently viewed
by tens of millions of viewers.244 The consequences for Ghyslain were severe — he was
subjected to bullying and harassment and states that he ‘lost what few friends he had in
the fallout’.245 Kowalski et al write that Ghyslain was forced to change schools and
required psychiatric help.246
Although these examples are extreme, involving as they do harassment and bullying, the
publication or dissemination of images may have a more ‘subtle’ effect on an individual’s
social standing and, thus, upon their friendships and social support networks. As discussed
above, the posting of images may act back upon an individual’s self‐esteem because of an
individual’s own self‐judgement. Poor self‐esteem can ultimately have consequences for
social relationships. This is not least because, as already noted, low self‐esteem individuals
may be less socially confident than high self‐esteem individuals and may find it more
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difficult to construct and maintain friendships and positive relationships.247 Moreover, as
discussed in Part Four above, lower self‐esteem individuals might be less motivated to
engage in techniques that create favourable self‐impressions, even in response to
unfavourable impressions.
C

Summary of this Part

Because impression management is fundamental to the creation and maintenance of
relationships, and visual images are one way in which impressions are managed, the
online publication of an unwanted image — particularly where it conflicts with an
individual’s identity claims — can negatively affect an individual’s relationships. The effect
on relationships can be more or less direct. It is more direct when an image causes
individuals to form an unfavourable impression of the image subject, and perhaps act on
that impression by responding in a certain way towards the image subject (such as by
excluding them from certain social events). It is less direct when the publication of an
image causes the image subject to experience low self‐esteem, which, in turn, acts back
on their ability to form and maintain relationships and on their sense of belonging. These
effects, in turn, pose a risk to optimal development. This is because of the centrality of
relationships to the goals of adolescence — namely identity formation, autonomy,
intimacy and the development of the sexual self — and the fact that supportive
relationships are also an important determinant of wellbeing.
VI

CAN THE UNWANTED ONLINE PUBLICATION OF IMAGES HAVE A POSITIVE
IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT?

Thus far it has been argued that the unwanted online publication of images of children
and young people may have detrimental consequences for development by lowering self‐
esteem or impacting on an individual’s relationships. However, might it be argued that
the unwanted online posting of an image can actually have positive developmental
implications? For example, where an image reveals a person engaged in antisocial or
‘norm‐violating’ behaviour or underage drinking, it is arguable that the revelation of that
behaviour, while unwanted by the person in question, could lead to interventions (by
parents or others) that could in fact be ultimately beneficial to the image subject. Perhaps
the revelation might lead to self‐reflection and, ultimately, self‐motivated behaviour
change? Stern describes situations in which the reactions of visitors to online
presentations of oneself instigated a change in self‐concept, self‐presentation and
ultimately (in some cases) the author’s offline behaviour.248 Indeed, social interaction
theory would suggest that public behaviour and public evaluation may have a greater
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impact on self‐concept change (leading in some cases to behaviour change) than private
behaviour.249
It could, moreover, be argued that the posting of ‘unflattering’ photographs might serve
as an antidote to narcissistic tendencies,250 or perhaps encourage resilience251 and assist
individuals to develop strength of character. These may also be outcomes where
embarrassing or humiliating photographs are posted.252 Moreover, there are those who
have suggested that an exaggerated sense of competence (that is, where a person’s sense
of their accomplishments or competence in a particular domain does not in fact match
their level of competence in a particular area) may well lead to high self‐esteem but can
have other less positive outcomes.253 Perhaps, then, this is a reason to argue that
challenging an individual’s false or exaggerated identity claims through the publication of
images that introduce a ‘dose of reality’ is in fact a useful way of encouraging a more
realistic perception of self. Furthermore, there are those who would challenge the
underlying assumption that high levels of self‐esteem are necessarily a good thing:
Tennen and Affleck, for example, have suggested that individuals high in self‐esteem may
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derogate others and engage in generally ‘maladaptive behaviour’ in order to enhance
their high self‐esteem.254
While these arguments are valid, a number of points can be made in response. Although
the publication of an image of underage drinking or involvement in a fight may ultimately
have positive consequences for behaviour change (such as where it leads to a successful
intervention), there are potentially ongoing negative consequences for the image subject
even after behaviour change has occurred. Firstly, it is important to remember that the
affordances of the internet mean that images can remain online and searchable
indefinitely. Solove opens his book The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumour and Privacy
on the Internet with the true story of a young Korean woman who became widely known
as ‘dog poop girl’ when she refused to clean up after her dog that had defecated on a
subway train in South Korea. Solove explains that someone took a photograph of the girl
and posted it online, at which point things got ‘even uglier’.255 Solove goes on to quote
directly from a blog published by Don Park, explaining what happened next:
Within hours, she was labelled gac‐ttong‐nyue (dog shit girl) and her pictures and parodies
were everywhere. Within days, her identity and her past were revealed. Requests for
information about her parents and relatives started popping up and people started to
recognise her by the dog and the bag she was carrying as well as her watch, clearly visible
in the original picture. All mentions of privacy invasion were shouted down … The common
excuse for their behaviour was that the girl doesn’t deserve privacy.256

Solove goes on to express his disagreement with the views of one commentator that the
dog poop girl would ‘be forgotten by the end of the season’, writing as follows:
But this comment is inaccurate. She will not be forgotten. That’s what the Internet
changes. Whereas before the girl would have been remembered merely by a few as just
some woman who wouldn’t clean up dog poop, now her image and identity are eternally
preserved in electrons. Forever she will be the ‘dog poop girl’; forever she will be captured
in Google’s unforgiving memory; and forever, she will be in the digital doghouse for being
rude and inconsiderate.257

Mayer‐Schönberger suggests that the ‘perfect memory’ of the internet in fact impedes
the ability of individuals to change and that ‘by recalling forever each of our errors and
transgressions, digital memory rejects our capacity to learn from them, to grow and to
evolve’:258
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In this sense, forgetfulness is seen as fundamental to the development of self and identity,
as well as to the capacity of individuals to make effective decisions. Being perpetually
confronted with things from their past that they would otherwise, naturally, have
forgotten or assimilated in time will, it has been suggested, make it difficult for individuals
to live and act in the present ‘cognizant of, but not shackled by, past events’. This
perspective focusses then not only on the future impact of persistent digital memory but
on present consequences of that persistence.259

Additionally, where an image depicts antisocial or norm‐violating behaviour, the response
to that image may involve a degree of disapprobation that, while it might succeed in
bringing about behaviour change in the individual concerned, might also be excessive. As
Solove has pointed out, ‘[h]aving a permanent record of norm violations is upping the
sanction to a whole new level.’260 An example of this is seen in the story of the dog poop
girl, referred to above. Another example is to be found in the story of the ‘cat bin woman’.
The UK Guardian reported on this story in 2010:
One inexplicable moment of cruelty when Mary Bale seized a cat and dropped it into a
wheelie bin was punished with a modest £250 fine … But the 45‐year‐old former bank
worker may pay the price for her impulsive act for the rest of her life.
The ‘cat bin woman’ from Coventry became reviled around the world, receiving abusive
phone calls and death threats from as far afield as Australia, after what she described as
a ‘split second of misjudgement’ — which was captured on CCTV and uploaded to
YouTube.261

Although Solove relates the degree of disapprobation to the permanence of the record,
the degree of disapprobation should be considered also by the extent to which the
information is disseminated, as well as to other attributes of information online — namely
that it might remain searchable and linkable to other information about the individual
concerned. This is concerning when others base important decisions affecting the
individual on information obtained from an online search. Hammer’s doctoral research,
for example, found that images posted on social media with an emphasis on drinking
alcohol had a negative effect on the way potential employers perceived of the image
subject as a potential employee.262 In Google, the European Court of Justice commented
on the potential for search engines to interfere with an individual’s right to privacy and
the protection of their data. In the Court’s view, the inclusion of links in a search page
following a search against that individual’s name constituted a serious invasion of that
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individual’s right to privacy and data protection because it allowed internet users to
obtain, through the list of results,
a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on
the internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his
private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or
could have been only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a more or less
detailed profile of him.263

Against arguments that the posting of ‘unflattering’ photographs might serve as an
antidote to narcissistic tendencies, or perhaps encourage resilience and develop strength
of character, research suggests that people with a narcissistic personality generally exhibit
reasonably high self‐esteem. Therefore, while images that challenge the way in which
narcissistic individuals perceive themselves may have an impact on their self‐esteem, the
impact is unlikely to reduce what is an overall level of high self‐esteem to an overall low
level of self‐esteem.264 Conversely, those individuals who exhibit low self‐esteem are
generally more vulnerable to further ‘attacks’ on their self‐worth. This is because, as
discussed above, low levels of self‐esteem correlate with lower levels of resilience and
higher levels of depression.265 The already low self‐esteem individuals are, then, at risk of
serious negative outcomes where unflattering or embarrassing images are posted online
and may be less likely to demonstrate resilience in the face of such attacks.
Moreover, although it may be considered ‘fair game’ to challenge a person’s identity
claims when those claims are exaggerated or false, it should be remembered that virtually
everyone presents different ‘fronts’ to different ‘audiences’. Indeed, the presentation of
different ‘selves’ or ‘fronts’ is generally considered necessary for smooth social interaction
and therefore to relationships.266 As also noted in Part Four above, the ability to
determine boundaries is also vital to self‐definition. Given that the internet is a space
where the usual boundaries between otherwise discrete audiences are often not in place,
the consequences of posting an image that challenges the front a person usually presents
to a particular audience can be devastating. An example of this collision of fronts occurred
in the Amanda Todd case referred to previously, where images meant for one audience
(a single individual) were presented to various audiences; Amanda’s intimate photograph
was made available to members of her family and school community.
Further, it must be recalled that the issue is the online posting of images of children and
adolescents. While there is fierce debate over whether and to what extent self‐esteem is
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a relatively stable construct throughout adult life,267 there is wide acceptance of the fact
that childhood, and adolescence in particular, is considered a crucial time for the
development of self‐esteem.268 Harter notes that evidence reveals that self‐evaluative
judgements tend to become less positive as children move into middle childhood and that
there is a further decline during early adolescence and gradual gains over the high school
years.269 Harter notes that developmentally, and in accordance with the ‘looking‐glass‐
self formulation’, children tend to ‘adopt about themselves the views of significant others
but then gradually internalise these attitudes of others towards the self.’270 Once attitudes
of others have been internalised, Harter and Whitesell argue, young people may become
less preoccupied with what others, particularly their peers, think of them.271 However,
Harter and Whitesell note that individuals appear to progress at different rates towards
the ‘goal’ of internalisation272 and conclude that those individuals who remain more
preoccupied with the opinions of others generally report less concentration on
schoolwork, lower overall self‐esteem and less peer approval than do those who have
internalised a ‘generalised other’ sense of self.273 Arguably, then, those individuals may
be more vulnerable, in terms of self‐esteem levels, to ‘compromising’, ‘unfavourable’ or
‘embarrassing’ material posted online than those who have already internalised a
generalised other. Given that childhood and adolescence is a period during which the
process of internalisation of the attitudes of others towards them takes place, the
importance of generally positive feedback in order to develop high self‐esteem cannot be
overstated. In other words, given that childhood and adolescence is a time when the self‐
concept and self‐esteem are vulnerable and more likely to be moulded by the reaction of
significant others, it is important to healthy development that events do not encourage
children to internalise negative responses.
The impact of online publication of images on self‐esteem and a sense of autonomy is
compounded by affordances of the internet such that, as already discussed, information
may be available permanently, may be widely disseminated and can potentially be
searched and linked to other information. As was mentioned in Chapter One, concerns
about the online posting of images may be accentuated by the development of face
recognition search engines and the linking or tagging of images with names and other data
about the image subject.274 Langos has referred to a number of factors likely to exacerbate
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the harm experienced in relation to cyberbullying,275 some of which arguably apply to the
harm experienced in relation to the online posting of images even where that would not
constitute ‘cyberbullying’. One of these factors is the spatial distance between the “cyber
world” and the “real world” whereby ‘[a] perpetrator, who is sheltered from the visual or
aural response of their victim by the presence of the screen, is less likely to be affected by
feelings of empathy.’276 Thus, in the context of the posting of images, a person sheltered
from the immediate responses of the image subject may think less about the
consequences for that image subject (where these might otherwise be apparent). Another
factor is the ‘anonymity’ of the perpetrator.277 According to Langos, the perceived
anonymity of a perpetrator can ‘exacerbate the power imbalance between the
perpetrator and the victim. A victim may experience fear and insecurity as a result of not
knowing the identity of the perpetrator. A victim may feel frustrated and powerless.’278
Where the person posting an unwanted image is anonymous, this is likely to compound
any sense on the part of an image subject that they have lost autonomy in the sense of
being able to control access to themself. Victims may experience feelings of ‘distrust and
despair’ due to not knowing from whom or where their torment originates.279
It is also necessary to consider that there is very little empirical evidence of the long‐term
effects on development of the online publication of personal information, including
images. The lack of knowledge is a reason to be cautious, at best, in suggesting that the
online publication of unwanted images can have a positive impact on the image subject’s
development. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that there are many positive
developmental implications for children in capturing and sharing images of others and
being active participants in using technology, including the internet and social media
platforms.280 The practice of capturing and sharing images of others is also an instance of
freedom of expression. As will be noted in Chapter Five, freedom of expression is a civil
right that, along with others, is considered ‘fundamental to guaranteeing the right to
health and development of adolescents.’281 Therefore, any response to the issue of
unwanted publication needs to consider the overall effect on the interests, rights and
freedoms of others.
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VII 9CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter began by noting the gaps in the literature regarding the implications for
development of the unwanted online publication or distribution of an image of a child or
young person. The use of images to perpetrate bullying or victimisation has been widely
noted, and has even been described as a particularly ‘impactful’ form of bullying or
victimisation. While there is fairly extensive research on the developmental implications
of bullying and victimisation for victims in general, that research rarely delves into the
reasons why the publication and distribution of images as a form of bullying or
victimisation has such impact. This chapter has added to that limited research by
suggesting that the online publication or sharing of images within a cyberbullying context
(as well as other contexts) is so impactful due to an inherent desire on the part of
individuals to create favourable impressions and the fact that the unwanted publication
or use of an image impacts directly and indirectly on an individual’s self‐esteem and on
their relationships with and sense of connection to others.
After establishing the scope and framework of the research in this chapter in Part Three,
Part Four then considered the centrality of self‐esteem to the development of identity.
Literature on the link between self‐esteem and appearance was referred to. It was noted
that when a person receives negative feedback or a negative response to their appearance
in an image, this may have a detrimental impact on that individual’s self‐esteem. It was
also noted that an individual’s self‐esteem can be negatively impacted not because of the
way in which others actually respond to the individual, but because of the individual’s
perception of how others might see them.
Moving beyond the link between self‐esteem and appearance, literature on the centrality
of impression management or self‐presentation to the development of positive self‐
esteem was discussed. It was noted that individuals generally aim to create favourable
(although not necessarily unrealistic) impressions of themselves, as well as impressions
that are consistent with their various identity claims. The phenomenon of context collapse
was discussed and it was seen that this phenomenon can make it more difficult for an
individual to manage impressions of themselves in an online environment. Context
collapse is the term given to the fact that in the online environment, particularly in the
context of social media, discrete audiences are often merged so that information is
‘pushed’ to all those with access to the online material, even if it was intended for a
particular group. Thus information or images that may be considered appropriate
amongst friends may not be considered appropriate when seen by family members, work
colleagues or professional contacts. An individual’s self‐esteem can be lowered if they
have created an unfavourable impression of themselves vis‐a‐vis a particular audience, or
even if they believe they have done so.
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The literature on self‐esteem and impression management tends to support both of the
propositions advanced at the beginning of this chapter in relation to the unwanted online
publication and distribution of images. The first proposition was that the detrimental
effect on development can occur even where the publication or sharing of an image is not
ill‐intentioned. This proposition is supported by the research demonstrating that an image
subject’s self‐esteem is influenced by self‐judgement. A person can form a negative self‐
judgement if they believe an image depicting them is unflattering or unfavourable — this
might be a purely subjective belief and not actually shared by others (including the person
publishing or sharing the image). It is worth recalling here Charon’s observations that even
when others actually like us, we may misinterpret their actions towards us as negative (or
vice versa).282 The second proposition was that detriment can occur regardless of whether
or not the image can be described, objectively, as harmful. Clearly, given that an image
subject’s subjective response to how they come across (or how they believe they come
across) to others can impact upon their self‐esteem, even a ‘benign’ or ‘anodyne’ image
can harm self‐esteem. This is not to say that ill‐intentioned behaviour on the part of the
person publishing or sharing an image of another is irrelevant in terms of the impact on
another’s self‐esteem. Neither is it to say that the nature of the image is irrelevant. Clearly
where others intend to harm or embarrass an individual, or where an image is likely to
have that effect, this is all likely to act upon that individual’s self‐judgement.
Part Four also explained the link between self‐esteem and autonomy. It was noted that
an individual’s self‐esteem can be affected by the extent to which they are able to control
the presentation of self and regulate interpersonal boundaries. The impact on autonomy
is quite apart from any consequences that might ensue from the publication or
distribution of an image, or from any impact on self‐esteem related to a person’s self‐
judgement in relation to the image in question. The link between autonomy and self‐
esteem also supports the two propositions advanced in the chapter. An individual’s sense
of control over how they are represented visually is potentially compromised whenever
others make decisions about how that individual is represented, such as by taking and
publishing or sharing images of the image subject, or when the individual has no capacity
to remove an image from publication or prevent it from being shared. An individual may
experience a lack of control even when others are well‐intentioned in their decision to
post or share images of that individual, or when the images are not inherently
embarrassing, harmful and so on.
Part Five of this chapter discussed the importance of positive relationships to
development. It was argued here that the online publication or use of an image without
the image subject’s consent — particularly where that image conflicts with an individual’s
identity claims — can negatively affect an individual’s relationships. The effect on
relationships can be ascribed to the fact that the image causes others to form an
282

Charon, above n 60, 84.
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unfavourable impression of the image subject. Those individuals might, in turn, react
towards the image subject (such as by excluding them from certain social events) in a way
that impacts upon the image subject’s sense of belonging and feelings of relatedness with
others. However, the effect on the image subject’s relationships can also occur more
indirectly: the publication of images (for reasons discussed in Part Four) can impact upon
an individual’s self‐esteem, which, in turn, can impact on an individual’s relationships and
their sense of connection with others.
It should be clear that the link between relationships and the unwanted publication or use
of images also supports both of the propositions that were advanced at the beginning of
this chapter. It is not necessary for an individual to be motivated by ill‐intent when
publishing or sharing an image of another for that image to adversely impact on another’s
relationships. For example, a person may post to a social media page a photograph of a
female school friend, at a party, sitting on a boy’s knee. The publication of the photograph
on Facebook may simply be motivated by the photographer’s desire to share images of
the party (perhaps this enhances their own identity claims or sense of belonging). The
person posting the picture might be unaware of the fact that the girl comes from a very
strict religious family who take a strong view on physical contact between the opposite
sexes. If the family are able to view the photograph this could pose a risk to the image
subject’s family or community relationships. As shown in Part Five, family relationships
also impact upon peer relationships. This outcome, moreover, can occur even though the
image would not be described, objectively, as embarrassing, intimate, harmful, and so
forth.
Part Six considered whether there are positive developmental implications for children
arising from the practice of the online publication of images, or sharing of online images.
Overall it was argued that in relation to children who are image subjects the potentially
harmful repercussions of the unwanted online publication or distribution of images can
outweigh the potential benefits. This is, not least, because publication or distribution in
the online environment can have unforeseeable or future consequences due to the
affordances of the internet, such that information (and images) are storable, searchable
and linkable with other information. The discussion in this chapter was intended to cover
only some of the possible developmental implications relating to the issue of the way
children are visually represented online by others. Given the paucity of research in this
area, it is likely that there are other implications not explored here.
However, it also needs to be recognised that there are likely to be numerous positive
developmental implications for children arising from the ability to capture, share and use
images of others, including the development of social networks and self‐identity. The
capture, use and sharing of images of others by children is also a form of expression and
it must be remembered that under the CRC children have a right to freedom of expression,
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as well as a right to development.283 These rights are elaborated further in Chapter Five.
Moreover, a response that seeks to protect children against harm or the risk of harm does
not necessarily, overall, promote optimal development. For example, a response that
attempted to regulate children’s access to the internet or social media as a way of
protecting them against the risk of harm would compromise positive developmental
processes, including identity formation, community building and creativity.284 It would
also compromise the development of ‘digital age literacies’, which encompass technical
skills as well as ‘competence in navigating the social nature of participatory media’.285
Therefore, any legal response to the risks outlined in this chapter needs to take into
account not only the efficacy of the response in addressing the risk of harm, but the
implications of that response on positive developmental experiences as well as its impact
on the various interests, rights and freedoms of others.
This chapter has not drawn any conclusions as to what if anything should be done to
mitigate the risks outlined. The answer to that question depends in part on whether the
risks are considered acceptable — part of the price of living in the digital age, perhaps.
However, as is argued later in Chapter Five, Australian’s commitment to the right of
development — where development is interpreted holistically to include a child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development286 — suggests
that these risks do need to be addressed where this is possible. This chapter has also not
considered what could be done to mitigate those risks. Possible regulatory solutions to
address these risks are discussed later in Chapter Six.
The risks identified in this chapter arise in part because children have little control over
whether and how they are represented online. From a regulatory point of view there are
few laws that prohibit the capture of an image of a child or young person, although the
capture of images of children is prohibited in some limited circumstances.287 Another
factor that gives rise to the risks identified in this chapter is that children have little if any
control over images once they have been published online, although this is not to say they
have none. In particular, unless the image subject themself has posted an image to their
own social media page or to a web page that they control (and it has remained there and
not been copied elsewhere) there are few options for removing the image. The purpose
of the next chapter is to consider in detail the extent to which children do have ‘control’
over the capture of an image or over an image itself, once it has been published online.
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CRC art 6(2) (right to development) and art 13 (right to freedom of expression).
See, eg, Swist above n 280; Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 280.
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Aspen Institute Task Force above n 280.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5: General Measures of Implementation of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 34th sess, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/05 (27 November 2003) 4 [12].
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Which will be discussed in the following chapter.
284

97

CHAPTER THREE –REVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the unwanted online publication of images of children and
young people, as well as the unwanted use of online images. The reason this issue is
important is because, as was explained in Chapter Two, the online publication of images
of children, or their subsequent use, can lead to developmental harm on the part of the
image subject. That harm is more likely when images are initially published without the
consent of the image subject, or where online images are further published in a way or
context that is unwanted by the image subject.1 Chapter Two argued that the nature of
images combined with the affordances of the internet (not least the persistence and
searchability of data once online) are such that an individual’s self‐esteem and
relationships, and thus their development, can be detrimentally impacted by the presence
of an image online. Despite this, children and young people have little control over how
they are represented visually in the online environment. Subject to some exceptions,
children are generally unable to prevent the capture of images of themselves and are also
unable to prevent the publication of images, or secure their removal from publication.
The factors that prevent children from being fully autonomous and deciding for
themselves whether an image should be captured and whether and in what circumstances
an image should be published are various, as are those that prevent children being able
to remove unwanted images from online publication or prevent the subsequent use of an
online image in a way that is unwanted. Some of these factors, explained in more detail
in Chapter Five, include social norms around photography and the online publication of
images of others; market factors (for example, social media sites actively encouraging
individuals to share information and photographs about themselves and their friends);
particular features of technology (for example, the ease by which images are able to be
captured, copied and shared online); and the regulatory environment.
This thesis will develop the proposition that children need greater control over the online
publication of images of themselves in order to protect them from the potential
developmental harms outlined in Chapter Two. It will be argued in Chapter Five that
regulation is an essential tool in providing children with greater control over images of
themselves and that the current regulatory environment does not provide sufficient
control. That argument rests, in turn, on the proposition that there are gaps in the current
regulatory environment. It is the purpose of this chapter and the next to identify those
gaps. This is done by first considering to what extent the current regulatory framework in
Australia allows individuals to exercise a measure of ‘control’ over their image in the
1

See further Chapter Two, Part Four.
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online environment. This chapter will therefore overview the limitations of various private
law and criminal law actions in providing children and young people with ‘control’ over
the capture, publication and use of their image. Those limitations will then be illustrated
in the context of various hypothetical case studies set out in the following chapter.
In this chapter the word ‘control’ is used in a very broad sense to mean the availability of
some form of legal redress with respect to the unwanted capture, publication or use of an
image in which the individual is a subject. Redress can take many forms, of course. While
it might allow an individual to secure removal of an image from publication, this is not a
given. It is probably true to say that an individual who is denied the ability to secure
removal of an image of themself from unwanted publication is unlikely to regard any other
form of redress as giving them a measure of ‘control’ over their image. However, as is
discussed in Chapter Five, there is interdependence between social norms and the law.2
Where social norms are developing rather than entrenched, as seems to be the case in
the online context, law is an important factor in influencing what norms develop (just as
norms and expectations have a more or less direct influence on law3).4 As such, the
availability of some form of redress vis‐a‐vis the capture, publication or use of an image is
likely to be an important tool in shaping social norms, thereby, albeit indirectly, affecting
the extent to which, in practice, children have control over the capture, publication and
use of their image.
II

CHAPTER OUTLINE AND SCOPE

The discussion part of this chapter (Part Three) provides an overview of the various private
law and criminal law actions that may provide redress to a person in relation to the
unwanted capture, publication or use of an image. Following that, Part Four will offer a
brief summary of the limitations of these actions in providing an individual with redress
for the capture, publication or use of their image. The p
A description of the broad legal context is a necessary starting point because it is only
when the limitations or shortcomings of the existing legal and regulatory framework are
2

Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006) 124.
A relevant example here is the reasonable expectations of privacy test: a ’formula that features, either as
the test, or as part of the test, of actionability in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States and
Canada; in European human rights law; and in private law cases in England, New Zealand and the United
States’: NSWLRC, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 20 [5.4]. The reasonable expectations of privacy
test has been described as ‘a reflection of contemporary societal values’ (Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR
1 [250] (Tipping J) (‘Hosking’)), but also as a ‘normative judicial finding … on … the current demand for the
legal protection of privacy and on whether the law ought to protect privacy in the particular circumstances’:
NSWLRC at 21 [5.5]. Solove has argued that focusing only on people’s current expectations of (social norms
around) privacy would, over time, erode the concept of privacy, given the level of surveillance which exists
in the modern world: Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualising Privacy’ (2002) 90 University of California Law Review
1087, 1142.
4
Indeed, when law mandates education in order to change social norms this is, as Lessig points out, an
example of a legal constraint operating indirectly (rather than directly by way of a sanction‐backed
constraint on behaviour): Lessig, above n 2, 131.
3
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clear that the need for new law can be assessed and any proposals for the introduction of
new laws can be properly evaluated. However, some of detail of the causes of action or
other means of redress considered here can only be truly appreciated when those laws
are applied to specific fact scenarios. Furthermore, it is only in applying the legal
framework to specific fact situations that some of the complexities and ‘grey areas’ are
highlighted. Therefore, the following chapter (Chapter Four) will build upon the overview
offered in this chapter by illustrating the application of some of the causes of action and
regulatory regimes to various case studies.
The purpose of this chapter is not to make a judgement on the value of the claim to
control, nor to consider the most appropriate remedies or forms of redress in relation to
the unwanted publication or use of image, although this will be explored further in
Chapter Six. This chapter also does not aim to describe every element of or every defence
to the legal causes of action or criminal offences considered, nor every aspect of the
legislation discussed. Rather, the aim is to highlight the limitations of current Australian
law in providing individuals with redress in relation to the unwanted capture, publication
or use of an image.
The regulatory framework itself is not, of course, determinative of how much control
children actually have over images of themselves, and says nothing about how relatively
easy or difficult it is to exercise control. To this end, other important considerations are
the availability of non‐legal mechanisms by which individuals might be able to control
their image and also access to justice and the cross‐jurisdictional enforceability of laws. In
order to determine how much control children in particular have over images, it is also
necessary to consider the ease or otherwise of procedures and processes by which
children can avail themselves of protection and focus on the attitude adopted by the
courts to claims before them.5 Nevertheless, this chapter confines itself to an examination
of the content and scope of the current Australian regulatory framework in providing
individuals with control over the unauthorised publication or subsequent use of images
of themselves.6
Although a broad range of legal actions are overviewed in this section, the aim is not to
‘cover the field’ and there may be some fact‐specific situations that give rise to legal
actions or remedies not mentioned here. For instance, where an image is captured and
published by a media outlet, whether online or otherwise, that media outlet might be
governed by industry standards such as those set by the Australian Press Council7 or those
5

Such as whether the courts adopt what Tobin has described as a ‘substantive rights approach’ in relation
to the rights of children: John Tobin, ‘Judging the Judges: Are they Adopting the Rights Approach in Matters
Involving Children?’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 579.
6
The term ‘image’ as used in this chapter includes photographic, videographic or cinematographic images,
no matter what format those images are captured or stored in, but does not include other forms of
representations of likeness, such as portraiture, drawings, sculptures and so forth.
7
Australian Press Council, Statements of Principles (2014) <http://www.presscouncil.org.au/statements‐of‐
principles/> and Specific Standards <http://www.presscouncil.org.au/specific‐standards/>. As to members
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registered under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) (‘BSA’).8 The use of an image in
an advertisement may contravene a provision of the Advertising Standard Bureau codes
of ethics or practice guidelines. A consideration of those regulatory regimes is beyond the
scope of this chapter, although the complaints mechanisms available under these codes
may enable an aggrieved individual to successfully obtain redress in relation to the
unauthorised publication or use of their image. However, three of the case studies
discussed in the following chapter will make reference, where relevant, to other
mechanisms of redress not discussed in this chapter. There may be scope, in some
situations, for an image subject to argue that the unauthorised publication of their image
constitutes a breach of a duty of care for the purposes of a negligence action.9 Likewise,
laws regulating individual behaviour in public places might, in certain circumstances, be
invoked to provide a measure of privacy protection for individuals,10 and where a criminal
offence has been committed conspiracy offences may also be relevant. However, these
actions are not considered in this chapter.
Although self‐regulation on the part of internet intermediaries11 is an important part of
the regulatory environment, this section does not consider in any detail the various terms
and conditions of internet content hosts12 or internet service providers,13 nor the industry
codes to which they may be party. Nevertheless, several of the case studies in Chapter
and constituent bodies of the Australian Press Council, see Australian Press Council, Who we Are
<http://www.presscouncil.org.au/who‐we‐are/>.
8
BSA s 123. For details of and links to Registered Codes and Schemes see Australian Communications and
Media
Authority
(‘ACMA’),
Register
of
Broadcasting
Codes
and
Schemes
Index
<http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The‐ACMA‐story/Regulating/broadcasting‐codes‐schemes‐
index‐radio‐content‐regulation‐i‐acma>.
9
This was the contention made by the plaintiff in Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC
1183 (4 October 2012) (‘Saad’) in which the plaintiff pleaded causes of action in negligence and defamation
(and later sought leave to amend it to include other causes of action, including breach of confidence and
invasion of privacy). The court refused to strike out the negligence claim against the first defendant.
10
For example, Department of Communications (Cth), Australian Government, Enhancing Online Safety for
Children: Public Consultation on Key Election Commitments (2014) 11, which notes that ‘issues relating to
online content can be the basis for complaints to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) under
federal anti‐discrimination law (for example, online content that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment
or racial hatred)’. See also R v Rowe [2005] 2 NZLR 833, a New Zealand case in which the appellant failed in
his bid to have his conviction overturned for taking surreptitious photographs of schoolgirls walking to
school under a section of the criminal law relating to behaving in an offensive manner in a public place. For
further discussion of the case see, generally, Paul Roth, ‘Unlawful Photography in Public Places: the New
Zealand Position’ (2006) 11(8) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 213.
11
The term ‘internet intermediary’ is used here in the same sense as it is used by the ALRC in its 2014 report,
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report no 123 (2014) 207 [11.100] and note 125: the
ALRC notes that the term ‘internet intermediary’ is a broad one, ‘commonly used to cover carriage service
providers, such as Telstra or Optus; content hosts, such as Google or Yahoo!; and search service and
application service providers, such as Facebook, Flickr and YouTube’ referring to Peter Leonard, ‘Safe
Harbors in Choppy Waters – Building a Sensible Approach to Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Australia’
(2010) 3 Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law 221, 226.
12
As that term is defined in the Broadcasting Standards Act 1992 (Cth) sch 5, cl 91(1)(b). See further the List
of Defined Terms used in this thesis.
13
As that term is defined in the Broadcasting Standards Act 1992 (Cth) sch 5, cl 8. See further the List of
Defined Terms used in this thesis.
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Four do touch on some of these specific provisions and Part Three, section 13 below
considers in a general sense the contractual force (if any) of the terms of service of certain
social media providers. Finally, it should be noted that while the focus of this thesis is the
online publication of images or their subsequent use, this chapter is not limited to
considering laws that regulate only online publication or the use of online images. That is
because, generally speaking — although with some exceptions that will be discussed in
Part Three — such laws that do regulate the capture, publication and use of images are
technology neutral.
III

DISCUSSION

This section begins in Part A by overviewing various private law causes of action that can
be relied upon to remedy the unauthorised publication or use of images in some
circumstances. It also considers the utility of contractual provisions and agreements
between internet content hosts (specifically certain popular social media providers) and
individuals, in so far as these may provide redress for the unwanted publication or use of
an image. Part B provides an overview of the federal regime relating to information
privacy, and the limitations of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) in regulating the capture and use
of images. Part C briefly outlines the recently introduced Enhancing Online Safety for
Children Act 2015 (Cth) and the complaints system introduced under that legislation,
which is designed to allow, among other things, for the rapid removal from social media
services of cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child. Part D outlines the
regulatory regime of the BSA in so far as it applies to online content, and Part E overviews
criminal offences that may be applicable to the capture and use of images.
A

Private Law Actions

1 Common Law Action for Invasion of Privacy
The existence of a common law action for invasion of privacy has been recognised in
Australia at a lower court level in the cases of Grosse v Purvis14 and Doe v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation.15 Nevertheless, the question of whether individuals do have a
cause of action for invasion of privacy in Australia cannot be answered definitively. The
position in Australia as at 2009 was summarised by Davis J in Chan v Sellwood as follows:
Whether the law of Australia recognises a tort for breach of privacy is a little unclear. What
the High Court said about it in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd would not appear to
preclude the emergence of such a tort. In Grosse v Purvis (2003) Skoien J of the
Queensland District Court found that there was such a tort. Heerey J in Kalaba v
Commonwealth thought that the weight of authority was, at that time, against the

14
15

(2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706 (‘Grosse’).
[2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) (‘Doe v ABC’).
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proposition that there was such a tort but in Gee v Burger McLaughlin AsJ thought that
the matter was arguable.16

Since then there has been no recognition of a cause of action for invasion of privacy, but
a number of courts have refused to rule out its existence.17
Uncertainty as to whether a tort of invasion of privacy exists at all in Australian law is the
biggest barrier to a plaintiff wishing to bring an action for invasion of privacy in respect of
the unauthorised publication or use of images of themselves. As the ALRC has observed
in its most recent report on privacy, ‘any significant development of the common law

16

Chan v Sellwood [2009] NSWSC 1335 (9 December 2009) [37] citing Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, Grosse
(2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706; Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763 (8 June 2004) and
Gee v Burger [2009] NSWSC 149 (13 March 2009). See also WBC v Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) [2012]
VSCA 159 [81] (Warren CJ): the question of whether a right to privacy exists at common law, and if so its
scope, is ‘yet to be settled by the High Court or a superior court of record’ (Hansen JA agreeing).
17
See, eg, Dye v Commonwealth [2010] FCA 720: here the plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim
to include, among other things, an action for breach of privacy. Katzmann J noted (at [280]) that there were
‘grave problems’ with the privacy claim, not least the fact that the submissions seemed to ‘conflate’ the
privacy claim with other claims, including for breach of confidence. However, Katzmann J accepted (at [290])
that it would not be appropriate to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to claim for breach of privacy on the
basis of the current state of the law, although expressed some doubt as to whether the matters complained
of would constitute an invasion of privacy. More recently in P6Y4SX and Department of Police [2012] QlCmr
9 the Queensland Information Commissioner observed (at [9]) that ‘in Australia there is neither a
constitutional right to privacy nor is there a generally recognised legal cause of action of ‘unjustified invasion
of privacy’, although the possibility of one has not necessarily been excluded’. See also Gee v Burger [2009]
NSWSC 149 (13 March 2009) where McLaughlin AJ suggested (at [53]‐[55]) that a claim for invasion of
privacy was arguable; and Saad [2012] NSWSC 1183 (4 October 2012) in which the plaintiff sought to amend
her Statement of Claim, originally pleading causes of action in negligence and defamation, to include other
causes of action, including breach of confidence and invasion of privacy. In allowing the Plaintiff to amend
her Statement of Claim to include actions based on invasions of privacy interests, Hall J held, at [183], that:
‘[o]n balance, I have concluded that, having regard to the source of the photographic images, the limited
purpose for which they were obtained and the nature of them, I do not consider that, at this stage of the
proceedings, it is open to conclude that the cause of action based on invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy would
be futile or bad in law.’ See also Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 181 (9 August 2013) in which the
defendants sought to have the plaintiff’s claims struck out. In refusing to strike out the claim for invasion of
privacy, Smith DCJ concluded (at [310]‐[311]) that: ‘it seems to me that there is an arguable case on invasion
of privacy. I would be very hesitant to strike out a cause of action where the law is developing or unclear.
As noted there are two single judge decisions in Australia where the claim has been successful’. Cf Maynes
v Casey [2011] NSWCA 156 (20 June 2011) [34], in which Basten JA (Allsop P concurring), referring to the
cases of Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199 and Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 (‘Giller’), commented that ‘these
cases may well lay the basis for development of liability for unjustified intrusion on personal privacy,
whether or not involving breach of confidence: cf John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock [2007]
NSWCA 364; 70 NSWLR 484 [124]’, suggesting that while a cause of action may be developed it did not
currently exist. See also Sands v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 44 (5 April 2013), in which Kelly J found,
at [614], that: ‘The ratio decidendi of the decision in Lenah is that it would require a further development
in the law to acknowledge the existence of a tort of privacy in Australia. In my view, the statements of the
majority in Lenah do not support the suggestion that the High Court in Lenah held out any invitation to
intermediate courts in Australia to develop the tort of privacy as an actionable wrong’. In Ghosh v Ninemsn
Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] NSWDC 63 (17 May 2013) the court considered that there was no recognised cause of
action for breach of privacy in Australia.
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would require litigants with the resources and determination both to initiate proceedings
and to take those proceedings through the appeals process.’18 Further, it is noted that
[t]here are indications that litigants may prefer to rely on the limited remedies of well‐
established causes of action, rather than risk the prolonging of proceedings or appeals on
uncertain points of law or novel arguments. This is particularly so if the monetary
compensation for any new cause of action is not likely to be high.19

Even if the existence of a cause of action for invasion of privacy becomes established in
the common law of Australia, however, its utility is likely to be limited by the difficulty for
plaintiffs in proving all of its likely elements. Given that the common law in Australia does
not definitely recognise a cause of action for invasion of privacy, the elements of any such
action, should one be held to exist, remain unfixed. However, in line with developments
thus far towards recognising such an action, the plaintiff would almost certainly have to
establish that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy.20 It is also possible that courts
would recognise an action only in situations involving an intrusion into seclusion or the
publication of private facts,21 and indeed this seems likely in the face of judicial and
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ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 55 [3.56].
Ibid 55 [3.57].
20
See, eg, Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) [116] and [119] (Hampel J). See also Saad [2012] NSWSC
1183 (4 October 2012) [166] referring to submissions of Counsel for the Defendant at [58]. The concept of
a reasonable expectation of privacy is familiar in many jurisdictions recognising a cause of action for invasion
of privacy. The NSWLRC refers to it as a ‘formula that features, either as the test, or as part of the test, of
actionability in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States and Canada; in European human rights law;
and in private law cases in England, New Zealand and the United States’: NSWLRC, Report, above n 3, 20
[5.4].
21
In its most recent report recommending the introduction of a statutory cause of action for invasions of
privacy, the ALRC recommended that the action be available where a plaintiff is able to prove that their
privacy was invaded in one of two ways: namely, by way of intrusion upon seclusion or the misuse of
private information: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 73 [5.1]. The ALRC notes that: ‘These
two categories of invasion of privacy are widely considered to be the core of a right to privacy’: ALRC,
Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 73 [5.4]. Australian courts may similiary decide to confine an
action for invasion of privacy to these two types of invasion (rather than invasions that place the plaintiff
in a false light or involve the appropriation of image or likeness). According to the ALRC, intrusion upon
seclusion ‘will usually involve watching, listening to, or recording someone’s private activities or private
affairs. It can also involved unwanted intrusion into someone’s private space’: ALRC, Serious Invasions of
Privacy, above n 11, 73 [5.2]. Misuse of private information, according to the ALRC, will ‘usually involve
collecting or disclosing someone’s private information’: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 73
[5.3]. In relation to intrusion upon seclusion, the ALRC links this to the first of Moreham’s ‘two overarching
categories’ of invasion of privacy, namely the ‘unwanted watching, listening, recording and disseminating
of recordings': ALRC, above n 11, 76 [5.14] referring to Nicole Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Physical
Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) Cambridge Law Journal 350. A key to understanding Moreham’s first
category is the word ‘unwanted’ ‐ unless the sensory access is unwanted, there has been no intrusion:
Nicole Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) Cambridge Law
Journal 350, 354). Although Moreham suggests that it is an intereference with physical privacy when
another disseminates photographs or recordings of private activities to others, it is not clear that
Moreham regards the person who merely accesses the images or recordings as having intruded upon the
subject matter’s seclusion. The ALRC suggests that an intrusion upon seclusion is generally concerned with
intrusions into another’s physical space, rather than a person who later gains ‘sensory’ access to that
space through images or recordings: see ALRC, above n 11, 76-77 [7.18]. Nevertheless, it is possible that
19
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academic commentary on the matter. In Lenah, for example, Gummow and Hayne JJ
suggested that the presentation of a person in a false light may not properly concern a
privacy interest and commented that ‘[t]o place the plaintiff in a false light may be
objectionable because it lowers the reputation of the plaintiff or causes financial loss or
both’.22 In terms of the appropriation of an image, members of the Australian judiciary,
as well as academic commentators, have suggested that this cannot properly be
categorised as an invasion of privacy at all.23 It is also possible that the plaintiff would have
to establish that the invasion was intentional24 and highly offensive, or at least serious,25
and possibly, also, to prove actual damage.26 Whether consent would be a defence is

courts would be prepared to recognise the unwanted access to personal information obtained by
anotherr as being an intrusion upon seclusion.
22
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256 [125].
23
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256 [125] (Gummow & Hayne JJ); see also ALRC, For Your Information, above
n 9, 2565–6 [74.120]; Raymond Wacks, ‘Why There Will Never Be an English Common Law Privacy Tort’ in
Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge, 2010) 154,
177. But see Jonathan Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence, and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62 (2)
Cambridge Law Journal 444, 450, arguing, in relation to appropriation of image or personality rights, that
‘two discrete interests, commercial and dignitary, are aspects of the same legal concern (protection of
image), but crucially, they are separable.’
24
Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,133 [446] (Skoien DCJ): because the defendant had wilfully
invaded the plaintiff’s privacy, it was not necessary to decide if an action for invasion of privacy would
encompass negligent acts. However, Skoien DCJ also said that ‘a willed act’ would, in his view, an essential
element of the action: at [444]. In Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007), however, Hampel J found that
an invasion of privacy was made out on the facts, which involved the publication by the ABC of details of
sexual offences perpetrated against the plaintiff, who was identified in the publications. Although the
invasion of privacy was not ‘wilful’ Hampel J nevertheless determined that it was unjustified in that the
defendants had failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the plaintiff’s privacy: at [163]. This unjustified
publication was sufficient to find the defendants liable for an invasion of privacy. In the context of its
recommendations for the form of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, the ALRC proposed
that the invasion be intentional — that is deliberate or reckless and that no liability should attach to
invasions that are negligent or unintentional: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 110
[Recommendation 7‐1]. According to the ALRC, the requisite intention could encompass ‘a subjective desire
or purpose to intrude or to misuse or disclose the plaintiff’s private information’ or ‘circumstances where
such an intent may be imputed to the defendant on the basis that the relevant consequences – the intrusion,
misuse or disclosure — were, objectively assessed, obviously or substantially likely to follow’: ALRC at 110
[7.7].
25
That the invasion be highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities was considered to be an element
of the action in Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187 [444]. In Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226
[42] Gleeson CJ referred to the highly offensive test in the context of an action for intrusion upon privacy in
the United States and suggested that it was, in many circumstances, ‘a useful practical test of what is
private’. The majority decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1, held that,
aside from establishing the existence of facts in relation to which there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy, a plaintiff must also establish that publicity given to those private facts would ‘be considered highly
offensive to an objective reasonable person’: at [117] (Gault P and Blanchard J).
26
It is unclear whether a common law action for invasion of privacy would be actionable per se, that is
without proof of harm. In Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187 [44] Skoien DCJ listed detriment
‘in the form of mental, physiological, or emotional harm or distress, or which prevents or hinders the
plaintiff from doing an act which he or she is lawfully entitled to do‘ as an element of the action. However,
in recommending the introduction of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, the ALRC has noted
that framing the tort so as to be actionable per se is consistent with other intentional torts concerned with
the plaintiff’s intangible, dignitary interests: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 138 [8.40].
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uncertain,27 although there is little doubt that courts would seek to balance the plaintiff’s
privacy interests with other interests, such as the public interest in free expression.28 The
limitations of a common law action are explored further, in the context of hypothetical
scenarios, in Chapter Four.
Common Law Action for Invasion of Privacy and Internet Intermediaries
Because there have been only two cases confirming a common law action for invasion of
privacy, neither of which involved the publication of material online, the position of an
internet intermediary29 in relation to material that is published by another in
circumstances involving an invasion of privacy is unclear. However, if intention is an
element of the action, an internet intermediary is unlikely to be found to possess the
requisite intent unless and until, at the very least, they become aware of the existence
and nature of the privacy invasive material. Discussing the potential liability of
intermediaries for invasions of privacy in the context of their recommendations for a
statutory tort of serious invasion of privacy, the ALRC has noted that they should not be
liable for invasions of privacy committed by third parties using their services, where they
have no knowledge of the invasion of privacy. However, the ALRC has also stated that
where intermediaries do have knowledge, there ‘does not seem to be any justification to
provide a complete exemption from liability.’30 An internet intermediary hosting content
on behalf of others cannot, however, be under a positive obligation to monitor content
posted by those others, due to clause 91(1)(b) of schedule 5 of the Broadcasting Service
Act 1992 (Cth), which provides that a law of a state or territory, or a rule of common law
or equity, has no effect to the extent to which it ‘requires, or would have the effect
(whether direct or indirect) of requiring, an internet content host to monitor, make
inquiries about, or keep records of, internet content hosted by the host …’31
In addition, an internet content host32 cannot be liable under any rule of common law or
equity, or under the law of a state or territory, where that rule or law

27

In Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187 [444] Skoien DCJ did not attempt to state the limits
of the action or available defences, and did not refer to a defence of consent (which was not relevant on
the facts). In Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) [124], Hampel J observed that consent to being
identified in information that was to be broadcast or published, would likely be ‘inconsistent’ with
establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to publication or the information in question.
Whether consent would operate as a specific defence was not considered.
28
Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187 [447]; Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) [163].
29
As to the definition of internet intermediary see above n 11.
30
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 11, 207–08 [11.100].
31
BSA sch 5, cl 91(1)(b). An internet content host is defined broadly, in sch 5, cl 3, as a ‘person who hosts
internet content in Australia’. See, further, the list of Defined Terms in this thesis.
32
As to the definition of internet content host, see above n 31.
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subjects, or would have the effect (whether direct or indirect) of subjecting, an internet
content host to liability (whether criminal or civil) in respect of hosting particular internet
content in a case where the host was not aware of the nature of the internet content …33

However, there are difficult questions as to what type of awareness on the part of the
internet content host would be required in order to ground liability — awareness of the
existence of the content or awareness that the content is invasive or privacy? Leonard has
observed that while there is a dearth of judicial commentary on clause 91(1), it is clear
that it requires awareness as to the existence of content rather than awareness that
content is infringing. This, according to Leonard, leaves ‘difficult questions as to when and
how an internet content host or an internet service provider should take steps to
determine whether content is infringing.’34 While in some instances the private nature of
the material might be readily apparent,35 in others it may not be.
2 Breach of Confidence
An action for breach of confidence allows individuals a remedy in relation to the disclosure
of confidential information about themselves, including images of themselves, and may
enable an individual to restrain the disclosure of that information by way of injunction.
It has been said that the action for breach of confidence action was designed to protect
confidential information by reason of the circumstances in which it was obtained36 and
the ‘desirability of protecting and encouraging relationships of trust’.37 Thus, it is said that
the action is borne of and reflects the value of confidential relationships, rather than other
values such as those usually said to underlie privacy: notably dignity38 and autonomy.39
On the other hand, although confidentiality and privacy may be regarded as ‘radically

33

BSA sch 5, cl 91(1)(a).
Peter Leonard, ‘Storms Batter Not‐So‐Safe Harbours – Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Australia’
(2012) 88 Intellectual Property Forum: Journal of the Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New
Zealand 41, 49.
35
See, eg, Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199,226 [42] (Gleeson CJ) where His Honour said that: ‘Certain kinds of
information about a person, such as information related to health, personal relationships, or finances, may
be easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying
contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand was meant to be unobserved. The
requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private.’
36
NSWLRC, Invasion of Privacy, Consultation Paper 1 (2007), 55 [2.81].
37
Timothy Pitt‐Payne, ‘Problems and Pit‐falls for Information Sharing’ (Paper presented at the Third
Northumbrian Information Rights Conference, Northumbria University, 17 April 2009); Campbell 2 All ER
995, 1009 [44] (Lord Hoffman).
38
See, eg, Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 [43] (Gleeson CJ).
39
See, eg, Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 [43] (Gleeson CJ), 256 [125]‐[126] (Gummow & Hayne JJ);
Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1010 (Lord Hoffman). Nevertheless the conceptual basis of a breach of
confidence action has been debated: See, eg, Gareth Jones, ‘The Restitution of Benefits acquired in Breach
of Another’s Confidence’ (1970) 86 Law Quarterly Review 463 and Sam Ricketson, ‘Confidential Information
– A New Proprietary Interest? Part I’ (1977) 11 Melbourne University Law Review 223.
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different qualities’,40 Writing even before the Human Right Act41 introduced directly into
UK law certain provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the European Convention on Human Rights
(‘ECHR’)), 42 including a right to privacy, Gurry had observed that in the context of breach
of confidence cases involving personal information ‘privacy seems paramount’ and that
‘the courts are prepared to allow a person to control the flow of personal information’
about themselves by way of an action for breach of confidence.43 That privacy is a value
underlying the breach of confidence action was also recognised by the House of Lords in
Campbell:
The right to privacy is in a general sense one of the values, and sometimes the most
important value, which underlies a number of more specific causes of action, both at
common law and under various statutes. One of these is the equitable action for breach
of confidence, which has long been recognised as capable of being used to protect
privacy.44

The traditional formulation of a breach of confidence action requires the plaintiff to
establish that confidential information relating to the plaintiff has been used, or its use
threatened, in contravention of an obligation of confidence owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff.45 In addition, the plaintiff may be required to identify the information in question
with specificity.46 Whether detriment is also an element of the action for breach of
confidence is not firmly settled.47
In terms of whether information is confidential, it is said that the information itself must
possess a sufficient ‘quality of confidence’.48 Information of a trivial nature and mere
gossip will not possess the necessary quality of confidence.49 In addition, information
40

Jonathan Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence, and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62 (2) Cambridge
Law Journal 444, 452.
41
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c4.
42
ECHR art 10.
43
Francis Gurry, Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press, 1984) 98. Note that a new edition of Gurry was
published in 2012: Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of Confidential
Information (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012).
44
Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1008 [43] (Lord Nicholls).
45
Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J) (‘Coco v Clark’).
46
Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2010) 26 ALR 281 [39] (Finn, Sundberg and Jacobsen JJ)
citing Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and
Health [1989] FCA 384; (1990) 22 FCR 73, 87.
47
Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41, 48 (Megarry J) and Attorney‐General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990]
1 AC 109, 281 (Lord Goff) (‘Guardian No 2’) both keeping open the question as to whether detriment is
required. See also X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648, 657 (Rose J). In Ammon v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [No 3] [2007]
WASC 232, Martin CJ was of the view that ‘although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the better
view seems to be that detriment is not an essential element of the cause of action’ [310]. See also Wilson v
Ferguson [2015] WASC 15 (‘Wilson’), where the court noted that although in Commonwealth v John Fairfax
& Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 Mason J had noted the requirement to show detriment, that requirement
had been doubted in subsequent cases: 43 (Mitchell J).
48
Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J).
49
Ibid 48 (Megarry J). Gurry, above n 43, 81 notes some uncertainty around this requirement.
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must be outside of the public domain, ‘not something which is public property and public
knowledge’50, or be ‘inaccessible’.
Gurry has suggested that in cases of personal confidences, the requirement of
‘inaccessibility’ takes on a rather peculiar meaning and can be ‘be ‘stretched’ to allow for
the protection of private information.51 He cites the case of Pollard v Photographic Co52 in
which the court restrained the defendant from displaying in his shop window photographs
of the plaintiff that had been commissioned by the plaintiff for her private use. Gurry
writes that:
The confidential information in this case consisted of the reproduction of a likeness of the
plaintiff, which seems to strain the meaning of inaccessibility since, no doubt, the
plaintiff’s visage was well known in the town in which she lived. The case emphasizes the
policy of protecting privacy which lies behind the jurisdiction in this area and it seems that
the courts are prepared to allow a person to control the flow of personal information
concerning himself by means of an action for breach of confidence.53

The older authority of Pollard has, however, often been construed as a decision based
upon contract.54 Nevertheless, courts in England and Wales have been prepared to
accommodate protection for a number of discrete areas of private life within the cause of
action for breach of confidence.55 However, according to Phillipson, it was not until the
House of Lords decision in Campbell that this first limb of the breach of confidence action
was ‘transformed’ so as to encompass information of a personal or private rather than
confidential nature.56 According to Phillipson the effect of the decision of the House of
Lords in Campbell (the facts of which were outlined previously in Chapter One) was the
‘abandonment’ of ‘tests based upon confidentiality of the information, as opposed to its
private character.’57 Reinforcing his observation, Phillipson suggests that ‘it would clearly
seem inapt to describe events taking place in the street, witnessed by numerous people,

50
Gurry, above n 43, 4 citing Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203,
215 per Lord Greene MR.
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Ibid 98 referring to Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch.D 345.
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(1889) 40 Ch D 345 (‘Pollard’).
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Gurry, above n 43, 98.
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Megan Richardson et al, Breach of Confidence: Social Origins and Modern Developments (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2012) 60.
55
Gavin Phillipson, ‘The “Right” of Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared’ in New Dimensions in
Privacy Law, Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (Eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 184, 193
(and refer to the types of information and cases cited by Phillipson 193 n 41). See also, generally, Gavin
Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human
Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726 reviewing a number of cases where personal information has
been protected under the breach of confidence action. However, in Google Inc v Vidal‐Hall & Ors [2015]
EWCA Civ 311 (27 March 2015) (Vidal‐Hall), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales confirmed that an
action in tort for misuse of private information, and an action for breach of confidence, are ‘now two
separate and distinct causes of action’: [21] (McFarlane MR and Sharp LJ).
56
Gavin Phillipson, ‘The “Right” of Privacy’, above n 55, 185.
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Ibid 197.
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as “confidential”’,58 a view echoed by other commentators.59 The suggestion here is that
the information in question is accessible, or in the public domain, and cannot therefore
be considered to possess the necessary quality of confidence. Arguably, however,
Campbell was concerned with ‘confidential information’ in the traditional sense – namely
information about Ms Campbell’s health that was neither trivial, nor generally accessible.
The case did not concern the mere description or depiction of events that took place in
public, witnessed by numerous people. Rather, the images of Ms Campbell, taken in
conjunction with the text with which they were inextricably linked,60 communicated
information about Ms Campbell’s addiction and treatment. As Lord Hope observed:
The words: ‘Therapy: Naomi outside meeting’ underneath the photograph on the front
page and the words ‘Hugs: Naomi dressed in jeans and baseball hat, arrives for a
lunchtime group meeting this week’ underneath the photograph on p13 were designed
to link what might otherwise have been anonymous and uninformative pictures with the
main text.61

If it is accepted that the images and text are inextricably linked then, on this reading of
Campbell, there was no transformation of the requirement that information must be
confidential in the sense of being inaccessible. Nevertheless, developments subsequent
to Campbell show that the courts of England and Wales are now prepared to accept that
even information that is generally accessible, in the sense of being in the public domain
— such as the way a particular person looks on a day‐to‐day basis — may nevertheless be
regarded as capable of protection by way of the breach of confidence action, provided
the information can be said to be ‘private’.62 It cannot, however, be said that a similar
58

Ibid echoing the view earlier expressed by Morgan such that: ‘non‐consensual photographs of an
individual in a public space may infringe privacy. Yet such information in the public domain cannot be
protected by an action designed to preserve confidentiality.’ See Morgan, above n 40, 453. See also
Moreham who writes that the majority in Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995 used the terms ‘confidential’ and
‘private’ interchangeably, whereas the minority expressly acknowledged that the concepts of privacy and
confidence had ‘merged in cases involving the disclosure of personal information’: Nicole Moreham, ‘Privacy
in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review, 628, 629.
However, in so far as the second limb of the breach of confidence action has (in the United Kingdom at least)
been transformed to dispense with the requirement of a pre‐existing relationship of confidence or even of
any requirement that there has been an ‘imparting’ of information from one party to the other (discussed
further in section 2) below, it is true that describing as ‘confidential’ information which does not depend
upon this relationship is probably misleading.
59
Morgan, above n 40, 453; Des Butler, ‘A tort of invasion of privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne
University Law Review 339, 352.
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As Lord Hope observed: ‘The words: “Therapy: Naomi outside meeting” underneath the photograph on
the front page and the words “Hugs: Naomi dressed in jeans and baseball hat, arrives for a lunchtime group
meeting this week” underneath the photograph on p13 were designed to link what might otherwise have
been anonymous and uninformative pictures with the main text.’ Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1028 [121]
(emphasis added).
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Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1028 [121] (emphasis added).
62
So, for example, in Murray v Big Pictures [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (‘Murray’) the author J K Rowling was
successful on behalf of her son David in overturning an order striking out the claim for an infringement of
his privacy (and under the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK)) when photographs of him were taken in a public
place, by the use of a long‐range lens. The Court of Appeal was anxious to emphasise that David arguably
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transformation has taken place in Australia. In Lenah, Gleeson CJ certainly suggested that
the law should be ‘more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a kind
which fall within the concept of privacy’63 and also noted that certain information may
easily be identified as private. This includes information about someone’s health, personal
relationships or finances and certain kinds of activity ‘which a reasonable person, applying
contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be
unobserved.’64 These examples of private information are also examples of information
that is neither trivial nor generally accessible.65 That said, it is possible that a closer focus
on privacy interests will result in information that is generally accessible (such as the way
a plaintiff looks on a day‐to‐day basis) being treated as possessing the necessary quality
of confidence in certain circumstances, perhaps where the plaintiff is a child,66 or in
circumstances involving intrusive photography.67 For the time being, however, there is no
higher court authority in Australia for the proposition that a breach of confidence action
can be used to remedy the use or threatened use of accessible (and/or trivial) information
on the basis that it is, nevertheless, private.68

had a reasonable expectation of privacy, not because of anything inherently private about or arising from
the photographs (which only depicted him as he must often have appeared) but because the image was
taken in a clandestine manner and was published for commercial gain as part of a series of photographs and
in circumstances where the publisher knew that consent of the parents to the photographs would not have
been forthcoming even had it been requested: Murray [17]. Nevertheless, the images did concern a private
interest (David engaged on a family outing). The developments in England and Wales have, of course, taken
place in the context of the ‘new’ approach to breach of confidence, recognising that the values enshrined
in Articles 8 and 10 of ECHR are now part of the action for breach of confidence: Campbell [2004] 2 All ER
995, 1033 [17] (Lord Nicholls). Lord Hope did not agree that the centre of gravity of breach of confidence
had shifted due to the recognition of the rights enshrined in articles 8 and 10, but rather that the ‘language
had changed’ — nevertheless he recognised that the articles have ‘new breadth and strength’ to the breach
of confidence action: Campbell 1017–18 [86].
63
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 16 [40].
64
Ibid 226 [42].
65
On the other hand, Lenah concerned information that it had been conceded was not confidential, because
it was accessible: Ibid 223 [30] (Gleeson CJ). Thus, Gleeson CJ’s suggestion (at 225 [39]) could be taken to
suggest that accessible but private information is capable of protection under the action for breach of
confidence. However, the activities in question were found not to be private (at 227 [43] (Gleeson CJ)) and,
as discussed further later in this section, it may be difficult in any event to establish a reasonable expectation
of privacy in relation to information that is generally accessible.
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As to this, refer to the discussion in Chapter Four, Part Four (Case Study Five – Tyger and Lilly) as to
considerations which have been determined to be applicable in deciding whether or not a child has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
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However, any extension of the breach of confidence action in this way would present numerous
challenges beyond those inherent in identifying when information is ‘private’. Not the least of these would
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information that is inaccessible; and whether corporations can be said to have a valid claim to ‘privacy’. A
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the difficulties of requiring the privacy claimant to establish an obligation of confidence see Butler, above n
59, 352 and Richardson et al, above n 54, 147.
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In determining the accessibility or otherwise of the information, the steps taken to ensure
that information remains inaccessible are a relevant consideration. Thus, in Lenah,
Gleeson CJ referred to the fact that the appellants did not impose the requirements of
confidentiality on people who might see the processing operations.69 In Campbell, at least
one of the judges considered the facts of Ms Campbell’s addiction and treatment as being
in the public domain because Ms Campbell herself had frequently raised the topic of drug
addiction by publicly asserting on a number of occasions that she had no such addiction.70
By contrast, in relation to her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous, Ms Campbell had been
more guarded: she was, in the words of Baroness Hale, ‘engaged, deliberately “low key
and drably dressed”, in the private activity of therapy.’71 On the other hand a plaintiff is
entitled to place trust in a person with whom they have a pre‐existing confidential
relationship. So, for example, in Giller v Procopets the fact that Ms Giller became aware
that she was being filmed by her partner during periods of sexual intimacy with him did
not mean that she had failed to protect the accessibility of the information.72 Likewise, in
Wilson, a recent case concerning the posting to Facebook of intimate personal images of
his ex‐lover by the defendant, the court noted as follows:
The explicit nature of the images was itself suggestive of their confidential character.
Intimate photographs and videos taken in private and shared between two lovers would
ordinarily bear a confidential character, and be implicitly provided on condition that they
not be shown to any third party.73

The current position in Australian law, then, is that there can be no action in breach of
confidence to restrain what is merely an unwanted or unauthorised disclosure of an image
unless the information revealed by the image has the necessary ‘quality of confidence’. In
order to possess the necessary quality of confidence, the information must be non‐trivial
and ‘inaccessible’ or ‘relatively inaccessible’ so that it can be said to be outside the public
domain. Gurry has written that, aside from these basic attributes ‘there are few formal
requirements relating to the substance of the information which can be considered
confidential.’74 However, it is Phillipson’s view that as courts have been required to
is inaccessible and non‐trivial may, in any event, be relevant. As noted in Chapter Six, it is telling that
examples given by the ALRC of disclosures that would constitute an invasion of privacy within the scope of
the proposed cause of action for invasion of privacy all relate to information that is inherently private or to
images that capture the plaintiff in an intimate or embarrassing moment. If courts were to adopt this
formulation, therefore, a reasonable expectation of privacy is likely only in relation to inaccessible or
relatively accessible information: see further the discussion in Chapter Six, Part Three, Section A (Statutory
Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy).
69
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 221 [25] (Gleeson CJ).
70
Campbell [2004] 2 All ER 995, 1004–5 [24] (Lord Nicholls). The other judges did not explicitly regard Ms
Campbell’s claims as to non‐addiction as having put the fact of her addiction into the public domain, so
much as creating an area of legitimate press comment: the press were ‘entitled to put the record straight’:
at 1017 [83] (Lord Hope).
71
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72
[2004] VSC 113 (7 April 2004).
73
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determine breach of confidence actions involving non‐commercial information they have
needed to develop workable tests for deciding what kinds of personal information would
have the necessary quality of confidence, save for the negative requirements of being
outside the public domain and non‐trivial.75 In terms of what kinds of information will be
confidential, it has been suggested that it may be that no absolute test can be settled, and
that the
issue will always be one requiring consideration through the medium of analogies drawn
from decided authorities and a close analysis of the facts of each case, particularly the
nature of the information and its relationship to the business or other activity of the
confider.76

This is in line with Gurry’s suggestion that courts have preferred to take a pragmatic,
‘recognition’ approach to decide whether information is confidential, rather than to
develop rigid definitions of what constitutes confidentiality.77
This ‘know it when you see it’ approach might also assist in determining whether ‘false’
information can nevertheless be regarded as confidential. Whether false information can
be protected as confidential has been described as a ‘thorny and as yet unresolved’
issue.78 Stanley has written that, in the UK context, only certain categories of false
information are likely to be protected as confidential.79 One category in which it has been
suggested that untrue information will usually be regarded as confidential is where the
false information has been ‘learned’ (as true) in the course of a confidential relationship.80
The second category is where false information is inherently ‘confidential’ (or private).81
Outside of those categories, Stanley has suggested that it is questionable how far
protection will extend.82 The position in the Australian context may be different, although
there is scant authority on point. In Brand v Monks, Ward J accepted the proposition
advanced by Sedley LJ (with which Longmore LJ and Ward LLJ agreed) in Financial Times
Limited & Ors v Interbrew SA83 that there can be no confidentiality in false information.84
Arguably, however, the need to identify what quality information must possess, beyond
the negative qualities of inaccessibility and non‐triviality, is most exigent when the second
limb of the breach of confidence action is either abandoned entirely, or is ‘transformed’
75
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so as to dispense with the need for a pre‐existing relationship of confidence. This is
because, in the words of Lord Nicholls in Campbell, ‘[t]he confidence referred to in the
phrase ‘breach of confidence’ was the confidence arising out of a confidential
relationship.’85 Since the decision in Campbell, the courts of England and Wales have
‘decisively and unambiguously removed’ the element of the breach of confidence action
requiring the information to have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation
of confidence.86 Now it is clear that an obligation of confidence will be imposed ‘whenever
a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be
regarded as confidential.’87 In relation to personal information, the duty of confidence will
be imposed ‘whenever the party subject to the duty is in a situation where he knows or
ought to know that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected.’88
As such, determining whether personal information is (objectively) ‘private’ is
fundamental to determining whether a person can be required to maintain its privacy (or
respect its confidentiality).89 The position in Australia is less clear‐cut.
In Australia, it is does appear to be accepted that an obligation of confidence can be
imposed absent a pre‐existing relationship90 and will almost certainly be imposed on a
person who has improperly or surreptitiously captured confidential information, or where
images, depicting something that is confidential or private, have been obtained
improperly or captured surreptitiously.91 It also seems established that an obligation of
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Verstergaard Frandsen v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31 could have
‘serious consequences’ for development of the protection of privacy, given the finding that the obligation
of confidence only arises where the defendant either agreed to keep the information confidential or knew,
subjectively, rather than objectively, that the information was confidential.
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One reason for this transformation is ‘the acceptance, under the influence of human rights instruments
such as art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950 … of the privacy of personal information as something worthy of protection in its own right’: Campbell
[2004] 2 All ER 995, 1009 [46] (Lord Hoffman).
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Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224–5 [34]–[36], 225 [39] Gleeson CJ was of the view that a pre‐existing
relationship of confidence was unnecessary in order to find that the defendant was under an obligation of
confidence. Nevertheless, the need to establish the existence of a confidential relationship seems to persist
in some judgments: see, eg, Power v Mann [2010] VCC 1401 (25 October 2010), 6 [26] (Misso J).
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Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224 [34], 230 [55] (Gleeson CJ), 271–2 [169] (Kirby J). But see Richardson et al,
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confidence can be placed upon a party who comes into possession of private or
confidential information that they know was improperly or surreptitiously obtained by
another.92 The ALRC recently expressed the view that it is ‘well accepted in the United
Kingdom (UK) and Australia that an obligation of confidence may arise where a party
comes into possession of information which he or she knows, or ought to know, is
confidential’.93 Here the ALRC cites the UK decision in Attorney‐General v Guardian
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109 (Guardian (No 2)) and the Australian decision in
Lenah.94 However, the illustrations given by Lord Goff in Guardian (No 2) as to
circumstances in which an obligation of confidence would be imposed absent a pre‐
existing obligation of confidence relate to ‘obviously confidential’ information – a private
diary or an ‘obviously confidential document’.95 Nahan has noted that whether
information is ‘obviously’ confidential is the key issue in the jurisprudence on accidental
confidences, although the meaning of ‘obviously’ is unclear.96 As for Lenah, it is doubtful
that the case supports the broad proposition that an obligation of confidence arises due
to the nature of the information per se, as opposed to confirming the narrower
proposition that the obligation extends to a person who obtains confidential or private
information illegally, improperly or surreptitiously.
Without forming a definitive view on the current position, it is important to note that
there is little Australian authority for the proposition that an obligation of confidence can
be imposed merely due to the nature of the information.97 In any event, as Butler has
the Commonwealth which coose to protect private under breach of confidence rather than a sui generis
information privacy tort are circumscribed by the relational language of Megarry J in Coco v AN Clark
(Engineers).’ See also The NSWLRC has stated that it regards as questionable the extent to which the breach
of confidence action can be used to protect information that was not disclosed in breach of an obligation of
confidence: NSWLRC, Report, above n 3, 14 [4.8] The NSWLRC suggests that transforming the action in this
way would involve a fusion of law and equity that the common law is unlikely to embrace: NSWLRC,
Consultation Paper, above n 36, 55 [2.81]–[2.82].
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of confidence, where the information itself was private; Power v Mann [2010] VCC 1401; Davis v Mann
[2010] VCC 1402.
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39(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 270, 282.
97
But see Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007) in which Hampel J found, at [115] that the breach of
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Privacy’ (2008) Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers’ Association 391, 397. In any event, Doe is poor
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observed, even if an obligation of confidence arises due to the nature of the information,
reasonable ignorance that the information was confidential or private will defeat the
action.98
Given the above, it is suggested that in the context of determining the obligation of
confidence, at least, it is essential to have regard to the nature of the information (beyond
the negative requirements of inaccessibility and non‐triviality). Where there is no pre‐
existing relationship of confidence between the plaintiff and the defendant it becomes
necessary to determine whether personal information was by its nature confidential or
private. This presents the additional difficulty as to what test is to be used to determine
the private nature of material. Is the Gleeson test (information that is ‘obviously private’
or the disclosure of which would be ‘highly offensive to a reasonable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities99) the correct test as to whether information is private? As
Phillipson has noted, this general test was, at least until Campbell, the one laid down by
UK cases, after the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998.100 Or, is the test an
expanded one, requiring consideration of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in all the circumstances?101 If it is the latter, then is a lack of actual
or subjective knowledge on the part of a recipient of the information irrelevant? Again,
these questions seem unresolved in the Australian context.
To place the above discussion in the context of images, an image capturing a person
engaged in a private activity (such as showering, sexual relations or even a private
ceremony)102 will probably be treated as confidential, even where the plaintiff has
the confidential information has been disclosed seeks to use it in breach of the terms on which it was
disclosed and to the detriment of the party who communicated the confidential information … The principle
will apply also where a person innocently comes into possession of confidential information through the
inadvertence of another … the court would be enforcing the obligation of conscience arising from the fact
that the finder came into possession of the information in circumstances in which it was not intended that
the confidential information could be used by the finder.’ (References omitted)
98
Butler, above n 59, 352. And it may be that absent an agreement to retain confidence or actual subjective
knowledge of confidence, the obligation will not arise: Hunt, above n 88, 508 concluding that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Verstergaard Frandsen v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] UKSC 31 could have ‘serious
consequences for development of the protection of privacy, given the finding that the obligation of
confidence will only arise where the defendant either agreed to keep the information confidential or knew,
subjectively, that the information was confidential.’
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Newspapers Ltd [2003] 1 All ER 224, 237‐238.
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[6.1]‐[6.4]; see also [2008] EWCA Civ 446 [36] (Sir Anthony Clarke MR, Laws LJ and Thomas LJ).
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See, eg, Giller (2008) 24 VR 1 and Wilson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January 2015) (images of people engaged
in sexual activity) and Power v Mann [2010] VCC 1401 and Davis v Mann [2010] VCC 1402 (videotaping
people in a bathroom). As to private ceremonies, see Douglas; Foster v Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 233.
However, whether pictures of private ceremonies will be considered to be actually confidential will depend
on the circumstances and the extent to which the information could be considered ‘relatively secret’ — thus
in Douglas the plaintiffs had gone to some lengths to preserve the confidentiality of images of their wedding,
for example, by requiring all service providers to sign confidentiality agreements and having security guards
check that guests were not carrying cameras or other recording equipment.
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consented to the capture (but not the subsequent use) of the image.103 An image showing
a person naked or in a state of undress will also probably be considered confidential, at
least where the person is in a place where they expect to be unobserved.104 All of these
examples relate to information that has a quality of confidence in that the information is
non‐trivial and is inaccessible or relatively inaccessible. The obligation of confidence will
likely be imposed due to a pre‐existing relationship of confidence and/or the fact that the
information has been improperly or surreptitiously obtained.
There is also an argument that certain images captured in public might nevertheless be
regarded as revealing information that is sufficiently inaccessible as to be outside of the
public domain. That is, images communicating information about a person’s health, or
other non‐trivial and inaccessible information might be regarded as confidential. The fact
that the images are captured in a public place does not necessarily put the information
into the public domain if it is accepted that even activities occurring in public are (unless
captured on film and subsequently communicated more broadly) observable to only a
limited audience.105 This would coincide with the approach taken by the House of Lords
in Campbell. However, if a person has taken few or no steps to protect the inaccessibility
of the information presented in a public place, the chances of the information being
regarded as confidential (or private) will diminish. Thus, a distinction might be drawn
between a situation where a person, albeit in a place accessible to the public, has sought
seclusion (for example, in a doorway) or anonymity (for example, by adopting a
deliberately ‘low‐key’ appearance) and someone who has not. An obligation of confidence
could arise due to the way in which the information is obtained (for example, where it is
obtained surreptitiously by the use of a long‐range lens). It is less clear that an obligation
would arise simply on the basis that the person seeking protection had a reasonable
expectation of privacy such that their seclusion would not intruded upon, or that
information (including images) would not be disseminated . Moreover, reasonable
ignorance of an expectation of privacy would defeat the action.
A focus on privacy interests may also persuade a court to treat as confidential information
that is accessible (in the public domain) and/or trivial – such as the way a person looks on
a day‐to‐day basis or what they were doing at a particular moment in time. That would,
however, depend on the anterior step of classifying such information as private. In this
regard, as previously discussed, a plaintiff will almost certainly need to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In relation to generally accessible or trivial information
establishing an expectation of privacy is, in any event, likely to be difficult.106 Even so, on
current authority, it seems unlikely that courts would recognise accessible and/or trivial
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(albeit private) information as possessing the necessary quality of confidence. If that is so,
the question of whether there was an obligation of confidence does not fall to be
considered. On the other hand, if such information is considered confidential, the plaintiff
will need to show that the person seeking to use the information was under an obligation
of confidence either due to a pre‐existing relationship, the way in which the information
was obtained (that is, surreptitiously or improperly) or because of the nature of the
information.
It would seem that the action for breach of confidence cannot be said to have been
transformed in the same way as it has in the UK to become a fully‐fledged action
encompassing protection against the unauthorised disclosure of private information (at
least not where information is considered generally accessible).107 If it is to become so,
there are significant considerations still to be worked out: as Callinan J observed in Lenah
‘[t]he value of free speech and publication in the public interest must be properly
assessed, but so must the value of privacy. The appropriate balance would need to be
struck in each case.’108 Although Callinan J was referring here to the development of a
discrete tort of invasion of privacy, it is submitted that these comments are equally
applicable to any development of the breach of confidence action to protect private
information.109 Moreover, if breach of confidence should be developed to encompass
private information of a type not previously within the scope of the action (that is,
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information that is generally accessible and/or trivial), or if the action is transformed so
as to effectively remove the requirement for an obligation of confidence, determining the
nature and extent of the public interest defence to breach of confidence will be of critical
importance. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, one of the consequences of using the
traditional breach of confidence action to protect private information in its own right is
uncertainty over whether different types of information should be treated differently
depending on whether they can be described as confidential, using the ‘old methodology’,
or whether they are more properly described as private.110
Remedies for Breach of Confidence
An injunction may be granted to restrain the disclosure of confidential information where
disclosure is apprehended, or in order to restrain further disclosure.111 However, where
information has already entered the public domain, even if this is by virtue of the
defendant’s breach of confidence, an injunction might be refused on the grounds that to
grant one would be pointless and would even bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.112 The doctrine of futility in relation to injunctive relief is captured in the maxim
‘equity will not act in vain’113 and has been described as having ‘a long pedigree’ and being
‘widely accepted.’114 Nevertheless, in cases where information has entered the public
domain as a result of a breach of confidence, an injunction will not automatically be
considered futile.115 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 2) the Court of Appeal of England and
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[2006] QB 125 [105]: ‘[o]nce intimate personal information about a celebrity's private life has been widely
published it may serve no useful purpose to prohibit further publication. The same will not necessarily be
true of photographs. Insofar as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on privacy
by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will be a fresh intrusion of privacy when

120

Wales noted, on this very issue, an ‘important potential distinction between the law
relating to private information and that relating to other types of confidential
information.’116 In the more recent decision of PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd (‘PJS’),
the UK Supreme Court drew an important distinction between an injunction to protect
confidential (or secret) information and an injunction to protect private information,
where publication of the material had already been widespread.117 In the case of
confidential or secret information, the court acknowledged that widespread publication
of material, including online, may undermine the claim for grant of a permanent
injunction.118 By contrast, where the claim was based on respect for privacy and family
life, even widespread publication would not necessarily render an injunction futile.119 The
court referred to a number of cases in which intrusion had been used to justify the grant
of an injunction despite widespread publicity, and cited with approval a passage from the
judgment of Tugendhat J in CTB commenting that the fact that ‘tens of thousands of
people have named the claimant on the internet’ confirms rather than undermines the
argument that ‘the claimant and his family need protection from intrusion into their
private and family life’.120 These decisions suggest that an Australian court would not
necessarily regard an injunction as futile where the purpose is to protect a plaintiff’s
privacy. However, it must be remembered that these decisions have occurred in the UK
context and that, as noted above, the action for breach of confidence in Australia cannot
be said to have been transformed in the same way as it has in the UK to become a fully‐
fledged action encompassing protection against the unauthorised disclosure of private
information (at least not where information is considered generally accessible).121
Accordingly, whether the same distinction between confidentiality and privacy would
apply in considering whether to award a permanent injunction where publication of
material is already widespread, cannot be confirmed.
Moreover, the posting of confidential information to the internet will not automatically
result in the information being found to have entered the public domain. Rather the
question of whether publication on the internet has caused information to enter the
public domain is a question of fact

each additional viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of
the photograph, is confronted by a fresh publication of it.’
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Confidential Information and Internet Intermediaries
In relation to images posted on the internet, an internet content host122 cannot be liable
in respect of confidential information posted on a web page it operates unless, at the very
least, it was aware of the nature of the content. This is due to clause 91(1) of schedule 5
of the BSA, discussed in section 1 (common law action for invasion of privacy and internet
intermediaries) above.
Thus, while it is clear that there can be no obligation of confidence imposed on an internet
content host unless and until that host becomes aware of the nature of the content, the
more difficult question is what type awareness on the part of the content host is required
before the ‘safe harbour’ of clause 91(1) of schedule 5 will be lost. As discussed above (in
section 1 — common law action for invasion of privacy) Leonard takes the view that
awareness as to the existence of content rather than awareness that content is infringing
is sufficient. However, this position is arguable where the confidential nature of the
material is not readily apparent.123
Where an individual has requested that the site host remove images on the basis that they
involve depictions or circumstances that would amount to confidential information, the
failure to remove them may give rise to an action for breach of confidence.124 Likewise,
where a site host otherwise becomes aware or has been given constructive notice of the
existence of confidential information.
Without the use or threatened use of information, however, it is likely that no action for
breach of confidence will lie, in which case breach of confidence is entirely ineffective in
restraining or remedying unwanted or surreptitious filming per se.125

122

As that term is defined in the BSA sch 5, cl 3: a ‘person who hosts internet content in Australia.’
By contrast, the confidential nature of information may be apparent because it is obvious that the
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3 Defamation
The success of a defamation action depends upon the meanings (‘imputations’) conveyed
by material being considered capable of being defamatory by reference to an objective
standard (the hypothetical referee).126 Only where the publication of an image is capable
of affecting the image subject’s reputation or standing is the publication likely to be
considered capable of being defamatory. The impact of the publication of an image upon
the image subject themself is not relevant in determining this.127 Where the plaintiff is a
child it may be more difficult for them to establish that imputations are capable of being
defamatory. For example, in Saunders v Nationwide News Pty Ltd,128 an appeal was
brought by a seven‐year‐old boy in respect of judgment entered against him in his
defamation action against Nationwide News. The action had been brought by the boy in
relation to a story identifying him and describing injuries he sustained as a result of setting
himself on fire while sniffing petrol. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that this news report
conveyed the imputation that he had committed the crime of petrol sniffing.129 This was
accepted by the jury, which went on, however, to find that the imputation was not
defamatory of the plaintiff.130 The appeal was dismissed and in the course of giving
judgment Hunt AJA commented as follows:
Assuming, as it must be assumed, that the plaintiff here is alleged to have committed the
crime of petrol sniffing, it was, in my view, clearly open to the jury to have found that the
ordinary decent members of the community would not have thought any less of the
plaintiff for having so acted, because of his immaturity.131
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An imputation that a person has given consent to the use of their image may also be
actionable under defamation, particularly where, as in Tolley v Fry, the imputation was
that the plaintiff had provided their consent for reward.132 Nevertheless, Pannam has
expressed the view that that imputation in itself will not necessarily damage the plaintiff’s
reputation: ‘an ordinary individual is not lowered in the esteem of his fellows if it is
thought he receives a fee from an advertisement’.133
Truth (or justification) is a defence to a defamation action so an authentic photograph
that depicts a person as they actually are will only be considered defamatory if an
argument can be sustained that the photograph conveys a meaning that is capable of
being defamatory, and which is substantially untrue.134 That meaning may be implied by
the context (including the forum in which the image is published) or in other ways, such
as by the addition of text and comments.135 Where the meanings conveyed by an image
are proven, on the balance of probabilities, to be substantially true then the effect of the
defamatory imputations on the claimant is irrelevant, as is the existence of a malicious
intent or the absence of a public interest justification.136 This is clearly a major limitation
on the utility of a defamation action in providing individuals with control over the
publication of images of themselves. Therefore, the truth defence will present a barrier
to success unless an image purports to be of the would‐be plaintiff but is not;137 has been
doctored such that it cannot be said to portray or convey the truth;138 is accompanied by
132
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Clifford L Pannam,’Unauthorized Use of Names or Photographs in Advertisements’ (1966) 40 The
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text or sounds that convey an untrue defamatory imputation;139 or where the context
imputes an untrue defamatory meaning to the picture.140
Even where a defamation action is made out by the publication of images of a person, the
action is of limited use in preventing publication, as free speech concerns mean that the
balance of convenience rarely comes down in favour of the grant of an interlocutory
injunction restraining publication.141 Nevertheless, where the action is made out the
successful plaintiff is likely to secure an undertaking or injunctive relief providing for
removal of the defamatory matter from publication by the person or persons responsible
for publication.142
Profile’, CBS News/Crimesider (online), 2 May 2012 <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301‐504083_162‐
57426001‐504083/ga‐girl‐14‐sues‐bullies‐for‐libel‐over‐fake‐facebook‐profile/>.
139
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On the other hand, the ease by which material can be copied and republished on the
internet means that the practical utility of a legal action for defamation is necessarily
limited by the cost and jurisdictional challenges of bringing an action against all those
responsible for publication or, in the case of internet intermediaries, liable for publication
by omission.
Defamation and Internet Intermediaries
The liability of internet intermediaries for defamatory content uploaded or posted by
another is a developing area of law and has been described as unsettled.143 Reviewing the
complexities of the question of intermediary liability is beyond the scope of this thesis, as
is consideration of the question of whether and if so in what circumstances intermediaries
should be liable in respect of defamatory matter posted by another.144 In short, however,
internet intermediaries have been held liable for defamation even where publication
occurs by omission — that is, without any intention to assist in the act of publication.145
As noted by Rolph, the trend of recent authorities on the question of whether internet
intermediaries should be regarded as publishers ‘appears, for now, to favour plaintiffs’.146
Accordingly, a person who has been defamed by way of an image theoretically has greater
control over their image than would be the case if the would‐be defendant was confined
to the person posting or uploading the image. The ability to sue an intermediary is
particularly important where the plaintiff wishes to secure removal of material from
publication and is unable to identify the person responsible for initially posting the
material. It is also important where the plaintiff finds that the material has been broadly
disseminated across a particular platform, such as is the case where a photograph on
Facebook, for example, is copied and reposted to other pages within the site.
Nevertheless, the practical utility of such an action is limited by the difficulty in enforcing
injunctive remedies against those located outside of Australia.147 Moreover, internet

(2013) 13(4) Human Rights Law Review 761, 775 who writes that it is nevertheless ‘possible that the
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2013) 5; Ryan J Turner, ‘Internet Defamation Law and Publication by Omission: A Multi‐Jurisdictional
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and the Internet after Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal
562.
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remedies in foreign jurisdictions mean a judgment obtained in one jurisdiction may be virtually ineffective
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intermediaries are not required to actively monitor content in order to determine
whether it is defamatory and, as noted in the previous section, cannot be held liable
unless and until they are aware of the nature of the content in question.148
4 Injurious Falsehood
In order to establish the common law tort of injurious falsehood a plaintiff must prove
that there has been malicious publication of a false statement concerning the plaintiff’s
goods or business that results in actual damage.149
An action for injurious falsehood is unlikely to assist a plaintiff in obtaining a remedy for
the unauthorised publication of an image of themself unless the plaintiff can show that
the publication affected their business or commercial interests. 150 Like an action for
passing off, discussed next, injurious falsehood is essentially an action that protects
economic rather than personal or dignitary interests.
5 Passing Off
In Australia the tort of passing off can be used to provide redress where there is a
misrepresentation of an association between the plaintiff and the goods, services or
business of the defendant. The misrepresentation at the heart of a passing off action can
take various forms, including the use of a person’s name,151 image,152 or visual
elsewhere’: Megan Richardson and Richard Garnett, ‘Perils of Publishing on the Internet: Broader
Implications of Dow Jones v Gutnick’ (2004) 13(1) Griffith Law Review 90.
148
BSA sch 5, cl 9(1).
149
Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 at 527–8 (Bowen LJ).
150
Swimsure (Laboratories) Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796, 801 (Hunt J); Ballina Shire Council v
Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680, 694 (Gleeson CJ); Palmer‐Bruyn & Parker (2001) 268 CLR 388, 406 (Gummow
J). False statements concerning an individual plaintiff’s personal reputation have formed the basis for
successful claims of injurious falsehood where the claims have resulted in damage to the plaintiff’s business
or trade (see, eg, Dye v Commonwealth [2012] FCA 242 (16 March 2012) 215 [664] (Buchanan J): ‘there are
cases where a person, whose profession or business depends upon their personal standing in the
community or in the world of business or in their own profession, may claim damages for an injury to their
trade or business arising from a maliciously false statement made about them’) and even where the damage
has been to an individual in the pursuit of their career (Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98 (30 April 2007)).
Although there have been suggestions to the contrary on the part of academic commentators (see, eg,
Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts, (Thomson Reuters, 10th Edition, 2011)
795,795 [30.230]), and judicial reference to interesting but unresolved questions as to the extent to which
the tort extends beyond concepts of business or property (see, eg, Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994)
33 NSWLR 680, 692–3 (Gleeson CJ); Palmer‐Bruyn and Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons 208 CLR 388, 393 [1] (Gleeson
CJ), 407 [60] Gummow J), Australian courts have generally been reluctant to accept that injurious falsehood
can extend beyond the protection of business or commercial interests. In Dye v Commonwealth [2012] FCA
242 (16 March 2012), 215 [664], Buchanan J was adamant that the plaintiff not be allowed to pursue her
claim for injurious falsehood: ‘Ms Dye was not pursuing a trade or business in the sense contemplated by
those cases. She was an employee in a large organisation at a relatively junior level. No property or
commercial or business interest of the kind necessary for this tort was pleaded, much less established. Ms
Dye sold no product, had no custom to be lost, had no professional practice to be injured and had no
business to be damaged. In my view, this cause of action was misconceived from the outset’.
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See, eg, Fitzgerald & Anor v 33 South Pty Ltd & Anor [2008] FMCA 1132 (13 August 2008) (‘Fitzgerald’).
152
See, eg, Henderson v Radio Corp (1960) SR NSW 576 (‘Henderson’); Fitzgerald [2008] FMCA 1132 (13
August 2008).
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‘likeness’.153 The elements of the action were laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnick
Besloten Vennootschap v J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Limited, as follows:
(1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective
customers of his or ultimate customers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is
calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business
or goodwill of the trader ...154

Reference to the business or goodwill of a trader has been interpreted broadly to include
the commercial reputation of a person engaged in various fields of activity, including
professional and artistic and literary endeavours.155 It is clear, however, that the
reputation the plaintiff claims is being taken advantage of must be commercially valuable
or must amount to a ‘saleable commodity’.156 McLelland has argued that every person’s
reputation is conceivably ‘saleable’,157 but Gummow (writing before he was appointed to
the judiciary), commenting on the case of Henderson v Radio Corp,158 has written that
there is ‘no suggestion that, absent such a saleable commodity in a capacity for
sponsorship, any citizen can protest as passing off the commercial exploitation of his
name without consent, for it is his pre‐existing notoriety from which derives his saleable
commodity.’159 This is, as Gummow goes on to note, because in Australia the tort of
passing off does not aim to protect privacy per se, but rather a business or commercial
goodwill.160 Thus, while privacy and publicity have been described as closely related
concepts,161 passing off is essentially an economic tort, designed to protect the pecuniary
interests that arise from a person’s reputation, rather than a person’s dignitary interests
or personal autonomy.162 As such, it is not an action that can be used to protect against
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unauthorised publication of image per se, regardless of whether the effect of the
publication is harmful to one’s personal reputation or constitutes an invasion of privacy.163
6 Actions under the Australian Consumer Law
A statutory action for misleading or deceptive conduct or misleading or deceptive
representations will usually present an alternative cause of action to passing off. The
Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) provides that ‘a person shall not, in the course of trade
or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or
deceive.’164 Each state and territory applies the ACL as a law of that jurisdiction.165 As with
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) before it, the ACL contains no definition of the term
‘misleading or deceptive’, leaving interpretation of it to the courts. Whether conduct is
misleading or deceptive is a question of fact to be determined by reference to all relevant
facts and circumstances of the case.166
An important difference, superficially at least, between the common law action for
passing off and an action for misleading or deceptive conduct (or representations) under
the ACL167 is that in order to bring an action under the statute there is no need to show
an established reputation or goodwill: the emphasis is on the effect of the conduct upon
the market (consumers and potential consumers).168
Theoretically then, it should be possible for anyone, regardless of celebrity, to make use
of the statutory action where the use of their image by another amounts to misleading or
deceptive conduct or representations. However, Catanzariti believes that it ‘it is difficult
for a person to establish that conduct is misleading or deceptive unless the person is
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sufficiently famous that the public would assume that the person would licence the use
of their image, so that the use of their image suggests that a licence in fact exists.’169
In considering whether conduct or representations are misleading or deceptive, courts
have noted that it is ‘of particular importance to identify the respect in which there is said
to be any misleading or deception.’170 In particular, Lockhart J, in the course of giving
judgment in Lumley Life Ltd v IOOF of Victoria Friendly Society, observed that where
people are led into error, the error must not be ‘commercially irrelevant’.171 This is in
keeping with the primary object of the legislation, which is, as noted above, the protection
of consumers.172 This should mean that it is possible for non‐celebrities to utilise the
statutory action wherever a commercially relevant error has been induced by the use of
their image. Hence it will amount to misleading or deceptive conduct to use names or
images of individuals, celebrities or otherwise, in promotions and advertisements if that
use constitutes a false testimonial.173 The success of the action for misleading or deceptive
conduct (or representations) relating to the use of another’s image should also not
depend on there being any misrepresentation as to a commercial arrangement between
the subject of the image and the person or organisation making use of it.174 What is
important is whether public perception can be influenced to more favourably regard a
product, business or organisation on the basis that it is being recommended by others.
Nevertheless, it is true to say that the use of a celebrity name or image is probably more
likely to influence the perception of the relevant section of the public than use of a non‐
169

See also Susan M Crennan, ‘The Commercial Exploitation of Personality’ (1995) 8 Australian Intellectual
Property Law Bulletin 129, 131 in which Crennan (writing before her appointment to the judiciary) observed
that the wrongful appropriation of personality could only be restrained under the statutory action for
misleading or deceptive conduct where a ‘significant section of the public would be misled into believing,
contrary to fact, that a commercial arrangement had been concluded between … a celebrity … and a
defendant or respondent, under which the plaintiff or applicant agreed to the use of the indicia of
personality for advertising purposes’ (emphasis added). See also Arts Law Centre of Australia, Unauthorised
Use of Your Image, Arts Law Information Sheet (24 May 2013) <http://www.artslaw.com.au/info‐
sheets/info‐sheet/unauthorised‐use‐of‐your‐image/>, suggesting that the ‘mere use of a person’s image is
unlikely to be found to mislead or deceive ... unless that person is a celebrity or well‐known endorser of
products.’
170
Hornsby (1978) 140 CLR 216, 228 (Stephen J), cited with approval in Taco Bell (1982) 42 ALR 177, 201
(Deane and Fitzgerald JJ).
171
Lumley Life Ltd v IOOF of Victoria Friendly Society (1990) ATPR 40‐987, 50, 838, as referred to in SAP
Australia Pty Ltd v Sapient Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1821 at 14 [51] (French, Heerey and Lindgren JJ). The
commercial relevance of the error goes to the question as to whether there is sufficient causal connection
between the conduct and the consumer’s state of mind: SAP Australia Pty Ltd v Sapient Australia Pty Ltd
[1999] FCA 1821 at 14 [51] (French, Heerey and Lindgren JJ). See also Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia
Ltd [2000] FCA 1572 (8 November 2000), [64] (French J).
172
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 2. See also Taco Bell (1982) 42 ALR 177, 183 (Franki J) citing
Stephen J in Hornsby (1978) 140 CLR 216: ‘[I]t is clear that the purpose of s52 is that of consumer protection
and therefore questions of goodwill or damage to an applicant are…unlikely to be of critical importance in
deciding whether an action to restrain conduct, which would be in contravention of s52, should succeed.’
173
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC: Removalist Admits Publishing False
Testimonials (2011) <http://www.accc.gov.au/media‐release/accc‐removalist‐admits‐publishing‐false‐
testimonials>. Cf Crennan, above n 169.
174
Cf Crennan, above n 169, 131.

130

celebrity image, and will almost certainly be a relevant consideration in considering
whether the conduct or representation in question is, in fact, misleading or deceptive.
It is also likely to be more difficult to establish that a section of the community has been
misled or deceived where the only basis of the alleged misleading or deceptive behaviour
in relation to the use of an image is that there has been a misrepresentation that the
image subject has consented to the use of the image (as distinct from any representation
that they the image subject has endorsed or approved of a business, product, service or
message). In Talmax Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd, the plaintiff, Australian swimmer
Kieren Perkins, alleged (among other things) that the use of his image in an advertisement
implied that he had given permission for his name and image to be so used and that this
amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct within the meaning of the statutory
prohibition.175 The trial judge reasoned that:
Anyone who inferred that Talmax or Perkins had allowed the name and image to be used
must have reasoned or assumed either that Telecom was not in law entitled to have
published the article and photo without consent; or that, consistently with ordinary or
proper practice, Telecom would not have done so; or that, in all the circumstances, the
text implied permission.176

The trial judge went on to hold:
[a] reader who took it that Telecom was legally obliged to obtain consent to use the name
and image of Perkins in the advertisement — one which did not amount to an
endorsement — would have proceeded on a belief about the law which, as things stand,
is erroneous. Such a mistake could not convert the article into conduct contravening s.
52.177

The plaintiff was unsuccessful at trial but on appeal the trial judge’s findings were
reversed.178 The appeal court did, however, find that as a whole the material gave the
impression that the appellant had consented to it,179 although commented that the
misrepresentation as to consent was of somewhat ‘less importance’ than the
misrepresentations as to a commercial arrangement between the parties.180
Where the plaintiff is a non‐celebrity, however, it is likely that any misrepresentation as
to consent to use of image will be considered commercially irrelevant. This is on the basis
that any such misrepresentation will be unlikely to influence the relevant section of the
public in their perception of the product, service or organisation in question (at least
175
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where there is no representation that the person somehow endorses or approves of that
product, service or organisation). Accordingly, while there may be a misrepresentation
conveyed as to consent of the image subject, that misrepresentation is unlikely to be
considered misleading or deceptive in a way that contravenes statutory consumer
protection provisions.
In summary, a statutory action for misleading or deceptive conduct (or representations)
may succeed where the use of an image misrepresents some form of endorsement by or
approval of the person in the image of a particular product, service or organisation. In
endorsement cases, celebrity plaintiffs are more assured of success than non‐celebrity
plaintiffs because their perceived support or endorsement is able to influence the
perception of the relevant section of the public, and is likely to be considered
commercially relevant. However, as has been noted, celebrity is not a pre‐requisite where
the representation amounts to a false testimonial. Further, individuals may be able to
succeed in establishing that use of their image without consent —even where that does
not amount to an endorsement — is misleading or deceptive; however, it is suggested
that such situations will be rare.
7 Intentional Infliction of Harm
Where a person intends to and does inflict harm on another, including by way of the use
or threatened use of that other’s image, it is possible that an action would lie for the tort
of intentional infliction of harm. The tort of intentional infliction of harm is usually traced
back to the English case of Wilkinson v Downton, where Justice Wright held that it was
unlawful to act in a manner calculated to cause physical harm to another.181 However, as
one commentator has observed, the case was concerned only indirectly with physical
harm and its ‘real significance lay in the fact that it was the first case in which an English
court offered redress for the intentional infliction of purely mental harm.’182 There have
been suggestions from the judiciary and commentators alike that Wilkinson was but a
‘creature of its time’183 and that it ‘does not have a leading role in modern law’.184 These
observations are made on the basis of a view that the action may have been largely
‘subsumed under the unintentional tort of negligence’185 which allows recovery for pure
mental harm.186
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Nevertheless, an important limitation of an action for intentional infliction of harm action
in providing a person with the ability to control the publication or use of images of
themselves is the need to demonstrate physical harm or a recognised psychiatric injury.187
Because harm is a prerequisite of the action, it cannot be used proactively to prevent the
unauthorised publication or dissemination of images, even if the likely consequence of
that publication or dissemination would be compensable physical or mental harm.188
Another limitation is the requirement that the infliction be intentional. In Wilkinson,
Wright J held that the tort was made out where the defendant had ‘wilfully done an act
calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff … and has in fact thereby caused harm
to her.’189 However, Wright J also found that intention could be ‘imputed’ to the
defendant where the defendant’s act was ‘so plainly calculated to produce some effect of
the kind which was produced that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the
defendant’.190 The question as to what constitutes intention for the purposes of the tort
of intentional infliction of harm has proven difficult to answer definitively. It has been
suggested that Wright J’s concept of imputed intention ‘sailed as close to negligence as
he felt he could go.’191 In Nationwide News v Naidu, however, Spigelman CJ observed that
‘something substantially more certain’ than the reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric
injury was required to satisfy the requirement that the defendant’s act was ‘calculated’ to
produce some effect of the kind that was produced.192 While it was clear that an actual
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subjective intention was not required, what actually was required had not, in Spigelman
J’s view, been determined authoritatively.193 Nevertheless, it was Spigelman J’s view that
‘reckless indifference’ would satisfy the requirement of intention. Recently the Supreme
Court of the UK has considered the mental element of the Wilkinson tort and determined
that recklessness is insufficient and that the mental element is ‘intention to cause physical
harm or severe mental or emotional distress’.194 Further, intention imputed on the basis
of law – that is, on the basis that the harm was a likely consequence – was a ‘vestige of a
previous age and has no proper role in the modern law of tort.’195
Commenting on the usefulness of the Wilkinson tort in remedying invasions of personal
privacy, the NSWLRC concluded that it would ‘at most … seem capable of applying to
invasions of privacy that are deliberate and, perhaps, possess some element of
vindictiveness.’196 As Des Butler has observed, where the complaint relates to the
publication of images by the media the plaintiff is ‘likely to be confronted with the
argument that the defendant’s intention was to cover the story, rather than inflict harm
on the plaintiff.’197
Therefore, the utility of a cause of action for intentional infliction of harm in remedying
the unwanted publication or use of images must be considered limited. This is because of
the need to establish recognised psychiatric harm, beyond emotional distress, humiliation
and embarrassment, and the need to establish the requisite intention on the part of the
party inflicting the mental harm.
8 Negligent Infliction of Harm
An action in negligence will lie where the defendant is in breach of a duty of care owed to
the plaintiff and where that breach is a cause of compensable damage that is not too
remote a consequence of the negligent act or omission.198 It is now well established in
common law that, for the purposes of a negligence action, pure mental harm199 is
compensable, but mental harm that does not amount to a recognised psychiatric illness
or injury is not a basis of recovery.200 Overlaying the common law position, civil liability
legislation in six jurisdictions provides that there is no duty of care on the part of a person
(a defendant) to take care not to cause mental harm to another, unless the defendant
ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances,
suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken (‘the normal
193
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fortitude test’).201 In Victoria the normal fortitude test applies only in respect of pure
mental harm,202 whereas in the other five jurisdictions the legislation stipulates a ‘normal
fortitude test’ in respect of any mental harm (defined as ‘impairment of a person’s mental
condition’203) incurred by the prospective plaintiff.204 However, each of these jurisdictions
also provides that the limitations on the duty of care imposed by the normal fortitude test
will or may not apply where the defendant knows or should have known that the plaintiff
is a person of less than normal fortitude.205 Furthermore, civil liability legislation in five of
the preceding six jurisdictions places an explicit limitation on recovery of damages where
the pure mental harm does not amount to a recognised psychiatric illness.206
The concept of ‘normal fortitude’ as a control mechanism of liability for pure mental harm
also exists under common law. Whether the normal fortitude test is satisfied will be taken
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into account as a factor relevant to establishing a duty of care or in assessing foreseeability
for the purpose of deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care.207
As negligence is premised upon objective standards of behaviour, neither the absence of
consent from an image subject to the distribution or publication of images of that person,
nor the impact or likely impact of such distribution or publication on the plaintiff’s mental
state, will suffice to establish the action unless the defendant’s conduct is otherwise
unreasonable.208 Rather, the absence of consent and the seriousness of the consequences
will be relevant factors in establishing whether the defendant acted unreasonably,209 but
are unlikely to be determinative.210
As with the tort of intentional infliction of harm, damage is a prerequisite of the cause of
action in negligence. Therefore, an action will not be useful in terms of preventing future
damage unless actual compensable damage has already been sustained.211
9 Harassment
It has variously been said that the common law does not recognise a general tort of
harassment,212 and that the tort is in an ‘embryonic form’.213 In Grosse the plaintiff
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pleaded a number of causes of action, including the tort of harassment.214 As Skoien DCJ
found that the plaintiff had successfully established an invasion of privacy, he found it
unnecessary to decide whether a tort of harassment should be recognised.215 There has
been no superior court recognition of such a tort in Australia, although in Lenah Gummow
and Hayne JJ referred to what may be a developing tort of harassment.216
In Chapman v Conservation Council of South Australia, Williams J noted that harassment
may be limited to ‘acts calculated to cause harm to the plaintiff’.217 As is the case with a
possible Wilkinson action, a harassment tort (in so far as it has any separate existence)
would likely only be effective in remedying photography and filming, or the subsequent
publication of images, in situations where it was possible to prove that the defendant
possessed subjective intention to cause harm and possibly in situations where intention
can be imputed on the basis that harm was likely or very likely to ensue. As with the tort
of intentional infliction of harm, imputing intention to a defendant would, in the words of
Spigelman CJ in Naidu, require ‘something substantially more certain’ than the reasonable
foreseeability of psychiatric injury.
The ALRC has recommended that if a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of
privacy is not enacted, state and territory governments should enact uniform legislation
creating a statutory tort of harassment.218
10 Trespass
A person in exclusive possession of land219 may impose conditions upon those who wish
to enter or remain on the land, such as a stipulation that no photography or filming is
permitted. If these conditions are not respected and consent to remain on the land is
withdrawn, the person breaching the conditions becomes a trespasser and the person in
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exclusive possession may use reasonable force to eject them.220 As Gleeson CJ observed
in Lenah:
the premises on which [the] activities took place were private in a proprietorial sense.
And, by virtue of its proprietary right to exclusive possession of the premises, the
respondent had the capacity (subject to the possibility of trespass or other surveillance)
to grant or refuse permission to anyone who wanted to observe, and record, its
operations.221

In recent times it has become increasingly common for public facilities, such as
gymnasiums and swimming pools, to restrict filming on their premises.222 However,
although a film may have been captured in circumstances involving a trespass, the
physical and intellectual property in the film will usually remain vested in the person who
captured it.223 Where this is the case, an injunction will be required in order to restrain
publication of the film. The principles around the issuing of an injunction to restrain
publication of a film captured during a trespass were considered by the High Court in
Lenah.224 The appeal to the High Court sought to overturn an interlocutory injunction
issued by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania restraining the ABC from
broadcasting a film that had been captured surreptitiously and as a result of a trespass
upon the respondent’s meat processing premises. The ABC itself was not a party to the
trespass. The majority of the High Court found in favour of the appellants and held that
the court had no power to grant an injunction absent an underlying cause of action.225
Gleeson CJ concluded that the fact that the information had been obtained tortiously in
the first place was not sufficient to restrain publication on the part of a person into whose
hands the information later came.226 He also expressed the view that even if the person
against whom the injunction was sought was the trespasser, an injunction would not lie
simply because of the tortious conduct but would need to be based on an appropriate
cause of action, such as breach of confidence.227
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Accordingly, the fact that a photograph or film is captured during a trespass is unlikely of
itself to provide sufficient basis for the granting of an injunction to restrain the publication
of the photograph or film. This is the case even if it is the trespasser themself who
publishes or threatens to publish the film. In any event, the image subject is often not the
person who has grounds to sue for trespass. For example, if an image is captured in a
public swimming pool despite bans on photography, the image subject has no standing to
sue for trespass (not being the person in exclusive possession) and would have to rely on
an underlying cause of action in order to successfully restrain publication of the images.
11 Nuisance
In contrast with trespass actions, the relevant interference in a nuisance action can be
indirect, although the same set of circumstances can give rise to contemporaneous
actions in trespass and nuisance.228 Thus nuisance cases have involved intrusions by way
of smell,229 noise230 and even light,231 among other things. In Victoria Park Racing &
Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor232 the appellant racecourse owner alleged that a
nuisance had been committed by the respondent who had erected a viewing platform
overlooking the appellant’s land, from which he was able to observe and broadcast
commentary on the races. The appellant claimed that the erection of the platform
amounted to an interference with their use and enjoyment of their land and sought to
support their argument by alleging that the defendant had infringed their right of
privacy.233 The High Court rejected the appellant’s contention that there was an
interference with the use and enjoyment of their land and disclaimed the existence of a
recognised right of privacy, at least under the head of nuisance.234
It is likely that a plaintiff with the requisite proprietary interest will have an action in
nuisance to restrain on‐going and unwanted surveillance, filming or photography that
amounts to a genuine interference with their use and enjoyment of land.235 In Raciti v
(‘Windridge Farm’) holding that there was no basis in equity for the grant of injunctive relief to restrain the
capture of a film made during a trespass, where there was no breach of confidence.
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Hughes Young J held that although the taking of photographs is not generally actionable,
there was sufficient evidence in the present case of a ‘deliberate attempt to snoop on the
privacy of a neighbour’ such as amounted to an actionable nuisance.236 Nevertheless,
actions that are more properly categorised as an interference with the person rather than
with a person’s use or enjoyment of land are unlikely to constitute nuisance.237
Even if a person does have grounds to sue in private nuisance in respect of unauthorised
photography or filming, the availability of an injunction to restrain the publication of
images captured during the nuisance is likely to be subject to the same difficulties
encountered when seeking an injunction to restrain images captured during a trespass, as
discussed above.
12 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property laws can assist an image subject to obtain redress for the
unauthorised publication of their image in only limited situations. Copyright in images
generally resides in the author (usually the person photographing or filming).238 This
means that unless the image is a ‘selfie’239 the image subject will generally not be the
copyright owner. A limited exception to this position exists where images have been
commissioned, and possibly where they were improperly obtained in circumstances
creating a constructive trust.240
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person capturing or commissioning the image subject to a constructive trust see Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199,
246 [102] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Gummow and Hayne JJ sought to explain the basis for the award of an
injunction in the case of Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457and subsequent
decisions, to restrain the publication of images captured during a trespass but in circumstances where no
breach of confidentiality was involved: ‘A cinematograph film may have been made, as in Lincoln Hunt, in
circumstances involving the invasion of the legal or equitable rights of the plaintiff or a breach of the
obligations of the maker to the plaintiff. It may then be inequitable and against good conscience for the
maker to assert ownership of the copyright against the plaintiff and to broadcast the film. The maker may
be regarded as a constructive trustee of an item of personal (albeit intangible) property, namely the
copyright conferred by s 98 of the Copyright Act.’ See also Windridge Farm [2011] NSWSC 196 (28 March
2011) (although Hay J decided that no such trust arose on the facts). There have been no subsequent
decisions since Windridge Farm on the issue of when a constructive trust will arise of the copyright
ownership of images captured during a trespass, and this area remains relatively unexplored. Asserting legal
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Trade marks will not be available for the majority of people, as registration requires an
intention to use the mark in relation to goods or services.241
13 Contractual Regulation
In some situations a person may be able to gain a remedy for the unauthorised publication
of images of themselves by relying on breach of contract. It is common these days for
organisations to adopt a privacy policy and these policies are often incorporated into
contracts that the organisation enters into with third parties. The incorporation of privacy
policies into contracts is common among, but not limited to, organisations operating in
the online environment. Indeed, organisations bound by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
(‘Privacy Act’) must have a privacy policy in order to comply with the Act.242 Privacy
policies usually set out the ways in which an organisation uses or intends to use personal
information and frequently contain undertakings on the part of an organisation not to
pass personal information on to others (other than in certain circumstances). One
example is the data use policy of Facebook, the popular social media website. Facebook’s
data policy sets out the kind of information collected by Facebook, for what it is used and
with whom it is shared (among other things).243 The Facebook data use policy is
incorporated into the Facebook terms, which form the contract between Facebook and
its members.244 If information, including an image, were to be used or shared in a way
that constituted a breach of an express term of the data use policy, the breach will prima
facie give rise to a contractual remedy. Whether or not a contractual remedy is of much
use to an individual is an entirely different matter and will depend, among other
considerations, upon whether the contract is governed by Australian law or by the laws

title in the intellectual property rights extant in an image or film, by way of a constructive trust, may
therefore be possible when the image has been taken in circumstances involving an invasion of a person’s
legal or equitable rights, such as where the film is captured during a trespass.
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Australian Government, Get the Right IP: Apply for a Trade Mark: Before you Apply, IP Australia < Trade
marks
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get‐the‐right‐ip/trade‐marks/apply‐for‐a‐trade‐mark/before‐you‐
apply/>.
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Privacy Act s 15 and Australian Privacy Principle 1.3.
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Facebook, Data Policy (29 September 2016) < https://www.facebook.com/policy.php>.
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Nevertheless, whether the terms of use have contractual status between Facebook and those who
merely access the site (without registering an account with Facebook) is not entirely clear: this is because
the terms are stated to apply to anyone who uses or accesses Facebook (Facebook, Facebook Terms of
Service (30 January 2015) < https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms>), yet those who only access the site
without registering have not been required to indicate assent to the terms and, indeed, do not have the
terms explicitly drawn to their attention. This type of ‘agreement’ (or assumed agreement) is often referred
to as a ‘browsewrap’ agreement and such ‘agreements’ are generally believed to be unenforceable on the
basis that there is insufficient notice given to the user to establish a valid contract, although there may be
exceptions. See, eg, Jay Forder and Dan Svantesson, Internet and E‐Commerce Law (Oxford University Press,
2007) 50–2; Pauline Sadler and Anna Bunn, ‘The Use of YouTube in iLectures: More Copyright Shades of
Grey’ Vol 16 (1) 2011 International Journal of Law & Education 7, 16. Browsewrap agreements can be
distinguished from so‐called ‘clickwrap’ agreements where the user does indicate consent to the terms by
a positive act, such as by clicking ‘I agree’ or (as is the case with Facebook registered users) by signing up to
a site where sign‐up itself indicates acceptance of the site’s terms and policies. As to the enforceability of
such agreements generally, see, eg, Forder & Svantesson, above n 78, 52.
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of an overseas jurisdiction.245 Also incorporated into the Facebook terms are the
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities.246 These include a number of obligations on the
part of the Facebook user regarding the collection and use of others’ information247 but
contain few reciprocal rights on the part of a user where others misuse their information.
Aside from reliance upon a privacy policy incorporated into a contract, individuals may
have an action for breach of contract where there is breach of an express or an implied
term limiting the use to which images can be put. Express terms limiting the use of images
are common in sponsorship agreements between organisations and celebrities or
sportspeople, or in publication agreements between the media and celebrities.248 Pannam
refers to two old English cases in which non‐celebrity individuals were successful in
restraining the use of a photograph of themselves on the grounds that use of the
photograph constituted breach of an implied term of a contract under which the
photographs were taken, such that all prints from the negative were for the sole use of
the customer.249
As has been discussed above, it is open to those with a proprietary interest in land to
impose conditions on the entry onto or remaining upon land. If a condition of entry
prohibits photography or filming (and is sufficiently incorporated into a contract
governing entry onto the premises in question), the publication of images taken in breach
of that condition give rise to an action for breach of contract against the person who
captured the images. However, the rules on privity of contract mean that actions for
breach of contract usually only benefit those who are party to the contract.250
In the course of contributing to the ALRCs inquiry into Australian privacy law and practice,
many young people expressed trust in the reporting mechanisms offered by social
networking sites and appeared to believe that these mechanisms would allow for the
removal of images that had been posted without authorisation.251 However, an
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For example, the Facebook terms of use that apply to members signing up in Australia are governed by
the laws of the State of California and the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Santa Clara
County, California, for the purpose of litigating all such claims: Facebook, Facebook Terms of Service (30
January 2015) < https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms> term 15(1).
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return for which the magazine would have the exclusive right to publish photographs of the wedding and
an accompanying article (Douglas & Ors v Hello Ltd & Ors [2005] EWCA Civ 595, Lord Phillips MR at [5]).
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et al, above n 54.
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Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762; Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; Jackson v Horizon
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Graw, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2015) 231 – 232.
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ALRC, For Your Information, above n 125, 2234 [67.43].
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examination of the terms and conditions of many of the popular social networking sites
reveals that while the site host generally retains wide discretion to remove images, they
are generally under no obligation to do so, even in response to a request by an individual
who can demonstrate that an image has been posted without consent or where the image
contravenes the site’s own terms and conditions.252
In summary, one of the most obvious limitations of a breach of contract action in
remedying the unauthorised publication of images of a person is that in the majority of
cases — particularly where images are published by an individual acting in a purely
personal capacity and in cases where the parties are friends or social acquaintances —
there will be no contract between the parties involved at all.253 Where a contract does
exist, it will only provide a remedy if the contract expressly or impliedly stipulates against
the use of images of the image subject, or imposes conditions that must be met before
such images are used. Even where a contractual remedy is available, issues of cross‐
jurisdictional enforcement may present a serious barrier to the utility of such actions.
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Facebook, Facebook Terms of Service (30 January 2015) < https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms> term
5(2) allows Facebook to remove content that violates their terms, which include commitments by users not
to upload content which violates someone else’s rights or the law. There is no obligation to remove the
content, although Facebook does state that it will ‘remove content, disable accounts or work with law
enforcement when we believe that there is a genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety’:
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January 2016) < https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en> term 8.
253
Where the presumption that there is no intention to create legal relations between family members or
friends is not rebutted: see, eg, Graw, above n, 250, 118 – 126.
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B

Federal Information Privacy Laws

The Privacy Act regulates the collection and handling of personal information by federal
government agencies and certain private sector organisations.254 The collection and
management of personal information by state‐based government agencies is generally
regulated by state‐based information privacy laws or privacy schemes.255 An overview of
the way that each state and territory regulates information privacy is beyond the scope
of this thesis, but importantly state‐based legislation generally only regulates the state
public sector agencies and will not regulate the handling of personal information by
federal government agencies, private sector organisations or individuals.256 The following
section therefore considers the application of the federal information privacy regime
established by the Privacy Act.
As observed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Austen v Civil Aviation Authority, ‘[i]t
would appear that a deliberate decision was made by Parliament not to give a right of
action in tort for breach of a privacy principle.’257 The lack of standing to sue for an
interference with privacy under the Privacy Act is one of the obvious limitations of the
national privacy regime in providing individuals with a measure of control over the
publication of images of themselves.
The Privacy Act does not regulate privacy in any general sense but rather regulates the
way in which personal information is collected, stored and used. Personal information is
currently defined in the Privacy Act as ‘information or an opinion, whether true or not,
and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an identified or reasonably
identifiable individual’.258
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APP Entities (defined in Privacy Act s 6) are bound to comply with the Australian Privacy Principles (set
out in schedule 1 of the Act) (‘APPs’) and an act or practice of an APP Entity that breaches an APP or any
privacy code registered under the Act in relation to personal information about an individual is deemed an
‘interference with the privacy of an individual’ (Privacy Act s 13).
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The following Acts make provision for information privacy: Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT); Privacy
and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW); Information Act (NT); Information Privacy Act 2009
(Qld); Personal Information and Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic);
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administrative instruction contained in the Premier and Cabinet (SA) Circular 12, Information Privacy
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as those dealing with telecommunications or surveillance — refer to E.
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Austen v Civil Aviation Authority (1994) 50 FCR 272, 278. In its more recent privacy report, the ALRC did
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No guidance has yet been issued by the OAIC on the application of the current definition
of personal information to images specifically, although the government has indicated a
need for OAIC guidance on the application of this definition in general.259 However, as to
the meaning of the words ‘identified’ and ‘reasonably identifiable’ the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth)
offers the following explanation:
Whether an individual can be identified or is reasonably identifiable depends on context
and circumstances. While it may be technically possible for an agency or organisation to
identify individuals from information it holds, for example, by linking the information with
other information held by it, or another entity, it may be that it is not practically possible.
For example, logistics or legislation may prevent such linkage. In these circumstances,
individuals are not ‘reasonably identifiable’. Whether an individual is reasonably
identifiable from certain information requires a consideration of the cost, difficulty,
practicality and likelihood that the information will be linked in such a way as to identify
him or her.260

The explanation above suggests that a person must be identified or reasonably
identifiable to the entity that holds the information. However, guidance subsequently
provided by the OAIC notes that a relevant consideration in determining whether an
individual is reasonably identifiable, where that information is publicly released, will
include whether a reasonable member of the public who accesses the information would
be able to identify the individual.261 This suggests that an image might be considered
personal information even if an image subject is not identified to or reasonably
identifiable by the entity itself. Where an image is therefore made accessible to the public,
such as on the website of an entity bound by the Australian Privacy Principles (‘APPs’),
and a reasonable member of the public with access to the website would be able to
identify the individual, the image may be considered ‘personal information’ regardless of
whether the entity itself can reasonably identify the individual from the image. However,
the OAIC has also suggested that a broad enough section of the public must be able to
identify an individual from information about them in order for that information to be
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Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth), 53.
Various state‐based Privacy Commissioners have, however, provided guidance on the question of whether
images constitute personal information (as that term was defined previously defined in the Privacy Act).
The Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner advises that it in determining whether an image
constitutes personal information it is necessary to take into account a number of factors, such as the clarity
of the image and the context: Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Images and Privacy, Information
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considered personal information.262 What constitutes a broad enough section of the
public is nowhere defined.
Images will also be treated as personal information if a person is identifiable by a
combination of information held by a particular agency or organisation. One example is
that advances in technology, such as facial recognition software as described in Chapter
One, may allow an individual to be identified not merely from the information itself but
from the aggregation of the information in the image with other information in the
possession of an agency or organisation.263
The definition of personal information in the Privacy Act requires the information to be
‘about an individual’ (emphasis added). As such, where a person is depicted as part of a
group of people, or where their depiction is incidental to the image rather than the focus
of it, the image is arguably not about the individual and will not fall within the definition
of ‘personal information’.264 On the other hand, a recent determination of the Privacy
Commissioner found that information can be ‘about’ more than one person and still
constitute ‘personal information about an individual’ under the definition of personal
information in the Privacy Act.265
The Privacy Act applies to federal government agencies and certain private
organisations266 but does not currently apply to the acts or practices of individuals (other
than those done or engaged in the course of a business carried on by an individual).267
Small business operators, namely those with an annual turnover of $3 million or less in
the previous financial year, are also generally exempt from the Act.268 This means that
many instances of unauthorised collection or use of personal information, including
images, will not be subject to the principles around the collection, use and handling of
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Telephone Conversation with Carl, OAIC Enquiry Officer (2 September 2015).
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such information set out in the APPs or a registered privacy code.269 In a statement made
to the Senate Environment and Communications Committee, in the context of their
inquiry into the protection of the privacy of Australians online, Ms King‐Siem, Vice
President of the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty Victoria), argued that the
Privacy Act needed to be strengthened in order to better promote and protect the privacy
of individuals:
We believe that privacy is a fundamental human right. It is recognized under article 17 of
the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. We do not believe that it is
adequately protected in Australia. There is what I would term a patchwork of legislative
protections that we have. For instance, in our federal Privacy Act there is an exemption
for small business. Small business is, going on the Victorian Privacy Commissioner’s
submission, approximately 95 per cent of business in Australia, which means that 95 per
cent of business is not subject to privacy regulation.270

Another limitation of the Privacy Act, in the online context, is the ambiguity over the
extent to which overseas organisations, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs)271 based
wholly offshore, are governed by the Privacy Act and the APPs.272 The Privacy Act has
some application to the acts and practices of foreign agencies and organisations where
the act or practice relates to personal information about a person in Australia and other
requirements are met.273 Where an organisation is a body corporate but is not
incorporated in Australia, the Privacy Act will apply if the organisation carries on business
in Australia and the personal information involved was collected or held by the
organisation in Australia either before or at the time of the act or practice.274 These
requirements are known as the ‘Australian link’ requirements.275 The Explanatory
Memorandum to the Privacy Amendments (Enhancing Privacy) Bill 2012 explains that the
words ‘in Australia’ in the organisational link requirements should be interpreted to
‘include the collection, by an overseas entity, of personal information from an individual
who is physically within the borders of Australia or an external territory, and that this
would include collection from an individual physically located in Australia over the
internet by a company which has no physical presence in Australia.’276 The Memorandum
also clarifies that those entities which ‘have an online presence (but no physical presence
269
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in Australia), and collect personal information from people who are physically in Australia,
carry on a business in Australia or an external Territory’.277 Nevertheless there remains
some uncertainty as to the extent to which the Privacy Act will apply to information
received or generated by organisations without a physical presence in Australia.278
Finally, the Privacy Act is of limited use in providing individuals with control over their
images because even when an organisation or entity is bound to comply with the APPs,
those principles do not generally prevent the collection or use of photographs and videos
of individuals, even where that collection or use occurs without consent and is unwanted.
That is, provided that an APP entity collects those images in a fair and lawful manner and
complies with the other APPs, there is no prohibition on the capture and use of
photographs or videos, even without consent. An exception applies in relation to
‘sensitive information’, which can generally only be collected with the express consent of
the individual to whom the information relates.279 The definition of ‘sensitive information’
in the Privacy Act includes (but is not limited to) information or an opinion about an
individual’s health, beliefs, racial or ethnic origin, political or Trade Union associations and
sexual preferences and practices.280
An image may be considered sensitive information depending on the information
revealed by the image itself and any associated metadata — for example, a photograph
of two same sex individuals kissing each other, or even holding hands, could be considered
sensitive information because it reveals information about an identified individual’s
sexual preferences and practices. Photographs will also be treated as sensitive
information where they constitute ‘biometric information’, which they will do where, for
example, they are used for the purpose of automated biometric verification or biometric
identification.’281 Photographs used in Australian passports, for example, will constitute
sensitive personal information. It is also likely that photographs used to create biometric
templates to be used within face recognition systems would constitute sensitive
information. Facebook, for example, may use photographs of some of its users to create
biometric templates for the purpose of automatically identifying those users in other
277

Ibid.
Essentially this is because there is some ambiguity over how the word ‘collect’ in the organisational link
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photographs.282 Such photographs will probably be regarded as sensitive information
given that the purpose of collecting them is to use them for automatic biometric
identification.283
In summary, there are a number of limitations of the Privacy Act in providing individuals
with control over the way in which personal information in the form of images is collected
and handled. These include the lack of standing on the part of affected individuals to sue
for an interference with privacy under the Act; the fact that an image will only be
considered ‘personal information’ in certain circumstances; and the fact that the Act does
not apply to individuals acting in their personal capacity, or to small businesses.
In the online context, there is ambiguity over the extent to which overseas organisations,
such as ISPs based wholly offshore, are governed by the Privacy Act at all and, if they are,
the extent to which the APPs govern their practices.284 Even when it is clear that an entity
is bound by the APPs, it has been noted that, with exceptions in the case of sensitive
information, this generally does not stop the entity from collecting or using photographs
and videos of an individual, even where that collection or use occurs without consent and
is unwanted.
Chapter Four further illustrates the limitations of the Privacy Act in the context of a
number of hypothetical examples.
C

Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation

The Enhancing Online Safety for Children Act 2015 (Cth) (‘Online Safety Act’) establishes a
Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner (‘the e‐Safety Commissioner’) and a complaints system
to deal with cyberbullying material that is targeted at an Australian child and posted on a
social media service or relevant electronic service.285 The Act also provides for a rapid
282

Facebook explains that ‘[w]e currently use facial recognition software that uses an algorithm to calculate
a unique number (“template”) based on someone’s facial features, like the distance between the eyes, nose
and ears. This template is based on photos you’ve been tagged in on Facebook. We use this template to
suggest tags to you when you’re adding a new photo to Facebook … Thus, when a new photograph of an
individual in the “face print” database is uploaded to Facebook, the facial recognition software is able to
automatically suggest the name of the person in the new photograph’: Facebook, Tagging Photos, (July
2013) <http://www.facebook.com/help/463455293673370/>.
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concerns around biometric information, for example, that such information may be used to identify
individuals without their knowledge or consent’: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 125, vol 1, 325 [6.120].
284
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media service is defined in Online Safety Act s 9, and in essence is a social media service if the primary or
sole purpose of the service is to enable online social interaction between two or more end‐users, is a service
that allows end‐users to link or interact with another or other end‐users and allows end‐users to post
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removal scheme in relation to cyberbullying material that is targeted at an Australian Child
and posted on a social media service that is categorised under the Act as either a Tier 1 or
a Tier 2 social media service.286 The e‐Safety Commissioner may also issue notices to a
person who has posted cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child (an end‐
user), which can require the removal of material by the end‐user, the issuance of an
apology by the end‐user to the child in question, or an agreement on the part of the end‐
user not to further post material.287
The extent to which the Online Safety Act is likely to provide children with control over
images themselves is somewhat unpredictable, given that the legislation and the
complaints and removal system it establishes is still in its infancy. However, the definition
of ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’ under the Act will clearly limit
the types of images that can be investigated by the e‐Safety Commissioner. Only material
that is seriously ‘threatening’, ‘intimidating’, ‘harassing’ and ‘humiliating’ will come within
the purview of the e‐Safety Commissioner, and material that is merely insulting or
offensive will not constitute cyberbullying material under the Act.288 The question of
whether material constitutes cyberbullying material will also be considered from the point
of view of an ordinary, reasonable person: in other words it is an objective test.289
Although the e‐Safety Commissioner is able to consider the particular circumstances and
vulnerabilities of the child whom is targeted by the material,290 the fact remains that the
material on the service (and satisfies any other conditions that may be specified in any legislative rules made
by the responsible Minister pursuant to s108 of the Online Safety Act. A ‘relevant electronic service’ is
defined in section 4 and includes, among other things, email services, SMS and MMS services.
286
A social media service is a Tier 1 service if the service has applied to be declared as a Tier 1 service under
Online Safety Act s 23, is not a Tier 2 service and meets certain basic online safety requirements. A Tier 2
service is a service that has been declared as such under s 30 following recommendation by the Children’s
e‐Safety Commissioner pursuant to s 31. Only large social media services or those who have requested to
be declared as Tier 2 services can be recommended by the Commissioner for classification as a Tier 2 service.
There is no definition as such of a ‘large social media service’. Instead, the Act provides that in determining
whether a service is a large social media service, the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner should have regard
to a number of considerations including the number of user accounts held by Australian residents, the
number of user accounts held by Australian resident children and such other matters as the Commissioner
considers relevant: Online Safety Act s 31(8).
287
Online Safety Act s 3.
288
The material must be such that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that ‘it is likely that the
material was intended to have an effect on a particular Australian child’ and the material would be likely to
have the effect on the child of ‘seriously threatening, seriously intimidating, seriously harassing or seriously
humiliating’ that child: Ibid s 5.
289
Explanatory Memorandum to the Enhancing Online Safety for Children Bill 2014, 10.
290
The Office of the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner provides the following explanation as to how the
Commissioner decides if something is serious cyberbullying material: ‘We take a flexible approach so that
children who are genuinely affected by cyberbullying material are protected. This involves considering both
the individual child and the material itself. When we consider a child we look at the child’s background and
particular circumstances, any vulnerabilities of the child and the relationship between the child and the
person posting the material. When considering the material, we look at things like the language used, the
impact of any audio or visual material, the sensitivity of the material, the number of potential views and
how often the material was posted. To be pursued, material must be more than merely offensive or
insulting’: To be pursued, material must be more than merely offensive or insulting’: Office of the Children’s
e‐Safety Commissioner, How Does the Commissioner Decide if Something Is Serious Cyberbullying Material?,
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material must be considered objectively humiliating, harassing and so on before the e‐
Safety Commissioner can intervene.
Moreover, to fall within the definition of ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian
child’ an ordinary, reasonable person must also conclude that ‘it is likely that the material
was intended to have an effect on a particular Australian child’.291 Therefore, if it does not
seem likely that material was intended to have such an effect then, even if it does so, the
Commissioner cannot investigate.
Complaints about cyberbullying material can be made to the e‐Safety Commissioner by a
child who believes they are or may be the target of such material,292 or by a person on
behalf of the child.293 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the complaints
process in detail, but the e‐Safety Commissioner is given power to investigate all
complaints — including complaints about material sent by SMS or MMS.294 However,
there is no process to request or require removal of material from an electronic service
(for example, material sent by SMS or MMS between mobile phones) unless that service
is listed under the scheme as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 social network service. In relation to
complaints upheld against Tier 1 social media services, the e‐Safety Commissioner can
request the service to remove cyberbullying material.295 The failure of a Tier 1 service to
comply with a removal request does not result in any direct enforcement measures.
However, where a Tier 1 service repeatedly refuses to comply with requests for removal
of relevant material over a 12‐month period, the e‐Safety Commissioner may revoke the
service’s Tier 1 status and recommend that the Minister re‐categorise the service as a Tier
2 service.296 In relation to complaints upheld against Tier 2 social media services, the e‐
Safety Commissioner can require the service to remove the offending material by issuing
a Social Media Services Notice.297 The failure of a Tier 2 service to comply with a notice
requiring removal of cyberbullying material will attract a civil penalty298 and the e‐Safety
Commissioner may issue a formal warning.299

Cyberbullying Complaints FAQs, < https://www.esafety.gov.au/complaints‐and‐reporting/cyberbullying‐
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Online Safety Act s 5(b).
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Ibid s 18(1). Under the Act, a child is a person under 18 years of age (s 4), but there is also provision for
children who have reached 18 to make a complaint in respect of material targeting them when they were
under 18, provided, among other things, that the complaint is made within six months of them turning 18
(s 18(3)).
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Online Safety Act s 18(2).
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As these are included under the definition of a ‘relevant electronic service’: Ibid s 4.
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Ibid s 29.
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Ibid s 26. The Minister can also publish a statement on the Office of the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner
to that effect: Online Safety Act s 39.
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Ibid s 35.
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Ibid s 36. The civil penalty is enforceable as an enforceable undertaking and subject to injunctive remedy
under the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 (Cth): Online Safety Act ss 47, 48.
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Commissioner to that effect: Online Safety Act s 40.
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One potentially significant limitation on the efficacy of the cyberbullying material removal
regime established by the Online Safety Act is that the e‐Safety Commissioner can only
request the removal of such material posted on a Tier 1 or Tier 2 service. In order to be
classified as a Tier 1 service, a social network service must apply to be so classified.300 At
the time of writing, a number of social network services are listed as Tier 1 services. These
include Twitter, Ask.fm and Flikr. A number of services are currently classified as Tier 2
services; these include Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. Social media services not listed
as Tier 1 or Tier 2 are under no obligation to apply for listing as either a Tier 1 or Tier 2
service.301 However, there is some incentive for large social media services to apply for
classification as a Tier 1 service. The incentive is that by being classified as a Tier 1 service,
the service has the benefit of electing whether complaints will be dealt with under the
‘default’ or the ‘special’ rule.302 The difference between the ‘default’ rule and the ‘special’
rule is that under the default rule the e‐Safety Commissioner assesses whether material
is ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’ by reference to the definition in
the Act, whereas under the special rule material is first assessed as to whether it breaches
the service’s own terms of use, and only if it does is it assessed against the legislative
definition.303 However, this incentive is very limited, given that the e‐Safety Commissioner
is unable to recommend that a service be classified as a Tier 2 service without first giving
it the opportunity to apply for classification as a Tier 1 service. 304 For social media services
that are unlikely to be considered a ‘large social media service’ there is, arguably, no
incentive to apply for classification as a Tier 1 service. This is because the e‐Safety
Commissioner cannot recommend that a service be classified as a Tier 2 service unless it
is a ‘large social media service’305 or unless the service itself has requested the e‐Safety
Commissioner to make such a declaration.306 The fact that the removal scheme is entirely
contingent upon material being posted on a social media service that is classified as either
a Tier 1 or Tier 2 service is therefore, potentially, a significant limitation. It is not clear
whether this limitation has been recognised as such by the government.307
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The Act does not contain any definition of a ‘large social media service’ but sets out a number of
considerations that the e‐Safety Commissioner should have regard to when determining if a social media
service is ‘large’. These include the number of accounts held by end‐users residing in Australia and the
number of accounts held by Australian children. The e‐Safety Commissioner may also take into account
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Ibid s 31(3).
307
The Regulation Impact Statement (‘RIS’) that forms part of the Explanatory Memorandum to the
Enhancing Online Safety for Children Bill 2014: Explanatory Memorandum, Enhancing Online Safety for
Children Bill 2014, 14–64 notes that there is a risk that smaller social media sites may not respond to
requests from the Commissioner to remove cyberbullying material, because they are not subject to legally
binding notices and penalties: ay27. There is, within this statement, an assumption that the Commissioner
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In summary, there are a number of potential limitations of the Online Safety Act in
providing children with control over their image. The extent of these is somewhat
unknown, given that the regime established by the Act is still in its infancy.308 However,
one limitation is that the interpretation of ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an
Australian child’ is such that material that is merely insulting or offensive will not
constitute ‘cyberbullying’ material under the Act. Another potentially significant
limitation is that complaints can only be made about material posted on a Tier 1 or Tier 2
social media service, and social media services have no obligation to apply for
classification as either a Tier 1 or Tier 2 service.
D

Regulation of Content under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth)

Online content in Australia is regulated by a scheme set out in schedules 5 and 7 of the
BSA. The BSA also regulates ISPs309 and internet content hosts.310 This national regulatory
scheme was previously administered by ACMA. However, since the enactment of the
Online Safety Act, administration of the scheme is now the responsibility of the e‐Safety
Commissioner,311 which is an independent statutory office within ACMA.312 Schedule 7 of
the BSA provides that certain content is prohibited or potentially prohibited,313 and the
definitions of ‘prohibited’ and ‘potentially prohibited’ are tied to the way in which such
content is or would be classified by the Australian Classification Board under the
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth).314 Where content
is prohibited or potentially prohibited and where the content is hosted or provided in
Australia, the e‐Safety Commissioner is able to issue a ‘take‐down’ notice to the content
host requiring the removal of the prohibited or potentially prohibited content315 (or
where the content is hosted live, issue a cessation notice).316 Failure to comply with a
will be able to issue requests for removal of material to smaller social network sites (whereas, unless the
service is a Tier 1 service there is no power under the Act to make such a request). Nevertheless, the RIS
goes on to explain that the Commissioner will be ‘expected to build strong working relationships with social
media services used by children in Australia, whether formally subject to the legislation or not’. The RIS also
notes that the Commissioner may ‘make informal requests to the sites not subject to Tier 2 regulation to
remove cyber‐bullying material’: at 27.It is unclear whether this is intended to refer to requests made under
the Tier 1 scheme, or not.
308
In its first twelve months’ of operation (to 1 July 2016), the Office of the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner
reported that it helped to resolve 186 complaints of serious cyberbullying for under 18s, and found that
71% of targets where girls and the remainder boys: Office of the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner,
Australian Government, eSafety 12 Month Report (July 2016) < https://www.esafety.gov.au/12‐month‐
report>.
309
BSA sch 5, cl 8.
310
Ibid, cl 3.
311
Online Safety Act s 15(1)(a)(ii).
312
Ibid ss 67 and 68; see also Explanatory Memorandum, Enhancing Online Safety for Children Bill 2014, 3.
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BSA sch 7, cls 20 and 21 respectively.
314
See also the National Classification Code (May 2005) F2005L01284. For background on the Australian
classification scheme generally, refer to Australian Government, Australian Classification
<http://www.classification.gov.au/Information/Pages/Home.aspx>.
315
BSA sch 7, cl 47.
316
Ibid, cl 56.
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relevant take‐down notice or cessation notice constitutes contravention of a designated
content/hosting service provider rule,317 which can give rise to both criminal and civil
liability.318 Where content is prohibited or potentially prohibited and where it is hosted
outside Australia, the e‐Safety Commissioner has certain options, including, in sufficiently
serious cases, referral to a law enforcement agency.319
In addition to the regulation of prohibited and potentially prohibited content, the BSA also
provides for and encourages the development of internet codes of practice.320 A report
prepared in 2012 by the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre at the University of NSW
identified thirteen codes of practice in relation to online activity that were then in force
in Australia, seven of which were registered with a regulator.321 Two of the codes
previously registered with ACMA are now the responsibility of the e‐Safety Commissioner,
namely the Internet Content Services Code, developed by the Internet Industry
Association, and the Codes for Industry Co‐Regulation in Areas of Internet and Mobile
Content.322 According to Connolly and Vaile, the general objectives of the Internet
Content Services Code are to ‘promote safer online experiences for the community
(particularly children)’ and to provide guidelines to designated providers in relation to
complaints handling, the removal of notified content or content services, the promotion
of online safety for Australian families, the implementation of restricted access systems
for certain content services and the regulation of certain chat services.323 Connolly and
Vaile write that the relevance of this Code is ‘in its regulation of content hosting which
occurs outside of Australia. The Code outlines the scheme to notify suppliers of IIA
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Activity in Australia’ (Report, Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre, University of NSW, March 2012) 5. The
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[Internet Industry Association] Family Friendly Filters with information on prohibited or
potentially prohibited content. It also requires an ISP to make available the use of IIA
Family Friendly Filters for charge.’324
Compliance with a registered code of practice is generally voluntary, although the e‐Safety
Commissioner does have the power to direct compliance in certain circumstances.325
Failure to comply with a direction can result in criminal and civil liability for the
content/hosting service provider.326
Limitations of the regulatory scheme relating to online content were considered by the
ALRC in its report into Australian Privacy Law and Practice, For Your Information. The
report noted that the dependence of the take‐down scheme upon the classification of
material in accordance with the National Classification Code limits the extent to which it
can be used to provide an effective remedy for a person who has had privacy invasive
material posted that would not be considered prohibited or potentially prohibited.327
Further, jurisdictional considerations mean that ACMA has limited powers to regulate
content hosted or provided outside of Australia.328
E

Criminal Law

There are a range of criminal laws that impact the taking or publication and use of images.
These include laws relating to surveillance devices,329 legislation relating to ‘stalking’,
‘harassment’ and ‘assault’, including cyberbullying,330 and laws related to voyeurism and
324
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Ibid 457 [11.12].
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All jurisdictions regulate the use of listening devices but only some jurisdictions regulate optical
surveillance devices: Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance
Devices Act 2007 (NT); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) (optical surveillance devices
regulated only in the context of their use arising from installation under warrant, and use of an optical
surveillance device to record a private activity is not prohibited); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic);
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA).
330
‘Stalking’ offences set out in criminal legislation of each state and territory, with the exception of Western
Australia, will apply to conduct that would reasonably be expected to intimidate or harass, where a person
has the intention to cause to cause harm or to arouse apprehension or fear on the part of the victim: Crimes
Act 1900 (ACT) s 35; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 545B; Crime (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)
s 13; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 189; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935
(SA) s 19AA; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 192; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A. The stalking offence in Western
Australia is more limited in that, to be guilty of the offence of stalking, a person must have pursued another
with intent to intimidate: Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s338E. The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss
19 and 20 contains provisions relating to unlawful threats that make it an offence to threaten a person by
words or conduct. Arguably therefore a threat may be communicated by way of an image. Section 19(3)
states that a threat can be made ‘directly or indirectly’ and communicated by ‘words or conduct’. As Langos
has pointed out, this allows the provision to ‘operate in the cyber context alongside the physical context
envisaged upon its initial drafting’: Colette Langos, Cyberbullying, Associated Harm and the Criminal Law
(PhD Thesis, University of South Australia, 2013) 180. Section 20 also makes it an offence to threaten by
‘words or conduct’. Accordingly, that provision is likely broad enough to apply to threats made by way of
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indecent filming.331 Some states have specific legislation governing the unlawful
publication or distribution of images;332 and in 2016 a private members bill was
images: Google Australia Pty Ltd, Submission to Department of Communications, Australian Government,
Enhancing Online Safety for Children, Discussion Paper, 7 March 2014, 22 and Langos at 185. Otherwise a
threat communicated by way of image is unlikely to constitute criminal assault: Google Australia Pty Ltd,
Submission to Department of Communications, Australian Government, Enhancing Online Safety for
Children, Discussion Paper, 7 March 2014, 22, although note that Criminal Code 1983 (NT) refers to threats
by movement or words. See also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 60E dealing with assault, stalking, harassment or
intimidation of a school student or staff member while at school. At the federal level, the Criminal Code
1995 (Cth) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if they use a carriage service ‘in a way (whether by
the method of use or the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable persons would regard as
being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive’: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 474.17. A
number of other provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) cover offences involving a carriage service,
including using a service to make threats to kill or cause serious harm (s 474.15).
330
Google Australia Pty Ltd, Submission to Department of Communications, Australian Government,
Enhancing Online Safety for Children, Discussion Paper, 7 March 2014, 22, although note that Criminal Code
1983 (NT) refers to threats by movement or words. See also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 60E dealing with
assault, stalking, harassment or intimidation of a school student or staff member while at school
331
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For an overview of these offences see Standing Committee of Attorneys‐General, Unauthorised
Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues, Discussion Paper (2005), 16–20 and Appendix 1;
see also NSWLRC, Consultation Paper, above n 36, 60–2. In Queensland, the Criminal Code involves an
offence of observing or recording images of another person, without their consent, in circumstances where
a reasonable person would expect to be afforded privacy and while the other person is in a private place or
engaging in a private act and ‘where the observation or visual recording is made for the purpose of observing
or visually recording a private act’: Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 227A(1) and see s 227A(2), which makes it an
offence to distribute prohibited recordings. Similar offences exist in Tasmania and South Australia: Police
Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 13A; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) Part 5A, which includes offences relating
to humiliating or degrading filming, distribution of an invasive image and indecent filming. NSW and Victoria
also include offences of a similar nature, but they are less wide‐ranging than those already mentioned. For
example, the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 91K makes it an offence to film someone engaged in a private act
without that person’s consent (and knowing the person does not consent) for the purpose of sexual arousal
or sexual gratification; the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) Division 4A sets out an offence relating to the
observation with a device or visual recording of a person’s anal or genital area when it would be reasonable
for a person to expect that region to be unobserved. These offences do not apply, however, where the
person being filmed has consented to being filmed. Accordingly, they will not apply to situations where
images were made with consent but later distributed or published without consent.
332
See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 578C, which makes it an offence to publish ‘indecent’ articles. This offence
was used to successfully prosecute a person who, in 2011, had posted six nude photographs of his former
partner on his Facebook page: Police v Ravshan Usmanov [2011] NSWLR 40. In Tasmania the Police Offences
Act 1935 s 13B makes it an offence to publish or distribute a ‘prohibited visual recording’. A prohibited visual
recording is defined as a visual recording of a person ‘in a private place or engaging in a private act made in
circumstance where a reasonable adult would expect to be afforded privacy’ or ‘a visual recording of a
person’s genital or anal region, when it is covered only by underwear or bare, made in circumstances where
a reasonable adult would expect to be afforded privacy in relation to that region’. The definition of distribute
is wide enough to include posting online (s 13B(2)). In Victoria it is an offence under the Summary Offences
Act 1966 (Vic) s 41DA (1) intentionally to distribute an ‘intimate image’ of another person, where the
distribution of the image is ‘contrary to community standards of acceptable conduct’. However, it is not
unlawful to distribute an intimate image if the person depicted is an adult and has expressly or impliedly
consented to its distribution (Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 41DA(3)). An intimate image is defined as
a moving or still image that depicts a person engaged in sexual activity or depicts a person in a sexual manner
or context or depicts the genital or anal region of a person or, in the case of a female, the breasts. An
example given in the legislation of an offence under this section is where a person posts to social media a
photograph depicting another engaged in sexual activity: Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 41DA(1). The
Act also makes it an offence to threaten to distribute such images: Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 41DB.
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introduced into federal parliament, which sought to amend the Commonwealth Criminal
Code so that it would apply to the publication of sexual and intimate images.333 At present,
the Bill is not proceeding but could be reintroduced.334 A range of other criminal offences
prohibit publication of images — or even the taking of an image — in certain
circumstances. Mostly these prohibitions relate to the capture or publication of images
that are offensive or indecent, or would constitute an offence under child pornography
laws.335
As noted by the ALRC, one of the limitations of the criminal law in addressing issues with
the unauthorised taking or distribution of images of individuals is that many of the
criminal offences involve elements of private activity or depend upon an expectation of
privacy and are not therefore generally applicable where images are captured in a public
place.336 An additional limitation is that while the criminal law generally regulates the
capture or publication of offensive images, the laws do not apply where the images
themselves are inherently non‐offensive but are used in a way which is offensive, for
example, where they are used for the purpose of sexual gratification. In respect of non‐
offensive images used in a way that is offensive there has been limited success on the part
333

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 October 2015, 10691–5 (Tim
Watts). The Criminal Code Amendment (Private Sexual Material) Bill 2015 would amend the Criminal Code
to make it an offence to use a carriage service to transmit and make available ‘private sexual material’. This
offence is intended to cover a range of material — including that which depicts a person who is engaged in
a sexual pose or sexual activity, or which depicts certain parts of the body — and in all cases where there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the material: Criminal Code Amendment (Private Sexual
Material) Bill 2015 (Cth). The maximum penalty proposed for that offence is three years’ imprisonment. The
Bill also seeks to create other offences, including the making of threats to upload or transmit private sexual
material.
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The Criminal Code Amendment (Private Sexual Material) Bill 2015 (Cth) lapsed due to prorogation on 15
April 2016 and is currently not proceeding: Parliament of Australia, Criminal Code Amendment (Private
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Practice6/Practice6HTML?file=Chapter10&section=06&fullscreen=1, Lapsed Bills, Chapter 10 (Legislation).
The Federal Minister for Women (as at May 2016), Michaelia Cash, has said that the Commonwealth will
review Commonwealth, state and territory legislation to ‘ensure it adequately criminalises the distribution
of intimate material … without the victim’s consent’: Jorge Branco, ‘Revenge Porn Laws Needed “Sooner
Rather than Later”’ The Age (online) 7 February 2016 <http://www.theage.com.au/queensland/revenge‐
porn‐laws‐needed‐sooner‐rather‐than‐later‐20160204‐gmm432.html>. The NSW Government has recently
announced that it will move to criminalise the distribution of intimate or sexually explicit images without
consent: NSW Government, Justice, Moving Ahead on New Law to Stop Revenge Porn, 5 September 2016
http://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/media‐news/media‐releases/2016/Moving‐ahead‐on‐new‐law‐to‐
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scope of this thesis. However, an overview can be found in SCAG, Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet
and Ancillary Privacy Issues, Discussion Paper, August 2005, 16–20; see also ALRC, For Your Information,
above n 125, 2330‐1 [69.119]–[69.120]; NSWLRC, Consultation Paper, above n 36, 60‐62 outlining offences
against the person in NSW. More recently, see an overview of indecent filming laws applicable to South
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of the law enforcement agencies in prosecuting individuals capturing the images and even
less success in effecting the removal of material from the internet.337 This is the case even
where those images are of children.
One of the obvious limitations of stalking offences for someone who has had images of
themselves posted online without their consent is that the person posting the images
must be proven to have the requisite intention: that is, either an intention to cause the
victim physical or mental harm, or to cause the victim to apprehend or fear physical or
mental harm (or which amounts to conduct that is intimidating or, in the case of federal
laws, menacing, harassing or offensive).
In terms of the cyber‐harassment offences under Commonwealth law, the ALRC noted in
its 2014 report that there have been to date 374 successful prosecutions. However, the
ALRC in its consultations had ‘heard concerns that state and territory police may be
unwilling or unable to enforce criminal offences due to a lack of training and expertise in
Commonwealth procedure which often differs significantly from state and territory police
procedure.’338
A more general limitation of criminal law in providing redress for individuals who have
had unauthorised images of themselves captured or distributed is that the criminal law is
public rather than private law. In some cases an individual has the right to commence a
private prosecution in respect of the alleged commission of a criminal offence.339
However, even where such right exists, prosecutions are rare, can be expensive to
pursue340 and present the risk of an adverse costs order.341 An individual may also have
the right to bring a private law action in order to enforce an offence by way of injunction
and/or to obtain a compensatory remedy in relation to the offence. Whether this right is
available depends on the legislation creating the offence — legislation may expressly
grant this right or the court may construe the statute as impliedly granting a private law
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(ACT) s 726; Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 54, or with the consent of the Director of Public
Prosecutions: see, eg, Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1914 (WA) s345(6).
340
See, eg, Belinda Kontominas, ‘Opponents are Free to Launch Legal Action’ Sydney Morning Herald
(online), 1 February 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/education/opponents‐are‐free‐to‐launch‐
private‐action‐20100131‐n6m9.html>; South Eastern Centre against Sexual Assault, Private Prosecutions
<http://www.secasa.com.au/pages/taking‐legal‐action/private‐prosecutions/>.
341
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 65 ALJR 151.
338
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right of action342 — or on whether the individual is considered to have a ‘special
interest’.343 Where an individual is the victim of a criminal offence, they may also be
entitled to receive compensation under a criminal injuries compensation scheme.344
There is also the possibility of a compensation or reparation order being made by a court
in favour of a victim of crime,345 although such orders are apparently rare.346 Garkawe
notes that cases can be dropped or a plea accepted by the prosecutors without any
consultation with the victim, and that whether or not the victim is kept informed about
developments in the case is dependent largely on the discretion of the police, prosecutors
and judges.347 Aside from this, criminal law does not necessarily provide a means by which
unauthorised images posted online can be removed from the internet. The ability to
secure removal of such images will generally depend upon whether the images constitute
prohibited content under the BSA, discussed above.348
Nevertheless, as was observed by the NSWLRC, criminal sanctions may punish or deter
invasions of privacy and ‘need to be acknowledged and recognized as part of the overall
regulation of privacy’.349

342

As to the considerations that will apply in determining whether or not legislation establishing a criminal
offence also creates a private right of action see King v Goussetis (1986) 5 NSWLR 89, 93 (McHugh J) and
Pillay T/As West Corp Mortgage Market v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited [2002] NSWSC 983, [16]–[17]
and cases referred to at [16]. Butler suggests that Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706 and cases such
as Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 were judicial attempts to provide civil remedies to compensate
criminal offences where, presumably, the relevant statute may not have created such a private right of
action in itself: Butler, above n 59, 372.
343
King v Goussetis (1986) 5 NSWLR 89, 93–4 (McHugh J); Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association
v Minister for Industrial Affairs (1995) 185 CLR 552; and see Pillay T/As West Corp Mortgage Market v Nine
Network Australia Pty Limited [2002] NSWSC 983, [22]–[27].
344
Each state and territory has a compensation scheme for victims of crime: Victims of Crime (Financial
Assistance) Act 1983 (ACT); Victims’ Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW); Victims of Crime Assistance Act
2006 (NT); Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld); Victims of
Crime Act 2001 (SA); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976 (Tas); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic);
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA). However, as noted by the NSWLRC, compensation may not
be available for mere distress and humiliation and there are limits to the amount of compensation available:
NSWLRC, Consultation Paper, above n 36, 23.
345
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 18, ch 7; Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) Part 6;
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 88; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 35; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act
1988 (SA) Part 7; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 68; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 84, 85B; Sentencing Act 1995
(WA) ss 117, 120.
346
Morabito, writing in 2000, notes that in respect of reparation orders made at the Commonwealth level,
the major beneficiaries of such orders are the Commissioner or Taxation, and to a lesser extent, the
Department of Social Security, rather than the victims of crime: see Vince Morabito, ‘Compensation Orders
Against Offenders – An Australian Perspective’ (2004) 4 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative
Law 59, 61.
347
Garkawe, above n 339, 597–8.
348
See, however, forfeiture provisions in the relevant Surveillance Devices legislation, discussed above; see
also Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 227B and Police Offences Act 1935 s 11B, which make it an offence for a
person to publish or distribute a prohibited visual recording; and see also Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s
474.25, which stipulates that Internet Service Providers or Content Hosts can be guilty of an offence for
failing to report child pornography or child abuse material to the Australian Federal Police.
349
NSWLRC, Consultation Paper, above n 36, 58.
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IV

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has considered a range of legal causes of action that may, depending on the
circumstances, be relied upon by an individual seeking to prevent or redress the
unauthorised publication of an image of themself. The availability of a cause of action will
usually depend upon the image revealing something that can be judged, objectively, to be
private or confidential or communicating something that is, when determined objectively,
detrimental to a person’s reputation or standing; or upon establishing that the image was
captured in breach of a legal or equitable right, or a contractual obligation owed to the
image subject. In each case the actual impact of publication upon the image subject is not
a relevant factor in considering whether the cause of action is established, although it may
be taken into account when determining an appropriate remedy. In this sense none of the
causes of action discussed in this chapter are designed to protect a person’s autonomy, in
terms of providing them with a choice as to whether or not, or when, how and to whom,
a particular image of themselves should be published.
Where images are published online without the authorisation of the image subject, the
image subject may be able to seek redress by virtue of the complaints mechanisms offered
by the relevant internet content host. However, these mechanisms often depend upon
the image being one that infringes the image subject’s legal rights, and in most cases the
internet content host has no contractual obligation to remove particular images. Aside
from any complaints procedures established by internet content hosts themselves, the
Online Safety Act provides a mechanism by which children and young people (or those
acting on their behalf) can complain to the e‐Safety Commissioner about certain online
content. This regime is designed only to assist in securing the removal of a very specific
type of material, namely cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child, and the
scheme only applies in respect of social media services listed as Tier 1 or Tier 2 social
media services.
Online content that has been collected or held in breach of the APPs established under
the Privacy Act or which amounts to prohibited content under the BSA can give rise to
liability on the part of the organisation collecting, holding or publishing the information.
However, the information privacy and online content regimes do not create private causes
of action for individuals, nor does an individual have standing to pursue breaches of the
Privacy Act, or the making available of content that should be prohibited, but must instead
rely upon making a complaint to the body overseeing the relevant regime. Additionally,
neither the regime under the Privacy Act nor that created by the Broadcasting Services
legislation regulate the conduct of private individuals.
Although a range of criminal offences may apply to a person who has published an image
without the authorisation of the image subject, the offences generally depend upon the
image being offensive or indecent, or upon the conduct of the publisher amounting to
160

stalking or harassment. Criminal offences certainly have a role in deterring or punishing
the unauthorised publication of images in some situations but are of limited utility in
giving individuals the ability to control how or whether their images are published. This is
not least because the criminal process is essentially a public one and the ability of
individuals to be direct participants within that process is limited.
Having highlighted the limitations of Australian law in providing an individual with
‘control’ over their image, the next chapter puts these limitations into context by
presenting a number of hypothetical case studies relating to the capture and publication
of images of children and young people. The aim is to illustrate some of the detail of the
causes of action or other means of redress considered here, specifically as they would
apply to the capture, publication and use of images of children and young people, and to
highlight some of the complexities and ‘grey areas’.
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CHAPTER FOUR – CASE STUDIES
I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter Three outlined some of the limitations of Australian law in providing an individual
with the right to obtain redress for the unauthorised publication of an image. This chapter
seeks to further illustrate the limitations of existing causes of action, and the complexities
in applying some of the causes of action to individual situations, by considering a number
of hypothetical scenarios, or case studies.
Although Chapter Three considered a number of cases that had been pursued through the
courts, relying only on actual cases to illustrate the application of the law fails to anticipate
the range of circumstances that may present themselves. The use of hypothetical cases,
therefore, can be used to consider the implications of a given argument and to ‘reason in
anticipation’ and, in this sense, have been described as a heuristic device.1 For example,
in relation to the law on breach of confidence, only a few Australian cases involve a claim
of breach of confidence in relation to personal information,2 such as through publication
of personal information conveyed by an image. Therefore the extent to which the
traditional elements of a breach of confidence would apply to the publication of an image
can only be effectively explored by considering hypothetical situations rather than real
cases.
Describing the boundaries of a legal cause of action is in many ways an easier task than
applying the cause of action described to a particular scenario. This is because an
application of law to a particular situation throws into relief some of the nuances or
‘complexities’ of the law. A hypothetical case can therefore be used to ‘focus attention on
subtle or troublesome points’3 and can assist in drawing distinctions between the ‘law‐in‐
the‐books’ and ‘law‐in‐action’.4 Bench‐Capon and Prakken describe the use of
hypothetical situations in US Supreme Court cases to ‘close the gap’ between the abstract

1

Edwina L Rissland and Kevin D Ashley, ‘Hypotheticals as Heuristic Device’ (1986) HLT ’86 Proceedings of
the Workshop on Strategic Computing Natural Language 165 (Association for Computational Linguistics,
1986) 165, 166.
2
Jillian Caldwell, ‘Protecting Privacy Post‐Lenah: Should the Courts Establish a New Tort or Develop Breach
of Confidence?’ (2003) 26 (1) University of New South Wales Law Review 90, 114; Gavin Phillipson,
‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act’
(2003) 66 Modern Law Review 726, 732.
3
Rissland and Ashley, above n 1— although the authors were referring here to the use of hypotheticals in
legal education the point is, it is submitted, equally applicable to legal scholarship.
4
W Michale Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner and Andre R Willard, ‘The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction’
(2007) 32(587) The Yale Journal of International Law 587, 589.
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terms in which laws tend to be expressed and the interpretation of those laws in light of
fact‐specific situations.5
The case studies are also presented here so as to enable some of the policy options
considered later in this thesis to be illustrated and to some extent ‘tested’ by reference to
the hypothetical scenarios. To what extent would the legal reforms proposed alter the
legal outcome for the image subject? Where should ‘the line be drawn’?6 For this purpose,
the scenarios introduced in this chapter will be revisited in Chapter Six and reconsidered
in light of the policy options discussed in this thesis. Illustrating the intended application
of proposed law reforms by reference to hypothetical examples is a technique employed
by various legislatures, law reform bodies and the judiciary.7 Rissland has noted that in
the field of law, examples are ‘crucial to reasoning’, and she notes that hypothetical case
studies are used not only in teaching law but also to illustrate legal principles set out in
codes.8 In fact, the ALRC in its report on Australian privacy law and practice, For Your
Information, uses a number of hypothetical examples to illustrate the types of invasions
of privacy that should, in its view, fall within the bounds of the their recommended
statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy.9
II

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The following part of this chapter, Part Three, explains the case study design and scope of
this chapter. Part Four then introduces various scenarios and discusses the legal aspects
arising from each. The chapter concludes in Part Five by summarising the limitations of
existing Australian law in providing individuals with control over their image by reference
to the salient aspects of the scenarios presented.
III

CASE STUDY DESIGN AND SCOPE

With one exception, the scenarios considered in this chapter are hypothetical. 10 However,
a number of the scenarios have been created around actual photographs available on a
public website.11 Where this is the case, the photographs are included with the case study.
5

Trevor Bench‐Capon and Henry Prakken, ‘Using Argument Schemes for Hypothetical Reasoning in Law’
(2010) 18(2) Artificial Intelligence and Law 153, 154.
6
Ibid 157.
7
For an example of this in an Australian judicial context see St George Bank Ltd v Quinerts Pty Ltd (2009) 25
VR 666 at 689 [82] (Nettle J) (drawing an analogy between the facts of the case and a hypothetical example
of loss arising as a result of a bank robbery). This hypothetical example was further analysed in Hunt & Hunt
Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 10 [39]–[40] (French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ) [74]
(Bell and Gageler JJ). See also South Australian Law Reform Institute, A Statutory Tort for Invasion of Privacy,
Report no 4, March 2016, 42–7, which uses hypothetical examples to illustrate the various ways in which
individuals may experience an invasion of privacy and how existing laws deal with (or fail to provide redress
for) that conduct.
8
Edwina L Rissland, ‘Examples in Legal Reasoning: Legal Hypotheticals’ (1983) IJCAI 90, 90.
9
ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 3, 2570.
10
Case Study Three (Alison).
11
Case Study Two (Tim); Case Study Three (Alison); Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly).
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The remainder of the case studies are closely based upon actual events described on the
internet or in news reports, or which have been the subject of legal action.12
It would be an impossible task to present the full range of scenarios in which images of
young people are taken and used. The scenarios selected for this chapter are therefore
only intended as a snapshot. However, the scenarios have been designed to include a
number of different variables, described in Part A below. These variables are used to
highlight some of the particular issues and complexities of applying the existing law to the
publication of images of children and young people. Nevertheless, the case studies do not
necessarily ‘give the whole picture’, for example, the impact upon the image subject of
the use to which the image is put is often not fully described or not described at all.
Likewise the intentions of the person in publishing the image are not always clear. This is
deliberate and designed to allow an exploration of how the legal outcome may differ
depending on the way in which the facts present themselves.
A

Case Study Variables

1 Common Elements of Each Case Study
One thing that the case studies have in common is that the relevant image has been
published online (although initial publication might have take place offline). Lack of
consent is also a common element in each case study. Some of the case studies involve
publication of the image in question without the express prior consent of the image
subject or, where there is more than one subject, without the express consent of all
subjects. In other cases, although initial publication online was consented to (or at least
not objected to), the image has been republished or used elsewhere without the express
consent of the image subject, or where there is more than one subject, without the
express consent of all. In one of the case studies (Case Study Five: Tyger and Lilly), the
image subjects are very young children who may be considered to lack the capacity to
consent to publication of their image, although it is the parent who has taken and first
published the photograph online.
Another thing that all of the images have in common is that they depict children or young
people under the age of 18. One of the scenarios involves a very young child,13 two involve
children in middle childhood,14 and the remainder involve children who are in adolescence
or approaching adulthood.15 Selecting scenarios involving children at different stages of

12

Case Study One (Jackie); Case Study Four (Shabeeha); Case Study Six (Ben); Case Study Seven (Schoolboy
Rowers).
13
Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) — where Lilly is two years’ old.
14
Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) — where Tyger is six years’ old, and Case Study Six (Ben). Berk defines
middle childhood as ranging from 6 – 11 years: Laura E Berk, Infants, Children, and Adolescents (Allyn and
Bacon, 4th ed, 2002) 5.
15
Case Study One (Jackie); Case Study Two (Tim); Case Study Three (Alison); Case Study Four (Shabeeha);
Case Study Seven (Schoolboy Rowers); Case Study Eight (Harry). Berk defines adolescence as ranging from
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childhood is important for a number of reasons. First, the capacity of children to give true
and informed consent to the capture or publication of an image, while to some extent
subjective, depends also upon the age or stage of the child.16 The extent to which an image
subject is able to give informed consent is relevant in the context of the design of possible
law reform options, and a lack of consent can increase the risk of harm to an image subject
due to the relationship between autonomy and self‐esteem explored in Chapter Two.
Secondly, a determination of the extent to which a child’s expectation of privacy can be
assessed without reference to their parents may depend on the age of the child (this is
discussed in Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly)). Thirdly, the impact upon a child of the
capture or publication of an image, while again having a subjective element, will also
depend upon the age of the child.17 Very young children are more likely to be unaware of
the existence of an image in which they are the subject or one of the subjects. This is
relevant because the impact of publication or use of an image is often related to an
individual’s awareness of that image and their perception of how others will react to it.18
The fact that children have different sensitivities at different ages was recognised by Lord
Dyson MR in the English case of Weller and Ors v Associated Newspapers (discussed in
more detail in the context of Case Study Five) when he observed:
An older child may be able to exercise his autonomy in a similar way to adults and, in the
words of Tugendhat J in Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB) at para 55,
they may create ‘a personality and public profile of their own’. An older child is likely to
have a greater perception of his own privacy and his experience of an interference with it
might well be more significant than for a younger child.19

2 The Type of Image and Its Composition
Another variable is the type and composition of the image. Most of the case studies relate
to photographic images, but video images are considered in two case studies.20 Scenarios
are presented involving images captured in a public place as well as images captured in a
person’s own home. Some of the case studies involve an image that depicts only one

11‐20 years of age: Ibid. However, for the purpose of this thesis, adulthood is considered to be 18 years of
age and above.
16
See ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, 2265 [68.37].
17
See, eg, Ferdinand Schoeman, ‘Adolescent Confidentiality and Family Privacy’ (1986–1987) 20 The John
Marshall Law Review 641, 653 who suggests that ‘privacy matters more to older children and is more central
to their development and integrity than it is to younger children.’
18
Although, as explained in Chapter Two, there may also be an impact on an image subject where the
subject is not aware of the publication or use of an image but where that publication or use causes others
to respond differently to the image subject (for example, by excluding him or her). The publication of images
of even young children or those unaware of the publication can also have other impacts — such as on their
safety and security, particularly if the child is the child of a celebrity. See, eg, Weller and Ors v Associated
Newspapers [2015] EWCA Civ 1176 (‘Weller’), Lord Dyson MR: ‘[i]nterference with a child’s article 8 rights
may also give rise to greater security concerns than it would in the case of the adult … Where a child has a
famous parent, this security and safety concern is arguable heightened even further.’
19
[2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [31] (Lord Dyson MR, with Lords Justice Tomlinson and Bean in agreement).
20
Case Study One (Jackie) and Case Study Six (Ben).
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individual, but others involve an image depicting a pair or small group.21 It is important to
consider images depicting more than one individual because, where this is the case, there
may be conflicting desires: one or more of the image subjects may wish to prevent
publication, while the other subject or subjects may either not have an issue with
publication or may actively desire publication to take place. Acknowledging these issues
and factoring them into any law reform option is essential.
Some of the case studies revolve around images depicting nudity or semi‐nudity. This is
relevant because depicting nudity of children can implicate the criminal law and because
nudity is also likely to be relevant in determining whether an image was confidential or
one in respect of the capture or publication of which the image subject had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.22
In addition, while most of the scenarios involve authentic images, that is, those that reveal
no more or less than what was captured by the photographer without digital alteration,
one scenario involves a non‐authentic, digitally altered image.23 The manipulation of an
image that places the image subject in a different context can be said to portray the image
subject in a ‘false light’. It has been suggested that situations involving false light are more
appropriately dealt with by the law of defamation;24 therefore, that scenario is included
here to illustrate the limitations of that approach.25
3 The Context in Which the Image is Published or Used
Another variable is the context in which the image in question is published or used. While
some scenarios involve images that have been published on social media sites, one
involves an image that has been used for advertising, and a number involve images used
on a news service or as part of a news report. It was considered necessary to include at
least one case study involving the use of an image in a commercial (advertising) context
in order to consider the legal response to what is often termed an ‘appropriation’ of image
or likeness. In recommending the form of a statutory cause of action for serious invasions
of privacy, the ALRC did not expressly include appropriation in the list of examples of
conduct amounting to an invasion of privacy. Indeed, members of the Australian judiciary,
as well as academic commentators, have suggested that appropriation of an image cannot
properly be categorised as an invasion of privacy at all.26 While this chapter does not seek
21

Case Study Four (Shabeeha); Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly); Case Study Six (Ben); Case Study Seven
(Schoolboy Rowers).
22
See, eg, views of Gleeson CJ in Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 [42].
23
Case Study Four (Shabeeha).
24
See Case Study Four (Shabeeha), section 3(a).
25
Case Study Four (Shabeeha).
26
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256 [125] (Gummow & Hayne JJ); see also ALRC, For Your Information, above
n 9, 2565–6 [74.120]; Raymond Wacks, ‘Why There Will Never Be an English Common Law Privacy Tort’ in
Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy Law (Cambridge, 2010) 154, 177.
But see Jonathan Morgan, ‘Privacy, Confidence, and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble’ (2003) 62 (2)
Cambridge Law Journal 444, 450, arguing, in relation to appropriation of image or personality rights, that
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to challenge that proposition, the commercial use scenario is included here to illustrate
the consequence of denying a privacy‐based remedy in such a situation. Including
situations where images have been used in the context of news is necessary to illustrate,
firstly, the exemptions enjoyed by media organisations from provisions of the Privacy Act
and the ACL, and secondly the extent to which public interest considerations (particularly
those of free speech and freedom of the press) might impact upon the availability of a
remedy. In addition, including situations involving media use allows for a brief discussion
on the self‐regulation regime applicable to many Australian media organisations.
B

Scope of this Chapter

It is important to realise that in any individual case the desire to control whether and how
a particular image is published can arise for many different reasons. A desire to prevent
publication or to remove an image from the online environment might be a purely
subjective response to the particular image itself: it may simply be that the image subject
does not like the way they look, for example. In fact, numerous comments found online
in blogs and internet chat rooms reveal young people are unhappy about the way they
look in images of themselves posted to the internet.27 It may be that what the image
depicts causes the image subject to fear being judged by others; or it may be that the
image subject feels violated by the publication of the image in question,28 or resents the
loss of control over how they are represented.29 The desire to control publication of an
image may, however, be a response to consequences ensuing from publication of a
particular image: for example, an image may result in the image subject being teased or
even bullied.30 However, the case studies in this chapter do not always consider the
reason why the individual concerned wishes to have control over the online publication

‘two discrete interests, commercial and dignitary, are aspects of the same legal concern (protection of
image), but crucially, they are separable.’
27
See, for example, the following: Facebook, What if I don’t like a photo I’m tagged in?,
<https://www.facebook.com/help/212466865441659>; Bunny, My Friend Keeps Posting Ugly Pictures of
Me
on
Instagram?,
Yahoo!Answers,
Family
and
Relationships,
Friends
<https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20130111224424AAvQGCo>; David Eddie, ‘My Partner’s
Sister Posted an Unflattering Photo of Me and Won’t Take it Down. What Do I Do?’, Life, Relationships, The
Globe and Mail Online, 23 July 2015, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/my‐partners‐
family‐wont‐take‐down‐a‐facebook‐picture‐what‐do‐i‐do/article25643789/>.
28
See, eg, Amanda Todd, Amanda Todd’s Story: Struggling, Bullying, Suicide, Self‐Harm, Chia Videos (11
October 2012) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ej7afkypUsc; see also Laura Trevelyan, ‘Shock at
Student’s Suicide over Sex Video’, BBC News (online), 4 October 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐
us‐canada‐11464617.
29
See, eg, Andrews (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Allan J, 15 December 2006) where the court
noted that the couple who were depicted in a video broadcast as part of a TV documentary experienced
‘chagrin and annoyance at not being advised they were being filmed at close range, either at the time or
later.’
30
See, eg, ‘Star Wars Kid is Top Viral Video’, BBC News (online), 27 November 2006
http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm.
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of their image (where this is the case)31 nor do they consider the consequences that can
ensue from not having control, although these issues were explored in Chapter Two.
As with the preceding chapter, the purpose at this stage is not to make a judgement on
the value of the claim to control, nor to consider the most appropriate remedies or forms
of redress, but rather to describe and illustrate the existing legal situation and to highlight
some of the complexities or ‘grey areas’ in applying the law to the scenarios described.
Not every legal action or area of law discussed in the preceding chapter is considered in
reference to each case study. Instead, discussion is confined to those causes of action or
avenues of address that the plaintiff (or their lawyers) would at least consider arguing on
the facts, or in respect of which the plaintiff would have standing.
With the exception of Case Study Three (Alison), the case studies do not involve the use
of an image in a commercial context (other than a media context), so actions for injurious
falsehood, passing off and misleading and deceptive conduct are not considered other
than in the discussion of law applicable to Case Study Three.
None of the case studies involves a direct contractual relationship between the image
subject and the person capturing the image, so contractual issues are not addressed
except to consider whether the image subject may have a remedy based upon an internet
content host’s terms and conditions.
Likewise, none of the scenarios involves an interference with proprietary interests, so
actions in trespass and nuisance are also not considered. Although some of the scenarios
might give rise to questions of copyright infringement vis‐a‐vis a person reproducing an
image and the person who captured it, in none of the scenarios discussed is the image
subject the owner of the copyright.32 Therefore, copyright is not considered in respect of
any of the case studies.
In most case studies the nature of the image will not be considered ‘prohibited’ or
‘potentially prohibited’ under the national classification scheme, in which case the e‐
Safety Commissioner has no grounds upon which to issue a take‐down notice under the
BSA. Therefore this area of internet regulation is not discussed except in relation to those
situations where it is possible that the image itself could be classified as prohibited or
potentially prohibited were it to be submitted for classification.
In most of the scenarios either the nature of the image or the conduct in capturing and
publishing the photograph will not attract criminal liability. As such, criminal offences are

31

One of the case studies involves a very young child — Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) where Lilly is two
years’ old and therefore too young to be aware of the existence online or use of the image.
32
Unless an argument can be made based on the existence of a constructive trust — see further the
discussion in Chapter Three, Part Three (Intellectual Property).
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only considered where it is possible that liability would attach to the person capturing and
publishing the image.
In considering the availability of private law actions to the image subjects in the following
case studies, it must be borne in mind that in practice commencing any formal legal
proceedings is necessarily complex and expensive. What is more, if the person responsible
for initial publication of the images in question is not resident in Australia, or if their
identity or their whereabouts in Australia is not known, these difficulties can be
insurmountable. In such cases liability might attach to an internet intermediary, so the
potential liability of an intermediary is discussed where relevant.
IV

CASE STUDIES

This part sets out eight case studies. After presenting each case study, there is discussion
of background issues and key features, before a discussion of possible legal avenues of
redress for the image subject or subjects (as the case may be).
A

Case Study One (Jackie)

1 Scenario
Jackie is 14 and spends lots of time in various internet chat rooms. One day she
‘meets’ a boy, Lenin, and they communicate, first in the chat room, later by
exchanging emails, becoming ‘friends’ on Facebook and finally by ‘Skyping’ each
other. Although both Jackie and Lenin live in Perth, Western Australia, they have
never met each other in person. Jackie believes that Lenin is 16 years old, as said on
his profile, but in actual fact he is 24. Over the course of a few weeks, the Skype
sessions become more and more frequent and the two develop an increasingly
intimate relationship. One day Lenin asks Jackie to show him her breasts, which she
does. Unbeknown to Jackie, Lenin is recording the Skype session, which he retains
as a video. In subsequent Skype sessions, Lenin makes further requests to Jackie to
show him her body, which she does, and which Lenin records (again, without Jackie’s
knowledge). However, after some time Jackie begins to feel uncomfortable with this
and decides to end the ‘relationship’ with Lenin. However, Lenin does not want to
end things. He informs Jackie that he has several videos of her showing her breasts
and revealing other parts of her body. He threatens Jackie that if she does not continue
to Skype him, and if she does not show him more of her body, he will upload the
videos of her to YouTube and will identify her by name.
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Figure 3: Still image from Amanda Todd's YouTube video33

2 Background and Key Features
While this is a hypothetical scenario, it is based on a number of real‐life scenarios, with
parallels to the story of Amanda Todd (Figure 3), discussed in Chapter Two.34 This scenario
is almost identical to one of the composite case studies included in a cyberbullying
research report to illustrate the types of cyberbullying incidents that have been dealt with
by the National Children’s and Youth Law Centre at the University of NSW.35 The scenario
also bears some similarity to the experiences of Alla Giller and Caroline Wilson, both of
whom successfully sued their former partners for breach of confidence in relation to the
distribution of intimate personal images.36 Nevertheless, there are important differences
between the situation described in this scenario and the circumstances of Giller and
Wilson. One difference is that Giller and Wilson were adults at the time the images were
recorded and released, whereas Jackie is a minor. Moreover, both Giller and Wilson were
aware (or subsequently became aware) that their partner was capturing or had access to
intimate images of them and both of them consented to that (either simultaneously or
retrospectively) — albeit on the understanding that the images were not to be shown to
anyone else. In Jackie’s case, she was unaware that she was being filmed and even if Jackie
is considered to have capacity to consent to this (discussed below), she did not consent.
In the case of Giller and Wilson, intimate images were distributed to others against the
plaintiff’s wishes. In Jackie’s case, there is a threat to distribute such images but they have
not been distributed.
The case study notes that Lenin is an adult posing as a child. A literature review on child
grooming published by the Australian Institute of Criminology made reference to a survey
conducted in 2005/2006 among Irish schoolchildren. That survey revealed that 7% of
participants had arranged to meet face‐to‐face with a person who they had only
33

Amanda Todd, above n 28.
See also Christina Ng, ‘Bullied Teen Leaves behind Chilling YouTube Video’, abcnews.go.com, 12 October
2012
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/bullied‐teen‐amanda‐todd‐leaves‐chilling‐youtube‐
video/story?id=17463266>.
35
Matthew Keeley et al, Research on Youth Exposure to, and Management of, Cyberbullying Incidents in
Australia: Part B ‐ Cyberbullying Incidents Involving Australian Minors, the Nature of the Incidents and How
They Are Currently Being Dealt With, (SPRC Report 10/2014) Sydney: Social Policy Research Centre, UNSW,
Australia, 89–90.
36
Giller (2008) 24 VR 1; Wilson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January 2015). Giller also involved the threatened
distribution of images. Giller (2008) 24 VR 1 [1].
34
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previously come to know ‘online’ and that of those children 24% reported that the person
they met, that person having introduced themselves online as a child, turned out to be an
adult.37
3 Discussion of the Law
The following sections discuss various private law remedies that will be available to Jackie,
as well as whether Lenin would be guilty of a criminal offence.
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
If a common law action for invasion of privacy is recognised, the likely elements of this are
would almost certainly be satisfied.38 Jackie would need to establish that a person in her
position would have a reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis the capture of the
images, as well as the publication or threatened publication of them. In determining that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is relevant that Jackie did not know that
she was being filmed (and cannot be said to have consented to this) — there has therefore
been an intrusion upon her seclusion.39 It is also relevant that the images depict her
engaged in what would reasonably be expected to be and remain a private exchange
between two people. As the images are intimate, and have been captured in a situation
involving an intrusion upon her seclusion, there is an expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis the
capture and publication of the images. The intrusion into her seclusion and the disclosure
or threatened disclosure would also likely be considered highly offensive to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities in Jackie’s position. This is not least because the images
are of a minor and were obtained without the subject’s knowledge and consent, in breach
of trust and (in relation to some of the images) as a result of coercion. The elements of
intention, lack of consent and lack of a public interest defence or justification on Lenin’s
part are all easily established. If actual harm is a necessary element of the action,40 Jackie
is likely to be able to establish this. This is because the threat of publication and any actual
publication that did take place would likely give rise to mental, physiological or emotional
harm or distress on Jackie’s part. The threats to reveal the intimate images also prevent
or hinder Jackie from doing an act that she is lawfully entitled to do.41

37

Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo, Online Child Grooming: a Literature Review on the Misuse of Social
Networking Sites for Grooming Children for Sexual Offences (Australian Institute of Criminology Research
and Public Policy Series, Report 103) 2009, xi.
38
Given that the tort has been recognised in only two lower court decisions, the elements of and defences
to the action have not been established and it is only possible to speculate on what they might be: as to
this, see the discussion in Chapter Three, Part Three (Common Law Action for Invasion of Privacy).
39
Recall that the ALRC notes that intrusion upon seclusion will ‘usually involve watching, listening to, or
recording someone’s private activities or private affairs’: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital
Era, Report no 123 (2014), 73 [5.2]. See further Chapter Three 105‐106.
40
Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187 [444] (Skoien DCJ).
41
This was a form of detriment according to Skoien DCJ in Grosse (2003) Aus Torts Reports ¶81‐706, 64,187
[444].
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If Jackie is able to establish a prima facie cause of action for invasion of privacy,
interlocutory injunctive relief is likely to be available to herAn internet content host would
possibly face an action for invasion of privacy if they failed within a reasonable time to
remove material which they became aware of, and which constituted an invasion of
privacy.42 The hosting of content such as this would contravene the terms and conditions
of the YouTube service itself, so notification to YouTube in this case would probably result
in the content being removed. However, if the video was republished to the internet by
other users, there are enormous practical difficulties in effecting its removal.
(b) Breach of Confidence
As mentioned above, Jackie’s situation is somewhat similar to that of both Alla Giller and
Caroline Wilson. Giller and Wilson were both successful in their respective breach of
confidence actions against a former partner who had distributed and threatened to
distribute intimate images of them. In Giller v Procopets, videotapes of Giller and her
partner engaging in sexual activities were found to constitute confidential information.43
The court held that the defendant was under an obligation in respect of this confidential
information; an obligation that arose from the circumstances and the nature of their
relationship.44 As Gillard J observed:
In my view persons indulging in a sexual activity in the privacy of their own home create
a confidential relationship during such activity. In my view it is difficult to think of anything
more intimate than consensual sexual activities between two parties in the privacy of their
home.45

In Wilson, there was also no question that the intimate images were confidential and
Mitchell J observed that ‘[i]ntimate photographs and videos taken in private and shared
between two lovers would ordinarily bear a confidential character.’46 The court found that
the obligation of confidence arose both from the nature of the information and from the
circumstances in which the defendant obtained the images.47
With a prima facie case for breach of confidence, Jackie may be able to obtain an
interlocutory injunction pending trial. If successful in establishing breach of confidence, a
final injunction to prevent the film from being uploaded to the internet or otherwise
published, or a mandatory injunction ordering Lenin to remove any material that had
42

As noted in Chapter Three, Part Three (Common Law Action for Invasion of Privacy and Internet
Intermediaries), an Internet Content Host (such as YouTube) has no obligation to proactively monitor
content posted by others, and cannot be taken to have invaded a person’s privacy unless and until they
become aware of the nature of the content in question: BSA sch 5, cl 91(1). As to what type of awareness is
required, refer to the discussion in Chapter Three, Part Three (Common Law Action for Invasion of Privacy
and Internet Intermediaries) 107‐108.
43
[2004] VSC 113 (7 April 2004) 62 [149].
44
Ibid [156].
45
Ibid [154]–[158].
46
Wilson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January 2015) [56].
47
Ibid [58].
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already been posted to the internet, may be available. If the videos are posted online
there is, however, a question as to whether an injunction will be issued requiring removal
of that material. If the images can be said to have entered the public domain, even if this
is by virtue of Lenin’s own actions, an injunction could be considered futile.48 Nevertheless
where, as here, the breach of confidence action involves dignitary or privacy interests —
and particularly where it involves intimate images — it may be that the public domain
argument, in relation to the granting of an injunction, will not operate to undermine the
claim for injunctive relief.49
While a final injunction would technically restrain anyone who had downloaded and
wished to repost the video to the internet, there are inherent difficulties in enforcing
injunctions in the online environment.50
There is also an argument that an internet content host that continues to make available
content of which it has been notified constitutes a breach of confidence may itself come
under an obligation of confidence in respect of the material.51 To the author’s knowledge,
this argument has not been tested in Australia. It is clear, however, that an internet
content host cannot be liable until such time as it becomes aware of the nature of the
content in question.52
(c) Defamation
An action in defamation is only complete once publication has occurred, although it is
possible that in limited circumstances an interlocutory injunction would be available to
prevent the apprehended publication of defamatory material.53 In order for the video or
photographic images to be considered capable of being defamatory, Jackie would need to
The question of whether publication is so widespread that information has entered the public domain so
that an injunction would be futile is essentially a question of fact. Refer to the discussion in Chapter Three,
Part Three (Breach of Confidence – Remedies for Breach of Confidence) 120 – 121 See also Australian
Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 428 (Kellam J).Cf Wilson [2015] WASC 15 (16
January 2015) [61], Mitchell J: ‘Allowing for the fact that third parties may have obtained copies of the
images, there is no evidence that the distribution of the images has been so widespread that the grant of
injunctive relief would serve no utility at this stage, or that the images have lost their confidential character
by reason of the extent of their publication so that the grant of an injunction would not prevent further
detriment to the plaintiff’.
Refer to the discussion in Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of Confidence – Remedies for Breach of
Confidence) 120 ‐ 121.
50
See, eg, Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, UK Parliament, Report on Privacy and Injunctions
(2012) Chapter Four.
51
Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 181 (9 August 2013); see further Chapter 3, Part Three (Breach of
Confidence).
52
BSA sch 5, cl 91(1). See further discussion in Chapter Three, Part Three (Confidential Information and
Internet Intermediaries) 122.
53
See above Chapter Three, Part Three (Defamation) and note in particular page 125 discussingthe criteria
for the award of an interlocutory injunction as stated in Jakudo Pty Ltd v South Australian Telecasters Ltd
(Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia Full Court, Doyle CJ, Williams and Belby JJ, 15 October 1997)
3 (Doyle CJ) referring to judgment of Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161
CLR 148, 153.
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establish that those images convey a meaning or meanings that would cause an ordinary
decent person54 to think less of her,55 or to shun or avoid her;56 or that the meanings
conveyed would expose her to hatred, contempt or ridicule.57 Unless the video is
accompanied by words or text (or possibly if the context of publication suggests
something defamatory)58 the only untrue imputation is that she has allowed herself to be
filmed semi‐naked.59 This imputation is probably capable of affecting her standing by
reference to one of the tests outlined above, although this is certainly not clear‐cut
because of her relatively young age. By analogy with the case of Saunders referred to in
Chapter Three, an ordinary decent member of the community may not think less of her,
because of her age.60 Moreover, the exchange of intimate images between partners has
been described as a ‘not uncommon contemporary practice’.61
If the material is found to be defamatory, Lenin could be required to provide an
undertaking to Jackie and a final injunction would technically be available to her. Again,
however, if the material has been republished elsewhere or downloaded by others, an
injunction might be of limited utility. However, an internet content host that is made
aware of the defamatory nature of the material might incur direct liability in defamation
if it fails to remove the material within a reasonable time.62
(d) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
If Jackie suffers a recognised psychiatric injury or illness as a result of the threats to reveal
the video she may also have grounds to sue for intentional or negligent infliction of harm

54

Radio 2UE (2009) 238 CLR 460, 478 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ), as summarised in Harbour
Radio Pty Ltd v Trad [2012] HCA 44 ( 5 October 2012), [54].
55
Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (Lord Atkin).
56
Youssoupoff v Metro‐Goldwyn‐Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, 587 (Slesser LJ); Boyd v Mirror
Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449.
57
Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 108 (Parke B); Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR
449; Ettingshausen (1991) 23 NSWLR 443 and see generally Chapter Three, Part Three (Defamation) 122 ‐
127.
58
See above Chapter Three, Part Three (Defamation) 124–125 and see, eg, Shepherd v Walsh [2001] QSC
358 (6 September 2001) [29] (Jones J) where the context of publication of the photographs (in a ‘salacious’
magazine) gave rise to the imputation that, inter alia, the plaintiff was a person who ‘would expose herself
to be photographed for the purpose of the photo being reproduced for reward in a magazine of the kind in
question’.
59
Although the plaintiff in a defamation action does not need to prove the falsity of the imputations
communicated truth is a complete defence: see above Chapter Three, Part Three (Defamation) 124‐125.
Therefore it is likely that Jackie would identify only those imputations that are untrue or at least those in
respect of which the truth of which would be difficult to establish.
60
Saunders v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 404 [13] (Hunt AJA): his Honour was of the opinion
that it was open to the jury to conclude that an ordinary decent member of the community would not think
less of a seven year old child engaged in petrol sniffing, due to his immaturity. However, he went on to
comment that, in his view, ‘[a] child of seven years old is, perhaps, somewhere near the borderline’.
61
Wilson [2015] WASC 15, [81].
62
See Chapter Three, Part Three (Liability in Defamation of Internet Intermediaries) 126‐127.
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or harassment.63 For the purposes of an action for intentional infliction of harm or
harassment, the requisite intention on the part of Lenin is likely to be fairly easy to
establish because he is using the threat of disclosure to coerce Jackie for his own ends.
For the purpose of an action for negligent infliction of harm, a threshold issue will be the
foreseeability of pure mental harm on the part of a person of normal fortitude.64
Foreseeability in this respect will likely be readily established in a situation such as this,
where Lenin is using threats to coerce Jackie into doing something she does not wish to
do. Jackie’s young age and Lenin’s relative maturity will also be relevant factors in
determining the foreseeability of harm.65
(e) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act does not apply to the acts or practices of individuals66 and will not,
therefore, apply to Lenin.
If the video is uploaded to YouTube then there is a preliminary question as to whether the
Privacy Act applies to that service. This is certainly not straightforward.67 If the Privacy Act
63

Where Jackie suffers distress, humiliation or embarrassment short of a recognised psychiatric injury or
illness this will not be sufficient to found an action: see above Chapter Three, Part Three (Intentional
infliction of Harm and Negligent Infliction of Harm) 132‐136.
64
In six jurisdictions foreseeability that mental harm might, in the circumstances, be suffered by a person
of normal fortitude is a threshold issue in establishing the duty of care: see Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s
5S(1). Similar provisions are contained within Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 34(1); Civil Liability Act
2002 (NSW) s 32(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s34(1). In the remaining
jurisdictions, foreseeability of pure mental harm on the part of a person of normal fortitude is relevant to
establishing duty or breach of duty: in Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 380 [189] Gummow
and Kirby JJ (380 [189]) described the normal fortitude test as going to the issue of foreseeability for the
purposes of establishing breach of duty, but Gleeson CJ (332–3 [16]), Gaudron J (339 [45]), McHugh J (346
[71]) and Hayne J (410 [273]) referred to the ‘normal fortitude’ rule as a control mechanism relevant to a
determination of whether or not there existed a duty of care.
65
Note also, in the six jurisdictions specifying a ‘normal fortitude test’ for mental harm, or pure mental
harm, a relevant consideration in establishing what the defendant ought to have foreseen will be the
existence of a pre‐existing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002
(ACT) s 34(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 32(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 33(2) Civil Liability Act 2002
(Tas) s 34(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5S(1).
66
Privacy Act s 7B(1).
67
It would appear that YouTube’s servers are all located outside of Australia ‐ see below n 98. Although
Google has an Australian company — Google Pty Ltd — this company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Google
International LLC, the ultimate holding company being Google Inc: Rana v Google Australia Pty Ltd [2013]
FCA 60 (7 February 2013) [35] (‘Rana’). In Rana the Federal Court of Australia considered (at [36]) whether
Google Australia Pty Ltd was a publisher of allegedly defamatory matter contained in websites hosted by
Google. Mansfield J referred to and accepted the evidence of Google Australia’s solicitor that Google Inc,
situated in the USA, owns and operates the business that supplies the Google Web Search and
Google Images products and that Google Inc offers the ‘products’ on its websites to the public pursuant to
written terms of service stating that the services are provided by Google Inc. In relation to YouTube,
therefore, it is likely, therefore, that the site is operated by Google Inc rather than Google Australia Pty Ltd.
As such, to determine whether the Privacy Act applies in respect of personal information uploaded to the
site, a threshold question will be whether the personal information can be said to be collected in Australia
or about Australians for the purpose of the application of the extraterritorial provisions of the Act. In 2010
the then Australian Privacy Commissioner obtained undertakings from Google in relation to its inadvertent
collection of wifi data by Google Street View Vehicles. The Privacy Commissioner stated that she was
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does apply to YouTube (or, rather, its parent Google) then that organisation will need to
comply with the APPs in relation to its collection of personal information.68 Where
personal information is held in a ‘record’, that personal information must also be used
and stored in accordance with the APPs.69
Whether the video of Jackie constitutes personal information within the meaning of the
Privacy Act depends on whether Jackie is identified in the video, or reasonably identifiable
in it.70 If captions or titles are applied to the video that name Jackie, then she has been
identified and the video will probably be considered personal information within the
meaning of the Act. Even if the video is not associated with Jackie’s name, however, it is
possible that the video will be considered personal information if a large enough section
of members of the public with access to the video could identify her from it.71
If YouTube is bound by the Privacy Act and the video of Jackie is personal information, the
uploading of a video onto YouTube will need to be considered by reference to APP 3
(personal information that is collected by solicitation) or APP 4 (personal information that
is received by an organisation, but not solicited).72 In either case, to comply with those
APPs the collection or receipt of personal information (video images) must be reasonably

satisfied that, on the information available, ‘any collection of personal information would have breached
the Australian Privacy Act’: OAIC, Australian Privacy Commissioner Obtains Undertakings from Google (9
July
2010)
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/media‐and‐speeches/statements/google‐street‐view‐wi‐fi‐
collection#australian‐privacy‐commissioner‐obtains‐privacy‐undertakings‐from‐google>. However, the
personal information collected by Google StreetView was collected directly by Google vehicles, in Australia.
Where information is not collected in Australia, the circumstances in which the Privacy Act will have
extraterritorial application are not entirely clear. See also Chapter 3, Part Three (Information Privacy Laws)
and see, also, Anna Bunn, ‘Facebook and Face Recognition: Kinda Cool, Kinda Creepy’ (2014) 25(1) Bond
Law Review 35. Nevertheless the OAIC has expressed the view that any personal information uploaded from
a computer located in Australia is information that is collected in Australia, albeit that it is never stored on
a server within Australia: Telephone Conversation with Carl, OAIC Enquiry Officer (2 September 2015).
68
Privacy Act s 6(1) (definition of ‘collect’) and sSee Chapter Three, Part Three (Information Privacy Laws)
148 ‐ 149.
69
An entity ‘holds’ information only if the entity has in its possession or control a record containing the
personal information: ibid (definition of ‘holds’).
70
Ibid (definition of ‘personal information’).
71
Although Jackie may be identifiable by those who know her (depending on what the video actually reveals
and how clear it is) this does not mean that she is ‘reasonably identifiable’ to the organisation collecting or
holding the video. For a discussion on the meaning of when an individual is considered ‘identified or
reasonably identifiable’ see ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, Vol 1, 300–6 [6.27]–[6.47]. In its
guidelines on the Australian Privacy Principles, the OAIC notes that whether an individual is reasonably
identifiable from particular information will depend on all the circumstances including, ‘if the information
is publically released, whether a reasonable member of the public who accesses that information would be
able to identify the individual’: OAIC, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, 31 March 2015, 20 [B.91].
However, the OAIC has also stated that it believes this may not be the case unless the section of the public
able to identify the person is sufficiently broad and that, for example, a photograph of someone’s house is
not personal information just because neighbours, family and friends are able to associate the house with
a particular individual as this group is not sufficiently broad: Telephone Conversation with Carl, OAIC Enquiry
Officer (2 September 2015).
72
For a discussion as to whether information posted by a Facebook user can be considered to have been
solicited by Facebook or not, see: Bunn, above n 67.

177

necessary for one or more of the organisation’s functions or purposes.73 Given that the
video content actually breaches YouTube’s own terms and community guidelines,74 it is
clearly not reasonably necessary for one or more of the organisation’s functions or
purposes. A failure by YouTube to delete the video of Jackie could therefore be a breach
of APPs. Complaining to the OAIC about a breach would, however, only be necessary if
YouTube had itself already been notified of the video’s existence, and had refused to
delete it.75 Given that, as noted above, the content is a clear breach of YouTube’s own
terms of service, it is likely that the video would be removed by the service upon receipt
of a complaint.
Jackie will have no standing to bring an action for breach of the Privacy Act directly.76
(f) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
If Lenin proceeds to post videos of Jackie to YouTube, these would likely be classed as
‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian Child’ under the Online Safety Act.77
YouTube is currently listed as a Tier 2 social media service under the Act’s tier scheme.
Therefore Jackie may lodge a complaint with the e‐Safety Commissioner in the event that
material is not removed from the site within 48 hours of a request being made by Jackie.78
Upon receipt of a complaint,79 the e‐Safety Commissioner could issue a social media
service notice requiring the removal of the material from YouTube.80 Upon receipt of such
notice, YouTube would then be required to remove the videos within 48 hours or face
consequences under the Act, which can include penalties, enforceable undertakings and
injunctions.81 Even if the videos are not actually posted to YouTube, Jackie may be able to
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Privacy Act sch 3, APPs 3, 4. The Explanatory Memorandum to Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy
Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth), page 53 explains that whether collection is reasonably necessary is to be
‘interpreted objectively and in a practical sense.’
74
YouTube, Terms of Service (9 June 2010) <http://www.youtube.com/t/terms> term 6E; YouTube,
Community Guidelines < https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html> (Don’t
Cross the Line); see also Chapter Three, Part Three (Regulation of Content under the Broadcasting Service
Act 1992 (Cth)) 153 ‐ 155.
75
The OAIC advises that complaints generally need to be lodged directly with the entity in question, which
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does not regard the response as satisfactory, then the complaint can be addressed to the OAIC: OAIC, How
do I Make a Privacy Complaint? < http://oaic.gov.au/privacy/making‐a‐privacy‐complaint>.
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Austen v Civil Aviation Authority (1994) 50 FCR 272, 278.
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Online Safety Act s 5: ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’ is defined as material that
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seriously threatening, seriously intimidating, seriously harassing or seriously humiliating’ the Australian
child. The video identifying Jackie is likely to be considered ‘seriously humiliating’.
78
Ibid s 18.
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Made pursuant to the Online Safety Act s 18.
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Ibid s 35. The Commissioner must be satisfied that the material is ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an
Australian child’ and that the other conditions specified in s 35 (such as prior lodgement of a complaint with
the social media service under its complaints scheme) are met.
81
Ibid ss 36 and 46 (civil penalty provisions); s 47 (enforceable undertakings); s 48 (injunctions).
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lodge a complaint with the e‐Safety Commissioner on the basis of material that has been
or is being provided on a relevant electronic service, namely Skype.82
If Lenin does post the material to YouTube and Jackie lodges a complaint with the e‐Safety
Commissioner,83 the e‐Safety Commissioner has power to issue an end‐user notice to
Lenin.84 That notice can require Lenin to take all reasonable steps to ensure the removal
of the material from YouTube within a specified period, to refrain from posting further
such material and to apologise to Jackie.85 Even if the videos are not posted to YouTube,
Jackie would be able to lodge a complaint with the e‐Safety Commissioner on the basis
that the material has been provided on a social media or relevant electronic service
(Skype).86 However, the e‐Safety Commissioner cannot issue an end‐user notice unless
and until Lenin posts the videos on a relevant service.87
(g) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
The YouTube terms and conditions are stated to apply to all those who use the site.88 The
YouTube terms and conditions incorporate its privacy policy, as well as its community
guidelines89 and state that users are not to upload content that is contrary to the
community guidelines.90 Those community guidelines state, among other things, that:
Things like predatory behavior, stalking, threats, harassment, intimidation, invading
privacy, revealing other people's personal information, and inciting others to commit
violent acts or to violate the Terms of Use are taken very seriously. Anyone caught doing
these things may be permanently banned from YouTube.91

The YouTube community guidelines state that YouTube works closely with law
enforcement and that they report child exploitation.92 However, the terms of service do
not oblige YouTube to remove content that amounts to an invasion of privacy or
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Material is ‘provided’ on a social media service or relevant electronic service if it is accessible or delivered
to one or more end‐users using the service: Ibid s 6. ‘Material’ includes material in the form of text, data,
speech, music, sounds, visual images or material in any other form: Online Safety Act s4. Given that the
images of Jackie (which constitute ‘material’ under the Act: at s 4) were accessible to Lenin, arguably they
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otherwise contravenes the community guidelines or the terms in general. Rather,
YouTube has discretion to remove the content. Accordingly, if the video of Jackie is posted
to YouTube Jackie can notify the site host and request that they remove the video.93
Although this request will not place YouTube under a contractually enforceable obligation
vis‐a‐vis Jackie, it is likely that the site host would comply: the video clearly involves the
revelation of personal information and probably amounts to child exploitation (although
the meaning of this term is not defined in the YouTube terms).
Jackie does not need to use the YouTube service or have any contract with YouTube in
order to report the images nor to request their removal.94
Should the video of Jackie or still images from it be uploaded to another social networking
site, similar procedures as discussed above would ordinarily allow Jackie to make a
request to the site host to remove the content. Generally, site hosts will have terms of
service prohibiting this type of material and will have the ability, but not the obligation,
to remove material contrary to its terms. In this case, the nature of the material is such
that it will almost certainly be removed by reputable sites.95
The video and photographs of Jackie would be ‘prohibited’ or ‘potentially prohibited’
based on criteria outlined in the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games)
Act 1995 (Cth), the National Classification Code and the Guidelines for the Classification
of Films and Computer Games 2005.96 However, the e‐Safety Commissioner can only issue
a take‐down notice if the content is hosted in or provided from Australia97 and as the
majority of YouTube content is hosted outside of Australia,98 a take‐down notice will not
be issued. However, the e‐Safety Commissioner can refer the content to the suppliers of
approved internet filters in accordance with the Internet Industry Association Code of
93

The procedure for reporting an inappropriate video using the ‘flagging procedure’ requires a user to be
logged into their Google account: YouTube, Flag Inappropriate Content, YouTube Help
<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802027?hl=en>.
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Practice and in relation to serious content, such as child pornography, may also notify a
law enforcement agency.99
(h) Criminal Offences
Lenin will have committed a number of criminal offences. First of all, the fact that both
Jackie and Lenin are resident in Western Australia and that Lenin recorded Jackie while
the two were involved in a private activity (the activity being their exchanges via Skype)
and without her consent means that Lenin will have committed a breach of the
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) (‘SDA’).100 If any of the video recordings, or still images
taken from them, are sent to others or uploaded to the internet, Lenin might also be in
breach of other provisions of the SDA, which prohibit the publication of private activities
recorded by use of a surveillance device.101 The penalty that can be applied to Lenin for
breach of each section of the SDA is a fine of $5,000, imprisonment for 12 months or
both.102 Breach of the SDA will not, however, give Jackie a private law right of action and,
importantly, does not mean that she will be able to use the breach as the basis for applying
for an injunction to prevent the publication of the images by Lenin.103
Because Jackie is a child under 16, the capture and distribution or threatened distribution
of the naked images of her, as well as the encouragement of her to reveal her body over
Skype to Lenin, will constitute a number of offences under the child exploitation
provisions of the Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) (‘Criminal Code’), with the
possibility of heavy penalty.104 Lenin’s action will also constitute a stalking offence under
the Criminal Code105 and will amount to an offence under the federal Criminal Code.106
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(i) Summary of Legal Position for Case Study One
In summary, Jackie has a number of possible options she could pursue in order to obtain
redress.
Given that Lenin has threatened to publish images of her, Jackie would likely be able to
obtain an interlocutory injunction to prevent publication on the basis of a demonstrable
cause of action for breach of confidence. If the images are published, a breach of
confidence action would nevertheless lie against Lenin, and it is likely that an injunction
would be ordered for removal of any images that have been published. Jackie may also
have an action against Lenin for intentional infliction of harm. If an action for invasion of
privacy is recognised, the capture and publication of the images would almost certainly
satisfy the elements of the action.
If Lenin posts the images to YouTube, Jackie’s best solution would be to notify YouTube
directly.107 Given her age and the nature of the images it is very likely that YouTube would
remove the images. If Lenin were to post the images on another site, however, this option
may not be available.108 It seems unlikely that any publication of the images by an internet
host would be a matter that the OAIC would investigate, for the reasons set out above.
However, if any content host fails to remove images within a reasonable time of being
notified of their existence, a complaint can be made to the e‐Safety Commissioner. If Lenin
actually uploads the images to a social media service such as YouTube, or a relevant
electronic service, the e‐Safety Commissioner may issue an end‐user notice to Lenin
requiring the materials to be removed, among other things.
Once publication on the internet has occurred, however, the ability to remove the images
from the internet altogether is largely dependent on them not having been copied (or
downloaded and ‘reposted’) by others — in this respect, time is of the essence.
In addition to pursuing a cause of action for breach of confidence or intentional infliction
of harm, or reporting the content to the service hosting it or to the e‐Safety Commissioner,
a report of Lenin’s threats or any actual publication of the images can be made to the
police. As discussed above, Lenin’s actions likely constitute a number of criminal offences.
Of course, the availability of legal remedies does not mean that Jackie would or could
easily avail herself of them. A number of practical barriers face children and young people
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wishing to take legal action: these may include lack of awareness of a remedy;109 lack of
awareness as to how to pursue a remedy; and access to justice issues, such as cost. It is
also the case that young people may not consider legal action as an option quite apart
from any practical difficulties; this could be for a number of reasons including
embarrassment and fear of further publicity, or fear of the consequences, such as a
concern that they may be ‘banned’ from access to technology or social media.110
B

Case Study Two (Tim)

1 Scenario
Tim is an overweight 15 year old boy. One day after school he visits a local park with
some friends. The group of friends play a brief game of football and Tim removes his
shirt, as it is a hot day and he is feeling uncomfortable. Before Tim realises what is
happening, another member of the group, Kieren, takes a photograph of Tim on his
mobile phone. The photograph is later posted on Kieren’s Facebook page. Tim is
Facebook ‘friends’ with Kieren and finds out about the photograph, as he is tagged
in it.111 Kieren has applied ‘public’ settings to his Facebook account, so access to
Kieren’s site, including all of the photographs he posts, is unrestricted and available
to anyone.112 When he sees the picture Tim feels very upset: he is already very
embarrassed about his weight and distraught that his photograph was taken at all, let
alone now viewable by a wide audience, including both people he knows as well as
complete strangers. Tim is also fearful that this photograph will forever be linked to
him whenever anyone searches against his name.
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2 Background and Key Features
The scenario presented in this case study is a hypothetical scenario, but based on a
photograph available on a public website.113
The case study bears some similarities to reports of a real‐life scenario. Paulson, in an
article on internet bullying, refers to reports of covert photographs taken of an overweight
Japanese schoolboy in the locker room being distributed to many of his peers.114 A key
difference between that scenario and the one of this case study, however, is that the
Japanese schoolboy was not aware of his photograph being taken whereas in this
situation Tim was aware. Other key features of this scenario are that while Tim was aware
of the photograph being taken, he did not pose for it and cannot be said to have expressly
consented to it being taken. Neither has Tim expressly consented to the photograph being
published online. Kieren’s purpose in taking and posting the photograph of Tim is not clear
from the facts of the case study.
3 Discussion of Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
Even if a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy is developed, Tim will face
considerable challenges demonstrating that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
relation to the publication of the photograph. One reason for this is that the photograph
was taken in a public place and reveals only information (how Tim looks without his shirt
on) that Tim had been prepared to ‘communicate’ to those present. If Australian courts
were to be guided by the approach of the ALRC to determining the reasonable expectation
of privacy in a public place, Tim would be unlikely to succeed. Although the ALRC
recognises that a person may have an expectation of privacy in relation to the publication
or information captured in a public place, 115 all of the examples given by the ALRC of
disclosures that would constitute an invasion of privacy within the scope of the proposed
cause of action relate to information that is inherently private or to images that capture
the plaintiff in an intimate or embarrassing moment.116 In Tim’s case it is difficult to say
that the ‘information’ itself is inherently private, unless perhaps the court is convinced by
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an argument that the photograph communicates information about Tim’s health and
should be considered private on that basis.117 This is also not a situation in which a person
in a public place has been caught in a humiliating or traumatic situation,118 although the
image might be considered embarrassing, and neither has there been any intrusion into a
private space. , However, Australian courts have shown some preparedness to recognise
that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis the publication of
information that is neither inherently private, nor intimate or embarrassing. In the case
of Saad, for example, the court suggested that it was arguable that a reasonable
expectation of privacy could, in some circumstances, attach to images captured by CCTV,
where the information conveyed by those images was not inherently private. This was on
the basis that the images were obtained for a limited purpose (security) and in
circumstances where the person captured in the image had no choice about their image
being captured.119 Also, and as discussed in Chapter Three, in Lenah, Gleeson CJ suggested
that ‘the requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’ is often a useful practical
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test of whether information is private.120 It could be argued that disclosure of the
photograph is highly offensive, when judged from the perspective of a person of ordinary
sensibilities in Tim’s position. However, an added difficulty for Tim here is that any
particular sensitivity on his part will be irrelevant in assessing whether publication would
be regarded as highly offensive.
It is also possible that courts would take into account Tim’s age in determining that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a situation such as this, even if an adult in the same
position might not have. As to the question of whether children have an expectation of
privacy in situations that an adult would not have, Australian courts might look to the
approach taken in other jurisdictions. In this regard, it is interesting to note recent
developments in the cause of action for invasion of privacy in England and Wales. In the
recent decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Weller,121 the court held
that children of a celebrity parent who were photographed on the street during a public
outing, photographs that were subsequently published in a magazine, had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to the publication of those photographs. In reaching that
conclusion, the Master of the Rolls, with whose judgment the other members of the court
concurred, held that the expectation of privacy arose due to a number of factors. One
such factor was that the children were engaged in a family outing.122 However, the ‘critical
factor’ supporting the finding that the children had a reasonable expectation of privacy
was, in the court’s view, the fact that the claimants were children and had been identified
by their surname.123 One reason this was important was because, in the view of the court,
‘[c]hildren should be protected from the risk of embarrassment and bullying and
potentially more serious threats to their safety.’124 This suggests that in certain
circumstances children may indeed be found to have an expectation of privacy when an
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adult might not.125 In the Australian context, the ALRC’s recommendations for the form of
a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy set out a number of non‐
exhaustive factors to be taken into account in determining whether a plaintiff has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. These include the attributes of the plaintiff, including
the plaintiff’s age.
It is possible that Australian courts in developing a common law cause of action for
invasion of privacy, guided by the ALRC recommendations referred to above and the
decision of UK courts relating to the interests of children, would likewise be prepared to
find that a child has a reasonable expectation of privacy in situations where an adult might
not do so. This could include, for example, situations where an image (not otherwise
depicting a ‘clearly private’ moment) is, as here, taken in a public place.
Even if Tim is able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, for the purpose of a
common law action, however, his chances of success are further curtailed by issues of
consent, seriousness, intention and countervailing interests in freedom of expression.
Consent may operate as a defence to any action for invasion of privacy or affect the
determination of whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to
the capture or publication or information. 126 It is possible to argue that the fact Tim
removed his shirt in a public place, in the knowledge that any number of individuals would
have had the ability to photograph him on their digital devices, was sufficient to imply his
consent to the photograph being taken and subsequently published (such as on a social
media platform). There is, however, a countervailing argument that consent to being
photographed does not, or should not, imply consent to its publication.127
It is unclear whether an action for invasion of privacy would be made out only where the
invasion concerned is serious, and if so how high the ‘bar would be set’ — so whether, for
example, the invasion would need to be ‘highly offensive’ or meet some other
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threshold.128 In any event, the factors that would be used by the court to determine
whether the invasion was serious (or highly offensive) are likely to be wide‐ranging and
could include the degree of offence and distress, the motivation and knowledge of the
defendant, and the nature and extent of the publication.129 The fact that Tim suffered
distress and embarrassment from publication of the image will not be conclusive.130
The fact that the photograph was published on a publicly accessible Facebook page, with
a potentially unrestricted audience, could result in the invasion being considered
‘serious’.131 On the other hand, the nature of the publication (on an individual’s Facebook
page) is quite different from the nature of publication of an image such as this in the
media, or to illustrate a website about obesity, for example. Although Kieren’s Facebook
page is publically accessible, the extent to which it is actually accessed by the public in
general is probably far less than the extent to which a news story or informational web
page is accessed. The purpose of placing an image on a social media site, designed to
facilitate the communication of information about oneself and others, is also quite
different to the purpose served by the incidental use of a photograph to illustrate a news
story or website.
If Tim was able to establish that Kieren was motivated by malice in publishing the
photograph, any invasion of privacy is more likely to be judged as serious. Related to
Kieren’s motives, is the question of whether liability for invasion of privacy would attach
only to ‘wilful’ invasions of privacy,132 or whether it would attach to those that were
negligent,133 or in circumstances where a reasonable person would know that intrusion,
misuse or disclosure was obviously or substantially likely to follow.134 Depending on how
‘intent’ is defined, it may be difficult for Tim to establish this.135
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If detriment, in the form of mental, physiological or emotional harm or distress is an
element of the common law action for invasion of privacy,136 it is likely that Tim would be
able to satisfy this element due to his reaction to the image.
Finally there is the question of the public interest in free expression, which would need to
be balanced against Tim’s interest in protecting his privacy. Factoring freedom of
expression into the equation could well be fatal to Tim’s claim, although much depends
on the value that the courts are prepared to place on that freedom when compared to
Tim’s privacy interest (or Tim’s own interests in free expression137). The relevant
consideration here is not simply the extent to which a person should be free to publish
photographs of another, but the extent to which the ability of a person to sue another in
a situation such as this would have a chilling effect on the use of social media, including
by young people, to share and communicate information, including photographs, about
themselves and others. The extent to which protecting Tim’s privacy interest would
impact on the various other interests (including economic interests) and freedoms of
social media sites and those who wish to upload or access material and photographs on
the internet will also need to be considered.
Overall, Tim is unlikely to be able to establish a common law action for invasion of privacy.
(b) Breach of Confidence
In order to succeed in an action for breach of confidence, Tim would need to establish
that the information possessed the necessary quality of confidence and that the
defendant was under an obligation of confidence.
In relation to the requirement that information possess a ‘quality of confidence’ Tim could
argue that the image conveys inaccessible and non‐trivial information – that is, the way
he looks without his shirt on. There is certainly an argument that while the way Tim looks
fully clothed is generally accessible information (any number of people see him on any
given day), the way he looks without his shirt on may be relatively inaccessible. It is true
that Tim removed his shirt in a public place, but arguably this made the ‘information’ (how
he looks without his shirt) accessible only to a relatively limited audience, rather than to
the public at large — at least, this was the case until the photograph of Tim was uploaded
110 [7.7]. A definition of intention that encompasses imputed intention means that a plaintiff does not
necessarily have the burden of proving that a defendant actually turned their mind to the invasion or privacy
(or misuse or disclosure of private information): at 117 [7.15]. However, the Commission makes it clear that
intention must attach not only to the action that invades the plaintiff’s privacy but requires that the
defendant: ‘needs to have been aware of the facts from which it can be objectively assessed whether or not
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and of the facts that an intrusion or disclosure would
(or in the case of recklessness, may) occur’: at 116 [7.35]. An example given by the ALRC of a situation in
which the requisite intention element would not be satisfied is that of a photographer who photographs a
public event without realising that the photograph captures a private activity (for example, people inside a
building) in the background: at 116 [7.37].
136
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to Facebook. Even so, if a person has taken few or no steps to protect the inaccessibility
of the information presented in a public place, the chances of that information being
regarded as confidential will diminish. The fact that Tim removed his shirt in a public place
and made no attempt to seek a level of seclusion (such as is the case, for example, where
a person retires to a doorway or a more secluded spot to change clothes) suggests that
no effort was made to guard the accessibility of the information (how he looked without
his shirt on). This, alone, would probably be fatal to any claim for breach of confidence.
Besides identifying the non‐triviality and inaccessibility of information, the courts have
tended to adopt a recognition approach to identifying information that can be considered
confidential. In the case of personal information, this involves considering whether the
information is ‘private’. As noted in Chapter Three, there is a dearth of Australian
authority as to the test that should be applied in determining whether information is
‘private’ for this purpose. However, if the current UK approach were to be adopted, it
would need to be determined, as a minimum, that the person seeking to restrain or obtain
a remedy for the misuse of the information had an expectation of privacy in relation to
the use of the information. As noted in the previous section, Tim would face considerable
challenges demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
publication of the photograph.
There is also some possibility that Tim could argue that information was confidential
because Kieren knew that Tim did not wish the information (the photograph) to be taken
or published. Gurry suggests that actual knowledge of special circumstances can serve to
imbue information with a quality of confidence it would otherwise not possess.138 This
argument only has a chance of success if Tim can establish that he specifically requested
Kieren not to take the photograph at all, or requested that the photograph not be
published online.
Even if the photograph of Tim139 is considered to have the necessary quality of confidence
(or be capable of protection under the action for breach of confidence based on a privacy
test), Tim would still need to establish that Kieren was under an obligation of confidence,
which he then breached.140 In Tim’s case there is no pre‐existing relationship of
138

Francis Gurry, Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press, 1984) 78–81, citing three cases in which
information has been held to be confidential between two parties, even where the information itself was
public knowledge, on the basis that it is ‘associated with a particular context and the confidant knows or
should know that the association of the information with the context is a matter of special significance,
peculiar sensitivity or confidentiality’: at 80–1. The argument in Tim’s case, then, would be that the
publication of these images in the context of Facebook was something that Kieran knew or should of known
was a matter of special significance, sensitivity or confidentiality. However, there are no cases known to the
author which apply this principle in a context similar to that of Tim’s and it would, in any event, be difficult
for Tim to establish that Kieran did know that publication would be a matter of particular significance,
sensitivity or confidentiality.
139
Or, further to the argument made immediately above, the publication of the photograph on Facebook
rather than the photograph itself.
140
See Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of Confidence), esp 115‐117.
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confidence between Kieren and himself at the time that Kieren takes the photograph,
unless perhaps Tim specifically asked Kieren not to take the photograph, or indicated that
he did not wish to be photographed.141 It is also possible that Kieren would be placed
under an obligation of confidence if Tim subsequently requested him not to show the
photograph to anyone, or specifically asked that it not be put online.142
It has been accepted that an obligation of confidence can arise where information has
been improperly or surreptitiously obtained.143 Here the photograph was not taken
surreptitiously. Nevertheless, the information may be regarded as having been obtained
‘improperly’ if this word is interpreted widely so as to mean against the wishes of the
image subject, rather than unlawfully.144 Therefore, if Tim can show that he had made it
clear that he did not wish to be photographed (or that he did not wish the photograph to
be published), the information might be regarded as having been improperly obtained.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, it is less clear whether, in Australia, the nature of
the information is sufficient in and of itself to place the person obtaining it under an
obligation of confidence.145 Even so, where — as here — the information has not been
obtained by intrusion into seclusion or covert means, and it is difficult to describe the
information as ‘obviously private’, establishing the obligation will be difficult. However,
should Tim be able to establish that the information itself was confidential due to Kieran’s
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In fact, if a pre‐existing relationship of confidence can be said to exist then this, arguably, makes it more
likely that the photographs will be treated as private information: so, for example, in McKennit v Ash [2006]
EWCA Civ 1714 and Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspaper Ltd [2008] QB 103 the fact that
information was obtained in the course of a pre‐existing confidential relationship ‘had a significant bearing
on whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information disclosed’:
Nicole Moreham, ‘Breach of confidence and misuse of private information. How Do the Two Actions Work
Together?’ (2010) 15 Media and Arts Law Review 265, 268.
142
It must be remembered, however, that an obligation of confidence can only exist if the information itself
is confidential — in other words, a request to keep information to oneself does not suffice to place the
subject of the request under an obligation of confidence unless the information is confidential in the first
place. There is also a question as to whether it is sufficient to impose an obligation of confidence upon the
recipient to notify the recipient of the information as to its confidential nature after the information has
been received: see Megan Richardson, ‘Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy:
Theory versus Law’ (1993–94) 19 University of Melbourne Law Review 673, 689 n 114 referring to the
different approach taken in Seager v Copydex [1967] 2 All ER 415, suggesting that it is sufficient, and
Fractionated Cane Technology Ltd v Ruiz‐Avalla [1988] 7 Qd R 610, suggesting that it is not.
143
Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225 [39] where Gleeson CJ suggests that if the ABC had known the information
was obtained improperly or surreptitiously that this would be sufficient to place them under an obligation
of confidence, where the information itself was private.
144
There is some suggestion that this is how the requirement would be interpreted: see Megan Richardson,
‘Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy’, above n 142, 694 referring to Franklin v
Giddins [1978] Qd R 72, which ‘indicates that unconscionable conduct, rather than unlawfulness in the
obtaining is the standard to be applied.’
145
In Wilson [2015] WASC 15 (16 January 2015) [56], Mitchell J observed that the ‘[t]he explicit nature of
the images was itself suggestive of their confidential character’ – however, beyond the nature of the images
‘that character was confirmed by the discussions between the plaintiff and defendant, in which the plaintiff
emphasised the deeply personal nature of the images.’
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knowledge of special circumstances then it would seem to follow that that knowledge
should be sufficient to place Kieran under an obligation of confidence.
It is possible, then, that Kieren will be under an obligation of confidence but this is likely
only if Tim made it clear that he did not wish to be photographed or, possibly, that he did
not wish the photograph to be shown to anyone else or put online. If the photograph is
copied by others onto their own Facebook pages, however, or indeed posted elsewhere
on the internet, the obligation of confidence would be unlikely to extend to those
others.146
Even assuming that Tim is able to make out the elements of breach of confidence,
questions would arise as to whether, and if so how, considerations such as Kieren’s right
of freedom of expression would be brought into the equation. Although in the UK Kieren’s
right to freedom of expression will necessarily be balanced against Tim’s interest in
maintaining his privacy, whether the public interest in freedom of expression generally
amounts to a defence in Australia is more difficult to say.147 It seems highly likely,
however, that freedom of expression and other matters of public interest would be
factored in at some stage — if not as a ‘defence’ to the action the as part of the
determination as to whether the information itself possessed a ‘quality of confidence’.
If Tim were successful in establishing an action for breach of confidence (which, overall, is
unlikely), it is not clear that he would succeed in securing an injunction requiring the
removal of the photograph by Kieren from Facebook. Certainly courts are less likely to
award an injunction if the posting of the photograph on Facebook has put the information
conveyed by the image into the public domain such that an injunction would be futile.148
As discussed in Chapter Three, however, whether information is in the public domain is a
question of fact, and the mere fact of publication on a social media site does not
automatically mean that information has entered the public domain.
The public interest in Kieren having the freedom to express himself (by communicating
his photographs online) might also be a consideration in determining what remedy should
be available to Tim, where the action for breach of confidence is made out.149
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This is for reasons discussed in Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of Confidence), namely that there is
little Australian authority for the proposition that an obligation of confidence can be imposed merely due
to the nature of the information, buteven if this is the case it is likely that an obligation would be imposed
only where information was ‘obviously’ confidential: see esp 115‐6.
147
See Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of Confidence) 119. Again, though, there may be an exception if
Tim is able to show that he specifically requested Kieren not to take the photograph or to refrain from
publishing it or showing it to anyone.
148
As to a discussion of futility arguments in relation to breach of confidence actions, see Chapter Three,
Part Three (Breach of Confidence) 120‐121.
149
For example, it may be that Kieren’s claim to freedom of expression would militate against the grant of
an injunction, even where the breach of confidence is established. This would be by analogy with
defamation cases where injunctions are only ‘grudgingly’ given due to free speech concerns; see comments
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In the unlikely event that the action for breach of confidence is established, Tim would be
able to notify Facebook of the existence of the confidential information. Facebook may
then decide to remove the information. Although the terms and conditions would permit
removal, they do not oblige it.150 However, the immunity from liability provided by clause
91(1) of schedule 5 of the BSA is lost once an internet content host becomes aware of the
nature of information it is hosting. As such, a refusal to remove the material could result
in Facebook being directly liable for a breach of confidence. Nevertheless, this is
unchartered waters, given that no Australian cases have found an internet content host
to be liable for breach of confidence in similar circumstances.
(c) Defamation
In order for the photograph of Tim to be considered capable of being defamatory, Tim
would need to establish that it conveys a meaning or meanings that would cause an
ordinary decent person to think less of him, or to shun or avoid him, or possibly that the
meanings conveyed would expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule.151 Given that the
photograph is an authentic representation of what Tim actually looks like, an action for
defamation will not be available unless, perhaps, the photograph of Tim posted on
Facebook was accompanied by the addition of text or comments that could be regarded
as conveying defamatory imputations. If, for example, comments suggested that Tim
needed to exercise more, there would be an arguable imputation that Tim was lazy and
that his weight issue was somehow his fault. Such an imputation is more likely to be
considered capable of being defamatory, although even where the defamatory capacity
of the matter is established it is still necessary to establish that it was in fact defamatory
of the image subject.152 Moreover, the person making the comments may be able to
utilise a defence.153

of Kirby J in Lenah (2001) 208 CLR 199, 286 [214] and 288 [221]; Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of
Confidence) 119‐120.
150
Facebook, Facebook, Data Policy (29 September 2016) < https://www.facebook.com/policy.php> (How
We Use the Information We Receive).
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Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (Lord Atkin); Youssoupoff v Metro‐Goldwyn‐Mayer Pictures Ltd
(1934) 50 TLR 581, 587 (Slesser LJ); Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 108 (Parke B); Boyd v Mirror
Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449; Ettingshausen (1991) 23 NSWLR 443. Danuta Mendelson writes that
the test of exposure to hatred, contempt or ridicule has yet to be confirmed by the High Court: Danuta
Mendelson, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2010) 780; nevertheless its existence
was acknowledged in Radio 2UE (2009) 238 CLR 460, with the plurality commenting that the test had come
to be regarded as too narrow (467–8 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ)).
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So, for example, it would be necessary to establish that an imputation such as that referred to in above
n Error! Bookmark not defined. was open to the ordinary, reasonable reader: see, eg, Farquhar v Bottom
[1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 385 (Hunt J). In relation to this case study, there is an argument that a reader would
understand the comments to be critical of McDonald’s but not necessarily of the boy in the photograph.
153
The defence of truth, or justification, may be open to the defendant should the defamatory imputations
be established: see further Chapter Three, Part Three (Defamation) 124‐125. The common law defence of
fair comment now exists alongside the statutory defence of honest opinion: see, eg, Defamation Act 2005
(WA) s 31 – however, whether an opinion defence would be open here is doubtful because a basis of relying
on the defence is that the opinion related to a matter of public interest: Defamation Act 2005 (WA)

193

An action for defamation is not likely to be made out here.
(d) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
An action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or for harassment is not available
unless a person has suffered a recognised psychiatric injury.154 As Tim appears to be
merely distressed or embarrassed by the publication of the photograph, he is unable to
rely on these causes of action. In any event, even if Kieren is aware that Tim does not like
the photograph and even if Tim requests that the image be removed from Facebook, it
would be difficult to prove that Kieren acted with intent to inflict harm, sufficient to
establish an action for intentional infliction of harm or harassment.155 It would also be
difficult to establish that Kieren ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude
would be likely to experience mental harm (in the form of a recognised psychiatric injury),
so as to establish the requisite duty of care for a negligence action.156
An action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm will not be made out.
(e) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act does not apply to the acts or practices of individuals157 and will not,
therefore, apply to Kieren.
It is less clear whether the Privacy Act applies to Facebook, given that the organisation
has no physical presence in Australia.158 If the Privacy Act does apply to Facebook then
that organisation will need to comply with the APPs in relation to its collection of
information and the use and storage of personal information where it is held ‘in a
record’.159

s 31(1)(b) and see, eg, Bellino v ABC [1996] 185 CLR 183 (28 March 1996) [16] (Dawson, McHugh and
Gummow JJ).
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In relation to an action for intentional infliction of harm, the majority of the court in Giller (2008) 24 VR
1 held that recognised psychiatric injury was necessary to establish an action (although Maxwell P favoured
the development of such an action to compensate for emotional distress falling short of recognised
psychiatric injury): at 6 [7].
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See Chapter Three, Part Three (Intentional Infliction of Harm) 133‐134 and (Harassment) 137.
156
See Chapter Three, Part Three (Negligent Infliction of Harm) 135‐136.
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Privacy Act s7B(1).
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Bunn, above n 67, 48; Aashish Srivastava, Roger Gamble and Janie Boey, ‘Cyberbullying in Australia:
Clarifying the Problem, Considering the Solutions’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Children’s Rights 25, 38
noting that Facebook’s servers are not located in Australia. Where information is not collected in Australia,
the circumstances in which the Privacy Act will have extraterritorial application are not entirely clear. See
also Chapter Three, Part Three (Federal Information Privacy Laws) 147‐148; Bunn, above n 67. Nevertheless
the OAIC has expressed the view that any personal information uploaded from a computer located in
Australia is information that is collected in Australia, albeit that it is never stored on a server within Australia:
Telephone Conversation with Carl, OAIC Enquiry Officer (2 September 2015).
159
The terms ‘collect’ and ‘record’ are defined in the Privacy Act s 6(1). An entity ‘holds’ information only if
the entity has in its possession or control a record containing the personal information: Privacy Act s 6 (1).
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The photograph can constitute personal information under the Privacy Act if Tim is
identified or reasonably identifiable in it.160 Because the photograph is tagged, and given
that Tim is also a user of Facebook, the image of Tim will probably be considered ‘personal
information’ in the hands of Facebook: this is because tags are automatically linked back
to user’s accounts.161 Given that the definition of ‘record’ includes photographs and
information in pictorial form, the images of Tim will be considered a ‘record’.
The posting of photographs onto a Facebook user’s site may therefore need to be
considered by reference to APP 3, relating to information that is collected by solicitation,
or APP 4, relating to information that is received by an organisation but not solicited.162
In either case, to comply with those APPs the collection or receipt of photographs that are
not sensitive information must be reasonably necessary for one or more of the
organisation’s functions or purposes.163 Facebook could almost certainly argue that the
collection of photographs and even associated information (such as tags) is necessary,
given that the sharing of personal information by members about themselves and others
is the very reason users open a Facebook account.
Collection of information must also be by lawful and fair means and information, other
than sensitive information, should be collected directly from the individual to whom it
relates, unless this is unreasonable or impracticable.164 Again, given the function that
Facebook serves, and given that copyright in images generally resides with the
photographer rather than the image subject,165 it would be unreasonable to stipulate that
photographs should be ‘collected’ only from individual or individuals the subject of any
given photograph.
If the photograph of Tim is considered sensitive information, however, it must not be
collected without Tim’s consent. It is possible that Tim’s photograph would be considered
sensitive information in the hands of Facebook either because it is biometric information,
or because it is considered ‘health’ information.166. However, given that Tim is also a
Facebook user, he may be taken to have consented to the collection of his information by
Facebook, by virtue of agreeing to the Facebook Terms upon signing up as a Facebook
member, although this is by no means clear‐cut.167
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Privacy Act s 6(1).
See further, Bunn, above n 67.
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For a discussion as to whether information posted by a Facebook user can be considered to have been
solicited by Facebook or not, see Bunn, above n 67, 58.
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Privacy Act sch 1, APPs 3.2, 4.1.
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Ibid APPs 3.5, 3.6.
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Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 35
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For a discussion of when photographs are also biometric information, see Chapter Three, Part Three
(Federal Information Privacy Laws) 148‐149 and Bunn, above n 67, 57.
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See further ibid 60 and 61. The question of whether agreeing to Facebook’s Terms is sufficient to
constitute consent for this purpose is a complex one. Essentially this is because in order to comply with the
Privacy Act, consent must be provided voluntarily, and the person providing the consent must have the
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In short then, it is unlikely that that the posting of Tim’s photograph onto Facebook would
constitute a non‐compliance with the APPs relating to the collection (or receipt) of
personal information, even assuming that the Privacy Act applies to Facebook in the first
place.168
If Facebook is bound by the APPs in relation to the photograph of Tim, it may also need to
comply with the APPs in Part 3 (dealing with personal information). This principle governs
the use and disclosure of information ‘held’ by an APP Entity. An APP Entity holds
information if it has possession or control of a record that contains the personal
information.169 Here the definition of record excludes a generally available publication.170
Although Tim’s photograph is generally available on the internet, the fact that Facebook
also collects and holds the photograph in a repository that is not available to the public171
means it is likely to be subject to the APPs in Part 3. These APPs suggest that Facebook
should not use the information about Tim for a purpose other than the primary purpose
(inclusion in the social media site) without Tim’s consent (or unless other conditions are
satisfied). Given that Tim has a Facebook account, he has agreed to Facebook’s terms and
conditions, which set out the uses that Facebook makes of a user’s information (including
information collected from others).172 Provided that the information is used in accordance
with these terms, it is unlikely that Facebook will be in breach of the APPs that apply to
dealings with personal information.

capacity to understand and communicate it: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, vol 1, 669 [19.9]. In
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(f) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
It is unlikely that the photograph of Tim would be considered ‘cyberbullying material
targeted at an Australian child’ under the Online Safety Act. In order to fall within the
definition, material must be such that an ordinary person would conclude that ‘it is likely
that the material was intended to have an effect on a particular Australian child’ and the
material would be likely to have the effect on the child of ‘seriously threatening, seriously
intimidating, seriously harassing or seriously humiliating’ that child.173 Although Tim feels
humiliated by the photograph it not clear that Kieran intended the photograph to have
any particular effect on Tim. However, even if it can be established that Kieren did intend
the image to have an effect on Tim, it is far from clear that the photograph would be
considered ‘seriously humiliating’.174 The addition of text, however, could result in the
material being regarded as ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’.
If the photograph of Tim was considered ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian
child’, and given that Facebook is listed as a Tier 2 social media service, the e‐Safety
Commissioner would have power to investigate and issue a social media service notice,
upon receipt of a complaint from Tim (or a person acting on his behalf) and provided that
other conditions were met.175 The e‐Safety Commissioner could also issue an end‐user
notice to Kieran, which could require him to take all reasonable steps to remove the
material, among other things.176
(g) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
In relation to the publication of the photograph on Facebook, Tim could certainly request
Facebook itself to remove his photograph. However, this request is unlikely to meet with
success. Facebook has the right to remove content, including photographs, which violate
its Statement of Rights and Responsibilities or its Policies.177 Material will violate
Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities if, for example, it is discriminatory,
unlawful, malicious or misleading;178 is used to bully, harass or intimate any user;179 or
constitutes hate speech, is threatening, or contains nudity.180 In the case of Tim, neither
the capture nor the publication of this photograph is likely to involve any violation of these
terms and therefore Facebook would be very unlikely to remove the image.181
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(h) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Two
Regardless of the fact that Tim does not wish his photograph to be published on the
internet, and regardless also of the impact of the publication upon him, Tim is unlikely to
have any legal remedy in respect of the publication of his photograph.
Even if a common law action for invasion of privacy is recognised, Tim is unlikely to be
able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was in a public place
when the photograph was captured and the information communicated by the image
does not depict Tim in a humiliating or distressing situation and is otherwise not
‘inherently private’. Should Tim succeed in establishing the elements of an invasion of
privacy action, however, public interest considerations in protecting free expression may
outweigh Tim’s privacy claim and thus prove fatal to it. That is, in developing any common
law action for invasion of privacy, Australian courts are likely to take note of the ALRC
recommendations on the form of any statutory tort for invasion of privacy.182 Those
recommendations seek to balance the ‘right’ to privacy with the rights and freedoms of
others by requiring a court to be satisfied that the public interest in privacy outweighs any
countervailing public interest,183 and has stressed that freedom of expression may be ‘the
most common interest at stake’.184 Moreover, Australian courts have already indicated
that they will factor in the public interest in determining privacy claims, 185 and this is likely
to include the public interest in freedom of expression. As such, an argument would likely
be raised that the taking and/or publication on social media of photographs in public
places is a legitimate exercise in freedom of expression and this argument may well
succeed.186
Likewise, an action for breach of confidence is unlikely to be made out because the
information was probably too accessible. That is, although the way Tim looked without
his shirt was observable by only a few people (those present in the park), Tim cannot claim
that he expected to go unobserved nor demonstrate that he took steps to limit the
accessibility of the information. Moreover, the nature of the information here is unlikely
to be regarded as obviously private. Questions of accessibility aside, an obligation of
confidence is unlikely to be established vis‐a‐vis Kieren (or Facebook).
The photograph of Tim of itself does not communicate any untrue imputations that are
capable of being defamatory, so an action in defamation is unavailable.
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Even if Tim suffers a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the publication of his
photograph, he is unlikely to be able to establish the requisite intention or foreseeability
on Kieren’s part to establish an action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or for
harassment.
It is unlikely that any interference with privacy under the Privacy Act has occurred.
Although Tim can request Facebook to remove the photograph, it is under no obligation
to do so and probably will not do so because the photograph does not appear to
contravene any of its own terms of use. As the material is unlikely to be considered
cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child, Tim will not be able to enlist
assistance from the e‐Safety Commissioner to secure removal of the image from
Facebook.
Thus, not only will Tim be unable to require Kieren to delete the photograph from his
Facebook page (and will almost certainly not succeed in having the photograph deleted
by Facebook itself), he has no grounds for any redress at all in respect of this unwanted
publication.
C

Case Study Three (Alison)

1 Scenario
Alison Chang is photographed by her church counsellor who later posts the
photograph onto Flikr, a photo-sharing website. The photographer publishes the
image under a Creative Commons licence, which allows for commercial use.187
Alison’s photograph is copied from Flikr and used by Virgin mobile in an
advertisement for the company. The advertisement takes the form of several billboard
posters and uses Alison’s photograph under the heading ‘Dump your pen friend’. At
the bottom of the picture are the words ‘Free Text Virgin to Virgin’, and the Virgin
logo. Several weeks after the photograph is uploaded to Flikr, Alison receives an
email from one of her friends attaching the photograph (reproduced below) of her
appearing in the advertisement. That photograph is subsequently uploaded to the
internet and attracts the attention of ‘news stations, legal commentators, and online
bloggers’.188 As a result of the attention, Alison suffers embarrassment, humiliation
and mental distress.189
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2 Background and Key Features
This scenario is factual. It has been reported by a number of news services,190 formed the
subject of a legal action in the United States,191 and been considered in at least one
academic paper.192 A photograph of the advertisement is reproduced below (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Virgin advertisement featuring Alison Chang193

A key feature of this scenario is that Alison consented to the photograph being taken,
indeed posed for it, but may not have expressly consented to the initial posting of the
photograph on Flikr (although she may not have objected to it) and certainly did not
consent to the inclusion of her photograph in an advertisement.194
This case study is illustrative of a situation where embarrassment, humiliation or distress
on the part of the image subject arises not from the initial online publication of an image,
but from its subsequent use (or ‘re‐contextualisation’). It is interesting at this point to
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recount a similar but much older situation involving Abigail Roberson, a ‘modest young
woman’ whose picture was, without her consent, used on an advertisement for Franklin
Mills Flour. When Abigail brought an action against the advertiser, the court described her
reaction in the following terms: she was ‘“mortified” that her face had been turned into
an object and spectacle — “a method of attracting widespread public attention to …
wares.”’195
In this case study the use of Alison’s image occurs within an offline context, as well as an
online one, and it is the particular context in which the image has been use (the billboard
advertisement) that Alison objects to and that has given rise to further republication of
the image online. This case study therefore highlights the difficulty of drawing distinctions
between the offline and online context for the purpose of designing a legal response, and
gives rise to an important question: should the publication of images offline be subject to
different regulation than the publication of images online? That question is not addressed
in this chapter, but is returned to in Chapter Six, with reference back to this case study.
Although Alison Chang is American, for the purpose of this chapter it will be assumed that
Alison is Australian and resides in Australia. The advertisements the subject of this case
study did, in fact, appear in Australia.196
3 Discussion of Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
Even if a common law tort for invasion of privacy is recognised, it will be difficult for Alison
to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. The image itself does not reveal private
information or a private activity, and was not taken in circumstances involving an intrusion
upon Alison’s seclusion. There may be room to argue that the image must be considered
with the text ‘Virgin to Virgin’ and that, when taken with the text, there is a
communication of private information (information about Alison’s sexual experience).
The fact that an image has been used in a particular context, in this case commercial,
without consent (often referred to as ‘appropriation’)197 is unlikely, in itself, to give rise to
195
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a reasonable expectation of privacy for the purposes of an action in Australia. There is
judicial opinion that an appropriation of image is more likely to be concerned with the
plaintiff’s financial and non‐dignitary interests, rather than the plaintiff’s privacy.198 It has
also been suggested that other recognised causes of action in Australia may well provide
recourse in relation to ‘one or more’ of the four invasions of privacy referred to in the US
Restatement of the Law of Torts (which includes appropriation of likeness),199 without the
plaintiff having to resort to an action for invasion of privacy.200 The discussion in the
remainder of this section illustrates, however, that other legal actions are in fact unlikely
to provide any recourse for Alison. This is so even though Alison is not motivated by the
protection of the commercial value in her image, so much as in perhaps preserving her
dignity, or autonomy, and/or seeking redress for the embarrassment, distress and
humiliating that she has suffered. Nevertheless, absent the publication of clearly private
information, and in view of judicial opinion referred to above, lower courts are likely to
be reluctant to find that Alison had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
appropriation of her image.
Alison would only succeed, therefore, if she was able to establish that she had a
reasonable expectation of privacy that the image would not be published or used in the
way in which it has been. As noted in the Case Study Two (Tim), Australian courts might
be prepared to find that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis the
publication of information that is not inherently private. One relevant factor here would
be whether publication would be regarded as ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities’.201 It could be argued that disclosure of the photograph is highly
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offensive, when judged from the perspective of a person of ordinary sensibilities in
Alison’s position. However, any particular sensitivity on Alison’s part will be irrelevant in
assessing whether publication would be regarded as highly offensive. There is nothing
‘undignified or distrait’202 about Alison’s appearance. It is questionable whether an
association between Alison and the company using her image (Virgin mobile) would be
considered a dignitary harm, although there certainly is an argument that harm to dignity
occurs by way of the use of the image in conjunction with the accompanying text. In
determining whether Virgin’s behaviour in publishing Alison’s photograph would be likely
to cause offense to a person in Alison’s position, it is relevant to consider the reaction of
other individuals, of whom there were several, whose photographs were, likewise, taken
from Flikr and used in Virgin’s campaign.203 This evidence will not be conclusive, however,
particularly if the individuals are not minors or have had their images used in different
contexts and in conjunction with different text.
It is also possible that courts would be prepared to find that Alison had a reasonable
expectation of privacy due to her age, for reasons already discussed in relation to Case
Study Two (Tim).
Even if Alison were able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
use of the image by Virgin, she would need to overcome other hurdles, including the
probable need to establish that the invasion was serious, or possibly highly offensive. As
discussed above and in relation to Case Study Two (Tim), the fact that Alison herself has
suffered distress as a result of the use of her image is not determinative of the seriousness
of the invasion.204 While the actual effect as well as the nature and extent of publication
might be taken into account, the test of seriousness is essentially objective and it may be
difficult for Alison to establish that the use of her image in this context would cause a
person of ordinary sensibilities in her position offence, distress or dignitary harm, for
reasons similar to those discussed above.
The fact that Alison found out about being part of the advertising campaign only after the
posters were widely distributed and only because she was informed about it by a friend
would be expected to cause a person in her position chagrin and annoyance, but not
necessarily offence, distress or dignitary harm.205 That said, the failure to establish
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offence, distress or dignitary harm does not mean that the invasion will not be considered
serious.
Virgin is not motivated by malice in using Alison’s image. However, courts in assessing
seriousness might consider what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the
fortitude of the plaintiff.206 Although Alison is not personally known to the individuals
responsible for the Virgin campaign, it is obvious from the image that she is a young
person, probably a minor. It could be argued that Virgin should have known that the
widespread publication of her image in this way would probably cause distress or, at least,
entail serious consequences for the individual concerned. Whether Virgin had already
received complaints from others whose images had been used without permission is also
likely to be relevant.
Assuming Alison is able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the
use of her image by Virgin and that the invasion was serious, Alison may also need to
establish that she suffered detriment, in the form of mental, physiological or emotional
harm or distress.207 Given her reaction to the use of the image, it is likely that this element
would be made out.
Alison might also need to establish that Virgin possessed the requisite intent, although it
is unclear whether this would require a ‘willed act’,208 a failure to exercise reasonable
care,209 or perhaps simply knowledge that intrusion, misuse or disclosure were obviously
or substantially likely to follow when objectively assessed.210 Unless a wilful invasion of
privacy was required, it is likely that Alison could establish the requisite intent.
Alison would also need to establish that there is no public interest reason that outweighs
her privacy claim. In this regard, the most relevant consideration is freedom of expression.
Virgin has used Alison’s image for commercial purposes but commercial expression is
expression nonetheless.211 On the other hand, in Google, the European Court of Justice
regarded Google’s interests in processing personal information as merely economic and,
as such, insufficient to justify an interference with a data subject’s personal
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information.212 Against this it may be argued that in designing its campaign, Virgin has
exercised creative judgement and deliberately chosen ‘spontaneous’ real‐life images and
that, therefore, the freedom claimed is freedom of artistic or creative expression.213 In
any event, Virgin would be unlikely to succeed in showing that their interest in freedom
of expression overrode Alison’s privacy interest, particularly as other options would have
been open to Virgin that did not involve an infringement of Alison’s privacy. Not least
among those other options was that Virgin could have sought Alison’s prior consent to
the use of her image, or negotiated a reasonable amount of remuneration.
Virgin may also argue that Alison consented to the use of her image in this way by allowing
herself to be photographed. However, it would be difficult for Virgin to establish that
Alison’s decision to pose for a photograph constituted express or implied consent to this
particular use of her image (including the addition of the text). Although Alison posed for
the photograph and clearly consented to it being taken, she presumably had little control
and possibly no knowledge over the initial publication of her image online — or at least
its publication subject to a free‐use creative commons licence — and could argue that
there was no consent to the particular disclosure or act complained of.214 To what extent
Alison’s consent to being photographed can imply consent to the publication of
photographs online is a difficult question.215 Somewhat more straightforward is the
question as to the extent to which being photographed in a private setting by a friend
implies consent to the image being used for a widespread commercial advertising
campaign.
On balance, Alison would be unlikely to succeed in establishing an actionable invasion of
privacy at common law.
(b) Breach of Confidence
To succeed in an action for breach of confidence, Alison would need to establish, inter
alia, that the photograph communicated confidential information, being information that
was both non‐trivial and inaccessible. Here the photograph of Alison, taken by itself,
communicates only how she looked on a particular day – this information is likely to be
212
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regarded as both trivial and generally accessible. An argument could be made that the
addition of the text ‘Virgin to Virgin’ changes the nature of what is communicated; that
the word ‘virgin’ communicates information about her sexual experience which is non‐
trivial and inaccessible and that the text and the image are inextricably linked and should
be considered together.216 Alternatively, Alison could argue that she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to publication of the image and that, on that basis, the
image should be found to constitute confidential information. As discussed in the previous
section, however, it is unlikely that Alison will be able to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to the use of the image.
In the (unlikely) event that Alison’s photograph (or the photograph and text, taken
together) is considered to be confidential information, Alison would still need to establish
that Virgin Mobile was under an obligation of confidence not to misuse the information
(the image and text). The image was not obtained by Virgin Mobile surreptitiously or
improperly.217 The information conveyed by the photograph itself is not inherently private
although, as discussed above, there is an argument that the photograph and the text,
taken together, do communicate inherently or obviously private information and an
obligation on Virgin’s part could be argued on that basis. It is far less certain that an
obligation of confidence will be imposed simply on the basis that the person using the
information knows or ought to know that there is an expectation of privacy in relation to
publication or use of the information.
Given the above, an action for breach of confidence is unlikely to be made out.
(c) Defamation
To sue for defamation Alison would need to establish, as a threshold issue, that the image
communicates imputations that are capable of being defamatory by reference to the
relevant tests.218 The photograph in and of itself (divorced from the context of its use in
the advertisements) does not communicate any imputations capable of being defamatory
— showing only, as it does, Alison as she actually looked at the time the photograph was
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taken. Alison would therefore need to establish that any defamatory imputation arose
from the context of the use of the image or the accompanying text.219
Alison could argue that the heading ‘Dump your pen friend’ implies that she is the kind of
person who would herself ‘dump her friends’ or encourage others to do so220 and that this
would cause an ordinary decent person to think less of such a person, or to hold them in
contempt. However, Alison would still need to establish that those imputations were open
to the reasonable reader.221 This in turn would be subject to the challenge that the
reasonable reader would not attribute the sentiment to Alison, but would properly regard
the heading only as an advertising slogan concocted by Virgin.222 As such, the defamatory
capacity of the imputations would probably not even fall to be considered.
The words appearing at the bottom of the photograph (‘Free Text Virgin to Virgin’) may
be taken to imply that Alison is a virgin, or that she is prepared to talk about her sex life
in public. Even if such imputations are open (unlikely for the reasons discussed above),
they would not be likely to negatively affect the standing of a girl of Alison’s age in the
eyes of an ordinary decent person. Again, then, this slogan will lack defamatory capacity,
regardless of the fact that it might cause Alison personal embarrassment and may even
subject her to ridicule from certain quarters.
Finally, Alison could argue that the context of the photograph implies that she has
consented to the association of herself with the advertising campaign, and possibly that
she received payment in return for the use of her photograph. Nevertheless, it is probably
the case that ‘an ordinary individual is not lowered in the esteem of his fellows if it is
thought he receives a fee from an advertisement’.223 An association with Virgin’s
advertising campaign in and of itself is unlikely to impact negatively on a person’s
standing, regardless of whether there is an imputation of reward.
(d) Australian Consumer Law
It may be possible for Alison to bring an action under the ACL on the basis that the
advertisement constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct, or that it conveys misleading
or deceptive representations.224 As discussed in Chapter Three, a non‐celebrity image
subject may be able to bring an action for misleading or deceptive conduct or
219
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representations where there is an implication that the image subject has endorsed or
recommended the product or service being promoted.225 Here, however, the
advertisement does not suggest that Alison endorses the Virgin mobile products or
services; 226 rather it can be taken to represent that Alison has consented to the use of her
image in the advertising campaign. Any assumption on the part of those viewing the
advertisement that Virgin required Alison’s permission to use her image would be
erroneous.227 Nevertheless, a reasonable member of the public might well assume that
Virgin would generally seek the express consent of those whose image it proposed to use
in an advertising campaign.228 On that basis it may be arguable that the overall impression
created by the advertisement is that Alison consented to the use of her image in the
advertisements.229 Even if this representation can be said to have been conveyed,
however, it is probably insufficient to found an action for misleading and deceptive
conduct or representations — this is because the representation is likely to be considered
‘commercially irrelevant’.230
(e) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
It is not clear from the pleadings filed in the action whether Alison is claiming to have
suffered a recognised psychiatric injury or illness, or whether she suffered ‘only’
embarrassment, humiliation and mental distress falling short of a recognised injury or
illness.231 Unless she has suffered a recognised psychiatric injury, an action for intentional
or negligent infliction of harm or for harassment is not available.232
In any event, in order to claim for intentional infliction of harm or harassment it will be
necessary to show that Virgin possessed the requisite mental element. Given that Virgin
used the photograph as part of a wider campaign involving the use of over 100 Flikr
images,233 actual intent to cause harm to Alison, or indeed any of the other image subjects
portrayed in the campaign,234 will not be established. Whether intention can be imputed
225
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to Virgin as a matter of law, and on what basis, has not, as discussed in the preceding
Chapter, been authoritatively determined. However, assuming it is unlikely that Alison
would be able to establish that it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude would
suffer a recognised psychiatric injury or illness as a result of the use of their image in this
way, even imputed intent to cause harm is unlikely to be made out.235
For similar reasons, Alison is likely to have little success with an action for negligent
infliction of harm. Although she will not need to establish an actual intention to cause
harm, the infliction of a recognised psychiatric injury or illness on a person of normal
fortitude will need, at the very least, to be considered a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the unauthorised use of her image.236 Furthermore, where a duty of care
on the part of Virgin can be established, a negligence action will only succeed if the
unauthorised use of photographs in an advertising campaign would be considered
unreasonable, such that the duty of care is breached.237 It may be that a court would
decide that using the photograph without the image subject’s permission was not
unreasonable, particularly where, as in this case, ‘neither the name, nationality or [sic]
residence of the photographed individual nor the location where the photograph was
taken are clear from the image itself.’238 On the other hand, if Virgin could have contacted
Alison via the photographer (to whom the photograph was attributed) a failure to take
steps to do so, or attempt to do so, may be unreasonable.
(f) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act applies to Virgin Mobile Australia, given that the organisation is
incorporated in Australia and meets the definition of an organisation under the Act.239
Virgin also has its own privacy policy.240
The photograph of Alison is likely to be considered ‘personal information’ as that term is
defined in the Privacy Act: namely ‘information or an opinion … about an identified or
reasonably identifiable individual’.241 Although Alison is not identified in the photograph,
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she might be considered reasonably identifiable by Virgin Mobile if they could have
reasonably ascertained her identity by contacting the photographer, Justin Wong.
Moreover, because the photograph is publically available it is likely to be considered
personal information because members of the public have been able to identify her from
it.242 As such, Virgin would need to comply with the APPs relating to collection and receipt
of information.243 Virgin will be compliant with the APPs provided that its collection of
Alison’s personal information (that is, the photograph) was reasonably necessary for one
or more of its functions or purposes244 and that collection was undertaken by lawful and
fair means.245 Moreover, the information must have been collected directly from Alison
unless it was unreasonable or impracticable to do so.246 Virgin Mobile would be able to
establish that the collection of the photograph was necessary for the purposes of its
advertising campaign.247 The collection of the photograph was also done lawfully,
although whether it was done fairly is debateable. Given the purpose of the advertising
campaign,248 it is also arguably both unreasonable and impracticable to require Virgin to
collect the information directly from the image subject: not least because the image
subject does not own the copyright in the image.
Virgin may also need to comply with the APPs relating to use of and dealing with personal
information. These APPs apply where an APP Entity ‘holds’ personal information which it
does where it has possession or control of a record that contains the personal
information.249 However, the use of the photograph in an advertisement is unlikely in to
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be a contravention of any of the APPs relating to the use of or dealing with personal
information that is not sensitive information.250
In summary, even if Alison’s photograph constitutes personal information, it is unlikely
that the use of the photograph in the advertising campaign contravenes any of the APPs
in relation to the collection and receipt of personal information or in relation to its use.
There may be an argument that the personal information (that is, the photograph) was
collected unfairly but, in any event, Alison would have no standing to bring an action for
breach of the Privacy Act directly and would instead need to report her complaint to the
OAIC, which may decide to investigate.251
(g) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
The photograph of Alison does not constitute cyberbullying material targeted at an
Australian child and therefore Alison has no grounds of complaint to the e‐Safety
Commissioner regarding the use of her photograph.
(h) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
The Australian Association of National Advertisers (‘AANA’) has established a system of
self‐regulation that is centred upon voluntary compliance by those within the advertising
industry with a set of codes and industry initiatives.252 The system of self‐regulation is not
underpinned by any legislation.253
AANA administers a number of codes of ethics. Where a member of the public believes
that the content of an advertisement or marketing communication contravenes any
provision of the relevant codes, they can complain to the Advertising Standards Bureau,
which may pass the complaint on to the Advertising Standards Board for determination.254
Although determinations are not binding, the compliance rate in 2015 was 99%.255
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AANA also develops practice guidelines in relation to certain aspects of advertising and
marketing practice. These guidelines do not actually form part of any of the AANA codes
of ethics, but are designed to ‘sit alongside’ such codes.256 One such guideline relates to
the use of images of children and young people. A key component of the best practice
approach outlined in that guideline is that children and young people have a right to
decide whether their image is to be taken and how that image is used. However, the
guidelines further state that consent is not required where images have been ‘captured
incidentally’ or where the child or young person was not employed by or on behalf of the
advertisers or marketers.257 The guidelines also state that advertisers and marketers must
take steps to ensure that a child or young person is ‘always portrayed in a dignified and
respectful manner’.258
The provisions of the best practice guideline on the use of images of children referred to
above do not form part of (and are not directly reflected in) any of the AANA codes of
practice. As such, even if these guidelines are not followed, it is unlikely that a complaint
could be made directly to Advertising Standards Bureau. However, if a complaint were to
be passed to the Advertising Standards Board for determination, it is not clear that there
has been any contravention of the relevant guidelines. In this case, the photograph of
Alison was taken incidentally and Alison was not employed by Virgin. There is an argument
that the photograph with the accompanying text does not portray Alison in a dignified
and respectful manner, but this is debateable. There is no record of a complaint being
made to the Advertising Standards Bureau about the image of Alison Chang.
(i) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Three
In summary Alison is unlikely to have any grounds upon which to bring legal action for the
use of her photograph in the Virgin campaign. In terms of an action for invasion of privacy
at common law (should such an action be recognised) Alison is unlikely to be able to
establish the threshold requirement of a reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that
Alison is distressed and humiliated by the use of her photograph is legally irrelevant in
establishing either a privacy‐based action or an action for breach of confidence or
defamation. Furthermore, if Alison has experienced distress and humiliation short of a
recognised psychiatric illness, an action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or
harassment is also unavailable. Although Alison’s image has been used in a commercial
context, any misleading or deceptive representation arising from the photograph is
unlikely to be considered ‘commercially relevant’, in which case the action would not
succeed. Alison may have grounds to argue that Virgin is in breach of the APPs relating to
collection of personal information under the Privacy Act, on the basis that collection of
256
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her personal information was not undertaken by fair means. In this case, Alison would
need to address her complaint to the regulator, the OAIC. It is unlikely that any other
contravention of the APPs has occurred. The image is not within the purview of the Online
Safety Act and is also unlikely to ground a complaint to the Advertising Standards Bureau.
D

Case Study Four (Shabeeha)

1 Scenario
Shabeeha is 16 and in Year 11 at High School. She is a quiet, studious girl with a
close group of friends. On arriving at school one Monday morning Shabeeha is
immediately bombarded by her friends asking her why she didn’t tell them she was
going to Jodi’s party, to which none of the others in the group had been invited, and
how she had managed to ‘score’ with a Year 12 student, Matt. Shabeeha tells her
friends she has no idea what they are talking about: they explain that they saw the
photo of her and Matt at the party because it is ‘all over Facebook’. When Shabeeha
checks her Facebook profile she is shocked to see that she has been tagged in a
photograph with Matt, who appears to have his arm around her. The caption attached
to the photo reads ‘Hot new item! Shabeeha and Matt at Jodi’s 17th’. Shabeeha did
not attend the party, has never had a boyfriend and is from a very strict Muslim
family: the photograph is a clever composite image that uses part of a photograph of
Shabeeha taken from a school sports event, which is posted on the school’s website.
To anyone who doesn’t know better, the picture of Shabeeha with Matt appears
authentic. Shabeeha is worried that her parents will find out about the photograph and
think that Shabeeha has been seeing a boy behind their back, has been allowing a boy
to touch her, and has been attending parties without their permission. She is also
worried about how the wider Muslim community of which she is a part would react.
The photograph was originally posted by friends of Matt (as a prank directed at Matt).
2 Background and Key Features
This is a hypothetical scenario but based on a number of real‐life examples of doctored
photographs being created and posted online.259 The manipulation of photographs has
been discussed in the context of research on cyberbullying. For example, Kowalski et al
refer to a case of denigration whereby a photograph of a schoolgirl that was designed to
make her look pregnant was posted online.260 Kowalski et al also refer to a case of a young
259
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man who, angry at being left by his girlfriend, created a picture whereby his ex‐girlfriend’s
head was superimposed onto her body.261 The JSCCS report of 2011 relays the following
from a 16‐year‐old girl:
Strangers went out of their way to insult a girl repeatedly on the social networking site,
Tumblr. Manipulating photos of her using photoshop and making them embarrassing and
humiliating for the girl.262

Software is readily available over the internet to enable individuals to create fake
photographs and manipulate images.263
A key feature of this scenario is that the original photograph of Shabeeha was originally
posted online, probably with her consent,264 and its use on the school website was not
problematic. However, it is the subsequent manipulation and republication (‘re‐
contextualisation’) of this image that causes Shabeeha distress and concern — although
it is unclear from the scenario whether the composite photograph of Shabeeha and Matt
causes concern for Matt. While Matt did not consent to his image being used in this way,
it is possible that Matt will regard the composite image as it was intended, that is, as a
joke. Alternatively, Matt could also be embarrassed or concerned by the use of the image
in this way.
Another key feature of the scenario is that the composite photograph of Shabeeha and
Matt has been created so that the information conveyed by the photograph is not factual
— Matt has never had his arm around Shabeeha. The photograph, in conjunction with the
text, also conveys untrue information: namely that Shabeeha attended Jodi’s birthday
party, when she did not.
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3 Discussion of the Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
The manipulation of an image to communicate something about Shabeeha (and Matt)
that is not factual amounts to the presentation of a person in a false light. In Lenah,
Gummow and Hayne JJ suggested that the presentation of a person in a false light may
not properly concern a privacy interest and commented that ‘[t]o place the plaintiff in a
false light may be objectionable because it lowers the reputation of the plaintiff or causes
financial loss or both.’265 This is a view shared by Raymond Wacks who has written that
the false light category ‘seems to be both redundant (for almost all such cases might
equally have been brought for defamation) and only tenuously related to the protection
of the plaintiff against aspects of his or her private life being exposed.’266 In this case,
however, and as discussed below, a claim for defamation is unlikely to succeed. Therefore,
the fact that Shabeeha has been presented in a false light is unlikely, in itself, to give rise
to a reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis publication of the image. Instead,
Shabeeha would need to establish that she had an expectation of privacy in relation to
publication of the image. This could be argued on the basis that it is the manipulation and
publication of the image — rather than any underlying information conveyed by it — that
constitutes an invasion of Shabeeha’s privacy.267 Applying Gleeson CJ’s test in Lenah, that
a useful practical test of whether information is private is ‘the requirement that disclosure
or observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person
of ordinary sensibilities’,268 it could be argued that disclosure of the photograph was
highly offensive, when judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in Shabeeha’s
position — namely, a person who is, like Shabeeha, from a strict Muslim background.269
265
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By reference to that test, the publication of a doctored photograph of Shabeeha might be
considered sufficiently offensive so as to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
On the other hand, if the truth of the information is an element of any common law action
then Shabeeha has no chance of success.270 Moreover, if those who composed and posted
the image were not aware of Shabeeha’s background (this is unclear from the case study),
it might be more difficult to conclude that Shabeeha had an expectation of privacy vis‐a‐
vis publication of an image by reference to the offensiveness test. Related to this is the
question of the type of fault or intent that the defendant must possess in order to ground
the action. As discussed above, it is unclear whether the fault element would require
Shabeeha to establish that the invasion of her privacy was ‘wilful’,271 or negligent,272 or
whether it could be imputed to the person or persons who doctored the image on the
basis that a reasonable person would know that intrusion, misuse or disclosure, were
obviously or substantially likely to follow, when objectively assessed.273 Unless those who
doctored and posted the image online were aware of Shabeeha’s strict background, it is
possible that Shabeeha would not be able to establish the necessary intention.
If detriment is an element of the action for invasion of privacy at common law, it is not
clear from the facts provided whether Shabeeha would be able to establish that she
suffered mental, physiological or emotional harm or distress.274
Shabeeha would need to establish that her privacy interest outweighed other public
interests, including freedom of expression. This may prove difficult. Although the
individuals who composed the image of Shabeeha and Matt and posted it online were
doing this as a prank directed at Matt, rather than as an exercise in artistic expression per
se, the fact remains that expression in this form is still expression. Absent malice on the
part of those individuals, it is likely that the public interest in free expression could be
considered to outweigh Shabeeha’s interest in being protected against the unwanted
publication of her image. On the other hand, the court may have regard to the public
interest in protecting Shabeeha’s free expression — so that, for example, the failure to
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provide a remedy might have a chilling effect on Shabeeha’s willingness to agree to being
photographed in future, even at school events.275
On balance, Shabeeha would be unlikely to succeed in an action for invasion of privacy.
(b) Breach of Confidence
The image of Shabeeha purports to reveal certain information about Shabeeha, although
that information is untrue. It is possible that even untrue information will be regarded as
confidential in certain circumstances, although the position in Australia on this point is
not settled.276
Even if untrue information is capable of being regarded as confidential, the information
would need to possess a quality of confidence which means that, among other things, it
must be regarded as non‐trivial. In the case of Shabeeha, it is likely that the information
conveyed by the image would, in any event, be regarded as trivial.
If Shabeeha were to succeed in establishing that the image conveyed confidential
information (which is unlikely) she would still need to establish that the person or persons
posting the image online were under an obligation of confidence to her. As there is no
pre‐existing relationship of confidence, this would depend on establishing that obligation
arose due to the nature of the information or possibly because the way in which the
information was obtained (created) was improper. The information in question is not
‘obviously’ private and it is unclear that the doctoring of a photograph, occurring by way
of a prank, would be considered ‘improper’. Therefore it is unlikely that Shabeeha would
succeed in establishing an obligation of confidence on the part of those posting the image.
It is possible that a court would be persuaded to impose an obligation of confidence where
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to publication of the
information but in any event, and as discussed above, it will be difficult for Shabeeha to
establish this.
An action for breach of confidence is not likely to succeed.
(c) Defamation
It has been said that situations in which a person is portrayed in a false light are more
appropriately left to be dealt with by the law of defamation rather than laws protecting
privacy.277 However, a remedy in defamation is only available if the person bringing the
action can establish that the image conveys imputations that are capable of being
defamatory, and which are in fact defamatory of that person (and not true). The
photograph of Shabeeha purports to convey information about Shabeeha (where she was
and who she was with) but this information is unlikely to have a defamatory capacity as it
275

This is discussed further in Chapter Five.
See Chapter Three, Part Three (Breach of Confidence) 114.
277
ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, 2566 [74.120].
276

217

conveys nothing that would cause an ordinary reasonable person to think less of
Shabeeha, shun and avoid her, or ridicule her. Although Shabeeha is worried about the
reaction of her strict Muslim family and community, the defamatory capacity will probably
not be judged by reference to sectional attitudes.278 As such, Shabeeha will not have
recourse to defamation.
(d) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
Unless Shabeeha suffers a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the doctored
photograph, an action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or harassment is not
open to her. In any event, it would be necessary to establish, for the purposes of such an
action, that the person who doctored and posted the photograph actually intended to
cause Shabeeha harm or (possibly) that intention can be imputed to them.279 Because the
photograph was not meant to target or harm Shabeeha, but was meant as a ‘prank’
directed at Matt, actual intention cannot be established. It is also unlikely that Shabeeha
can establish that it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude would suffer a
recognised psychiatric injury or illness (although there may be some room for argument
here if the individuals who doctored the photograph specifically knew of Shabeeha’s
family and cultural background and the likely reaction of her parents or her wider Muslim
community to the information conveyed by the photograph and caption).280 As such,
imputed intention for the purpose of an action for intentional infliction of harm is also
unlikely to be made out,281 and for the same reason an action for negligent infliction of
harm will also fail.
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(e) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act does not apply to the acts or practices of individuals282 and will not
therefore apply to the person or persons who doctored and uploaded Shabeeha’s
photograph to the internet.
As is the case with Tim (Case Study Two) there is a question as to whether the Privacy Act
applies to Facebook at all.283 Even if the Act does apply and the photograph is considered
‘personal information’ in relation to Shabeeha, it is unlikely that the collection or receipt
of Shabeeha’s photograph will breach the APPs. Unlike the situation with Tim, however,
it could be more difficult for Facebook to show that the collection or receipt of information
about Shabeeha (in the form of doctored photographs) was reasonably necessary for one
or more of its functions and purposes, given that the purpose of the site is to allow users
to exchange personal information about themselves and others, rather than to exchange
false or misleading information (indeed, posting misleading information is a breach of
Facebook’s own terms and conditions).284 The photograph of Shabeeha may be
considered sensitive information on the basis that it constitutes ‘biometric
information’,285 in which case her consent is required to collection (or receipt) of the
information. However, as Shabeeha has a Facebook account, she may be taken to have
agreed to the collection of her information by Facebook due to having agreed to their
terms or service upon signing up as a Facebook member, although this is arguable.286
Practically, it might be difficult for Shabeeha to demonstrate to Facebook that the image
had been doctored. However, if she was able to do this and Facebook refused to remove
the image within a reasonable time of receipt of a request from her, she could complain
to the OAIC, which might decide to investigate.287
(f) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
It is unlikely that the photograph of Shabeeha would be considered ‘cyberbullying
material targeted at an Australian child’ under the Online Safety Act. The photograph was
posted online by friends of Matt, as a prank directed at Matt. As such, a reasonable person
would be unlikely to conclude that the image was intended to have any effect on
Shabeeha herself, as opposed to Matt. In terms of whether the image is likely to be
considered seriously humiliating (or seriously threatening, intimidating or harassing)
within the meaning of the Act, the e‐Safety Commissioner has noted that the background
of the child and their particular circumstances and vulnerabilities as well as the material
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itself, including its sensitivity, will be taken into account. Even so, while the photograph
causes Shabeeha to be concerned about the reaction of her family and immediate
community that does not mean the photographs is, when judged objectively, likely to be
considered seriously humiliating (or seriously threatening, intimidating or harassing).288
(g) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
The doctored photograph of Shabeeha has been uploaded to Facebook. As the
photograph and text suggests that Shabeeha was in a place she was not and with a person
she was not with, it is misleading and as such will breach one of Facebook’s own terms of
use.289 Posting of the photograph of Shabeeha without her permission may also infringe
the Facebook community standards.290 Shabeeha herself has a contract with Facebook by
virtue of being an account holder. Even so, and as discussed in Chapter Three, Facebook
is under no obligation to her (or others, regardless of whether or not those others have a
contract with the social media provider) to remove content that breaches its terms and
conditions. Indeed, Facebook reminds users in the ‘Reporting Abuse’ section to ‘keep in
mind that reporting a piece of content does not guarantee that it will be removed from
the site.’291 Facebook does, of course, have discretion to remove content that violates its
terms.292
(h) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Four
Shabeeha probably has no direct legal cause of action in relation to the image that has
been created and posted, even though the existence of the image causes her distress, and
causes her to fear that her parents will think she has been lying to them or has acted
improperly. Even if an action for invasion of privacy is available at common law, Shabeeha
is unlikely to satisfy the threshold requirement that she had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in relation to the publication of the image. This is because, although the image
presents her in a false light, it was not captured in circumstances involving an intrusion
into a private space, nor does it convey private information. Moreover, the fact that the
information conveyed by the photograph is false could also be fatal to the action. Even if
Shabeeha could demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy, it could be difficult to
establish requisite intent on the part of those creating and posting the image and, in any
event, public interest in protecting freedom of expression could be considered to override
her privacy interest. An action for breach of confidence is probably unavailable given that
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the information will not possess the necessary quality of confidence, and an action for
defamation would also fail because the image communicates no defamatory imputations
about Shabeeha. Even if Shabeeha has suffered a recognised psychiatric illness as a result
of the publication of the photograph, actions for intentional or negligent infliction of harm
or harassment would also fail on the element of intent or fault.
Shabeeha could certainly request Facebook to remove the image, but given the nature of
the image it is unlikely that this request would be met, even if she was able to demonstrate
it had been doctored. The rapid removal scheme established by the Online Safety Act will
not assist Shabeeha here, either, as the image would not fall within the definition of
‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’. There is a possibility that
Shabeeha could complain to the OAIC, on the basis that Facebook’s collection (or receipt)
of the image was not reasonably necessary for one or more of its purposes. It is by no
means clear that the OAIC would choose to (or would have standing to) investigate.
Finally, although the image appears to contravene Facebook’s own terms and conditions,
there is no obligation on the part of that organisation to remove the material from the
site.
E

Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly)

1 Scenario
Tyger and Lilly are six and two respectively when they are photographed by their
parents in the living room of their own home. Tyger is wearing only his underpants
and Lilly is still in a diaper. Tyger and Lilly’s mother uploads the photograph to her
Facebook page, the privacy setting of which is ‘public’.293 At the time the photograph
is published neither of the children are aware of its existence or publication. However,
two years after the photograph is uploaded to Facebook, it is subsequently discovered
by an online news service running a story about obese children and the dangers of
‘junk food’. The news service publishes the photograph, acknowledging the source
(although not the names of the children), on their website along with the caption
‘Even very young children are addicted to junk food’. Soon after the photograph
appears it comes to the attention of some of the children at Tyger’s school who begin
to tease him about being a ‘junk food addict’ and call him ‘fatty’.
2 Background and Key Features
This scenario is hypothetical; however, it was created around a photograph found on a
publicly accessible website that came up on ‘Google images’ after searching under the
term ‘obese children’. 294 The photograph has been used to illustrate a news story entitled
293
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‘Overweight kids face bias from own moms, dads’, although neither of the children were
named.295 The photograph has also been used to illustrate at least three other stories.296
Recently it has been reported that a young Austrian woman is bringing an action for
invasion of privacy against her parents in relation to the publication on Facebook of
numerous images of her, as a child. The woman is quoted as saying: ‘They knew no shame
and no limits. They didn’t care if I was sitting on the toilet or lying naked in the cot, every
moment was photographed and made public.’297 This case study bears some similarities
to the facts of a US case, Faloona v Hustler Magazine, Inc,298 which involved, inter alia, a
claim for invasion of privacy. In Faloona a mother brought an action based on invasion of
privacy, as well as an action seeking to void a photographic release, in respect of the
publication in Hustler magazine of nude photographs of her and her two children. The
photographs in question had been taken with the permission of the mother who had
signed a photographic release in respect of the images, which had then been published in
two books: ‘The Sex Atlas’ and ‘Meditations of the Gift of Sexuality’.299 Hustler magazine
published a book review of Meditations and included with that review one of the nude
photographs that had appeared of the mother and children. Hustler also published, in a
subsequent edition, an excerpt of ‘The Sex Atlas’ along with a photograph of the
children.300
A key feature of this case study is that, unlike the case study involving Tim (Case Study
Two) the children who are the subjects of this photograph were comfortable with the
photograph being taken (indeed they posed for it).
Other key features are that only one of the children (Tyger) is aware of the publication
and use of the image by the news service and the photograph is initially published on the
internet by the children’s own mother. This latter fact affects questions of consent. Unlike
the Austrian woman reportedly suing her parents for invasion of privacy, the issue here is
not so much the publication of the image on the mother’s Facebook page but its
subsequent use (or ‘re‐contextualisation’).
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In considering the legal position arising from this scenario it is necessary to put aside the
most obvious difficulty that presents here, which is that, given the age of the children,
they would be unlikely to be aware of their right to take legal action (even assuming that
a cause of action were available to them). Therefore, unless a parent wished to take action
on behalf of the children there would, practically speaking, be very little that the children,
or others on their behalf, could do.
3 Discussion of the Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
The image was not captured in circumstances involving an intrusion upon the children’s
seclusion because it was taken by the childlren’s mother. Therefore, an action for invasion
of privacy will be made out only if the children can establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy in relation to the particular use of the image.. As such, the children will need to
show that the image constitutes private information or that, in any event, the children
had an expectation of privacy that the image would not be published. In determining
whether Tyger and Lilly did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, one question that
would need to be resolved is whose perspective that expectation is determined from? In
particular, given that Lilly is so young, there is the question of whether and if so when a
very young child can be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether a
child whose parents have ‘courted publicity’ for the child can be said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.301 There is also a question of whether children may have an
expectation of privacy in circumstances that an adult would not.
In relation to the first question, courts have grappled with the correct perspective to adopt
where the claimant is a young child. In Campbell, Lord Hope emphasised that the
perspective to be adopted in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy was that of
the ‘reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’ who was ‘placed in the same position as
the claimant and faced with the same publicity’.302 Referring to Lord Hope’s test, the trial
judge in Murray v Express Newspapers commented as follows:
This test cannot, of course, be applied to a child of the Claimant’s age who has no obvious
sensitivity to any invasion of his privacy which does not involve some direct physical
intrusion into his personal space. A literal application of Lord Hope’s words would lead to
the rejection of any claim by an infant unless it related to harassment of an extreme kind
… The question whether a child in any particular circumstances has a reasonable
expectation for privacy must be determined by the Court taking an objective view of the
matter including the reasonable expectations of his parents in those same circumstances
as to whether their children’s lives in a public place should remain private … The Court can
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attribute to the child reasonable expectations about his private life based on matters such
as how it has in fact been conducted by those responsible for his welfare and
upbringing.303

The Court of Appeal in Murray v Big Pictures expressed their agreement with the judge’s
approach quoted above.304 That approach was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in In re JR 38305 and by the Court of Appeal in Weller.306 In the latter case, a
newspaper had published photographs of the three children of Paul Weller, a well‐known
musician, during a family outing in California. In the UK, therefore, it seems well‐
established that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is objective but should
nevertheless take account of the perspective of the plaintiff and other subjective factors
such as the actual impact of publication on the plaintiff.307 Given the objective nature of
the test, a very young child may well have an expectation of privacy, although in any given
case this will be a question of fact dependent on all the circumstances. If a cause of action
for invasion of privacy is recognised by Australian courts, it is likely that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test would be applied in a similar way.308
There is also the question of the extent to which the expectations of privacy on the part
of children are distinct from the expectations of their parents. This question is illustrated
in cases such as Murray and Weller, involving children of celebrity parents (the question
being whether the child’s expectations are ‘likely to be diminished simply by the flow‐on
effects of their relationship with their celebrity parent’)309 and in situations such as this
where images of young children have been posted to the internet by a parent. Hughes has
described the decision of the Court of Appeal in Murray as ‘disappointing’ in that the
‘court left open the possibility that a child’s right to privacy may be waived by his or her
parents’.310 Nevertheless, this approach has been followed in subsequent cases. In Weller,
the Court of Appeal, referring to the fact that young children generally do not choose to
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be in a particular place or interact in a private or public way with other people, expressed
the view that:
it is parents who usually exercise this decision‐making for young children. Thus, if parents
choose to bring a young child onto the red carpet at a premiere or awards night, it would
be difficult to see how the child would have a reasonable expectation of privacy or article
8 would be engaged. In such circumstances, the parents have made a choice about the
child’s family life and the types of interactions that it will involve. A child’s reasonable
expectations of privacy must be seen in the light of the way in which his family life is
conducted.311

It is relevant here to note that in the New Zealand case of Hosking, a case also involving
the photographing of children of celebrity parents in a public place, the majority of the
Court of Appeal supported the general proposition that a child’s reasonable expectations
of privacy would likely be ‘diminished simply by the flow‐on effects of their relationship
with their celebrity parent’.312
Whether courts in Australia would follow this position remains to be seen if ever a
common law cause of action for invasion of privacy is recognised. There is certainly an
argument, however, that Tyger and Lilly’s expectations of privacy vis‐a‐vis the use of their
image have been diminished due to the mother’s action in posting the image to a
publically accessible Facebook page.
As to the question of whether children have an expectation of privacy in situations that
an adult would not, Australian courts might look to the approach taken in other
jurisdictions. One approach, outlined in the discussion relating to Case Study Two (Tim),
suggests that in certain circumstances children may indeed be found to have an
expectation of privacy when an adult might not. However, it is also possible that the
opposite is true and that in some circumstances adults, or older children, may have an
expectation of privacy when a younger child would not. In Weller, for example, a relevant
factor in determining whether or not there is an expectation of privacy is the impact of
publication on the image subject.313 To this end, the court noted that ‘[a]n older child is
likely to have a greater perception of his own privacy and his experience of an interference
with it might well be more significant than for a younger child.’314 In the Australian
context, as also noted in Case Study Two (Tim), in recommending the form of a statutory
cause of action for serious invasions of privacy, the ALRC set out a number of non‐
311
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exhaustive factors to be taken into account in determining whether a plaintiff has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. These also include the attributes of the plaintiff, one
of which is the plaintiff’s age.
It is possible therefore that a court would determine that Tyger and Lilly would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis use of the image even if an adult would not
have an expectation of privacy in the same situation. Even if that is the case, however, it
could well be fatal to establishing an expectation of privacy that the children’s mother
published the image on her publically accessible Facebook page.
On the assumption that Tyger and Lilly are able to establish an expectation of privacy in
respect of the use of their image to illustrate the news website, it may also be necessary
for the children to establish also that the invasion of privacy was serious or that
publication was highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities in their position. In
relation to the application of the offensiveness test to images of children, the Court of
Appeal of England and Wales found in Murray that the test had been wrongly applied in
Hosking:
The approved test is not whether a person of ordinary sensibilities would find the
publication highly offensive or objectionable, even bearing in mind that young children
are involved, but (as Lord Hope put it …) what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities
would feel if he or she was placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the
same publicity. [Gault and Blanchard JJ] did not consider either of the two questions posed
through the eyes of the reasonable child, or (more realistically) through the eyes of the
reasonable parent on behalf of the child.315

It is likely that a reasonable parent would indeed find the use of the photograph to
illustrate an obesity website offensive.
If detriment, in the form of mental, physiological or emotional harm or distress is an
element of the common law action for invasion of privacy,316 this would prevent Lilly from
establishing the cause of action because she is not aware of the use of the photograph.
Even if the children are able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, for the
purpose of a common law action they may need to establish intention or fault on the part
of the news service. As already noted, it is unclear whether this would require the children
to establish that the invasion of their privacy was ‘wilful’,317 or negligent,318 or whether it
could be imputed to the news site on the basis that a reasonable person would know that
intrusion, misuse or disclosure were obviously or substantially likely to follow.319
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A court would also need to be satisfied that there are no countervailing interests in
freedom of expression sufficient to override the children’s privacy interest. In this regard,
freedom of information and of the press is a relevant consideration. However, use of Tyger
and Lilly’s image is not central to the information being communicated by the website —
the information is about obesity in general and not about the children in particular.
Moreover, the image would probably have been as effective if the faces of the children
were pixelated so that the children could not be identified. In this case, particularly if the
best interests of the children are considered, the balance is likely to come down in favour
of the children’s privacy interests.
There is an argument that the fact that the image was placed onto a publically accessible
Facebook page by the children’s mother was tantamount to consent to the use of the
image by the news site. While the children themselves obviously have not consented, they
are likely to be regarded, in any event, as too young to have capacity to consent and it
would be for a parent or carer to make decisions around publication or use of images.320
However, although the children’s mother has clearly consented to the publication of the
image on Facebook, she has presumably not expressly consented to the use of the image
on the website about obese children. The question would therefore be whether consent
can be implied by the posting of the image to a publically accessible Facebook page.321 If
consent is a defence to an action for invasion of privacy (or if it affects the question of
whether the children have a reasonable expectation of privacy) it is unlikely that it would
prevent the action from being made out in this case.322
On balance the children have a reasonable chance of establishing the elements of a
common law action for invasion of privacy, should one be recognised. If detriment is a
prerequisite, however, then Lilly will not be able to establish an expectation of privacy.
(b) Breach of Confidence
To be considered confidential, information must be non‐trivial and generally inaccessible.
Given that the children’s mother has posted the image onto her Facebook page with
320
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public settings, it may be difficult to sustain the argument that when it came into the
hands of the online news service the information was properly considered confidential
and outside of the public domain.323 However, the extent to which information is in the
public domain is ultimately a question of fact. If the information conveyed by the image
is considered to be sufficiently outside the public domain, a question remains as to
whether the information nevertheless is of a type that can properly be categorised as
confidential which, in the case of personal information, will depend on being able to
identify the information as private. As noted above, there is scant Australian authority as
to the test that should be applied to determine whether information is ‘private’ for this
purpose. However, if the current UK approach were to be adopted, then Tyger and Lilly
would need to establish, as a minimum, that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in relation to the information. This may be possible, as discussed in the preceding section.
However, even if the images can be considered ‘confidential’, it is necessary to consider
whether the news service that used the photograph would be under an obligation of
confidence to the children. It is clear that an obligation of confidence can arise absent a
pre‐existing confidential relationship and that an obligation can arise where information
has been improperly or surreptitiously obtained.324 Here the parties are not in a pre‐
existing relationship of confidence. The photograph of the children was not taken
surreptitiously and may not be considered to have been obtained improperly (unless the
photograph has been used in breach of copyright — as to which see section (f) below). As
previously discussed, it is possible that the nature of the information would be sufficient
in and of itself to place the person obtaining it under an obligation of confidence — that
is, where the information is inherently, or obviously, private. If it is, then there is an
argument that the news site will be under an obligation of confidence towards the
children. However, on current authority this must be accepted as unlikely.
(c) Defamation
The photographs themselves do not convey any imputations about Tyger and Lilly that
have the capacity to defame. The photographs are accompanied by the caption ‘Even very
young children are addicted to junk food’. However, it is unlikely that even that imputation
would be considered to have a capacity to defame very young children: their standing is
not likely to be lowered in the eyes of the ‘ordinary reasonable member’ of society who,
to adopt the wording of Ipp JA in Saunders, discussed in Chapter Three, is more likely to
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feel pity and compassion for the children and who might attribute blame for their
circumstances to others.325
(d) Australian Consumer Law
The photographs have been published on the website of a news service. Although
publication is made in a commercial context the provisions as to misleading and deceptive
conduct or representations under the ACL326 do not apply to information providers,327 and
would not, therefore, apply to the news service.
(e) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
No cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or harassment will be
available unless the children suffer a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the use of
the image. Moreover, the use of the image by the website on childhood obesity was
intended to illustrate a news story, not to cause any harm to the children. Therefore it is
unlikely that an action for intentional infliction of harm or harassment would be available,
given that actual intent will not be established. As to whether intent could be imputed to
the news service this will depend on something ‘substantially more certain’ than
reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury.328 The mental element is, therefore,
unlikely to be made out. In terms of an action for negligent infliction of harm, establishing
a duty of care will depend upon the extent to which it is reasonably foreseeable that a
child of normal fortitude in Tyger and Lilly’s position would suffer psychiatric harm as a
result of the use of their image in this way, as well the extent to which the actions of the
news service in using the image can be considered unreasonable. Further, even if Tyger
does suffer a recognised psychiatric illness it is not clear that a causal link could be
established between the use of the photograph and the illness, in the sense that Tyger’s
reaction would arguably be due to the teasing of his friends.
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(f) Intellectual Property
Copyright in the image would belong to Tyger and Lilly’s mother as the photographer.329
However, having posted this information onto her Facebook page the privacy settings of
which are set to public, the children’s mother has agreed to allow ‘everyone, including
people off Facebook, to access and use that information’.330 Despite this, it is arguable
that this term does not confer on third parties a licence to use copyright material without
permission.331 Accordingly, if the image has been used on the obesity website without her
permission she may have a remedy available to her.332
(g) Information Privacy Legislation
An online news service may be exempt from the Privacy Act if it is considered a media
organisation that has published personal information in the course of journalism.333
However, exemption from the Act does depend upon the news service being ‘publicly
committed to media standards dealing with privacy’.334 If the news service that has
published Tyger and Lilly’s photograph is committed to such standards then the use of this
photograph may well be contrary to these.
Where the news service is not publicly committed to media standards dealing with
privacy, it may be bound by the Privacy Act. If so, the use of Tyger and Lilly’s image may
contravene the APPs relating to collection of information. This depends firstly on whether
the photograph of Tyger and Lilly can be considered ‘personal information’. Given that
the photographs have been made publically available, the fact that some people are able
to identify the children (even if the news organisation itself cannot) might suggest that
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content that you post on or in connection with Facebook’: Ibid term 2(1). Moreover, there is no direct
contractual relationship between a Facebook user and a third party who has used content posted on
Facebook.
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However, this will depend on whether, inter alia, the use of the image is subject to a fair dealing exception
under Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) — the only fair dealing exception that is likely to be relevant here is fair
dealing for the purpose of reporting news (s 42) although it is unlikely that the website would be considered
to be reporting news and, in any event, there may have been no acknowledgement of the work (as required
by s 42(1)(a)).
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Privacy Act s 7B(4).
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Ibid s 7B(4)(b). The ALRC has noted that: ‘For a media organisation to meet the requirement of being
‘publically committed’ to media privacy standards, it must both expressly commit to observing the
standards and evidence conduct of such observance’: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, vol 2, 1471
[42.124]. In 2007 the Privacy Commissioner refused to find a newspaper exempt from the Privacy Act on
the grounds that it could not establish it was publicly committed to privacy: U v Newspaper Publisher [2007]
PrivCmrA 23. Despite that, no breach of the Privacy Act was found.
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the image is personal information. However, as discussed above,335 it may be necessary
for a broad enough section of the public to be able to identify the children from the image
to be considered personal information. In any event, if the photographs have been taken
directly from the children’s mother’s public Facebook page, it is likely that the news
service would be aware of the identity of the children in the photographs and the
photograph would then be considered ‘personal information’.
Where personal information is collected by an organisation, the collection of that
information must be reasonably necessary for one or more of the organisation’s functions
or purposes.336 Although the news service would no doubt argue that illustrative
photographs are necessary for journalistic purposes, there is a counterargument that an
anonymous photograph (for example, where the children’s faces are pixelated or
otherwise obscured) would suffice. In addition, information must be collected by lawful
and fair means — if the taking (and subsequent use) of the photograph by the news
service infringes the copyright owned by Tyger and Lilly’s mother, the collection is neither
lawful nor fair. If there is no issue of copyright infringement, however, then the collection
of the photograph may be considered both lawful and, because there is no issue of covert
photography, fair. The news service may also need to comply with the APPs relating to
use of and dealing with personal information. These APPs apply where an APP Entity
‘holds’ personal information which it does where it has possession or control of a record
that contains the personal information.337 In any event, the use of the photograph for the
purpose of illustrating the news story is unlikely in to be a contravention of any of the
APPs relating to the use of or dealing with personal information that is not sensitive
information.338
In summary, although a complaint may be addressed to the OAIC it is uncertain whether
the news service would be considered to have contravened the Privacy Act in its collection
and subsequent use of the photograph.
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See Case Study One (Jackie) – Information Privacy Laws and, esp, above n 71; see also Case Study Three
(Alison) – Information Privacy Laws.
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Privacy Act sch 1, APPs 3.2, 4.1. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing
Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth), 53 explains that whether collection is reasonably necessary is to be
judged ‘interpreted objectively and in a practical sense’.
337
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) – definition of ‘holds’. A record, in turn, includes a document but does not
include a generally available publication: s 6(1) – definition of ‘record’. Although the photograph of Alison,
having been available on the internet, would have been a generally available publication, after it was
collected by Virgin it would have been held as a document or file that was not publically available. For that
reason the APPs relating to the dealing with information will then apply to the information.
338
Use of personal information for a purpose other than a primary purpose is subject to certain conditions:
Ibid sch 1, APP 6. However, in this case the primary purpose of collection was for use in the advertising
campaign so the privacy principle has not here been contravened.
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(h) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
The photograph was originally published on Facebook, which is, at the time of writing, a
Tier 2 social media service for the purposes of the Online Safety Act.339 However, the
concern relates to the use of the photograph on a news website. The posting of the
photograph on the news website will not be considered posting on a social media service
or relevant electronic service within the meaning of the Act.340 Accordingly, there is no
ground for complaint to the e‐Safety Commissioner about the use of the photograph on
the news website. Although Tyger or Lilly (or a person on their behalf) could complain
about the posting of the photograph by their mother on Facebook, the photograph would
not, in any event, be determined to be ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian
child’. This is because an objective person would not consider the material was ‘intended
to have an effect on a particular Australian child’ given that it was posted by the children’s
mother (presumably) as a record of or means of sharing a photograph of her children with
her friends and others.
(i) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
Tyger and Lilly, or their parent or parents on their behalf, could certainly request the news
service to remove the photograph from its website. The news service may agree to this,
although they are unlikely to have any obligation to do so.
It is also possible that the use of the image would contravene the news service’s own
privacy policy or be contrary to a code of ethics that they subscribe to; these factors may
influence the news service in its decision to remove the image.341
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Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner, Social Media Partners, Social Media Regulation <
https://www.esafety.gov.au/social‐media‐regulation/social‐media‐partners>.
340
A relevant electronic service is defined in the Online Safety Act s 4 as any of the following: ‘(a) a service
that enables end‐users to communicate, by means of email, with other end‐users; (b) an instant messaging
service that enables end‐users to communicate with other end‐users; (c) an SMS service that enables end‐
users to communicate with other end‐users; (d) an MMS service that enables end‐users to communicate
with other end‐users; (e) a chat service that enables end‐users to communicate with other end‐users; (f) a
service that enables end‐users to play online games with other end‐users; (g) an electronic service specified
in the legislative rules. A social media service is defined in s 9 as a relevant electronic service specified in the
legislative rules (other than exempt services) or one that satisfies all the following conditions: (a) the sole
or primary purpose of the service is to enable online social interaction between 2 or more end‐users; (ii) the
service allows end‐users to link to, or interact with, some or all of the other end‐users; (iii) the service allows
end‐users to post material on the service; (iv) such other conditions (if any) as are set out in the legislative
rules; or (b) an electronic service specified in the legislative rules; but does not include an exempt service
(as defined by subsection (4) or (5)).
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In its 2008 report, For Your Information, the ALRC noted that stakeholders had ‘raised particular concerns
about the manner in which the media handles certain type of personal information, including the personal
information of children and young people’: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, 1462 [42.90] The
Commission also expressed the view, in the context of discussing the self‐regulatory regime applying to
print media, that it had: ‘ongoing concerns about the capacity of a self‐regulatory system to preserve the
tenuous balance between the public interest in freedom of expression and the public interest in adequately
safeguarding the handling of personal information’: ALRC at 1472 [42.128]. Interestingly, the Independent
Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation reports on findings of research on media reporting of the Black
Saturday fires in Victoria, 2009, such that there was ‘no consensus about obtaining prior consent before
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(j) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Five
In summary, Tyger and Lilly would have some prospect of success if a common law action
for invasion of privacy was to be recognised in Australia. The children may also be able to
establish an action for breach of confidence, although would face the obstacle of proving
that the image had not entered the public domain due to its publication on their mother’s
Facebook page. It is unlikely that any other cause of action would be available to the
children (or their parents) in respect of the use of the photograph to illustrate the news
story, although the children’s mother may be able to establish that the news site had
infringed her copyright in the image.
Even if bound to comply with the APPs, the news service is unlikely to have contravened
any APPs in relation to its collection and use of the photograph, although the position may
be different if it can be established that collection and use of the image infringed the
mother’s copyright. The e‐Safety Commissioner has no standing in respect of the use of
the photograph on a news website that is not a social media service or relevant electronic
service under the Online Safety Act. Neither is the posting of the photograph on the
mother’s Facebook page ground for complaint to the e‐Safety Commissioner, as the
photograph would not be considered cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian
child.
F

Case Study Six (Ben)

1 Scenario
Ben is 11 years old and comes from a large family. Last year Ben’s uncle David was
driving Ben and three of Ben’s cousins home from watching a football game. At that
time, Ben’s cousins ranged in age from 8 to 17. During the journey Ben’s uncle
swerved to avoid an animal that had wandered onto the highway, causing the car to
veer onto the opposite side of the road and then to collide with a tree. In the collision
David suffered serious head injuries and was trapped behind the steering wheel.
Ben’s oldest cousin, who had been travelling in the front passenger seat, was
relatively unhurt and managed to escape from the car and raise the alarm. The other
three children, including Ben, travelling in the rear of the vehicle were also not
seriously hurt, although all three were in shock and had sustained minor facial injuries
and bruising. None of the three children in the back of the car were able to exit the
vehicle, however, because of child locks on the doors. Ben’s oldest cousin, himself
in shock, did not think to open the rear doors from the outside.
The police, two ambulances and a fire truck arrived on the scene. Unbeknown to any
of Ben’s family at the time, a TV news crew from the commercial broadcaster,

using images and content from social media sites such as Facebook’: The Hon R Finkelstein QC, Report of
the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation, Report to the Minister for Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy, 28 February 2012 198.
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Network5 TV,342 also attended the scene and captured footage of the accident. That
footage showed, among other things, Ben and his other two cousins being attended
to by ambulance officers, while still in the back of the car; Ben crying; and Ben being
helped into the back of one of the ambulances. The footage of the accident was aired
on the TV news the day after the accident. Ben did not see the news, and neither did
any of those involved in the accident, although a number of Ben’s family members
and his friends did see it. However, the footage also appeared on Network5’s website
as an embedded video.
Ben is very distressed when the embedded video is reposted on one of his school
friend’s social media pages and ‘liked’ by a large number of mutual friends.
However, Ben’s other two cousins, also shown in the footage, are unconcerned about
being on TV or having the video reposted online.
2 Background and Key Features
This is a hypothetical scenario that is, however, based loosely upon the facts of Andrews
v Television New Zealand Limited,343 a case concerning a husband and wife whose
involvement in a car accident was filmed and shown on TV, without their knowledge or
consent, as part of a documentary series on the work of firefighters.344 A key difference
between that scenario and this case study is that in Andrews the footage in question
depicted not only images of the plaintiffs but also their intimate conversations with each
other and exchanges with the rescuers. Another key difference is that in Andrews the
footage was part of a documentary rather than a news program.
A key feature of this case study is that although Ben is distressed about the online
publication of the video, other subjects of the video are not.
Before considering the various legal avenues open to Ben, if any, it is necessary to consider
who Ben would bring an action against. The case study indicates that Ben is distressed
due to the particular use of the footage — the fact that it has been embedded on one of
his friend’s social media pages. This might be distressing because it exposes Ben’s
vulnerabilities to a group of people he knows. However, assuming that Ben’s friend has
legally embedded the video into his social media page, Ben’s complaint is likely to be only
with the TV company that took and published the footage. Unless he is able to bring an
action against the TV company, there will be no means of redress vis‐a‐vis the subsequent
republication of that footage. This can be distinguished from the facts in Case Study Five
(Tyger and Lilly) where the use of the children’s image to illustrate a website on obesity
changed the nature of the information conveyed by way of the image alone. Therefore,
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Fictitious name, but assume that the broadcaster is an Australian commercial broadcaster.
(Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Allan J, 15 December 2006) (‘Andrews’).
344
There are also similarities with the Californian case of Shulman v Group W Productions Inc 18 Cal 4th 200
which involved the capture and broadcast of conversations and footage, without consent, during a car
accident rescue operation.
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the following discussion considers only whether Ben would have a right of action vis‐a‐vis
the initial publisher (the TV station).
3 Discussion of the Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
In order to bring an action for invasion of privacy, Ben would likely need to establish that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the use of his image by the
broadcaster.
A person involved in a car accident cannot be said to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy vis‐a‐vis being observed by others at the time, as the accident occurs in a public
place and necessitates the attendance of various emergency service workers. The relevant
question, then, is whether a person involved in a car accident can reasonably expect not
to be filmed or not to have footage of the accident aired on TV, at least in a way which
identifies them. That question was considered in the case of Andrews, discussed below.
In Andrews, the New Zealand High Court held that a couple involved in a car accident did
have a reasonable expectation of privacy; however, the expectation arose because the
footage of the car accident, used in a documentary series about fire fighters, included not
only images of the plaintiffs, but also sound recordings of ‘intimate’ conversations
between the two of them. Allan J expressed the following view:
Neither was aware they were being filmed throughout from close range. I do not accept,
as Mr Akel submitted, that the footage of the plaintiffs went no further than observing
them at the scene. It went much further than that. The length of the screened footage
combined with the accumulation of depicted intimate communications, serves to
distinguish the privacy expectations in this case from those in which images portrayed and
the information conveyed can be characterised as part and parcel of general news
footage.345

In this case the footage of the car accident, while showing close‐up images of Ben, did not
depict any intimate conversation or exchanges between Ben and anyone else. Moreover,
because the film was made for the purposes of a news broadcast it would necessarily have
been of shorter length than footage used in a documentary. The footage in which Ben is
depicted may be described as ‘part and parcel of general news footage’ and for this reason
Ben’s privacy expectations may be lower than those of the Andrews. Further, although
Ben is involuntarily involved in a traumatic experience, that experience cannot be
described as one in which the subject expected to be ‘reasonably imperceptible’.346
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Andrews (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Allan J, 15 December 2006) [65].
The ALRC refers to the views expressed by Nicole Moreham as to circumstances in which a person in a
public place may be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, which include circumstances in which
a person is involuntarily experiencing a traumatic or intimate experience and where they would expect to
be ‘reasonably imperceptible’: ALRC, For Your Information, above n 9, 2567 [74.126], but expresses no view
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Even if is able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis the recording of
the accident footage for news purposes, he would probably also need to prove that the
airing of the footage was a serious invasion of privacy, or possibly that it was a highly
offensive invasion of privacy. In determining this, courts might take into account, among
other things, the degree of offence, distress or harm to the dignity of a person of ordinary
sensibilities in Ben’s position. In Andrews the court was required to decide whether airing
of the footage would be considered highly offensive. In that case publication of footage
was not considered to satisfy the offensiveness test. Allan J noted that the plaintiffs had
acknowledged that nothing in the footage presented them in a bad light or was
‘inherently’ embarrassing or distressing and referred to the judgment of Gault P and
Blanchard J in Hosking where their Honours said that concern is with publicity that is truly
humiliating, distressful or otherwise harmful, and not with publicity, even extensive
publicity, of matters which ‘although private, are not really sensitive’.347 If similar
considerations are applied to Ben’s case it is unlikely that publication of the news footage
would be considered offensive to a person in Ben’s position. The fact that others involved
in the accident did not experience offence or distress is a relevant, although not
conclusive, consideration. However, as already noted, the degree of offence, distress and
harm is only one relevant consideration.348
In addition to establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the footage,
and possibly that the invasion was sufficiently serious, Ben would need to establish other
elements of the action, which may include intention or fault on the part of the
broadcaster. As noted above, it is not clear whether this would require Ben to establish
on whether or not it agrees that this would be sufficient to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy:
cf Peck [2003] I Eur Court HR 123. Here the applicant was filmed by CCTV attempting to commit suicide. A
segment of the footage, and still photographs from it, were later published on TV, and featured in
newspapers and other press outlets. The government of the United Kingdom argued that the applicant’s
actions were in the public domain and that ‘[d]isclosure of those actions simply distributed a public event
to a wider public and could not change the public quality of the applicant’s original conduct and render it
more private.’ The European Court of Human Rights found, however, that the applicant’s private life was
engaged by publication (but not capture) of the relevant footage and that publication amounted to a serious
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life: ‘the relevant moment was viewed to
an extent which far exceeded any exposure to a passer‐by or to security observation … and to a degree
surpassing that which the applicant could possibly have foreseen’: at [62]. However, it was relevant to the
court’s decision that the applicant was ‘deeply perturbed and in a state of distress’: at [62]. The applicant
also maintained that he did not know he was being filmed: at [54].
347

Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1 [126].
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Note here that Moreham has criticised the decision in Andrews on the basis that the approach taken by
the court in determining that publication was not highly offensive because it ‘did not make the plaintiffs
“look bad”’ obscures the ‘dignitary nature of the privacy interest’: N A Moreham, ‘Why is Privacy
Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort’ (Legal Research
Paper No 113/2015, Victoria University of Wellington, 2015) 242. According to Moreham : ‘By using the
couple’s conversations to liven up their documentary, the broadcasters turned a private trauma into a
public spectacle to be used to further their own professional and commercial ends; what was to the
plaintiffs an intimate and traumatic experience, in the defendant’s hands became simply a segment in a
television documentary. This was humiliating regardless of whether the tone of the documentary was
positive or negative’: N A Moreham, ‘Why is Privacy Important?’ 242.
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that the invasion of his privacy was ‘wilful’349 or negligent,350 and whether intent could be
imputed to the broadcaster on the basis that a reasonable person would know that
intrusion, misuse or disclosure were obviously or substantially likely to follow.351 If a wilful
invasion is necessary, this element is unlikely to be made out.
A court would also need to balance the public interest in Ben’s privacy with other matters
of public interest, including the interest of the public to be informed about matters of
public concern, and the public interest in freedom of expression generally. As the footage
was captured in the context of reporting on a traffic accident, the TV station has a strong
case for arguing that any traffic accident is a matter of public concern and that sensitive
reporting of a traffic accident, including footage from the accident, should outweigh any
individual’s privacy claims.352 In contrast to Case Study Three (Alison) and Case Study Five
(Tyger and Lilly), the news service has used authentic images rather than pre‐existing
images of an individual not directly implicated in the story; thus there is a stronger public
interest argument for the news service, and the images of Ben were not readily
interchangeable with other images. However, there is an argument that the ‘close‐up’
footage of Ben oversteps the mark and is disproportionate to the public interest in being
informed about the road accident, or road accidents in general. In this regard, the extent
to which the broadcaster complied with relevant broadcasting codes (as to which see
section (h) below) may be a relevant consideration.
Overall, Ben has little chance of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy for the
purposes of an action for invasion of privacy. Even if this and other elements are satisfied,
however, public interest considerations in free expression, incorporating freedom of the
press and the right of the public to information would likely outweigh Ben’s privacy
interest, unless the reporting was considered excessive.
(b) Breach of Confidence
The footage obtained by the TV crew will only be considered confidential information if it
is non‐trivial and outside of the public domain (inaccessible) and, possibly, if it can be
‘recognised’ as confidential based on a quality other than these negative attributes. The
information relayed in the footage concerns events which played out in public. This in
itself does not necessarily mean the information was generally accessible, as it was
observable only to a limited audience. Even if this information is considered ‘inaccessible’
349
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As to this, see the discussion in Andrews (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Allan J, 15 December
2006) [80]–[94] and, in particular [91] where the court noted that if it had been necessary to do so, it would
have upheld a the defendant’s defence of public concern: ‘The television series, while providing a certain
level of entertainment, nevertheless had a serious underlying purpose.’ See also the discussions as to what
is ‘newsworthy’ in Shulman v Group W Productions Inc 18 Cal 4th 200, including Werdegar J’s remarks (at
223) that ‘when a person is involuntarily involved in a newsworthy incident, not all aspects of the person’s
life and not everything the person says and does, is thereby rendered newsworthy.’
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and non‐trivial, however, this is unlikely to be enough. The information does not fall
readily into a category of information that is obviously or inherently private or that courts
have typically recognised as possessing a quality of confidence. Therefore, Ben would
need to establish that the information should be treated as ‘private’. As noted in Chapter
Three and above, there is little Australian authority as to the test that should be applied
to determine whether information is private for the purpose of a breach of confidence
action ‐ if courts were to follow the UK approach here, Ben would need to establish, as a
minimum, that he had an expectation of privacy in relation to the use of the information.
As discussed in the preceding section, it is unlikely that Ben would be able to establish
this. Accordingly a breach of confidence action will not succeed against the TV station
because the information itself will not be considered to possess the necessary quality of
confidence.
(c) Defamation
The footage conveys no imputations that have the capacity to defame.
(d) Australian Consumer Law
The video footage was aired on TV and later published on the website of the news service.
Even though publication has been made in a commercial context, as already noted above,
the provisions as to misleading or deceptive conduct or representations under the ACL353
do not apply to information providers,354 and would not, therefore, apply to the news
service even if the images conveyed something that was misleading or deceptive (which
they do not).
(e) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
Unless Ben suffers a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the footage of the accident
being aired on TV or being made available on the internet, no action for intentional or
negligent infliction of harm or harassment can be brought. If Ben were to suffer a
recognised psychiatric illness then an action for intentional infliction of harm or
harassment would depend upon establishing the requisite intent on the part of the news
service. Given that the purpose of the footage being captured and aired was not to harm
Ben but to form part of the news broadcast, neither action is likely to succeed. Intention
is also not likely to be imputed to the news service for the same reasons given in relation
to Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) above. An action for negligent infliction of harm will
also be unavailable, not least because it would be necessary to establish that the news
353

ACL s 18 (misleading and deceptive conduct); s29 (false and misleading representations about goods or
services).
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Ibid s 19 (excluding application of misleading and deceptive conduct provisions); s 38 (exclusive
application of false and misleading representations about goods or services provisions). For the exclusions
to apply the relevant publication must have been made ‘in the course of carrying on a business of providing
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service had acted unreasonably in airing the footage in question. Even if the news service
can be said to owe a duty of care not to cause mental harm to Ben through publication of
the footage (and this would only be the case if mental harm on the part of a person of
normal fortitude was reasonably foreseeable), this duty is probably discharged through
reporting that is sufficiently sensitive and accurate.355
(f) Information Privacy Legislation
As discussed in relation to Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly), a media organisation is exempt
from the Privacy Act if personal information is published in the course of journalism.
However, exemption from the Act does depend upon the news service being ‘publicly
committed to media standards dealing with privacy’.356 If the news service that has
broadcast the footage is committed to privacy then the use of the footage is unlikely to
contravene the Privacy Act.
Given that all commercial broadcasters in Australia are publicly committed to privacy
standards, the news service will almost certainly be exempt from the provisions of the
Privacy Act.
(g) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
The film footage will not constitute cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child
so there will be no grounds for complaint to the e‐Safety Commissioner under the Online
Safety Act.
(h) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
Ben could request the news service to remove the video from its website. However, the
news service would only be likely to agree to this if the video contravened its own privacy
policy or was contrary to an applicable code of ethics.
In terms of the airing of the news on television, the content of the program will be
governed by a relevant code of practice. As Network5 is a commercial broadcaster, the
relevant code would be the Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice. That code
provides, among other things, that licensees must ‘not broadcast material relating to a
person’s personal or private affairs or which invades an individual’s privacy, unless there
is a public interest reason for the material to be broadcast; or the person has provided
implicit or explicit consent for the broadcast.’357 Moreover, licensees must ‘exercise
special care before broadcasting material relating to a Child’s personal or private affairs
in a report of a sensitive matter concerning the Child’.358 The code also provides that
licensees must ‘exercise sensitivity in broadcasting images of or interviews with bereaved
355

Here a relevant factor will be the extent to which the broadcaster has complied with an applicable code
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Privacy Act s 7B(4)(b) and above n 334.
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relatives or people who have witnessed or survived a traumatic incident.’359 Although Ben
himself is unhappy about the airing of the footage, this does not mean (as discussed
above) that it is invasive of his privacy. However, ACMA, which investigates breaches of
the relevant code of practice, has previously accepted that although filming that takes
place in a public place is generally not considered private, there may be circumstances
when it will be invasive of privacy.360 In 2009 ACMA investigated a TV news report of a
boating accident in which two people had died and other family members had been
seriously injured.361 A survivor of the accident, the owner of the boat and son of the
deceased couple, was filmed sobbing on a hospital trolley as he was been wheeled into
an ambulance. Without recording a finding as to whether particular footage was invasive
of privacy, ACMA expressed the view that ‘an ordinary reasonable viewer would have
been likely to find highly offensive the continuing lengthy footage of the survivor’s
expressions of grief.’362 However, ACMA acknowledged that:
in the aftermath of an accident in a public place, a reasonable viewer might not ordinarily
consider the broadcast of images of accident victims to be an invasion of an individual’s
privacy. ACMA maintains that the decision as to whether or not the broadcast of particular
material amounts to an invasion of privacy must therefore be assessed on its own merits
and in its particular context. These decisions are, by their nature, complex and are
dependent on the facts of each individual case.363

Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the broadcast of the footage of Ben would
be considered invasive of his privacy should a complaint be addressed to ACMA. An
important difference between Ben’s situation and that described above, however, is that
Ben is suffering from distress but not from grief. It was also a relevant factor in the
decision referred to above that the victim had made clear his objections to being filmed,
but such filming had continued nonetheless.364 In Ben’s case, he is not aware of being
filmed.
Moreover, there is an arguable public interest reason for the material to be broadcast,
given that it shows the aftermath of a vehicle accident in the context of a news report.365
In ACMA’s investigation of Ten News at Five, referred to above, it acknowledged that:

there was an indentifiable public interest reason in reporting the boating incident in terms
of boating safety and that there may have been a public interst in conveying images of the
359
360

Ibid cl 3.2.1(d).
ACMA, Investigation Report Number 2027, Ten News at Five: Broadcast 3 May 2008, ACMA2008/1100,

6.
361

Ibid.
Ibid, 7.
363
Ibid, 8.
364
Ibid, 8.
365
This was discussed above, see section 3(a) of this case study (Action for Invasion of Privacy).
362

240

survivors of the accident. However, the use of the material of the identifiable accident
victim in a state of obvious distress for a prolonged period would not have been justified
in the context of the broadcast as a whole.366

Accordingly, it is possible that the footage of the aftermath of the accident in which Ben
was involved would be considered in the public interest. However, given that Ben was
identifiable and in an obvious state of distress, the length of the footage in the context of
the broadcast as a whole would be a relevant consideration.
Neither is it clear that the TV station acted insensitively.367 However, against this, there is
an argument that Ben’s consent should have been sought for airing of the images; or
(where the TV station regarded that this was impracticable) that close‐up images of the
survivors should have been avoided; or that the images should have been pixelated so
that Ben was not identifiable.
A complaint about breach of the code should first be addressed to the TV station but can
be forwarded to the Australian Media and Communications Authority (‘ACMA’) if Ben is
dissatisfied with the response.368 Even if such a complaint is upheld, however, the footage
has already been broadcast on television, and ACMA is most likely to require the
broadcaster to take measures to ensure future compliance.369 Moreover, a finding that
the news service has breached the Commercial TV code will not necessarily impact upon
the continuing availability of the news footage on the internet. The Report of the
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Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation notes that online publishers
are generally not subject to any form of regulation, other than having to comply with the
law of the land.370 Nevertheless, as also noted in that report, broadcasters generally apply
the same editorial standards to online content as they do to offline content and, on that
basis, the TV station may decide to remove or edit the online footage.371 Even if the
footage is removed from the TV station’s website, however, this does not compel
individuals or online content providers372 who have linked to that footage (such as Ben’s
school friend) to remove it.
(i) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Six
In summary, Ben is unlikely to have any cause of action against the news station in respect
of the airing of the footage. He has little chance of establishing a reasonable expectation
of privacy for the purposes of an action for invasion of privacy and for that reason, among
others, is also unlikely to establish that the publication of the footage was made in breach
of confidence. The footage of the car accident imputes nothing that has the capacity to
defame Ben and, even if Ben has suffered a recognised psychiatric illness, an action for
intentional infliction of harm or harassment is unlikely to lie against the news service on
the basis that they lack the requisite intent.
Assuming that the news service is publically committed to privacy, the service will not be
bound by the APPs and the footage does not constitute cyberbullying material, so there
are no grounds for a complaint under the Online Safety Act. Unless the news service
agrees to remove the video from its website, therefore, there are unlikely to be any legal
avenues of redress open to Ben and even a complaint for breach of the Commercial TV
code is unlikely to affect the continuing availability of the footage online.
G

Case Study Seven (Schoolboy Rowers)

1 Scenario
A photograph is taken of 16 and 17 year old schoolboy rowers in their boat,
participating in an inter-school rowing competition. Each of the boys, with the
exception of the coxswain, is clearly visible. The photograph appears on the school
website. Written consent had been provided to the school by each of the boys and
their parents for the taking and use of the photograph. Sometime later it comes to
light that the photograph has been copied from the website and reposted on a gay
voyeuristic blog. The blog is run by an individual or group who uses a pseudonym
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and is hosted by blog hosting site ‘Dodgee’,373 which is located in Eastern Europe
and which has no servers in Australia. The discovery is made by a journalist
investigating the proliferation of websites using images of children and young people.
The journalist informs the school, which, in turn, informs each of the rowers. The
matter is also widely reported in the press.
2 Background and Key Features
Although hypothetical, this scenario is very closely based on a real‐life situation that came
to light in 2002 and which is referred to by SCAG in its discussion paper Unauthorised
Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues. SCAG writes that:
... in February 2002 the media reported the discovery of a website containing photographs
of teenage Melbourne school boys taken without consent. The website featured pictures
of male students involved in a variety of sporting activities such as rowing and playing
football.374

A key difference between the scenario here and the situations referred to by SCAG is that
the photographs referred to by SCAG were taken without consent. In the scenario that
forms this case study, the photographs were taken and initially published with express
consent, but their republication on the voyeuristic website has taken place without the
consent or prior knowledge of the image subjects.
3 Discussion of the Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
The use of the image on the website may be considered an ‘appropriation’ of image if the
website obtained pecuniary gain by its use of the image (for example, if the blog is
accessible only by paying customers). As discussed above, in relation to Case Study Three
(Alison), it is unlikely that the appropriation of an image is, in itself, sufficient to create a
reasonable expectation of privacy for the purpose of an action for invasion of privacy. As
the photograph was not captured in circumstances involving an intrusion upon seclusion
and does not depict a private activity or inherently private information, it is likely that the
boys would need establish that a reasonable expectation of privacy arose due to the
particular use of the image. This would require courts to take a broad approach as to what
situations constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy. As discussed above (see, in
particular, Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly)) it is possible that courts may be prepared to
do this, particularly bearing in mind the age of the boys. If courts are prepared to accept
that the boys have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the use of their image
on the website, other elements of the common law action are likely to be met.
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(b) Breach of Confidence
To establish breach of confidence, the rowers must be able to establish that the
information conveyed by the image has a quality of confidence. That is, it is non‐trivial,
inaccessible and falls into a category of information that can be recognised as confidential.
The information conveyed by the image in and of itself only depicts the boys engaged in
a sporting activity. It would probably be considered trivial. Given that the information was
posted on the school website, it may also be considered to be in the public domain.
Ultimately, this is a question of fact. However, the boys also gave consent for the
information to be posted online so that they cannot be said to have taken steps to guard
the accessibility of the information. This is likely to be fatal to any claim that the
information possessed a quality of confidence. In addition, the information itself does not
fall into a category of information that has typically been regarded as confidential and
there is nothing inherently private about the information.
It is possible, however, that courts could be persuaded to treat as confidential information
that is nevertheless accessible (and trivial), even where it is not inherently private, if the
boys can establish an expectation of privacy in relation to the use of the information
complained of. As discussed in the preceding section, it is possible that the boys could
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the use of the information on
a voyeuristic website, but this is by no means certain. However, even if the information
can be considered private, there is little authority for imposing an obligation of confidence
upon the internet content host. There is no pre‐existing relationship of confidence
between the parties; the information has not been obtained improperly or surreptitiously
(although there is an argument that the reposting of the photograph would constitute an
infringement of copyright and, on this basis, be considered to have been obtained
improperly); and the information is not obviously or inherently private. Therefore, an
obligation of confidence would need to be imposed on the basis that the content host
knew or ought to have known that there was an expectation of privacy in relation to the
publication or use of the information. Although it is arguable that an obligation of
confidence should be imposed in these circumstances, there is little Australian authority
for this.
(c) Defamation
In order to establish that publication of the photograph on the voyeuristic website is
defamatory, imputations would have to be identified that have the capacity to defame
the boys. As the photograph depicts the boys engaged in a sporting activity, there is
nothing inherently defamatory about the image. It is possible that the context of the
publication gives rise to an imputation that has the capacity to defame, for example, that
the boys allowed themselves to be photographed for the purposes of appearing on such
a website, or allowed the photograph to be reproduced on the website. Even so, a
considerable hurdle here would be establishing that such imputations were open to the
244

reasonable reader: it is more likely that the reasonable reader (given the nature of the
website) would assume that the photograph had been reproduced without permission or
knowledge. A defamation action is therefore unlikely to succeed.375
(d) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
An action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or harassment is only possible if
any of the boys suffers a recognised psychiatric injury or illness as a result of posting of
the images on the website in question. Even then, however, establishing the requisite
intention for the purpose of an action for intentional infliction of harm or harassment will
be difficult, as the publisher of the photographs is likely to argue that the purpose of
posting the images was for the gratification of those accessing the site, rather than to
harm the boys. It is possible, however, that intention could be imputed to the content
host but only with ‘something substantially more certain’ than the reasonable
foreseeability of psychiatric injury.376
Assuming any of the boys suffers a recognised psychiatric injury a result of knowledge of
the image on the website, the biggest obstacle in bringing a negligence action (apart from
the fact that the content host is located overseas) is likely to be establishing that that it
was reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude would suffer from such a
recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the posting of images in this way.377 If this
obstacle can be overcome it is possible that the other elements of a negligence action
(breach of duty and damage) would be made out.
(e) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act will not apply to the individual or group who authors the blog, as the Act
does not apply to private individuals acting in a personal capacity. However, the Act may
apply to the blog hosting service, ‘Dodgee’, although this is not straightforward.378
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If the Privacy Act does apply to ‘Dodgee’, that organisation will need to comply with the
APPs in relation to its collection or receipt of personal information.379 Where personal
information is held in a ‘record’, that personal information must also be used and stored
in accordance with the APPs.380
There is a preliminary question as to whether the photograph of the rowers can be said
to constitute personal information about each of them within the meaning of the Privacy
Act. However, the OAIC has confirmed that an image can be about an individual even if it
depicts others as well. More pertinent is the question of whether the individuals in
question are identified in the photograph, or reasonably identifiable from it.381 This will
depend in part on what is revealed of the boys’ faces, and whether the boys are identified
or reasonably identifiable from the context, for example, the name of the school
appearing on clothing; or perhaps the linking of the photographs with the boys names on
the original website from which the photographs have been copied. Because the
photograph is a group photograph it might be more difficult to establish that each and
every individual is identified or reasonably identifiable.382
On the assumption that ‘Dodgee’ is bound by the Privacy Act and the photograph
constitutes personal information about one or more of the boys, ‘Dodgee’ may have
contravened principles relating to the collection (or receipt) of information by fair and
lawful means.383 This is because the photograph has been copied without the permission
of the copyright owner. Therefore, if ‘Dodgee’ is notified of the breach of copyright and
refuses to remove the image within a reasonable time, it could be considered to be in
breach of the APPs. For similar reasons to those outlined in Case Study Two (Tim), it is
unlikely that the use of the photograph would contravene other APPs unless the
photograph constitutes ‘sensitive information’. As to that, the photograph in itself is not
likely to be considered sensitive information, but if text is added to the photograph that
suggests (for example) that the boys are homosexual, this would be information about a
sexual preference and therefore ‘sensitive information’, even if untrue.384 In this case, the
APPs stipulate that sensitive information should not be collected (or, if it is received,
379
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retained) unless consent of the person to whom it relates is provided.385 If this is the case
and the blog hosting service is notified that the photograph has been collected or received
without consent, a failure to remove the photograph from the blog within a reasonable
time could contravene the APPs and constitute an interference with privacy under the
Privacy Act.
Nevertheless, the boys depicted have no standing to bring an action directly against
‘Dodgee’ for breach of the Privacy Act,386 and even if ‘Dodgee’ itself has contravened the
APPs, enforcement of an action against them is fraught with difficulty, given that they are
located offshore.
(f) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
Given that the photograph is of a group of boys, it is unclear whether the photograph
would meet the definition of ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’
(emphasis added).387 In any event, the material will not likely be considered, by the
ordinary reasonable person, as intended to have an effect on any particular child388 given
that the purpose of displaying the image was for the gratification of those accessing the
image. Accordingly, the complaints and removal scheme under the Online Safety Act will
not apply.
(g) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
It is not clear whether the photograph would be considered ‘prohibited’ or ‘potentially
prohibited’ content, based on criteria outlined in the Classification (Publications, Films and
Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), the National Classification Code and the Guidelines for
the Classification of Films and Computer Games 2005. This is because the photograph
itself is not offensive or explicit. SCAG does note in its 2005 report that an image that is
not inherently offensive may be classified as prohibited if the URL of the website upon
which the image is posted is offensive. One difficulty here, referred to by SCAG, is that the
Classification Board is only able to take into account the ‘context visually apparent with
the image of the child’.389 Thus, SCAG reports, even if a photograph appears with a link
385
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titled ‘more pics’ (where the link was to a site containing child pornography) where
neither the photograph itself nor the title of the link are offensive, the content of the
linked web page cannot be taken into account.390
Even if the photograph was considered prohibited or potentially prohibited, the e‐Safety
Commissioner is unable to direct the blog hosting service to remove the content from the
internet, as it is not hosted in Australia. Accordingly, the e‐Safety Commissioner would
need to notify suppliers of approved filters or, if a view is taken that the content is
sufficiently serious (unlikely), notify law enforcement agencies in the relevant
jurisdiction.391 In the case at hand it may be that the likelihood of it being classified as
prohibited or potentially prohibited is very low.392
It is possible that the blog hosting service, if reputable, would agree to delete the image
if it were found to contravene its own terms and conditions. However, the boys have no
contractual basis on which to require ‘Dodgee’ to delete the image.393
(h) Criminal Offences
Given that the image in this scenario is not inherently indecent or offensive, nor captured
in circumstances involving an intrusion into privacy or the use of a surveillance device, and
as it does not involve an intention to create fear or apprehension, the application of the
criminal law to this situation is limited.394 It is, however, possible that the federal offence
of using a carriage service ‘in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all
the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive’395 would be made out on the facts.
There may be limited application of a number of state‐based criminal offences.396
(i) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Seven
In summary, the boys are unlikely to succeed in an action for invasion of privacy as the
photograph itself was taken in a public place, initially published online with consent, and
reveals nothing inherently private or offensive. However, there is a small chance that the
context of its use may persuade courts that the boys had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in relation to the use of the photograph on the blog. The information
390
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communicated by the photograph is not confidential or defamatory and an action for
intentional or negligent infliction of harm is likely to fail, either because there is no
relevant harm or, where there is, because the requisite intent to cause that harm, or the
reasonable foreseeability of it, is not made out.
The Privacy Act will not apply to the individual or individuals who author the blog (even if
they are identifiable from their pseudonyms) although it may apply to the blog hosting
service itself. Even if this is the case, and the hosting service is determined to be in breach
of the APPs, enforcing the Act against the content host is likely to prove difficult, given
that they are located outside of Australia. The photograph is not likely to be classed as
cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child under the Online Safety Act, nor
prohibited content under the BSA.
H

Case Study Eight (Harry)

1 Scenario
Harry is 14 years old and in Year 9 of High School. He has a few friends at school
but is neither especially popular nor unpopular. Harry is very ‘tech-savvy’, and has
had his own mobile phone since starting High School at the age of 12. He loves taking
‘selfies’, either of himself alone or of himself with friends, but he does not post these
pictures online. Harry’s father is a senior federal Police Officer and Harry has been
brought up with a strong sense of how important it is to guard his own privacy and to
be careful about the amount of identifying information that is available online.
Moreover, Harry is very image conscious and does not like anyone else taking
pictures of him without his permission. He is dismayed and frustrated, therefore, to
find that a fellow student has taken a picture of him waiting at the school bus stop,
and uploaded it to Instagram. There is nothing inherently embarrassing or revealing
about the image.
2 Background and Key Features
This is a hypothetical scenario, although Harry is based on a 14‐year‐old boy known to the
author who, like Harry and for similar reasons, does not like anyone else taking or using
his photograph without his express permission.
A key feature of this scenario is that, unlike a number of the other scenarios included in
this chapter, it is probably more difficult for an objective bystander to understand why
Harry is concerned about the use of his image, given that there is nothing revealing,
intimate or embarrassing about it. In Case Study Two (Tim), for example, the objective
bystander can probably sympathise with the effect of publication of Tim’s image on his
already low self‐esteem, given the nature of the image in that case. By contrast, Harry’s
dismay and frustration do not necessarily stem from the nature of the image at all, but
rather from his own attitudes towards having his image taken and published online. Those
attitudes, in turn, arise from his upbringing as well as his personality. In Harry’s case,
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publication of the image will not necessarily have a directly negative impact on his self‐
esteem — Harry is described as dismayed and frustrated, rather than distressed,
embarrassed and humiliated. Nevertheless, as was explained in Chapter Two, the extent
to which an individual can control access to themselves (and, by extension, personal
information about themselves) is itself a source of feedback about that individual’s
relational value and, in that sense, may impact upon self‐worth or self‐esteem.397
3 Discussion of the Law
(a) Action for Invasion of Privacy
A common law action for invasion of privacy would not be available to Harry. The image
itself does not convey private information or capture a private activity or moment, and
neither was it captured in circumstances involving an intrusion into seclusion. As discussed
above, however, in developing a common law action for invasion of privacy, courts may
be prepared to find that a reasonable expectation of privacy can arise due to the context
in which an image is used. However, a relevant factor in determining whether there is an
expectation of privacy in relation to the particular use of an image is the extent to which
that use would be considered offensive to a reasonable person. Here there is nothing
about the image or the context in which it is used to suggest that it would be offensive to
a reasonable person. Moreover, Harry’s particular sensitivities regarding the capture and
use of his image are largely irrelevant in assessing whether publication would be regarded
as offensive, as the test is objective.398 Even if Harry could establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy — highly unlikely — the other elements of the action would not be
made out, for similar reasons to those given in relation to Case Study Two (Tim).
(b) Confidential Information
The photograph of Harry reveals no information of a private or confidential nature. Harry
was in a public place at the time that the image was captured and the information
conveyed by the photograph — how Harry looks standing at the bus stop — will not be
regarded as information that is relatively inaccessible (outside the public domain). In
addition, the image does not convey private information and Harry would have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the publication of the photograph. A
breach of confidence action is not available to Harry.
(c) Defamation
As the photograph of Harry at the bus stop conveys no imputations that would be
regarded as defamatory, this action is unavailable.
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(d) Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Harm or Harassment
Harry has not suffered any recognised psychiatric injury as a result of the capture and
publication of his photograph so an action for intentional or negligent infliction of harm,
and an action for harassment, is unavailable.
(e) Information Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act does not apply to the acts or practices of individuals acting in a personal
capacity and so will not apply to the individual who took and uploaded Harry’s
photograph.
The photograph has been uploaded to Instagram. That organisation belongs to
Facebook399 and the application of the Australian privacy laws to Facebook has been
discussed in the context of Case‐Study Two (Tim). The photograph of Harry does not
constitute sensitive information, however, so even if Instagram is bound by the APPs, the
existence of Harry’s photograph on the site is most unlikely to contravene those
principles. As such, Harry will not have grounds to complain to the OAIC.
(f) Enhancing Online Safety for Children Legislation
The photograph of Harry does not constitute cyberbullying material targeted at an
Australian child400 so Harry has no grounds upon which to complain to the e‐Safety
Commissioner.
(g) Contract/Internet Content Regulation/Industry Regulation
Harry could request that his image be removed from Instagram. However, given that the
photograph does not contravene any of Instagram’s terms and conditions, any such
request would be unlikely to meet with success.
(h) Summary of the Legal Position for Case Study Eight
Although Harry is dismayed and frustrated at having an image of himself captured without his
consent, it is most unlikely that any legal remedy will be available to him. Harry will probably be
unable to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the capture and/or
publication of the image so an action for invasion of privacy would not succeed. Neither does the
image reveal anything confidential or private in respect of which a breach of confidence action
could be established, nor convey anything defamatory for the purpose of an action in defamation.
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Harry has not suffered from any recognised psychological injury — hence an action for intentional
or negligent infliction of harm, or harassment, is also unavailable.
The Privacy Act does not apply to the individual who took or uploaded the photograph and, were
it to apply to Instagram, a contravention of the APPs has probably not occurred. Given that the
image does not constitute cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child, and otherwise
does not appear to contravene Instagram’s terms and conditions, a request for removal of the
image from Instagram is also unlikely to succeed, and could not be enforced.

V

CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has considered how Australian law would apply in respect of eight different
scenarios and has focused mostly on the availability of civil remedies as well as the
application of the Privacy Act and, to some extent, the application of codes of ethics or
terms and conditions governing internet content hosts.
It has often not been possible to draw firm conclusions about the legal outcome in each
scenario. In the case of an action for invasion of privacy, the existence of the cause of
action is not firmly established and thus not only are the elements of the action
necessarily speculative but there are also a number of unresolved questions as to how the
likely elements of the action would in fact be applied by the courts. The same applies in
relation to the action for breach of confidence, which, although of long history,401 can
nevertheless be said to be in something of a transition phase perhaps best summed up in
the words of the question posed by Richardson et al: ‘Where is the doctrine of breach of
confidence now?’.402 In other cases this is because the outcome will depend on particular
facts that have not been described. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions have been drawn
as to whether the image subject in each scenario would be likely to establish a cause of
action or obtain legal redress via other means for the online publication of their image,
either generally or in a particular context.
It is possible to say with some certainty that various private law causes of action will be
open to Jackie (Case Study One) in respect of the use or threatened use of her images by
Lenin. Here the use or threatened use of Jackie’s images against her wishes would
constitute a breach of confidence. If Australian courts were prepared to recognise an
action for invasion of privacy at common law, Jackie is likely to satisfy the elements of the
action. If Jackie suffers psychiatric harm as a result of the threats or use of her image, she
will also likely have an action for intentional infliction of harm or harassment.
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Megan Richardson et al, Breach of Confidence: Social Origins and Modern Developments (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2012) 17, writing that the doctrine was given shape by the case of Prince Albert v Strange (1849)
1 H & TW 1; 47 ER 1302, albeit that its origins cannot be traced back to a seminal case.
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Ibid 144.
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In all of the other case studies set out in this chapter, a private law cause of action is far
less likely.
In terms of an action for invasion of privacy, none of the other scenarios involve images
that convey information that is inherently private, or that were captured in circumstances
involving an intrusion into a private space (seclusion). Given that, the image subjects will
succeed only if courts are prepared to accept that a reasonable expectation of privacy can
attach to the publication or use of an image in a particular context, albeit that the
information communicated is not inherently private and the circumstances in which the
image was captured did not involve an intrusion into seclusion. There is limited judicial
authority suggesting that courts may be prepared to take this route —although it may be
that this is more likely where the plaintiff is a child — but unless a common law action for
invasion of privacy becomes well enough established, lower courts are very unlikely to
create one on the back of ‘difficult’ facts such as those outlined in Case Studies Two to
Eight.
The case of Alison Chang (Case Study Three) provided an example of an image being
appropriated for commercial purposes.403 It was shown that the mere fact of
appropriation for pecuniary gain is unlikely (in itself) to create a reasonable expectation
of privacy on the part of the image subject. This is so even where the use of the image is,
as here, objected to on non‐commercial grounds.404
The discussion around Case Studies Two to Eight also illustrated that even if the image
subject was able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the action would be
unlikely to succeed on the basis that one or other of the elements of the tort were absent,
or that the defendant had a public interest defence.
In terms of an action for breach of confidence, none of the case studies (with the
exception of the first) involve clearly ‘confidential information’. In many cases this is
because the information, even if it is not in the public domain, probably cannot be
403

Case Studies Five (Tyger and Lilly) and Six (Ben) both involved the use of images to illustrate news stories.
Although news sites and commercial broadcasters operate for profit, Prosser writes that, in the United
States where the tort of appropriation is developed, there must be a more direct connection between the
use of the plaintiff’s identity and the generation of profit: Prosser, above n 197, 405. As such, it is unlikely
that these situations could properly be described as appropriation, in the usual sense. The same is probably
true for Case Study Seven (Schoolboy Rowers), although if the particular blog post using the image is only
accessible behind a paywall, there may be an argument that there is a more direct connection and that this
is also, therefore, an example of appropriation.
404
As already noted above, the ALRC has expressly excluded from the form of its recommended statutory
action for serious invasions of privacy the appropriation of images for commercial purposes, in so far as
such an appropriation would not otherwise constitute an intrusion upon seclusion or the misuse of private
information: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n39, 88 [5.73]. On the other hand, the NSWLRC has
expressed the view that the use of a person’s name, identity, likeness or voice without authority or consent
should properly be classified as an invasion of privacy where the harm suffered is mental distress rather
than damage to commercial interests, and should be actionable: NSWLRC, Invasion of Privacy, above n 200,
(2009), 15 [4.5].
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regarded as ‘confidential’ because it does not depict a private activity or concern a private
interest. However, even if the subjects of these case studies were able to establish that
the information was ‘private’, that information would nevertheless not be regarded as
confidential either because it is already in the public domain or because the person to
whom it related (or a parent) had failed to take steps to protect its inaccessibility.405 This
illustrates a key difference between the range of interests capable of protection by an
action for breach of confidence (at least in its traditional form) and the range of interests
capable of protection by a full‐blown privacy tort, which may allow for the protection of
information that is in the public domain (such as how a person looks on a day‐to‐day
basis), but nevertheless considered private (for example, because it was captured in
circumstances involving an intrusion into seclusion or because the image subject was
targeted on the basis of their celebrity status).406 As such, the action for breach of
confidence in Australia can be contrasted with the breach of confidence action in England
and Wales. Whereas an action in England and Wales is capable of protecting private
information that is, nevertheless, accessible, in Australia information is unlikely to be
considered confidential where it is in the public domain. Conversely, in Australia even
information that is inaccessible may yet be incapable of protection by an action for breach
of confidence on the basis that it is not sufficiently ‘private’ — this is illustrated most
starkly in Case Study Six (Ben). Another difference is that in England and Wales the
requirement for a person to establish an obligation of confidence has all but disappeared
in relation to private information; or, at least, an obligation will be said to arise where the
defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in relation to the information. In Australia, the need to establish an obligation
of confidence has not fallen away, and neither can it be said with confidence that the
obligation is satisfied where the defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the use of the information. This is
another reason why the image subjects in Case Studies Two to Eight are unlikely to
succeed in establishing an action for breach of confidence.
In terms of an action for defamation, none of the image subjects in the case studies is
likely to succeed in establishing that the images conveyed imputations that had the
capacity to defame — although the facts do not always lend themselves to a conclusive
answer here, as it may be that images that are accompanied by text or commentary would
then be considered defamatory. In the case of Shabeeha (Case Study Four) it was noted
that the doctored image presents her in a false light and it has been suggested that such
cases are more properly dealt with by reference to the law of defamation. However, even
though the image of Shabeeha may cause her to be thought less of (or shunned and
avoided) among her own community, for the purposes of establishing an action in
405

That is, unlike the position that has been reached by the UK courts, where breach of confidence can be
utilised to protect private information that is in the public domain: see, eg, Weller [2015] EWCA Civ 1176
(Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, with Lords Justice Tomlinson and Bean in agreement).
406
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defamation it is likely that the defamatory capacity of the imputations will probably not
be judged by reference to sectional attitudes among the Muslim family and community of
which Shabeeha is part.407 Given that Shabeeha also has no other action open to her,
claims that the presentation of individuals in a false light are more properly dealt with by
recourse to defamation law are unsubstantiated. Moreover, Chapter Three explained that
where the subject is a child, it is often more difficult to establish a defamatory imputation.
Actions for intentional or negligent infliction of harm or harassment are unlikely to
succeed on the facts of any of the Case Studies Two to Eight. This is primarily because the
actions will not be made out unless a person suffers a recognised psychiatric injury and
none of the case studies (with the exception of the first) suggest this is the case.408
However, even if any of the image subjects in Case Studies Two to Eight has suffered from
a recognised psychiatric injury, a likely stumbling block in each case is the need to prove
that harm was actually intended or that that intention can be imputed to the defendant
on the basis of something more than the fact that harm on the part of a person of normal
fortitude was a foreseeable consequence of the unauthorised use of their image.409
In addition to the availability of a private law action, Jackie (Case Study One) may have
grounds to complain to the OAIC if her image is posted onto YouTube and not removed
within a reasonable time. The basis of the complaint would be that YouTube was in breach
of the APPs by the collection or retention of personal information that is not reasonably
necessary for one or more of that organisation’s functions or purposes. However, it was
noted in the discussion that there is some question as to whether the Privacy Act will
apply to YouTube in any event and, if it does, whether images of Jackie would be
considered ‘personal information’ by the OAIC. In each of the other case studies
discussed, there is unlikely to be grounds for complaint about an interference with privacy
under the Privacy Act, even vis‐a‐vis an internet intermediary that hosts the images (such
as Facebook, YouTube and so on). This is either because the internet content host or the
organisation responsible for collecting or using the information is not bound by the
Privacy Act (or there is some question as to whether the organisation is bound); because
there is doubt as to whether the images in question would be considered personal
information; or because there is no breach of the APPs in any event. Nevertheless, given
the many grey areas surrounding application of the Privacy Act, it not always possible to
give a clear‐cut view as to whether or not the Act would apply to the organisation in
respect of the information in question and whether, if its did, the organisation would be
taken to have contravened any of the APPs. Even so, there are inherent limitations of the
federal information privacy regime in providing individuals with a measure of control over
their image — the lack of standing to bring an action for an interference with privacy on
the part of individuals affected being one limitation, and another being the challenges of
407
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enforcement vis‐a‐vis organisations without an Australian presence. Moreover, the fact
that the Privacy Act does not apply to the acts and practices of individuals in a personal
capacity means that it may be ineffective in deterring individuals from continually posting
and reposting information that is (in the hands of the APP Entity hosting the content)
considered an interference with privacy.410
In Jackie’s case, the images of her if posted online would almost certainly be considered
‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’ under the Online Safety Act. If
Lenin carries out his threat to upload the images to YouTube, Jackie could lodge a
complaint to YouTube directly and, if that does not result in the take‐down of the images
within a reasonable time span,411 Jackie can complain to the e‐Safety Commissioner by
utilising the complaints scheme established by the Online Safety Act. As YouTube is listed
as a Tier 2 service, the e‐Safety Commissioner can require the removal of the material
from YouTube by issuing a notice to that service.412 Upon receipt of such notice, YouTube
would then be required to remove the videos within 48 hours or face consequences under
the Act, which can include penalties, enforceable undertakings and injunctions.413 The e‐
Safety Commissioner is also able to issue an end‐user notice to Lenin, should the material
be posted on YouTube, requiring him to remove it (among other things).
In all of the other case studies the image in question is unlikely to be considered
‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’. As such, the regime introduced by
the Online Safety Act will not assist any of those image subjects in removing their image
from online publication.
In none of the case studies, with the exception of the first and possibly the seventh
(Schoolboy Rowers), will the image posted online be considered prohibited content under
the BSA. Nor is there any solid ground for complaint by reference to another regulator
such as the Advertising Standards Bureau or ACMA. Moreover, other than in a few cases
it is also unlikely that the internet content host with whom the image is published
(YouTube, Facebook and so on) will agree to delete the image in question on the basis
that it breaches its own terms of use. In Jackie’s case, YouTube would be likely to delete
any explicit images upon being notified of their publication. This is because the images
breach YouTube’s own terms of use. In relation to Shabeeha (Case Study Four) it is
410
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possible that Facebook would agree to delete the doctored photograph if Shabeeha could
demonstrate that it was not authentic. In respect of the schoolboy rowers (Case Study
Seven), the terms and conditions of the internet content host are not known, but if the
publication of the image on its site contravened its terms, it may be prepared to remove
the image in question.
It has been demonstrated that even where an image has been used for commercial
purposes without the consent of the image subject, an action under the ACL is not likely
to succeed. In the case of Alison (Case Study Three) this is because it is unlikely that there
has been a commercially relevant representation. In Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) and
Six (Ben), the images have been used by a news service, which, as an information provider,
is not subject to the relevant provisions of the ACL.
None of the image subjects have grounds to bring an action for copyright infringement
against the publisher as none of the subjects themselves would own the intellectual
property in the photograph. In Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly) — subject to any fair use
exception that may apply — the mother may have grounds to bring an infringement action
against the news service, assuming that it copied the image from her Facebook page
without permission.
Finally, none of the case studies would give rise to criminal liability, with the exception of
the first and possibly the seventh.
The scenarios therefore illustrate the limitations of Australian law in giving a child or
young person control over their image, in the sense of having a private law action or other
avenue of redress open to them. This is the case even where the image has been captured
or used without the image subject’s consent, and where the publication of the image
online or its use in a particular context is unwanted and even harmful. As noted at the
beginning of this chapter, these observations should not be taken as offering judgement
about the claim for control. Neither do these observations equate to suggestions that the
law should respond to provide a remedy to the image subjects in any or all of Case Studies
Two to Eight above. The question as to whether Australian law should respond to provide
a remedy in some or all of the situations illustrated in this chapter, and if so on what basis,
is the subject of the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE NEED AND JUSTIFICATION FOR LAW
REFORM
I

INTRODUCTION

The previous two chapters illustrated the gaps in Australian law in terms of providing
individuals with control over the capture and use of their image by others. For children
and young people these gaps are significant given the potential impact on development,
outlined in Chapter Two, as a result of the unwanted online publication of images or their
subsequent use. This chapter considers whether a legal response is required to address
the problem of the unwanted posting of images online or their subsequent use and, if so,
what might be a justificatory basis for that response. The former question is approached
by considering Lessig’s four ‘modalities’ that regulate cyberspace.1 The second question
is approached from a rights‐based perspective by considering Australia’s commitment to
children’s rights as set out in the CRC and by examining the particular rights enshrined
within it. The nature of any legal response and how it might achieve an appropriate
balance between respective rights is not considered in this chapter, but is the subject of
the next.
II

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The discussion part of this chapter (Part Three) begins, in Section A, by explaining Lessig’s
four ‘modalities’ that regulate cyberspace: law, norms, architecture and the market. This
section then considers whether, in view of the gaps in the law identified in Chapters Three
and Four, it is sufficient to rely on one or more of the other modalities of regulation in
order to fill those gaps and address the problem of unwanted online posting of images of
children or their subsequent use. This section of the chapter concludes that it is not
sufficient to rely on norms, architecture or the market and that a legal response is
necessary.
Part Three then moves on, in Section B, to consider the justificatory basis for a legal
response to the problem of the unwanted online posting of images or their subsequent
use in light of the risks of harm associated outlined in Chapter Two. That section suggests
that one or more of the rights set out in the CRC provides that basis. Before considering
specific rights under the CRC, a brief background on the CRC and its status in Australian
law is provided, along with a brief consideration of some of the criticisms levelled against
it. The sections following that discuss two of the CRC’s core principles — the best interests
principle and the right of the child to be heard — before going on to consider the right to
privacy, the right to development and the right to freedom of expression.
1

Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006) 125.
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This chapter focuses on the right of privacy and of development as rights that, taken
together or individually, can provide the justificatory basis for a legal response to the issue
of the unauthorised posting of images online. This is not to suggest that these are the only
rights capable of providing that justificatory basis. Other rights, such as the right to
identity (in Article 8) or the right to protection from violence (Article 19), could also
provide at least something of a justificatory basis for a legal response to that issue.2
Nevertheless, given that the harms focused on in Chapter Two are developmental harms,
and that the issue of the unauthorised publication of images can be considered as a
privacy issue,3 focus is directed on the right to privacy and the right to development. Other
rights — the best interests principle and the right of the child to be heard — are discussed
because they are important core principles of the CRC. The right to freedom of expression
is also briefly considered, particularly because it is this right that is probably most affected
by any legal response to the issue of the unauthorised online publication of images.
Following the main discussion in Part Three, this chapter then moves on, in Part Four, to
summarise the findings of the chapter.
III
A

DISCUSSION

Lessig’s Four Modalities that Regulate Cyberspace

When considering how ‘cyberspace’ is regulated, Lessig urges us to consider four distinct
yet interdependent modalities, or constraints: law, norms, architecture and the market.4
These four modalities not only regulate cyberspace but act as constraints on behaviour in
general.5
Lessig recognises that in addition to law in the sense of commands backed up by sanctions,
law can command behaviour or reflect societal values (for example, by stipulating that
2
In relation to the right of identity, see, eg, Noberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, ‘Oblivion: The Right to be
Different … from Oneself: Reproposing the Right to be Forgotten’ (2012) 13 Revista D’Internet, Dret I Política
122. While not writing specifically about the right to identity in the CRC, de Andrade has defined the right
to identity as a right to have the ‘indica, attributes or the facets of personality which are characteristic of,
or unique to a particular person (such as appearance, name, character, voice, life history, etc.) recognized
and respected by others’: at 125. de Andrade also refers to Italian jurisprudence as adding another
dimension to the right of identify, which ‘concerns the correct image that one wants to project in society’:
at 125. In relation to the right to protection from violence in article 19, this right can provide justification
for laws that target sexual exploitation and cyberbullying as well as protection against exposure to harmful
online content: see, eg, Child Rights International Network, Towards a Charter for Children’s Rights in the
Digital Context , Submission to Committee on the Rights of the Child, Day of General Discussion ‘Digital
Media and Children’s Rights’, 12 September 2014, 5. See also, generally, Livingstone, Sonia and Brian O’Neill,
‘Children’s Rights Online: Challenges, Dilemmas and Emerging Directions’ in Simone van der Hof, Bibi van
den Berg and Bart Schermer (eds) Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety
(Springer, 2014 (24)) 19.
3
See, eg, ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 3, 2296
[69.5]; Saad [2012] NSWSC 1183 (4 October 2012); Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1.
4
Lessig, above n 1, 123–4.
5
Ibid 123.

260

certain days should be public holidays), constitute or regulate governmental structures,
and establish individual rights.6 Reference to ‘norms’ is to social norms that constrain
behaviour ‘not through the organized or centralized actions of a state, but through the
many slight and sometimes forceful sanctions that members of a community impose on
each other.’7 The market, according to Lessig, typically regulates through price8 and
although the market exists in a broader context of law and norms it ‘still constrains in a
distinct way’.9 Examples of market‐based constraints in a cyberspace context include
constraints on access due to pricing, the greater revenue from advertising for popular
sites and the abandonment of low‐population forums by online service providers.10
Lessig’s reference to architecture is, in the broadest sense, a reference to the way things
are designed and structured, as well as to the inherent nature of things — the way things
are.11 In the context of cyberspace, architecture should be thought of as its ‘code’ or ‘the
instructions embedded in the software or hardware that makes cyberspace what it is.’12
1 Considering the Four Regulators in the Context of the Risks of Developmental
Harms Outlined in Chapter Two
The following sections consider each of Lessig’s four regulators and the extent to which
each of them is able to address the problem of the unwanted online posting of images or
their subsequent use. There are undoubtedly various ways in which the problem might be
addressed, such as by giving image subjects the ability to call for the removal (‘take‐down’)
of images posted by others without their consent; by preventing or restricting the
capturing of images; or by operating to change behaviours around the taking or posting
of images.
(a) Law
Chapters Three and Four illustrated the limitations of Australian law in giving a child or
young person control over their image, in the sense of having a private law action or other
avenue of redress open to them. That is not to say that there is no control, but that the
constraints on the online publication and use of online images, even when that publication
or use is unwanted and/or harmful to the individual is incomplete. In particular, children
are only able to effect the removal of an image from online publication in limited
circumstances. This, in turn, is problematic because of the risks of developmental harm,
outlined in Chapter Two, which arise to the insufficiency of control.

6

Ibid 340.
Ibid.
8
Ibid 341.
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Ibid.
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Ibid 124.
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Ibid 341.
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Ibid 121.
7
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Might it be said, however, that the problem is adequately addressed by the operation of
one or other modalities — namely relevant social norms, the market, or code? If this is
the case then the creation of new laws would be unnecessary, or at least less pressing?
(b) Norms
A number of studies have considered the influence of social norms on how one ‘behaves’
in the online environment.13 For example, one recent study investigated the impact of
young people’s perceptions of peer norms, as well as parental monitoring, on risky online
behaviours, including the posting of personal details online and the uploading of offensive
video clips.14 The study found that peer injunctive norms are more influential on
adolescents than the injunctive norms of parents.15 These findings fit in more generally
with social norms theory, which ‘emphasizes the powerful impact of friends on adolescent
behaviour.’16 It has also been suggested that social networking sites ‘may actually serve
as a “media super‐peer” by endorsing and establishing social and behavioural norms of
an adolescent’s peers.’17
In terms of norms that operate specifically as constraints on the online disclosure of
information about others, it can be difficult to identify any fixed or ‘entrenched’ norms
given the relative novelty of the technology and information flows under consideration.
For example, when considering norms around the disclosure of information about others
on social networking sites,18 it is relevant to consider that social networking only really
established itself as a phenomenon in the early years of the 21st century.19 Nevertheless,
Nissenbaum has rejected claims that ‘social networking sites define a newly emergent, sui
generis social context with its own internal rules’ and denies ‘that there are no entrenched

13

See, eg, Hagit Sasson and Gustavo Mesch, ‘Parental Mediation, Peer Norms and Risky Online Behaviour
among Adolescents’ (2014) 33 Computers in Human Behaviour 32; Katherine Strater and Heather Richter
Lipford, ‘Strategies and Struggles with Privacy in an Online Social Networking Community’ BCS‐HCI '08
Proceedings of the 22nd British HCI Group Annual Conference on People and Computers: Culture, Creativity,
Interaction ‐ Volume 1, (British Computer Society, 2008) 111; Airi Lampinen et al, ‘We’re in it Together:
Interpersonal Management of Disclosure in Social Network Services’ CHI 2011 Session: Privacy (Vancouver,
Canada, 7–12 May 2011); Sonja Utz and Nicole C Krämer, ‘The Privacy Paradox on Social Network Sites
Revisited: The role of Individual Characteristics and Group Norms’ 2009 3(2) Journal of Psychosocial
Research on Cyberspace, article 1 <http://www.cyberpsychology.eu/view.php?cisloclanku=2009111001>.
14
Sasson and Mesch, above n 13, 35.
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Ibid 37. Utz and Krämer have also noted the influence of peer norms on privacy behaviours in the context
of social networking sites: Utz and Krämer, above n 13.
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Sasson and Mesch, above n 13, 37.
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Lisa M Cookingham and Ginny L Ryan, ‘The Impact of Social Media on the Sexual and Social Wellness of
Adolescents’ (2015) 28(1) Journal of Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology 2, 3.
18
There are a number of different definitions of social networking and social networking sites: for a more
detailed discussion see Katherine Sarah Raynes‐Goldie, Privacy in the Age of Facebook: Discourse,
Architecture, Consequences (PhD Thesis, Curtin University, 2012) 50–2. See also Malcolm Shore and
Quinglan Zhou, ‘Second Life: The Future of Social Networking?’ in Maryam Purvis, Bastin Tony Roy
Savarimuthu (eds), Computer‐Mediated Social Networking: First International Conference ‘Revised Selected
Papers’, ICCMSN 2008 (Dunedin, New Zealand, June 2008) 18, 19–21.
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Raynes‐Goldie, above n 18, 52.
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norms with which we need to contend.’20 When considering the flow of information into
online contexts such as social networking sites, Nissenbaum argues that it is important to
consider whether that flow violates established context‐relative informational norms.21 If
it does, it will be experienced as a violation of privacy (privacy being understood ‘neither
as a right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate flow of information’).22
Raynes‐Goldie has claimed that social networking sites violate contextual informational
norms because they mix surveillance with social life.23 In other words, although users are
sharing information in the context of socialising, the information is being used for and
transferred into other contexts unrelated to social activities.24 Personal information
uploaded to social networking sites, for example, can be used for marketing and other
commercial purposes. As Shih has written:
New norms about sharing personal information on social networking sites are also
providing companies with a wealth of audience data. Businesses are using this data to get
a pulse on what people are saying, identify problematic issues, and reach precise audience
segments with targeted ads.25

Moreover, information on a personal Facebook page may be used by employers to make
employment decisions,26 and information on a news website may be picked up and
indexed by a search engine.27
The unauthorised online publication of images of others can be seen as a violation of
entrenched informational norms, if those norms are understood in the terms described
by Nissenbaum. Nissenbaum identifies relevant informational norms by reference to the
context in which information was gathered, the information subjects, senders and
recipients (referred to as ‘actors’), and the transmission principles that apply to the flow
of information in that particular context.
Transmission principles are described as principles that express the ‘terms and conditions’
under which transfers of information should or should not occur.28 Such principles can
include implicit understandings as to how information will be treated, as well as legal or
mandated obligations either to disclose or not to disclose certain information (such as
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Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford Law
Books, 2010) 223.
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Ibid 140.
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Ibid 127 (emphasis in original).
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of the European Communities, C‐131/12) Opinion of AG Jääskinen (25 June 2013) 1030 [18].
28
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obligations of confidentiality).29 Another important parameter in determining relevant
informational norms is the attributes of the information in question, or the type and
nature of the information.30 Depending on the context, information of a certain nature
may or may not be considered appropriate according to the relevant context‐relative
informational norms. By way of example, in the context of a job interview, information
about an applicant’s marital status is generally considered inappropriate where the same
information in a different context, say courtship, would be considered appropriate.31
Determining the attributes of information also involves a consideration of the conditions
under which information is accessible. Depending on the form in which information is
made available (whether the information is digitised, placed online, or takes the form of
words or images) and the access conditions that apply to the information (for example,
whether it is available on a publically accessible website or is restricted to certain
individuals or institutions), information can yield new information. One example, provided
by Nissenbaum, is the placing of criminal records online with no access restrictions:
Records placed on the Web may easily be harvested en masse by institutional information
aggregators that facilitate grand sweeps of public records databases for inclusion in data
warehouses … [O]nline records allow in‐depth targeting of particular individuals with the
possibility of short‐circuiting much effort if one is willing to pay the fee charged by
information providers for dossiers of interest.32

Another example might be the use of face recognition technology such as that employed
by Facebook in respect of images uploaded to the social network site. Face recognition
technology is behind Facebook’s tag suggest feature, introduced in 2011. The technology
and its use for tag suggest was described by the company as follows:
We currently use facial recognition software that uses an algorithm to calculate a unique
number (‘template’) based on someone’s facial features, like the distance between the
eyes, nose and ears. This template is based on photos you’ve been tagged in on Facebook.
We use this template to suggest tags to you when you’re adding a new photo to Facebook
… Thus, when a new photograph of an individual in the ‘face print’ database is uploaded
to Facebook, the facial recognition software is able to automatically suggest the name of
the person in the new photograph.33

Given advances in technology that allow large‐scale data mining, data aggregation and
analysis, as well as the use of technology such as face recognition, there is arguably a
change in the attributes of information in the form of an image any time that image is
uploaded to the internet. There is also, very often, a broadening of the potential recipients
29
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of the information. This fact in and of itself does not render the information flow
inappropriate because Nissenbaum recognises that novel flows may in fact ‘sometimes be
“better” than those prescribed by existing norms.’34 Nevertheless, if the flow of
information into the online environment is considered by reference to entrenched
context relative norms, it is apparent that there is usually a contravention of those norms
simply on the basis of the change in attributes and actors (and often, also, due to changes
in transmission principles).
On the other hand, there is evidence that offline social norms are gradually changing to
reflect the realities of the digital world and the prevalence of internet use — particularly
amongst the younger generation. Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg, for
example, has suggested that social norms have changed and that people are more open
and less private.35 Shih has written that ‘[t]he social Web is drastically changing how we
communicate. Social norms are being invented about what, how frequently, and with
whom we share even the smallest details of our lives.’36 While these norms affect how
people communicate online, they also tip over into offline forms of communication and
practices. In relation to the practice of the taking of images of others, for example, the
findings of the ALRC during its 2008 privacy inquiry are instructive:
Participants in the workshops accepted that it is often difficult to stop individuals from
posting unauthorised photographs online. Some went so far as to say that anyone who
poses for a photograph impliedly consents to its publication on the internet. One
participant commented that the way to prevent online publication of your image was to
‘cover your face’. This suggestion received a negative reaction from people over the age
of 25 with whom the ALRC consulted, and is indicative of the way in which young people
are developing different norms around the use of the internet for communication
purposes.37

If the posting of images of others is seen as being in line with developing informational
norms, clearly those norms will not then operate to prevent the potential developmental
harms outlined in Chapter Two. Moreover, there is some evidence that informational
norms developing around the taking and online posting of images of others might in fact
be related to a mistaken assumption that those who do not consent to their image being
online can obtain adequate redress via the reporting mechanisms of social networking
sites (in other words ‘the market’). It is worth here repeating the observation made by the
ALRC in its 2008 report, as earlier set out in Chapter One:
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Despite acknowledging the difficulties associated with the permanent removal of website
content, most young people considered that an individual should be able to have a
photograph removed from a website if he or she did not consent to its posting. This was
seen as a suitable remedy to the unauthorised publication of a person’s image, and was
considered more practical than putting laws in place to prevent the initial posting.
Participants in the workshops placed a significant amount of trust in the reporting
mechanisms available on the major social networking websites, although none indicated
that they had any experience using such mechanisms.38

As noted in Chapters Three and Four, while the reporting mechanisms of many major
social media sites allow the operators to delete certain content, there is generally no
obligation on the part of these operators to do so. In a submission to the ALRC’s 2014
privacy discussion paper, the University of NSW Cyberlaw Centre writes:
Our colleagues at the National Children’s and Youth Law Centre have reported frequently
encountering difficulties in getting prompt and effective action in relation to online
material that poses risks of serious intrusion on privacy for young people, especially if
hosted in the Cloud or offshore.39

Ausloos has also suggested that individuals expect to have absolute control over their
personal data but that this expectation may be ‘merely a remainder of the pre‐internet
era’.40
If norms relating to the taking or online posting of images of others develop on the basis
of mistaken assumptions as to the ease by which those images can subsequently be
‘removed’ or control over the images exercised, this suggests that greater education and
awareness might, over time, lead to the creation of new norms. Indeed, the ALRC among
others has highlighted the importance of education about the risks and consequences to
self and others of online disclosures.41 On the other hand, what must be said about social
norms is that they rarely, if ever, operate as a perfect constraint on behaviour. While
norms may impose sanction on ‘deviant’ behaviour, the sanction itself is unlikely to
provide a complete deterrent. There will always be deviant behaviour. The same, of
course, can be said about the law. However, there is — as Lessig points out — a
relationship of interdependence between social norms and the law (as there is between
each of the four modalities).42 In particular, where social norms are developing rather than
entrenched, as seems to be the case in the online context, law is an important factor in
38
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influencing what norms develop (just as norms and expectations, of course, have a more
or less direct influence on law43).44
(c) The Market
Cyberspace, it has been observed, is increasingly regulated by market forces. Ausloos has
commented that the internet is ‘evolving from a practically entirely “free” network to a
primarily commercial environment.’ 45 The terms and conditions of internet content hosts
operate similarly to the law in that they provide for constraints on behaviour, backed by
sanctions (usually limited to the removal of material or, perhaps, the suspension of a
user’s account or service).46 Such terms and conditions can be expected to have a direct
influence on the development of informational norms in the online contexts to which such
terms apply.47 However, these terms and conditions are more properly to be regarded as
an incidence of regulation by the market, and the mechanisms that back‐up the terms and
conditions are to be regarded as ‘code’ or architecture.
The fact that many platforms and services are provided without charge to users should
not mask the fact that users are in fact paying a price for using such services and platforms,
with personal data as ‘the major currency’.48 Facebook’s pictures, for example, have been
described as its most ‘vital assets’.49 When Rupert Murdoch purchased the social
networking site MySpace, the purchase was described as bringing him ‘a gold mine of
43
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market research, a microscope into the content habits and brand choices of America’s
capricious youth market — not to mention millions of potential new customers for News
Corp.’s Fox subsidiaries.’50
Noting that the outlay incurred by media platforms in providing services at no cost to
users will, in many cases, be recovered through advertising, the OAIC has observed that:
There is an inherent tension between this business model and the requirement to give
individuals the ability to control, to the greatest extent possible, what happens to their
personal information … This tension will continue to challenge the traditional concepts of
the regulation of the handling of personal information into the future.51

The OAIC’s comment above suggests that rather than addressing the problem of
unwanted online publication of images or their subsequent use, the advertiser‐funded
business model of a number of platforms is more likely to exacerbate the problem by
encouraging users to share personal information, including images, about themselves and
others. Moreover, it is difficult to see how there is any incentive for the market to provide
a means of redress, prevention or mitigation in respect of the harms referred to in Chapter
Two in the absence of either laws or social norms that constrain the sharing and
unauthorised online posting of images. Moreover, it has been observed that the market
has failed to adequately address even those harms arising from material that does violate
social norms — such as cyberbullying material.52
In short, the market is unlikely to provide a solution, or even a partial solution, to the
problem of unwanted online publication of images or their subsequent use, and may even
contribute to the occurrence of the problem.
(d) Code
Finally, it must be considered whether ‘code’, or the design of particular platforms and
online services, provides a solution or partial solution to the problem of unwanted online
posting of images of children or their subsequent use. Given that the architecture of
internet platforms is often initiated and shaped by the commercial interests behind
them,53 it seems again unlikely that the architecture of specific platforms will offer this
solution. Then again, privacy policies and architecture are not necessarily determined
solely by an organisation’s drive for profit. Raynes‐Goldie’s thesis ‘Privacy in the Age of
Facebook’ details how Facebook’s privacy policies and design decisions are guided ‘by a
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belief system which encourages “radical transparency”.’54 Van Dijck, writing in relation to
Facebook and Linked‐In, claims that
subtle adjustments of interface strategies over the years show how platforms deploy
users’ needs for connectedness to stimulate lucrative connectivity, and how they push
narrative forms to enhance the traceability of social behaviour. Social media profiles, in
other words, are not a reflection of one’s identity, as Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg wants
us to believe, but are part and parcel of a power struggle between users,
employers/employees and platform owners to steer online information and behaviour.55

The architecture of the internet can, of course, give individuals, including children, the
ability to exercise some control over their personal information, including images. In a
social networking context, for example, privacy settings can provide users with the ability
to restrict the availability of the personal information and images they choose to put on
their own sites. Depending on the platform used, individuals can choose whether this
information is shared with the world at large, with friends or with a more limited
audience.56 Of course this option only applies to information that individuals have already
chosen to post online and does not allow for control over information that others post.
On the other hand, and as discussed in Chapter Two, Facebook’s photo tagging
architecture is an example of code that provides individuals with an opportunity to be
aware, at least, of what images are posted of them by others, and to choose whether or
not to be identified by name (tagged) in such an image. Overall, however, code does not
give individuals a means of removing from online publication images of themselves that
have been posted by others, even without their consent. In some cases the architecture
of certain applications may even thwart an individual’s wishes for anonymity. For
example, in her thesis on digital identity, Davison notes that Google has recently launched
a new image application that can ‘de‐pixelate’ images and compare the image against
internet data to reveal the true identity of the person whose features had been
deliberately blurred. According to Davison, this is an ‘example of how technology acts on
its own to change the initial way that information was originally shared on the Internet.’57
Of course platforms and system architecture can be designed differently. Code can change
the way that things are. For example, Mayer‐Scönberger has proposed a ‘code’ solution
to the problem of the persistence of information in the online environment: namely the

54

Raynes‐Goldie, above n 18, ii, citing Kirkpatrick (references omitted). Whether ‘radical transparency’ has
become a social norm is debateable: see Raynes‐Goldie at 71 and 72.
55
José van Dijck, ‘You Have One Identity: Performing the Self on Facebook and LinkedIn’ (2013) 35(2) Media,
Culture and Society 199, 212.
56
Facebook, for example, allows posts to be made visible to anyone on Facebook, Friends, Family members
of an audience customised by the individual user: see: Facebook, Facebook, Data Policy (29 September
2016) < https://www.facebook.com/policy.php>.
57
Claire Davison, Presentation of Digital Self in Everyday Life: Towards a Theory of Digital Identity (PhD
Thesis, RMIT, 2012) 236.

269

building in of digital expiry dates for personal data.58 The advent of digital rights
management (‘DRM’) technology to protect the interests of copyright owners59 is another
example of code changing how things are. Following on from their findings that posts
made by individuals about others frequently failed or were unable to take into account
the potential audience for the post, Litt et al proposed a number of design solutions to
counteract the problem that posts about others might reach an unintended audience.60
One possible solution, they suggested, was an audience cue feature that could allow the
person posting information to see the potential visibility of it before it is posted.61
In reality, legal measures that aim to prevent, mitigate or provide redress for the
developmental harms outlined in Chapter Two will almost certainly need to be supported
by code in order to have practical effect. Code would be necessary, for example, to enable
the verification of the identity of a person entitled to make a take‐down request in respect
of certain information or to enable the identification and removal of particular content.
2 Discussion
As noted above and in Chapters Three and Four, the right for an individual to call for the
removal from online publication of a particular image (either generally or in a particular
context) is only available in limited circumstances — where, for example, the image is
defamatory or offensive or where it constitutes cyberbullying material targeted at an
Australian child.62 These limitations on control are problematic, in light of the potential
for developmental harm arising from the unwanted online publication of an image or its
subsequent use.
The previous sections then considered whether any of Lessig’s other regulators — namely
social norms, the market or code — could be relied upon to address this problem. A
conclusion was reached that none of the other modalities could do so, and that a legal
response was therefore necessary. That is not to say that a legal response is sufficient in
itself, nor that it should be pursued in isolation. For one thing, the effective
implementation and enforcement of laws often relies on voluntary cooperation by the
private sector, particularly in the case of laws seeking to regulate online content.63
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Moreover behavioural change may be brought about more effectively through a change
in norms rather than through (direct) legal constraints. As the Australian Human Rights
Commission remarked in its submission to the government’s public consultation
Enhancing Online Safety for Children, research carried out by the Commission in 2012
emphasised that the ‘key driver of behavioural change among children and young people
is peer support and educative approaches rather than simply legislative prescription.’64
Finally, as noted earlier in this chapter, legal measures that aim to prevent, mitigate or
provide redress for the developmental harms outlined in Chapter Two will almost
certainly need to be supported by ‘code’ in order to have practical effect.
Given the conclusion reached here that a legal response is required to provide a partial
solution to the problem of the unwanted online posting of images of children or their
subsequent use, this chapter now moves on to consider the possible justificatory basis of
any such response.
B

The Convention on the Rights of the Child

The CRC was ratified in 1989 and entered into force in 1990. To date the CRC is the most
widely ratified of any international convention,65 and has been described as unique due
to the fact that it ‘protects the broadest scope of fundamental human rights ever brought
together within one treaty — economic, social and cultural, and civil and political’.66 By
ratifying the CRC, States Parties undertake to implement all the rights enshrined within it.
In respect of civil and political rights, implementation is to be achieved by taking all
‘appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures’.67 In relation to economic,
social and cultural rights, implementation is to be achieved by ‘undertaking such measures
to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the
framework of international cooperation.’68 As noted in the Implementation Handbook on
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘Implementation Handbook’), neither the CRC
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) [46]: ‘F,
and the Global Network Initiative serves as a helpful example to encourage good practice by corporations.’
64
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itself nor the Committee on the Rights of the Child (‘the Committee’), the body established
under the CRC to monitor implementation of its obligations,69 are explicit as to which
articles include civil or political rights, or economic, social and cultural rights.70 In fact it
has been said that almost all the articles of the CRC include elements of civil or political
rights.71
The CRC comprises 42 substantive articles,72 four of which have been identified by the
Committee as ‘general principles’:





Article 2 (the principle of non‐discrimination)
Article 3(1) (best interests of the child to be the primary consideration in all
matters concerning children)
Article 6 (right to life and maximum possible survival and development)
Article 12 (respect for the child’s views in all matters concerning the child).73

These general principles are ‘meant to help with the interpretation of the Convention as
a whole and thereby guide national programmes of implementation.’74 However, the

69

Ibid art 43.
According to LeBlanc avoidance of this traditional classification is innovative and differentiates the
Convention from most other human rights instruments: Lawrence J LeBlanc, ‘The Convention on the Rights
of the Child’, (1991) 4(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 281, 288.
71
Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNICEF, 3rd ed) 47; the Committee explains, in General Comment No 5: ‘There is no simple or authoritative
division of human rights in general or of Convention rights into two categories. The Committee’s Reporting
guidelines … group articles 7–8, 13–17 and 37(a) under the heading ‘Civil rights and freedoms’, but indicate
by the context that these are not the only civil and political rights in the Convention. Indeed, it is clear that
many other articles, including articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the Convention, contain elements which constitute
civil/political rights, thus reflecting the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. Enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights is inextricably intertwined with enjoyment of civil and political rights. …
[T]he Committee believes that economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights, should
be regarded as justiciable’: Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5: General Measures
of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 34th sess, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/05 (27
November 2003), 2 [6].
72
Hodgkin and Newell, above n 71, xi (although scholars differ in their views as to the number of substantive
articles: see Martin Woodhead, ‘Early Childhood Development: a Question of Rights’ (2005) 37 (3)
International Journal of Early Childhood 79, 81 who refers to there being 41 substantive articles; and further
Jim Lurie, ‘The Tension between Protection and Participation – General Theory and Consequences as
Related to Rights of Children, Including Working Children’ (2003/2004) 7 IUC Journal of Social Work Theory
and Practice 1, 1 referring to 40 substantive articles).
73
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5, above n 71, 3–4 [12].
74
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Rights of the Child, Fact Sheet No 10 (Rev 1).
70

272

Implementation Handbook cautions that the CRC is indivisible and its articles
interdependent,75 and that no article of the CRC should be considered in isolation.76
The CRC applies to each and every child within the jurisdiction of the States Parties,77 a
child being defined as a ‘human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.’78 Although the CRC itself makes
no provision for individual complaint or petition,79 the UN General Assembly did approve,
in 2011, a communications procedure (the ‘Third Optional Protocol’) by which children
can submit complaints as to violations of a right or rights under the CRC (or under the
Optional Protocols to it).80 The Third Optional Protocol entered into force in April 2014,
but at the time of writing Australia is yet to sign or ratify it.81 There is also, as D’Sa notes,
no provision for inter‐state complaints within the CRC, and there are no specific sanctions
within international law for non‐compliance with the CRC’s provisions.82
1 Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Australian Law
The CRC was ratified by Australia on 17 December 1990 and entered into force in Australia
on 16 January 1991.83 By ratifying the CRC Australia agreed to ‘undertake all legislative,
administrative, and other measures’ for the implementation of the CRC rights.84 As noted
by Jones, the standards of the CRC are to be applied at all levels of government, and thus
75
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apply equally at the Commonwealth, state and territory level.85 However, the act of
ratification by Australia did not result in the CRC being automatically incorporated into
Australian law86 and to date Australia has not enacted legislation to incorporate its
provisions wholesale into Australian law.87 Nevertheless, according to the ALRC, Australia
has ‘consistently asserted that the provisions of [the CRC] are fully implemented in the
wide range of federal, State and Territory laws, programs and policies affecting children.’88
Moreover, the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) requires all Bills
introduced into federal parliament to be examined by the Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Human Rights and to contain a Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights.89 This
includes compatibility with the rights contained in the CRC.90
Although the CRC does not have direct effect in Australian law, it may have indirect effect
in a number of ways. Firstly, indirect effect occurs through the interpretation of domestic
legislation in accordance with the principle that in the case of ambiguity domestic
legislation should where possible be given an interpretation that is consistent with
Australia’s international treaty obligations.91 Secondly, indirect effect comes about
through the formulation of common law principles, which emphasise the importance of
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ratified conventions.92 Finally the provisions of the CRC can be given effect through the
exercise of administrative discretion.93
In terms of the impact of treaties in general and the CRC in particular on the exercise of
administrative discretion, a seminal and highly controversial decision of the High Court of
Australia in Teoh94 held that the ratification of a convention gives rise to a ‘legitimate
expectation’ for Australians that the executive will act in accordance with it. In a joint
judgment Mason CJ and Deane J held that:
ratification by Australia of an international convention is not to be dismissed as a merely
platitudinous or ineffectual act, particularly when the instrument evidences
internationally accepted standards to be applied by courts and administrative authorities
in dealing with basic human rights affecting the family and children. Rather, ratification of
a convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this country to the
world and to the Australian people that the executive government and its agencies will
act in accordance with the Convention. That positive statement is an adequate foundation
for a legitimate expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that
administrative decision‐makers will act in conformity with the Convention and treat the
best interests of the children as ‘a primary consideration’.95

The decision in Teoh provoked a ‘brisk response’96 from the Australian Government with
the issuance of a joint statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney‐
General in 1995. Referring to the acknowledgement in Teoh that any legitimate
expectation that administrative decision‐makers would act in accordance with treaty
obligations could be displaced by ‘statutory or executive indications to the contrary’,97 the
Ministers intended to put beyond doubt the fact that entering into a treaty never had and
never should give rise to an expectation that government decision‐makers would act in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty where those provisions had not been enacted
into domestic law.98 According to a number of commentators, the exact legal status of
those statements remains unsettled.99
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In 2011 the Child Rights NGO Report for Australia, Listen to Children, (‘NGO Report’) noted
that the CRC had still not been comprehensively implemented into Australian law.
According to the NGO Report, the lack of comprehensive implementation of CRC
provisions ‘raises concerns in relation to Australia’s obligations under Article 4’;100 renders
as ‘fragmented and inconsistent’ the approach to the promotion of children’s rights in
Australia;101 and leaves violations of many of the rights in the CRC without enforceable
remedies.102 In 2012 the Committee adopted its Concluding Observations on Australia’s
fourth report to the Committee on the Convention and its Optional Protocols (‘Concluding
Observations’).103 In its Concluding Observations the Committee expressed concern that
there continues to be no comprehensive child rights Act at the national level giving full
and direct effect to the Convention in the State party's national law, and that only two
states have passed such legislation. In this context, the Committee further notes that
due to the State party's federal system, the absence of such legislation has resulted in
fragmentation and inconsistencies in the implementation of child rights across its
territory, with children in similar situations being subject to variations in the fulfilment
of their rights depending on the state or territory in which they reside.104

2 Criticisms of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
The children’s rights movement as a whole is not without critics. Some have questioned
the very notion of children as rights bearers.105 Others have questioned the real value of
rights discourses, including the children’s rights discourse.106 The CRC itself has frequently
been criticised on the basis that, among other things, the standards embodied within it
may conflict with culturally‐specific norms,107 or on the basis that those standards reflect
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largely ‘Western’ ideals.108 The wording of some of the CRC’s articles has also been
criticised as being ‘platitudinous’ and ‘ambiguous’109 and the effect of the CRC has been
described in some quarters as ‘anti‐family’.110 Reflecting a number of these concerns and
others, ratification of the CRC by Australia was, both at the time of ratification and
subsequent to it, a matter of some controversy.111
It is no doubt true to say that the CRC has not necessarily ‘genuinely or extensively
transformed the lived realities of children, especially poor children in the developing
world, to the extent that the drafters of the [CRC] hoped’,112 nor that it has even
transformed the lived realities of Australian children.113 It is nevertheless suggested here
that the CRC is properly described as constituting ‘a major step forward in the effort to
bring the weight of the international community to bear on behalf of a better quality of
life for children.’114 Criticisms of the CRC referred to above have been addressed by
various scholars.115 Nevertheless, the CRC undoubtedly reflects a conception of childhood
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and of ideals that were dominant at a particular point in history.116 However, it is also
submitted that the CRC is very much a living document in the sense that interpretation of
the rights expressed within it can and will evolve over time. In other words, the rights in
the CRC, in so much as they are expressed in fairly general terms, are capable of being
interpreted in a way that reflects contemporary norms and values, as well as
contemporary (and evolving) understandings about childhood and children and, even, the
needs and wishes of children themselves. This is important because the needs, wishes and
views of children in relation to the online publication of personal information, including
images, in the online environment are likely to evolve just as the impact and role of
technology in our lived experience also evolves.
For the purpose of this thesis, the basic premises of the CRC — including the premise that
the child needs special safeguards and care and is deserving of appropriate protection,
including legal protection117 — are not questioned. Instead, the CRC and each of its articles
are accepted as being both representational of and influential upon what has been
described as an ‘emerging international regime on the rights of the child.’118
Following a brief consideration of two of the core principle of the CRC — the best interests
principle and the right of the child to be heard — the following sections of this chapter
examine the rights of privacy, development and freedom of expression.
3 The Best Interests Principle and the Right of the Child to be Heard
Although the Committee has outlined the four guiding principles of the CRC,119 Freeman
has commented that the best interests principle and the right of the child to be heard are
the most important.120 These principles are discussed briefly below.
(a) The Best Interests Principle
The best interests of the child principle, set out in Article 3(1), provides:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

Alston regards this principle as performing a mediating role whenever there is a conflict
between rights,121 and Parker has suggested that the principle offers guidance where
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there is a ‘lacuna’.122 According to Freeman, the best interests principle may be used to
reinterpret rights or construct new ones.123
When interpreting the best interests principle, it is important to note that the obligation
is to consider that child’s best interests as a primary consideration. This needs to be
contrasted with the obligation, expressed, for example, in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth),
to consider the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration.124 Tobin has written
that the inclusion of the best interests principle recognises that there is the potential for
conflict between the rights of a child and those of their parents or their broader
community.125 However, resolution of this conflict does not presuppose a finding that
advances the child’s interests ahead of others, but rather invokes ‘a far more inclusive and
nuanced process by which to balance the rights and best interests of children with the
rights and interests of other groups within society.’126 By way of example, and in the
context of balancing a child’s right to privacy with other interests — such as the right of
freedom of expression set out in Article 10 ECHR127 — the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales noted in Weller that the fact that a child has a reasonable expectation of privacy
‘does not automatically mean that any article 10 rights will be trumped by the need to
consider the best interests of a child’128 but does mean that ‘where a child’s interests
would be adversely affected, they must be given considerable weight.’129
(b) The Right of the Child to be Heard
Article 12(1) of the CRC provides that:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

This provision is often referred to as ‘the right of the child to be heard’. In its General
Comment on Article 12, the Committee reported that ‘[t]he views expressed by children
may add relevant perspectives and experience and should be considered in decision‐
making, policymaking and preparation of laws and/or measures as well as their
evaluation.’130 In this regard it is relevant to note that Australian children have been given
some opportunity to share their views on the unauthorised online posting of images. In
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the course of its inquiry into Australian privacy law and practice, the ALRC undertook a
number of workshops with children and young people whereby the participants were
given the opportunity to express their views on a number of issues related to the
inquiry.131 The ALRC also developed a website that sought to engage young people and
encourage them to send comments to the ALRC inquiry.132
The ALRC reported that young people generally appeared to value the ability to choose
what information they disclosed about themselves and to whom, with this control being
seen as an aspect of privacy.133 Many participants in the youth consultation workshops
held the view that disclosure of information by themselves to another did not entitle that
other to use the information for a different purpose.134 The ALRC quotes a participant in
consultation sessions conducted by the Commission for Children and Young People as
saying that: ‘privacy matters because it is up to me whether or not I share information
and who I share it with.’135 In relation to the issue of posting of photographs online, the
ALRC comments that ‘[i]n general, young people thought that it was good practice to
obtain a person’s consent before taking his or her photograph and posting it on the
internet.’136 As already noted above, the ALRC also found that young people believed that
individuals should be able to have a photograph removed from a website if the image
subject did not consent to its posting.137
The views reported above generally support young people’s wish for greater control over
their image in the online environment than they currently have. Similar views have been
aired elsewhere, as already discussed in Chapter One. Young people have not suggested
that laws should prevent either the taking of images or the posting of images to the
internet, but they have suggested that they should have the ability to effect the take‐
down of an image where they did not consent to its posting. Although more research
needs to be done in this area,138 it is important that such views are taken into account in
developing law and policy around the online publication of images.
4 The Right to Privacy
In 2011 the NGO Report emphasised that the lack of comprehensive protection of an
individual’s right to privacy in Australia was concerning in light of Australia’s obligations
under Article 16 of the CRC.139 This concern was echoed in the Concluding Observations:
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the Committee is concerned that the State party does not have comprehensive
legislation protecting the right to privacy of children. Furthermore, while noting that the
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner is empowered to hear complaints
about breaches of privacy rights under the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth), it is concerned that
there are no child‐specific and child‐friendly mechanisms and that those available are
limited to complaints made against government agencies and officers and large private
organizations. The Committee is also concerned at the inadequacy of privacy
protection.140

Article 16 of the CRC provides that:
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her
privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour or
reputation.
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.

These provisions virtually mirror those of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights141 and closely resemble Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights142 and Article 8 of ECHR.143 A right to privacy and reputation is also included
in the human rights legislation of the Australian Capital Territory144 and Victoria.145
The nature of the protection afforded by Article 16 of the CRC is against arbitrary or
unlawful interferences with privacy, family or correspondence. While there has been no
General Comment released by the Committee on the interpretation of Article 16
specifically, General Comment 16 on the interpretation of the similarly worded Article 17
of the ICCPR was released by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (‘UNHCHR’) in 1988 (‘General Comment 16 UNHCHR’).146 Given the close
resemblance in the wording of Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the CRC147 it is
appropriate to draw on General Comment 16 UNHCHR in the interpretation of Article 16.
General Comment 16 UNHCHR notes that interference by states with a person’s privacy,
family, home or correspondence can ‘only take place on the basis of law, which itself must
comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant’.148 In addition, the
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General Comment makes it clear that the word ‘arbitrary’ is intended to encompass even
lawful interference and that even interferences which are lawful should be in accordance
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the ICCPR and should also be reasonable in the
particular circumstances.149 Further the General Comment clarifies that states not only
have the obligation to refrain from interferences as specified in Article 17, but that they
also have positive obligations to implement a legislative framework that prohibits such
interference by others.150
The word ‘privacy’ as used in Article 16 is nowhere defined in the CRC, nor has any
definition been attempted in the other international instruments mentioned above.
Although the United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘UNHRC’) has stated that privacy
includes a ‘sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can freely express his or her identity,
be it by entering into relationships with others or alone’,151 it has been observed that the
UNHRC itself has ‘not really clarified the notion of privacy’ and that in General Comment
16 UNHCHR it ‘leaves open the definition of the main right enshrined in that article, i.e.
the right to “privacy”.’152
Given the interrelationship between the various rights of the CRC, an interpretation of the
right to privacy should take into account the best interests of the child in a given case.
Thus, in Weller, for example, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales concurred with
the findings of the trial judge such that the best interests of the children were a relevant
factor in determining that they had an expectation of privacy.153
The Meaning of ‘Privacy’
The difficulty of offering any all‐encompassing definition of privacy is evident by the
prevalence of literature on that very topic. Gormley has described privacy as an
‘evanescent concept’ that many of the foremost legal scholars and philosophers of the
twentieth century have attempted to ‘wrestle down’, concluding that in fact a unitary
definition of legal privacy (at least) does not and probably never will exist.154 De Zwart et
al have opined that the ‘lack of a common understanding of what is or what should be
encompassed within privacy makes it a very fragile creature indeed.’155 As a concept,
privacy has been described by Margulis as one which is ‘experientially obvious [but]
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conceptually frustrating’156 and Thomson has gone so far as to conclude that ‘nobody
seems to have any very clear idea what it is.’157
What can be said of privacy as a concept is that it means different things to different
people in different contexts,158 and may be understood differently depending on one’s
cultural, geographical and temporal location,159 as well as upon one’s age. In respect of
the latter point, Hughes has argued that children may ‘require greater and different
privacy protection than adults’ and that children’s privacy raises special issues.160 Further,
privacy may be defined differently depending on whether it is being approached from a
philosophical, legal, psychological or other perspective and on whether one is, for
example, seeking to explain privacy in terms of how it is experienced,161 what functions it
serves,162 or what values underlie it.163
The difficulty (if not the impossibility) of the task of establishing an all‐encompassing
definition of privacy has a number of practical consequences. One consequence is that
while there remains furious debate over which particular interests laws on privacy should
protect, some fundamental questions may remain ultimately unresolved and interests
may remain unprotected. As Solove points out, the lack of clarity around the concept of
privacy gives rise to difficulties in making policy or resolving a case because of the fact
that the privacy harm may not easily be articulated and privacy interests may not be
recognised.164 Nissenbaum has commented that a belief that one must provide an
156
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‘account of privacy before one can systematically address critical challenges can thwart
further progress.’165
While ‘privacy’ has sometimes been used as a ‘battle cry’,166 Solove has observed that
there is often no clear account given of the reasons why privacy is important or of the
values said to underlie it.167 It is frequently said that values of human dignity, autonomy
or liberty underpin the ‘right’ of or need for privacy168 but what is exactly meant by these
notions or how they should affect the way in which privacy laws are interpreted and
applied is seldom articulated.169 It has been said that the content of notions of
‘autonomy’, ‘dignity’ and ‘liberty’ is even ‘less precisely definable than that of privacy
itself’,170 with appeals to these concepts taking place in ‘the stratosphere of
abstraction’.171 That is not to say that any attempt to give content to the right of privacy
by reference to its underlying values should be forgone: rather that it may be more
practical to consider privacy in specific contexts rather than as a generalised concept.172
Solove has suggested that because ‘abstract incantations of “privacy” are not nuanced
enough to capture the problems involved’,173 a more pragmatic approach should be taken
whereby focus is instead directed to particular problems and concrete practices.174 In
other words, he advocates a ‘bottom‐up’ rather than a ‘top‐down’ approach.175 A similar
approach has been advised by Hughes who describes privacy as a ‘multi‐faceted concept
which derives its meaning in particular situations from the social context and the ways in
which people experience and respond to those situations.’176
In terms of the context of personal information in computers, Schwartz has suggested that
a ‘privacy right’ is an unsatisfactory basis for regulation of this area and that the law
should, instead, ‘examine the dangers of specific data processing constellations in which
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individual information is employed.’177 Some of the dangers for children and young people
of the online publication of images were outlined in Chapter Two. Given the nature of
those dangers, and the difficulties inherent in defining privacy and giving content to the
right to privacy, it is suggested that the other rights enshrined in the CRC, and discussed
in the following sections of this part, can provide an alternative or additional justificatory
basis for a legal response. This is not to say that the problem of the unwanted online
posting of images of children and young people, or their subsequent use, is not properly
conceptualised as a privacy problem. A number of scholars argue that privacy is in fact
best understood as being about control, whether in relation to certain domains (such as
personal information)178 or, more generally, in the sense of controlling access to self in
general179 or the management of social interaction.180 If privacy is understood in terms of
control, therefore, the problem with which this thesis is concerned — that children have
insufficient control over the online publication of images of themselves, or subsequent
use of those images — is properly conceptualised as a privacy problem. Following that, if
a right to privacy is recognised or established in Australian law, and interpreted in line
with control‐based definitions, the ‘problem’ may be addressed, or partially addressed,
by reference to privacy‐specific laws (for example, a tort on invasion of privacy). It is of
177
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interest here to refer to the functions ascribed to privacy by Westin, who defined privacy
as ‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.’181 Westin,
having made specific reference to theorists, including Goffman, posited that privacy is
necessary, amongst other things, to protect the ‘masks’ people wear:
Every individual lives behind a mask in this manner; indeed, the first etymological meaning
of the word ‘person’ was ‘mask’, indicating both the conscious and expressive
presentation of the self to a social audience. If this mask is torn off and the individual’s
real self bared to a world in which everyone still wears his mask and believes in masked
performances, the individual can be seared by the hot light of selective, forced exposure.
The numerous instances of suicides and nervous breakdowns resulting from such
exposures by government investigation, press stories, and even published research
constantly remind a free society that only grave social need can ever justify destruction of
the privacy which guards the individual’s ultimate autonomy.182

With this in mind the following chapter considers whether the ALRC’s recommendations
for the form of a statutory tort of invasion of privacy might offer a solution or partial
solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned. However, reliance on the
contested notion of privacy as the sole footing for a legal response to that problem is likely
to be insufficient, as will become clear in the following chapter. As such it is suggested
that other rights enshrined within the CRC, in particular the right to development, can
provide at least part of the justification for new laws relating to the unauthorised posting
of online images of children and young people.183 The right to development is discussed
in the following section.
5 The Right to Development
Article 6(2) of the CRC provides that: ‘States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child.’ The goal of development is reflected
in a number of the other articles of the CRC, either expressly or by implication.184
According to the Implementation Handbook, the concept of survival and development to
the maximum extent possible is ‘crucial to the implementation of the whole
Convention’,185 hence the recognition of the right to life and development as one of four
general principles of the CRC.
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Woodhead writes that the principle that children have a right to development goes back
‘at least as far as the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child’186 (‘Geneva
Declaration’). The Geneva Declaration was adopted by the League of Nations in 1924 and
included a statement that: ‘The child must be given the means needed for its normal
development, both materially and spiritually.’187
The text of the CRC does not elaborate on ‘development’ and how it should be interpreted
in giving effect to the right enshrined in Article 6. However, the Committee, in its General
Comment No 5, has advised that states should interpret development, both in the context
of Article 6 and the CRC generally, ‘in its broadest sense as a holistic concept, embracing
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development.’188 The
Committee further advises that implementation measures should be aimed at achieving
the optimal development for all children.’189 Nowak, in his detailed commentary on Article
6, writes that the concept of development in Article 6 is thus similar to the concept of
‘human development’ as defined in Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration of the Right
to Development in 1986.190 Novak continues that the Article 6 right to development
therefore obliges States Parties to ‘create an environment which enables all children
under their respective jurisdiction to grow up in a healthy and protected manner, free
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from fear and want, and to develop their personality, talents and mental and physical
abilities to their fullest potential consistent with their evolving capacities.’191
In common with interpretation of other CRC provisions, interpretation of the right to
development in Article 6 requires consideration to be given to the other overarching aims
and objectives of the CRC and, as noted above, the principles of interrelatedness and
interdependence. In addition, Article 6 requires states to take positive measures to ensure
the survival and development of the child: this interpretation being clear, according to
Nowak, from the travaux préparatoires.192 The requirement to take positive measures to
ensure development is also reflected in the General Guidelines for Periodic Reports (‘the
Guidelines’)193 issued in 1996 by the Committee. The Guidelines request states to
describe specific measures taken to guarantee the child’s right to life and to create an
environment conducive to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child, including physical, mental, spiritual, moral psychological and
social development, in a manner compatible with human dignity, and to prepare the child
for an individual life in a free society.194

Nevertheless, the right to development in Article 6 can be described as ‘aspirational’ in
the sense that the survival and development of the child is to be ensured ‘to the maximum
extent possible’.195
(a) What is ‘Optimal Development’?
As Woodhead has pointed out, interpreting the right to development in practice ‘depends
crucially on beliefs and knowledge about how development occurs, what factors harm
development and how development can best be fostered.’196 Yet an interpretation of
development and an answer to the question of what constitutes optimal development for
a child is necessarily complex and challenging.197 Indeed, one of the problems in
interpreting the Article 6 right to development is that, as discussed in Chapter Two, child
development theory does not present a unified perspective on how development occurs
and what constitutes optimal development, even across a single domain.198 Accordingly,
191
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it may not be possible to give a definitive answer to what optimal development is nor how
optimal development can best be fostered. Nevertheless, an understanding of child
development and the factors that influence development, both positively and negatively,
can be approached by considering, among other things, scientific research on childhood
and child development (including research in the field of developmental or child
psychology and childhood studies).199
By drawing on some of the research in the field of developmental and social psychology,
Chapter Two has indicated that the online existence of images of children presents a
number of threats to development. These threats need to be addressed, in line with the
child’s right to development. Nevertheless, it also needs to be recognised that the internet
also presents ‘unique opportunities’ for child development200 and these positive aspects
must also be considered within the context of any framework that seeks to respond to
the threats.201
(b) Right of Development and Other Rights under the CRC
As discussed above, the rights of the CRC are fundamentally interconnected and the right
of development is one of the four principles that should guide the interpretation of the
other rights.202 In its General Comment No 4 on ‘Adolescent Health and Development in
the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’, the Committee noted that the
civil rights and freedoms of children and adolescents, as set out in Articles 13‐17 of the
CRC, are ‘fundamental to guaranteeing the right to health and development of
adolescents.’203 Of these, the right to privacy (Article 16) has already been discussed in
Section Four above, the right of the child to be heard (Article 12) was discussed in Section
Three, and the right to freedom of expression (Article 13) is discussed below.
6 The Right to Freedom of Expression
Article 13 of the CRC provides that:
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
the child's choice.
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2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.

The protection enshrined in Article 13 closely resembles Article 19 of the ICCPR.204 The
right to freedom of expression is also incorporated into the UDHR205 and ECHR,206 as well
as in human rights legislation enacted in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria.207
In Australia, an aspect of the right to freedom of expression, namely the right to freedom
of political communication, is implied under the Constitution.208
A detailed consideration of the scope and nature of the right to freedom of expression,
and its underlying rationales, is beyond the scope of this chapter.209 However, it is
important to at least briefly consider the right to freedom of expression here for a number
of reasons.
Firstly, the right to freedom of expression has been described as being ‘as much a
fundamental right on its own accord as it is an “enabler” of other rights.’210 In the context
of children’s rights, the right to freedom of expression has a key role in enabling the
realisation of one of the CRC’s general principles, namely the child’s right to express their
views freely in all matters affecting the child, and for those views to be given due
weight.211
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Secondly, as noted by the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (‘Special Rapporteur’) —
and following on from the first point made above — the internet has ‘become a key means
by which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of expression and opinion.’212 By
‘acting as a catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and
expression, the Internet also facilitates the realization of a range of other human rights.’213
Children’s access to and use of the internet clearly plays a key role in their development.
In this regard, the Special Rapporteur has noted that the internet is an ‘important vehicle
for children to exercise their right to freedom of expression and can serve as a tool to help
children claim their other rights’.214 In addition, the Special Rapporteur commented on
the benefits of social networking sites as a means of encouraging supportive relationships
and creativity, as a platform for self‐expression and as an enabler of choices and opinions
informed by peer preferences (among other things).215 The Special Rapporteur has also
emphasised that restrictions on internet use should be looked at ‘carefully and critically
in order to uncover potentially negative consequences for children and adults, encourage
practical solutions to Internet safety concerns and maximise opportunities for children on
the Internet.’216 Thus, while limits upon freedom of expression are permitted where they
are in accordance with Article 13(2) above, any constraints upon online expression,
including constraints on the posting of images, must be considered by reference not only
to their impact on the right to freedom of expression but by reference to their impact on
the realisation of other rights that depend upon that right (including the right to
development).
Thirdly, and related to both previous points, the Committee has flagged the CRC’s civil
rights and freedoms, including Article 13 (right to freedom of expression), as ‘fundamental
in guaranteeing the right to health and development of adolescents.’217 Nevertheless, this
right can sometimes conflict with other rights and freedoms. Where there is a conflict
between freedom of expression and other rights, the right to freedom of expression may
need to be limited and any such limitations must—in accordance with Article 13(2) — be
provided for by law and be necessary to ‘respect the rights and reputations of others’ or
for the ‘protection of national security or of public order or public health or morals.’ In its
submission to the Department of Communications as part of the Australian Government’s
public consultation into Enhancing Online Safety for Children, the Australian Human Rights
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Commission expresses the view that ‘[l]imits on free speech can be justified in certain
circumstances, particularly in the context of the protection of children’s safety.’218
However, any restrictions on freedom of expression must also be reasonable and
proportionate219 in order to achieve the proper balance between that right and others.
A ‘familiar theme’ is that the right to freedom of expression is often seen as existing in
opposition to and conflict with the right to privacy.220 While some conflicts are inevitable,
this should not obscure an important fact: namely that the right to privacy and freedom
of expression are also often complementary rather than competing. As the ALRC have
recently noted, privacy ‘underpins freedom of speech, thought and self‐expression.’221
Barendt has written that ‘some privacy protection is necessary for [individuals] to exercise
their speech rights free from anxiety and inhibition.’222 Moreover, one of the commonly
cited rationales for freedom of expression is the self‐determination rationale whereby
‘free speech is conceived of as an aspect of self‐realisation and individual autonomy.’223
This rationale sees freedom of expression as having an ‘inherent value’.224 According to
the self‐determination rationale, ‘[t]he ability to relate our thoughts and experiences is
asserted to be an intrinsic part of being human. Restrictions on freedom of expression
therefore potentially inhibit self‐fulfilment and individual autonomy.’225
The capture and communication of images of oneself and others is undoubtedly a form of
expression. Writing about the practice of people taking intimate images of themselves
and sharing them with others, Bambauer describes the images involved as an ‘important
exemplar of non‐commercial amateur production of expressive content’.226 However, in
Bambauer’s view, this form of expression is potentially undermined by the threat of non‐
consensual display of those images.227 That is, the fear of non‐consensual display of
images of ourselves might have a chilling effect on the creation of images of ourselves
(‘selfies’). But what of the relationship between freedom of expression and images
created by others? Bambauer suggests that the production process as a whole is
dependent, albeit ‘counterintuitively’ on ‘recognizing the interests of people captured in
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these videos of photos’ and suggests that legal recognition of those interests is a
‘generative move’.228 However, it is important to understand that ‘expression’ is not
limited to the relaying of thoughts and experiences (nor the capture and sharing of
images). Expression can take many forms, including action, interaction, behaviour, dress
and so on.229 Scanlon defines expression as follows:
any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more persons some
proposition or attitude. This is an extremely broad class. In addition to many acts of
speech and publication it includes displays of symbols, failures to display them,
demonstrations, many musical performances, and some bombings, assassinations and
self‐immolations. In order for any act to be classified as an act of expression it is sufficient
that it be linked with some proposition or attitude which it is intended to convey.230

As such, it is here suggested that expression should be considered not only as the things
people say (including to one another) but the way in which people act and behave,
whether in public or private. According to this broad understanding of expression, self‐
presentation is a form of expression. Chapter Two discussed how people present
themselves differently in different contexts, and that the unauthorised publication of
images online can collapse contexts and threaten self‐presentation claims. As such, the
failure to address the problem of unwanted online publication of images or their
subsequent use can affect an individual’s self‐presentation, and therefore their
expression. The unwanted posting or use of images might also threaten expression in
other ways — people might act differently not for fear of having their self‐presentation
claims challenged but for fear that a broader audience will have ‘access’ to those images
and what they reveal about a person. This notion is captured in the SCAG Discussion Paper
‘Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Ancillary Privacy Issues’ and it is worth
repeating the extract from this paper, which was set out earlier in Chapter Two:
People present themselves differently in different public places. For instance, while a
person might be comfortable wearing and being seen in a swimsuit at the beach, they
might not be comfortable being seen in a swimsuit whilst shopping in a mall. While a
person might be comfortable in presenting themselves in a particular way at a beach, a
photograph, which facilitates a permanent image, provides a broader context for those
images.231
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The NSW Commissioner for Children has observed that the ‘unauthorised publication of
photographs can cause distress to children, young people and families involved. It can
make them fearful of further occurrences and affect their enjoyment of being in public
places.’232
A failure to address the problem of the unwanted online publication of images or their
subsequent use may, therefore, have a chilling effect on expression. An example of this is
given by Nissenbaum and relates to Google Street View. Google Street View is a feature
of Google Maps that offers ‘360‐degree photographic “streetscapes” that allow users to
“explore neighbourhoods at a street level — virtually”.’233 Nissenbaum notes that in order
to comply with national privacy laws in Australia and Canada, Google Street View blurred
the faces of individuals and vehicle licence plates in those countries, but took no such
measures in its coverage of US cities.234 Nissenbaum notes that in relation to images of
themselves appearing on Google Street view, individuals are ‘concerned about
embarrassment, loss of control over information about their activities and whereabouts,
and possible harmful consequences such as ridicule or sanction.’235 In reaching the
conclusion that the failure to blur faces results in an inappropriate flow of information,
Nissenbaum considers not only the possible harmful consequences (described above) but
also the purposes and values of the context in which the information was gathered:
namely people appearing in public or open spaces. Here, Nissenbaum asserts that those
purposes and values are contravened by ‘even the remotest chance of a chilling effect on
behaviour otherwise permitted on public thoroughfares’236 (by virtue, presumably, of a
concern that one’s image may appear online and be publically accessible).237 In fact, legal
action was brought against Google Street View in 2014 by a Canadian woman who was
depicted sitting outside her house with ‘part of her breast exposed’.238 Google was
ordered to pay compensation to the claimant who claimed to have suffered: ‘Mockeries,
derisions, disrespectful ans [sic] sexually related comments in relation to the
photographs’.239 It is quite possible that such an experience would have a chilling effect
on the image subject’s future behaviour.

232

NSW Commission for Children and Young People, Submission to the Standing Committee of Attorneys‐
General (SCAG), Discussion Paper: Unauthorised Photographs on the Internet and Related Privacy Issues,
October 2005, 3.
233
Nissenbaum, above n 20, 51.
234
Ibid 217.
235
Ibid 219.
236
Ibid 221.
237
A recent example of the intrusive capacity of Google Street View is provided in the case, reported in
2014, of a Canadian woman who successfully sued Google for compensation after she was shown sitting
outside of her house with ‘part of her breast exposed’: see Jeff John Roberts, Google Must Pay Canadian
Woman $2,250 for Showing her Cleavage in Street View, Gigaom Research (29 October 2014)
<https://gigaom.com/2014/10/29/google‐must‐pay‐canadian‐woman‐2250‐for‐showing‐her‐cleavage‐in‐
street‐view/>.
238
Ibid, referring to the case of Maria Pia Grillo c. Google Inc 2014 QCCQ 9394 (Cour Du Québec) (‘Grillo’).
239
Grillo 2014 QCCQ 9394 (Cour Du Québec) [24].

294

In Murray the Court of Appeal of England and Wales were required to determine whether
the plaintiff, a minor and the young son of celebrity author J K Rowling, was entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy such that photographs surreptitiously taken of him and
his family on the way to a local cafe and then published in the press would constitute an
invasion of that privacy.240 The Court referred to the trial judge’s arguments that a
distinction could be drawn between a person engaged in family and sporting activities, on
the one hand, and on the other ‘something as simple as a walk down the street or a visit
to the grocers to buy milk.’241 The trial judge had argued that a reasonable expectation of
privacy might attach to the former type of activity, following Von Hannover v Germany,242
but that if it attached to the latter it would be tantamount to creating an expectation of
people not being photographed without consent. The Court of Appeal, however, did not
agree that it was ‘possible to draw a clear distinction in principle between the two kinds
of activity.’ The Court of Appeal went on to say:
Thus, an expedition to a café of the kind which occurred here seems to us to be at least
arguably part of each member of the family’s recreation time intended to be enjoyed by
them and such that publicity of it is intrusive and such as adversely to affect such activities
in the future.243

There is recognition in this section of the Court of Appeal’s judgment that intrusion into
this private sphere might adversely influence an individual’s future decisions about
engaging in activities in the public eye.
To take another example from Case Study Two (Tim), the fact that Tim has no control over
publication of his image on the internet (and has no legal grounds for seeking its removal)
may well mean that the next time Tim plays football in the park he will think twice about
removing his shirt. Moreover, he may be more cautious generally about visiting the local
swimming pool or changing in the school changing rooms after a sports lesson. If so, Tim’s
freedom of expression will have been curtailed and his expression ‘chilled’.
Further, if freedom of expression is also understood as the freedom to choose whether
and how one present’s oneself to the outside world, then removing that choice by
publishing an image of another online can impact on the image subject’s freedom of
expression – at least where the publication is unwanted. However, although the
unwanted online publication and use of an image may have a chilling affect on expression
vis‐a‐vis a particular image subject, this is not inevitable. As noted in Chapter Two, the
reaction to the unwanted publication or use of one’s image, or even the threat thereof, is
subjective. However, it is suggested that the fact that children and young people have
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little control over the online publication of an image or its subsequent use and, in
particular, the fact that they often have no legal grounds upon which to call for the
removal from online publication of such images is more likely to have an overall chilling
effect on expression in the future.
Any legal measures that seek to address this lack of control will prima facie almost
invariably interfere with another’s freedom of expression. Most directly, such measures
will interfere with the expression of the individual who posted the image (who will often
be the person who also captured the image). Less directly, those measures will interfere
with the ‘freedom of others to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds’,
and this implicates individuals as well as organisations (for example, social media
providers and other internet content hosts).
Given the above, any restrictions on freedom of expression that are mandated through
law need to be considered by reference to the terms of Article 13(2): namely, whether
they are necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others. In considering whether
such restrictions are necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others, the right to
freedom of expression of an image subject should be considered along with other rights
such as the right to privacy and, where the image subject is a child, the right to
development. Moreover, any such restrictions need to be proportionate to achieve the
correct balance between rights.244 In considering whether restrictions meet these criteria,
freedom of expression should not be placed only on one side of the scales — the side of
the person posting the image online, or sharing it with others. For the reasons described
above, in so far as self‐presentation and choice over whether and how to present oneself
to the outside word constitute expression, an image subject’s claim to freedom of
expression should also be weighed into the equation.
IV

CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The discussion part of this chapter began, in Section A, by explaining Lessig’s four
modalities of regulation in cyberspace, namely law, social norms, the market and
architecture, or ‘code’. With reference back to Chapters Three and Four this part of the
chapter noted that there are limitations in the extent to which Australian law provides
children with control over the online publication of their image, or its subsequent use.
This is a problem because the limitations on control can have implications for a child’s
development. The chapter then considered why Lessig’s other modalities of regulation do
not adequately address the problem of the unwanted online publication of images of
children or their subsequent use, and in some cases might even encourage such
publication or use, thereby potentially exacerbating the risk of harm. Section A concluded
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that, in order to address the problem of unwanted online publication of images of children
or their subsequent use, a legal response was necessary.
The chapter then moved to consider a justificatory basis for any such legal response.
Section B of Part Three began by providing background on the CRC before briefly
considering two of its core principles: the best interests principle and the right of the child
to be heard. With regard to the latter it was noted that more research is needed as to
children’s views regarding the issue of the unwanted online posting of images of other
children or the use of online images of others, and as to what an appropriate response to
that issue may be. Some of the views that have been expressed by children in this regard
were presented. It was noted that those views were generally supportive of giving
children the ability to remove images that were posted online without their consent.
Subsequent sections examined the right to privacy, the right to development and the right
to freedom of expression. The difficulty in giving content to the right to privacy was noted,
largely due to definitional challenges around the concept of privacy. This part of the
chapter concluded that a right to privacy could provide a justificatory basis for laws that
sought to give children more control over the online publication of image. However, it was
suggested that in recognition of the difficulties of giving content to a right of privacy, the
right of development set out in the CRC could provide an alternative footing upon which
to ground new laws designed to address the problem with which this thesis is concerned.
The right to development, its interpretation and scope was then explored before moving
on to consider the right to freedom of expression. This part of the chapter emphasised
the importance of viewing the right to freedom of expression (also contained in the CRC)
as complementary of other rights, in particular the right to privacy. Here the breadth of
the term ‘expression’ was noted, a term which — it was suggested — could include
expression through self‐presentation. While any laws that aim to give children more
control over their image in the online environment often entail restrictions on the exercise
of expression of others, this part of the chapter argued that the failure to provide such
control also impacted on the freedom of expression of image subjects themselves.
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that a legal response to the problem with which
this thesis is concerned is required and that the CRC, and in particular the right to
development, provides a justificatory basis for that response. As US Senator Ted Markey
has remarked ‘[t]he right to develop is very important right for children and in an online
world that is something that we must protect as being sacred.’245 The question, then, is
not whether Australia needs to respond to the threats to development posed by the
online existence of images, but rather what form that response should take. The following
chapter takes this up by discussing and critically evaluating a number of law reform
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options. One particular option from those discussed is put forward as the best option to
address the central problem with which this thesis is concerned.

298

CHAPTER SIX – OUTLINE AND EVALUATION OF LAW
REFORM OPTIONS
I

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter concluded that neither extant laws and social norms, nor the market
and the architecture of the internet (or ‘code’) are sufficient to address the problem of
the unwanted online posting of an image of a child or its subsequent use. The chapter
concluded that a legal response was therefore required. This chapter overviews a number
of law reform options and evaluates one option in more detail. This chapter therefore
addresses research objective (7) of this thesis: to identify and critically evaluate a number
of law reform options.
II

CHAPTER OUTLINE AND SCOPE

The Australian Government Guide to Regulation states that at least one policy option
explored as a response to a problem should be non‐regulatory.1 Given that the previous
chapter illustrated the need for a regulatory response, this chapter confines itself to
considering only regulatory options. However, the recommendations section of Chapter
Seven considers non‐regulatory options that should operate in addition to any regulatory
option that is introduced.
A number of law reform options could provide a partial solution to the problem with
which this thesis is concerned. However, although this thesis has argued that there is
certainly a risk of harm to individual children from the unwanted publication of images,
the actual occurrence of harm is not a given. Whether harm actually eventuates depends
on a range of factors — some internal (such as the level of a child’s resilience and self‐
esteem and their own response to an image of themselves) and some external (the way
in which others respond to a particular image; the support network available to the image
subject). At this stage, therefore, legislating to remove the risk — rather than deal with
the harm as and when it does occur — must be considered overreach. This is one reason
that law reforms that would make it unlawful or actionable as a civil wrong to capture
and/or publish images of children per se are not considered further in this chapter. This
includes reforms that would make it unlawful or actionable to capture and/or publish
images of children without prior consent. That said, one of the recommendations of this
thesis is that further research is needed as to the impact of unwanted publication of
images on children’s development. In light of findings from that research, it may be that
more does need to be done to manage the risk at its source.
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When proposing the adoption of new regulation, or the abolition of existing regulation,
the Australian Government’s RIS requires policymakers to measure the ‘net benefit’ of
each policy option — this requires all of the costs and benefits of each option to be taken
into account.2 According to the RIS, the benefits will usually accrue via the achievement
of the desired policy objective, while costs include economic, social and environmental
costs.3 Rather than outlining the relative benefits and costs of each law reform option
presented, however, this chapter will consider only the key benefit of each option—
namely the extent to which it is likely to be effective in solving the problem with which
this thesis is concerned. Having described the way in which the key benefit of each option
will be evaluated and after assessing the key benefit of each option, Part Three of this
chapter then concludes that only one of those options is likely to be at all effective. Part
Four of this chapter then analyses that option in more detail — taking into account other
benefits as well as costs. Part Five, offers some general conclusions.
Evaluating the Key Benefit of Each Law Reform Option
As noted above, the key benefit of any law reform option is the extent to which it is likely
to be effective in addressing the problem it is being implemented to address.
As this thesis is concerned with children and young people, any effective legal response
must address practical issues associated with the capacity of children and young people
to utilise legal mechanisms, not least in terms of cost and other ‘access to justice’ issues.
Processes and procedures that are built around legal measures, as well as the attitude of
courts to claims brought by or on behalf of children, are all important in determining how
easily children are able to utilise a particular legal remedy. Perhaps even more
fundamental, however, is the nature of the remedy itself. Remedies that depend upon an
individual accessing ‘the machinery of formal justice’ (lawyers, courts or dispute
resolution services)4 generally involve more complexity than non‐formal resolution
mechanisms. Accessing courts or tribunals often requires the assistance of a legal
representative and, for children, a litigation representative.5 Moreover, accessing formal
justice machinery is likely to be expensive.6 Given that legal aid is generally unavailable to
individuals who wish to pursue civil actions, the cost of pursuing a civil remedy is likely to
be prohibitive for many children, particularly if they are not supported by their parents in
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bringing the action.7 As such, the most effective remedies are likely to be ones that, by
their nature, are readily accessible by children and young people.
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter Five, law and social norms are interrelated. As
such, while formal legal remedies might be difficult for children to access, their existence
could nevertheless have an indirect impact by influencing behaviour and social norms, the
market or the architecture of the internet.
As was noted in Chapter Two, a legislative response to the risk of harm arising from the
unwanted publication of images of children or their subsequent use needs to consider the
overall impact on children’s development, as well as upon the rights, interests and
freedoms of others. That is, a response that is assessed only by reference to its efficacy in
reducing the risk of harm might in itself compromise some of the positive developmental
processes associated with children’s use of the internet and social media in general, or
the capture and sharing of images of other children. For example, a response to the risk
of harm in the form of a ban on the capture or publication of images of children would
necessarily impinge on the positive developmental implications associated with such
practices — these include the development of expression, social networks and self‐
identity. This is another reason why a reform option along these lines is not considered in
this chapter. A response that sought to limit children’s access to the internet, or impose
restrictions on children’s use of social media (for example) could also compromise positive
developmental processes, such as identity formation, community building and creativity8
and the development of ‘digital age literacies’.9 For this reason, a response along these
lines is also not considered further.
III

OVERVIEW OF LAW REFORM OPTIONS

The following sections provide an overview of the various reform options before moving
on, in Part Four, to evaluate more closely one particular option: the introduction of a take‐
down scheme in relation to images of children.
A

A Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasions of Privacy

One possible law reform option is the introduction of a statutory cause of action for
invasion of privacy. Such an action was proposed by the ALRC in 2008, and the form of the
7

Community Law Australia, Unaffordable and Out of Reach: The Problem of Access to the Australian Legal
System, Report (July 2012) 7; Commonwealth of Australia, Productivity Commission, Access to Justice
Arrangements, Inquiry Report no 72 (2014) vol 1 30.
8
See, eg, Teresa Swist et al, ‘Social Media and the Wellbeing of Children and Young People: A Literature
Review’ (Report prepared for Commissioner for Children and Young People, Western Australia, 2015) 5;
Australian Human Rights Commission, Children’s Rights Report 2014 – National Children’s Commissioner,
(2014) 17. See also Australian Human Rights Commission, Children’s Rights Report 2015 – National
Children’s Commissioner (2015) 78.
9
Aspen Institute Task Force on Learning and the Internet, Learner at the Center of a Networked World (2014)
72.

301

action was reconsidered in 2014.10 If a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy is
introduced in the form proposed by the ALRC, it would be available to all individuals able
to establish the elements of an action, and would not be limited to children. The ALRC
recommended that the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy be
introduced in Commonwealth legislation11 and that it be described as an action in tort.12
The elements of the action as proposed by the ALRC are that the plaintiff’s privacy has
been invaded by an intrusion upon their seclusion or the misuse of private information;
that a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in all the circumstances; that the invasion was intentional or reckless; and that the
invasion was serious. The ALRC has recommended that the tort be actionable per se but
that a court must be satisfied that the public interest in privacy outweighs any
countervailing public interests.13
The ALRC has recommended that a range of remedies should be available to courts in the
event that a plaintiff is successful in bringing an action for invasion of privacy. These
remedies include an award of damages, including for emotional distress,14 and an order
for the delivery up, destruction or removal of material.15 An order for removal of material
may require its removal from the internet by the defendant, but may also involve a take‐
down order addressed to an online provider, or to an individual who controls their own
website.16 The ALRC has also recommended that courts be given the ability to issue
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injunctive relief at any stage of the proceedings.17 This would allow courts to issue
interlocutory and final injunctive relief on such terms as they think fit.18
1 Key Benefit
The design of the cause of action proposed by the ALRC takes into account access to
justice issues by recommending that the Privacy Commissioner be given enhanced powers
to investigate complaints about serious invasions of privacy and to make appropriate
declarations, which could include a declaration that material should be removed (or
taken‐down) from the internet. Enforcement of those declarations would, however,
require reference to a court.19 These recommendations are intended to complement the
introduction of a statutory tort and provide a ‘low cost alternative to litigation’.20 The
ALRC has also suggested that consideration be given to permitting state and territory
tribunals to hear matters arising from the cause of action for invasion of privacy.21
The proposed action also seeks to balance the ‘right’ to privacy with the rights and
freedoms of others by requiring a court to be satisfied that the public interest in privacy
outweighs any countervailing public interest.22 As an element determining actionability,
it will be for the plaintiff to establish that their interest in privacy outweighs any
countervailing public interest. This places a greater onus on plaintiffs than would be the
case if public interest considerations operated instead as a defence to the action. The
ALRC has stressed that while freedom of expression may be ‘the most common interest
at stake’, a range of public interests may need to be considered in balancing the privacy
interest.23 A non‐exhaustive list of public interest matters that a court can consider is set
out in the ALRC’s report, which stresses that ‘no one interest should have automatic
priority over the privacy interest of the plaintiff’.24 While various public interests at stake
in any particular matter, including privacy interests, should therefore be placed on a
relatively ‘equal footing’, the ALRC has nevertheless observed that ‘[i]f anything, by
requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the public interest in privacy outweighs any
countervailing public interest, the scales may be tilted slightly in favour of free expression
and other public interests.’25
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In practice, the broad interpretation proposed by the ALRC of ‘freedom of expression’26
and the fact that the scales are possibly ‘tilted slightly in favour of free expression and
other public interests’ may make it very difficult for an individual to establish that their
interest in ‘privacy’ outweighs the interests of another in publishing images.27
Nevertheless, where the balance to be struck is between the privacy interests of a plaintiff
who is a child, on one hand, and the interests of an organisation or an adult individual, on
the other, it is possible that courts will favour the child’s privacy interests. Certainly there
is evidence of this in privacy cases heard in England and, as Hughes has written, ‘children
may require greater and different privacy protection than adults’.28 So, for example, in
Weller, the High Court noted that when considering the rights of children in relation to
matters of privacy, courts must have regard to the judgment of Lord Kerr in ZH (Tanzania)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department29 where he stated:
in reaching a decision that will affect a child, a primacy of importance must be accorded
to his or her interests. This is not, it is agreed, a factor of limitless importance in the sense
that it will prevail over all considerations. It is a factor, however, that must rank higher
than any other. It is not merely one consideration that weighs in the balance alongside
other competing factors. Where the best interests of the child clearly favour a certain
course, that course should be followed, unless countervailing reasons of considerable
force displace them.30

However, as Tobin has observed: ‘ultimately the adoption of a substantive rights approach
begins with the capacity to conceptualise a dispute through the eyes of a child — a task
which, for judges and lawyers, can often prove difficult.’31 Of course where the defendant
is also a child, the balancing exercise arguably becomes more complex.
To the extent that the proposed statutory cause of action takes into account access to
justice issues and balances the public interest in privacy with other matters of public
26
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interest, it is well designed. Despite this, the action for serious invasion of privacy, in the
form proposed by the ALRC, would overall be of limited benefit in addressing the problem
with which this thesis is concerned. This is primarily because the action is limited to
situations in which the image subject is able to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
privacy in all the circumstances. In cases involving publication of images, this requirement
is likely to rule out an action in most cases where an image has been captured in public,
unless the image reveals something inherently private or humiliating and embarrassing.32
The ALRC recognises, however, that ‘[t]here may be different expectations of privacy with
respect to the taking of a photograph and its later publication’, and that while it may be
unreasonable to expect not to be photographed in public, it may be reasonable to expect
the photograph not to be published, ‘particularly if the photo captures a clearly private or
humiliating moment.’33 An example of this is where an image of a person is captured at
the moment her skirt is blown up, revealing her underwear.34
A more difficult question is whether unauthorised publication of information that is not
inherently private or embarrassing is capable of rendering the information private where
it otherwise would not have been.35 Ultimately, it would be for courts to resolve that
32
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question. Courts could decide that information which is not otherwise private could be
considered so because of the way in which it has been used (or rather misused), for
example, where it is used for purposes beyond those for which it was collected. The
‘repurposing’ of information is illustrated in a number of the case studies presented in
Chapter Four, namely Case Study Three (Alison), Case Study Four (Shabeeha) and Case
Study Seven (Schoolboy Rowers), as well as in the Saad case discussed in Chapter Three.
Even in situations where images captured for one purpose are used for another, the
nature of the information itself is likely to be a central factor in determining whether
information is private, albeit not the only factor. Indeed, the ALRC refers to the fact that
in the United Kingdom the nature of the information is ‘plainly of considerable if not prime
importance’ and that ‘it may even be decisive in the question of whether the claimant
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of it.’36 It is telling that examples
given by the ALRC of disclosures that would constitute an invasion of privacy within the
scope of the proposed cause of action all relate to information that is inherently private
or to images that capture the plaintiff in an intimate or embarrassing moment.37 It should
be noted, also, that the ALRC has recommended that the appropriation of a person’s name
or likeness or the presentation of a person in a false light be specifically excluded from the
cause of action. That is, these things are excluded unless the publication or use of the
information constitutes a misuse of private information, or the information itself was
gathered in circumstances amounting to an intrusion upon seclusion.38
If courts were to adopt the ALRC’s approach to determining whether a plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it is a fair supposition that even extensive and
unanticipated publication given to information that is not otherwise private, or the
repurposing or re‐contextualisation of such information, will not, in and of itself, render
that information private for the purpose of the cause of action. This would then be a
considerable limitation of the action in terms of reducing the vulnerability of children to
harm from the unwanted online publication of an image or its subsequent use. Referring
back to the case studies set out in Chapter Four, it would be unlikely that any of the image
subjects — with the exception of Jackie in Case Study One — would be able to satisfy the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. That is because in all of those case studies — with
the exception of Case Study five (Tyger and Lilly) — the images are captured in public and
convey nothing inherently private, or anything that would likely be regarded as ‘clearly

engaged in a ‘private activity’: Saad [2012] NSWSC 1183 (4 October 2012). Although counsel for the plaintiff
had argued that there could be no expectation of privacy vis‐a‐vis information which was not inherently
private: Saad [168], [183] (Hall J).
36
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 10, 99 [6.38].
37
Ibid 85–87 [5.56]–[5.66], 116 [7.36].
38
Both the NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice and the South Australian Law Reform Institute
have also recommended that any statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy introduced into the law
of their respective jurisdictions also be confined to invasions of privacy that involve an intrusion upon
seclusion on the misuse of private information: NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, above n 13,
71 [Recommendation 4]; and South Australian Law Reform Institute, 10, 17 (respectively).
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private or humiliating’.39 Although the image subject concerned might be humiliated by
publication of the images, the test, being objective, would not take this subjective
response into account. In the case of Tyger and Lilly (Case Study Five) the photograph of
the young children was taken by their own mother, who was also responsible for initially
publishing that image online. One of the difficulties this scenario presents, as discussed
earlier in Chapter Four, is that the children’s expectations of privacy (in so far as a young
child can be said to have any expectation of privacy)40 may be diminished by the fact that
their mother posted the photograph on a public Facebook page.
Aside from difficulties in establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy, the image
subjects in Case Studies Two to Eight would also be unlikely to establish the other
elements of the statutory tort — including the need to establish that the invasion was
serious and that the invasion of privacy was intentional or reckless.
The ALRC makes clear that the test of seriousness is an objective one: it does not concern
the plaintiff’s subjective view of seriousness, or even the plaintiff’s actual experience
(such as suffering serious harm as a result of the invasion or privacy or misuse or disclosure
of private information).41 Yet, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, an individual’s self‐
esteem can be negatively affected by their purely subjective response to an image — this
is because self‐esteem is dependent, in part, on how an individual perceives others
reactions to a particular image. It was also demonstrated that an individual may
experience a lack of control, in turn potentially impacting on self‐esteem, even when an
image is not inherently embarrassing, harmful and so on. As such, an action for invasion
of privacy, which depends on an objective test of ‘privacy expectations’ as well as
seriousness, is probably ill‐suited to address the risks of harm related to the unwanted
online publication of an image or its subsequent use, as explained in Chapter Two.
In terms of the need to demonstrate intention or recklessness on the part of an image
subject, Chapter Two also illustrated that an individual can experience a lack of control
even when others are well‐intentioned in their decision to post or share images of that
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Nevertheless, it is useful to note that in its submission to the NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice
inquiry into Remedies for Serious Invasions of Privacy in NSW, the organisation, Women’s Legal Services of
NSW noted that ‘an image of a woman without her religious headscarf can cause harm to a victim if they
are shared or threatened to be shared without consent’ and urged the Standing Committee to ‘give these
forms of invasions of privacy serious consideration and to recognise the serious impact sharing images such
as these could have on the victim: Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission No 32 to NSW Standing
Committee on Law and Justice, Inquiry into Remedies for the Serious Invasion of Privacy in New South Wales,
3 March 2016, 5 [11].
40
The reasonable expectation of privacy test, expressed by the ALRC, is an objective test that requires a
court to consider not whether the plaintiff subjectively expected privacy, but ‘whether it would be
reasonable for a person in the position of the plaintiff to expect privacy’: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy,
above n 10, 92 [6.7]. In determining a plaintiff’s reasonable expectations, the age of the plaintiff will be a
relevant consideration: ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy at 96 [Recommendation 6.2(g)]. The common law
approach to this question is also instructive — as to which see Chapter Four Case Study Five (Tyger & Lilly).
41
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 10, 134 [8.18].
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individual, or when the images are not inherently embarrassing or harmful and so on.
Therefore, the cause of action proposed by the ALRC will provide no remedy when images
have been posted by a person who is not objectively aware of the circumstances giving
rise to an invasion of privacy.
The need to establish intention or recklessness has another important consequence in
terms of the efficacy of the action in addressing the risk of harm described in this thesis.
The fact that an internet intermediary does not know that its service has been used to
invade privacy means it will not possess the requisite fault to ground an action against it.42
The ALRC observes that the statutory action is ‘not intended to impose liability for mere
omissions — that is, failing to stop an invasion of privacy by a third party.’43 However, it
does seem to be the ALRC’s intention that if an internet intermediary becomes aware of
an invasion of privacy and does not take reasonable steps to remove invasive material
within a reasonable time, it may be taken to possess the requisite fault element to ground
the action.44 In practical terms, however, there are important questions about when an
internet intermediary should be taken to be aware of the privacy invasive nature of
material. If awareness will only be imputed once the intermediary receives notice of a
declaration or court order to that effect, this necessarily impacts on the efficacy of the
cause of action, because it means there is a potential for privacy invasive material to
remain available online for a considerable length of time. The longer material is available,
of course, the more opportunity there is for its broader dissemination and for others to
download the material. On the other hand, internet intermediaries may be prepared or
perhaps even encouraged to remove material claimed to be invasive of privacy on
receiving notice from a person affected, even before any court order is issued or even
before proceedings are commenced. If the latter were the case then the introduction of
a cause of action for serious invasions of privacy could result in a greater number of
images being removed than might be the case if internet intermediaries awaited the
outcome of court proceedings before making a decision. That would, in turn, give children
a greater level of control over their image in the online environment.45
The efficacy of the cause of action proposed by the ALRC is also affected by the proposal
that a defence be available where the would‐be defendant is a child or young person
below an age to be specified by the legislature.46 The ALRC itself does not recommend a
particular age but offers its ‘tentative view’ that the age of 16 is appropriate.47 The
42

Ibid 208 [11.101]–[11.102]. Likewise, an internet intermediary who is not reasonably able to prevent the
invasion of privacy will not be considered to intend the invasion, and is unlikely to be considered ‘reckless’.
43
Ibid 208 [11.101].
44
See further ibid 208 [11.103] and 210 [11.16]: noting that the ALRC does not regard a ‘safe harbour’
scheme as necessary — given the fault element of the action — but that if one was designed a condition of
reliance would be acting to remove privacy invasive material on receiving notice to do so.
45
It would also be likely, however, to give rise to concerns that the public interest in free expression would
not be adequately protected and that the intermediaries themselves are ill‐placed to make determinations.
46
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy, above n 10, 187 [Recommendation 11‐8].
47
Ibid 213 [11]–[131].
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rationale behind this recommendation is that the ALRC believes that education on the
risks and ethical dimensions of invading another’s privacy is more appropriate than the
imposition of civil liability.48 Without arguing with the rationale behind this, a defence or
exception for young people would further limit the extent to which this action addresses
the risk of developmental harm related to the online publication of an image or the
subsequent use of such an image. This is because those responsible for capturing and
subsequently publishing images of children are very often other children.49
2 Conclusion as to Efficacy of this Option
Although a statutory tort for serious invasions of privacy would give children greater
control over their image than they currently enjoy, including in the online environment,
on balance the action is likely to do little to address the problem with which this thesis is
concerned. As discussed, the action is limited to situations in which the image subject is
able to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in all the circumstances. In cases
involving publication of images, this requirement is likely to rule out an action in most
cases where an image has been captured in public, unless the image reveals something
inherently private or humiliating and embarrassing. The objective nature of the test
cannot account for a given image subject’s subjective wishes in relation to the online
publication or subsequent use of an image. As also noted above, a would‐be plaintiff will
also need to demonstrate that any invasion of privacy was serious, and that their privacy
interest outweighs the public interest in other matters, including freedom of expression.
This sets the bar fairly high and the ALRC has acknowledged the elements of the action
present ‘significant hurdles’ for plaintiffs. Given the range of remedies that are proposed
be made available to a court (or regulator) in respect of an invasion of privacy, which
includes the payment of compensation, and given that a plaintiff need not demonstrate
actual physical or mental harm as a result of the invasion, it is understandable that the
bar should be set high. Ultimately, an action for invasion of privacy should never be
available as a remedy unless the harm can be assessed objectively. Without an objective
standard, it would be impossible for people to determine in advance whether a particular
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Ibid 211 [11]–[121]. It is also interesting here to note that the right to freedom of expression in the CRC,
although similar in wording to Article 19 (Freedom of Expression) in the ICCPR, does not include the first
sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR: “The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2
of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.” According to the Special Rapporteur, ‘The
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modern media of expression, was apparently not found necessary with regard to the child’s freedom of
expression’: Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/69/335 (21 August 2014) (focusing on the right of the child
to freedom of expression) 6.
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having access to their own mobile phone’: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister
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act (or, specifically, the online publication of an image or its subsequent use in a different
context) would constitute an invasion of privacy. In view of these limitations, other
possible law reform options are considered below.
B

Amendment of the Privacy Act to Include a Requirement to Delete Information

Another way to partially address the problem with which this thesis is concerned is to
insert a requirement into the Privacy Act on the part of APP Entities to delete personal
information in certain circumstances. A new APP regarding the deletion of personal
information could take various forms. In its issues paper on serious invasions of privacy in
the digital era, the ALRC canvassed the introduction into the Privacy Act of a requirement
for data controllers to ‘permanently delete information at the request of an individual
who is the subject of that information’.50 This requirement to delete data was proposed
in order to address what the ALRC termed the ‘loss of control’ over information. The ALRC
noted that one possible solution to the loss of control was the ‘right of erasure and to be
forgotten’ recently proposed in Europe. That ‘right of erasure and to be forgotten’ was, at
the time of the ALRC report, being considered by the European Union in the context of its
proposed new European Regulation on Data Protection.51 The new Regulation has now
been adopted by the European Parliament.52 The form of a new APP requiring APP Entities
to delete information in certain circumstances could, therefore, be modelled on the right
of erasure and to be forgotten in the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, which has
been included as Article 17.53
In order to closely resemble Article 17,54 a new APP regarding erasure of personal
information would provide, in essence, that where the collection of personal information
or its use or disclosure for a particular purpose is dependent upon the information subject
50

ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Issues Paper no 43 (October 2013) 50 [170].
ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper No 80 (March 2014) 223 [15.23],
referring to COM 2012/011 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) (‘COM 2012/011’), art 17.
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COM 2012/011, above n 51.
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In its Issues Paper, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, the ALRC had noted that one possible
solution to the problem of the loss of control over personal information was to give individuals a right to
permanently delete their personal information at their request: ALRC, Issues Paper no 43, above n 50, 50
[170]. However, in its Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed the inclusion in the Privacy Act of a right of
erasure that was significantly narrower than the right of deletion referred to in its issues paper; that is, the
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themselves had provided to the data controller: ALRC, Discussion Paper No 80, above n 51, 223. In its final
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[16.51]. An APP requiring only the deletion of personal information provided by a data subject themself
would do very little to address the problem with which this thesis is concerned. That is because images, as
a form of personal information, are often not provided by an image subject themself, but by others.
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The text of that Article cannot be directly translated into the Privacy Act, given the difference between
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having provided consent, the subject should be able to withdraw consent and require the
deletion of the personal information or a restriction on the use or uses to which it is put,
or the further disclosure of that information.55 Where collection, use or disclosure of
personal information is not dependent upon the information subject’s consent, the
subject should have the right to object to the retention of their information, or its use for
a particular purpose or purposes, or its further disclosure.56 Where an information subject
does object, an APP Entity would then be required to delete the information or cease
using it for the purpose or purposes specified in the notice of objection or further
disclosing the information. However, this would not be required if there were compelling
overriding legitimate grounds for retaining or continuing to use or disclose the personal
information.57 In addition, an APP entity would be obliged to delete personal information
or restrict its use or disclosure where that information is no longer necessary for the
purpose or purposes for which it was collected or used or where the APP Entity has
collected, used or holds the information in a way that does not comply with the APPs.58
If it were to reflect Article 17, the requirement to erase or restrict the use of personal
information would also be subject to exceptions. Erasure or restriction on use of
information would not be required where (among other things) retention of the personal
information or its use or disclosure for a particular purpose or purposes was necessary for
freedom of expression and information, to comply with legal requirements, or for
archiving or scientific, statistical or historical purposes.59
If the Privacy Act was amended to insert a new APP in the form outlined above, it is
possible that the OAIC could issue detailed guidance on the question of what legitimate
grounds would be considered compelling and sufficient to override the interests, rights
and freedoms of the information subject. That is, where such grounds exist, personal
information could be retained or continue to be used or disclosed despite objection on
the part of the information subject.60 It is possible that images would be considered a
special case, given their impact, in which case guidance could be provided as to specific
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COM 2012/011, above n 51, art 17(1)(b).
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situations in which the image subject’s interest would generally be considered to override
the legitimate interests of the APP Entity or a third party. The subject or subjects of an
image, its nature, the medium of publication and the context of publication could all be
taken into account. For example, it might be that a strong presumption should be made
in favour of requiring the erasure of images that depict a child,61 particularly where those
images are posted online.62 A presumption in favour of erasure could also arise where
images are inaccurate — that is, they have been falsified (doctored) so that they appear
to depict something other than what was actually captured on film; and where images are
invasive of ‘privacy’ (however defined) or depict nudity or partial nudity or are published
in sexualised or voyeuristic contexts. For example, in Case Study Four, Shabeeha’s
interests in having her photograph deleted could be considered to override the interest
of the other person depicted, the person who took the photograph and the person who
uploaded it, as well as the internet content host that controls publication, or its users. This
is on the basis that the photograph had been altered to ‘depict’ something that did not
actually happen.63 Likewise, the interests of the schoolboy rowers (Case Study Seven) in
having the use of their image on a gay voyeuristic blog restricted might be considered to
outweigh the legitimate interest of any APP Entity that hosts the blog.64 This would be on
the basis that the context of publication sexualises the image subjects and as a result is
likely to cause distress and embarrassment. In other cases the interests of the image
subject might not be considered to override those of the APP Entity or third parties. A
case could be made in relation to Harry (Case Study Eight), for example, that the legitimate
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interests of the social media company publishing his image, as well as third parties using
the service to post or access the image, and the person who captured and uploaded it,
override Harry’s interest in it not being published. The photograph is not offensive,
objectionable, or embarrassing and does not depict nudity or sexualise the image subject.
Likewise, it may be considered that the interest of free information and news reportage
should override any interests that Ben (Case Study Six) may have in seeking the removal
of his image from social media.65 Other cases, such as that of Tim (Case Study Two) are
probably less clear‐cut. However, it is possible that consideration could be directed
specifically to the circumstances of individuals raising an objection. In other words, the
actual impact and reasons for objecting to the ongoing disclosure or use of an image upon
a particular information subject could be taken into account in striking the balance
between the data subject’s interests and those of the APP Entity or third parties. For
example, if an individual were able to demonstrate that they had been subjected to
ongoing teasing as a result the image, or if they had been rejected by their community
because of it, this could weigh in favour of requiring deletion of the image in question.
A case‐by‐case determination as to where the balance should be struck would allow a
nuanced weighing of the interests, rights and freedoms of the various actors. However, if
the OAIC were required to make determinations on a case‐by‐case basis, this would also
entail an additional cost burden for the taxpayer. If it were for APP Entities themselves to
undertake a case‐by‐case consideration, this would involve significant additional costs for
the APP Entity. A determination that involved consideration of factors specific to the case
at hand would also lead to some uncertainty for APP Entities as it would be difficult or
impossible to predict in advance what personal information (or images) would need to be
deleted upon receipt of a request. Nevertheless, the OAIC could be charged with
developing detailed guidance in this area.
1 Key Benefits
An obligation on the part of APP Entities to erase personal information or restrict its use
and disclosure in the circumstances outlined above would go some way to giving children
greater control over their image and thereby to reducing their vulnerability to harm
arising from unwanted publication. This is especially so if any new APP was underpinned
by specific guidance or subordinate legislation specifically relating to images of children.
Nevertheless, there are significant limitations associated with this option.
First, the obligation to delete information would do little to prevent publication in the first
place and would also be unlikely to influence social norms around the publishing of images
of children.66 Secondly, the efficacy of a requirement to delete or restrict the processing
65
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of personal information is also limited by the fact that the Privacy Act does not generally
apply to the acts and practices of individuals or small businesses.67 As such, unless the
Privacy Act were amended to apply to individuals, the inclusion of a requirement to delete
personal information would not prevent individuals from simply re‐posting or
republishing personal information that had previously been erased (or the processing of
which restricted). Moreover, the publication or use of images on websites and blogs
operated by individuals or small businesses would not be covered by the requirement.
This represents a very significant obstacle to effective enforcement of the APP in the
context of user‐generated content. Given that many of the problems related to image use
arise because of the popularity of social media sites, the usefulness of an APP requiring
erasure or restriction on the use or disclosure of personal information has to be
considered limited. However, internet content hosts that provide platforms allowing
others to post information (such as social networking sites) do have the ability to disable
the accounts of users who repeatedly infringe individual’s privacy and may be able to rely
on these terms and conditions, or bring in amendments to them, in order to disable the
accounts of users who re‐post information that had been erased pursuant to the Privacy
Act. In practice, however, organisations are likely to be reluctant to disable accounts of
repeat ‘infringers’ on this basis because it would be both costly and unpopular with the
organisation’s own clients.
It is also possible that this limitation could be overcome by design: in other words, a ‘code’
solution might be found. One possibility, for example, is the use of face recognition
technology to allow for the automated detection and removal of images that are re‐
posted online after the image or a similar image had been removed from view, due to a
requirement to restrict the use or processing of information (but not to delete it entirely)
pursuant to the Privacy Act. Of course, such a solution would present its own difficulties
— not least the fact that face recognition technology requires the persistence of personal
information in order to operate and that it is considered, by some, inherently invasive of
privacy.68 Ironically, then, using this particular code solution to provide individuals with a
measure of control over one aspect of their personal information (how their images are
displayed) may result in the loss of control over another aspect (the persistence of
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personal information). It is, however, possible that other ‘code’ solutions exist or could be
found.
Using the mechanism of guidance or possibly subordinate legislation in the form of
Regulations applicable to images of children69 to address particular issues in relation to
images could be an effective way of balancing an image subject’s subjective wishes with
broader interests. However, wherever a balancing exercise occurs, there is a risk that the
balance will be struck against the image subject, in which case there is still a risk of harm
to that particular individual. The only way to avoid that risk entirely, therefore, would be
to include a general right on the part of all image subjects (or on the part of image subjects
who are children) to require the deletion of personal information in the form of images
upon request. Such a broad right would likely attract strong criticism on the basis that it
would be a significant restriction on freedom of expression and information. Such a broad
right might also have an ultimately detrimental impact on children’s development —
images of children are often captured and published by other children, so the erasure of
images would impact on the freedom of expression of the child capturing and publishing
the image and arguably, therefore, on their development. It would also give rise to
complex considerations in situations where more than one image subject is depicted, but
only one of them wishes the image to be removed. It would also likely result in a high
burden for business, particularly for internet content hosts, which is explored further
below. That is not to say that further consideration should not be given to the question of
whether a child should have a right to require erasure of their image solely based on their
subjective wish. Depending on the extent of the harm attendant on the unwanted online
publication of images, or their use, such a right may ultimately be considered in the best
interests of children, and therefore in the public interest. However, from a pragmatic
point of view, there is insufficient evidence available at present to overcome the likely
objections to such a wide‐ranging right. This is one reason why further research on the
risks of harm relating to the unwanted publication of images is needed.
The draft of Article 17 of the Proposed Data Protection Regulation does not require a data
controller to delete data in any case where its processing is ‘necessary’ for exercising the
right to freedom of expression or information. This is a broad exception as it applies even
where there are no lawful grounds for the processing of data, as well as in situations
where a data subject has objected to the processing of data and the data subject’s
interests have been determined to override the interests of the data controller. In other
words, in the context of the right of erasure and to be forgotten in the Proposed Data
Protection Regulation, freedom of expression and information operates as a ‘trump card’.
Drafting an APP requiring the deletion of information or a restriction on its use or
disclosure in certain circumstances in a similar way to Article 17 would arguably tilt the
scales in favour of free expression and information. This, in turn, is likely to undermine
69
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the efficacy of the APP in addressing the problem with which this thesis is concerned. In
the case of images (other than ‘selfies’), there is an inherent tension between the free
expression of the person capturing the image, on the one hand, and the rights and
interests of the image subject on the other. This is not to say that considerations of the
broader public interest in free expression and information should not be taken into
account, of course they should be. However, any amendment to the Privacy Act should
make it clear that equal weight is to be accorded to the interests, rights and freedoms of
the data subject, on the one hand, and the interests, rights and freedoms of APP Entities
and third parties on the other. In order to be effective in addressing the problem with
which this thesis is concerned, the Privacy Act (or any guidance provided or subordinate
legislation issued in respect of the obligation to erase or restrict the use or disclosure of
personal information in general, or images in particular) should make explicit the fact that
a data subject’s freedom of expression is also implicated whenever personal information
(or images) are collected, used or disclosed against their wishes.
Other factors that must be taken into account in assessing the efficacy of this option are
the process around the withdrawal of consent, the making of an objection and the lodging
a complaint under the Privacy Act, and applicable time limits.
2 Conclusion as to Efficacy of this Option
On balance it is difficult to see that the inclusion of a right to delete in the Privacy Act is
an effective solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned. Without
consequences for individuals who re‐post images that have previously been erased (or
removed from publication) there is the high likelihood of an endless cycle of removal and
reposting — that is, unless a ‘code’ solution to this problem is found. A requirement to
erase images or restrict their processing would also not apply to the publication of images
on websites, blogs and other media operated by individuals and small businesses. Given
these limitations, a ‘right’ to delete images would be more effective if it was not located
in the Privacy Act but applied more generally (such as in the context of a broad take‐down
scheme discussed in Section F below).
C

Requirement to Anonymise or De‐Identify Data

The previous section considered the introduction into the Privacy Act of a new APP that
would require APP Entities to delete personal information in certain circumstances, or
restrict its use or disclosure. An alternative to that is a requirement that APP Entities
anonymise or de‐identify data in certain circumstances. De‐identifying data would
address some of the reasons why the publication of unwanted images is so harmful to
development. For example, Chapter Two referred to the fact that the existence of digital
images can affect a person long into the future — it can affect their job prospects and the
way people regard them or react to them. If data cannot readily be linked to an individual
many of these problems would be avoided. If an image is altered so that an image subject
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is not recognisable in it, this would also overcome many of the harms referred to in
Chapter Two. Although an individual may still experience a loss of autonomy where
images have been captured or published without their consent, and although those close
to the image subject may still be able to recognise them from the context, other risks of
harm — including the fear of the image being seen by a broader audience — would be
addressed.
1 Key Benefits
The existence of an image can represent an ongoing challenge to a person’s identity
claims, and can also be used to develop algorithms for face recognition purposes. If an
image is de‐identified, some of these problems might be avoided. De‐identification could,
for example, take the form of pixelating an image so that a person is not recognisable in
it,70 or it might involve removing tags and metadata that links a person depicted with a
name and other identifying information. As Bernal has pointed out, using anonymisation
or de‐identification in this way could be a useful means to resolve the conflict between
different rights and interests — such as where a group photograph is uploaded online and
one of the image subjects wishes the image to be deleted but others do not. In this
instance, the de‐identification or anonymisation of information through the removal of
tags could achieve an effective balance between the competing interests.71 A requirement
to de‐identify or anonymise data could therefore be considered as a complement or
alternative to a requirement to delete certain information or restrict its use or processing.
However, anonymisation of images could also be required in a broader range of situations
than a requirement to delete images. Anonymisation — at least in the sense of removing
tags or identifying text, for example — could be the default position in relation to any
image depicting a child or children. While this would not address all of the harms arising
from unwanted publication, and some exceptions to the default rule would be required,
overall this could reduce the impact of harm arising from the unwanted online publication
of images or their subsequent use.
2 Conclusion as to the Efficacy of this Option
On balance, a requirement to anonymise or de‐identify data is, if situated in the Privacy
Act, likely to suffer from the same drawbacks as a requirement to delete data. In
particular, without consequences for individuals who re‐post or re‐identify images that
have previously been anonymised or de‐identified, there is a high likelihood of an endless
cycle of removal and reposting of images. Nevertheless, anonymisation or de‐
identification could be considered a useful complement or alternative to the ‘take‐down’
of images, an option discussed in Section F below.
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Although it is possible that advance face recognition technology can recognise individuals even when
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D

Laws That Give Effect to a ‘Code’ Solution to the Persistence of Data

Another regulatory option to address the problem with which this thesis is concerned is
the introduction of regulatory measures that would give effect to a ‘code’ solution to the
persistence of data. Viktor Mayer‐Schönberger, for example, has proposed the
development of a technical tool that would counter the problem of digital persistence —
that is, building into personal data a digital expiry date.72 Mayer‐Schönberger envisages
that the person to whom the information relates would set or agree a date at which the
‘information’ would expire and should be deleted by the person or persons holding it.73
1 Key Benefits
Mayer‐Schönberger’s code solution is inherently problematic when applied to images of
children that have been captured by others. Given that the image subject often has no
control over whether the images are published and with whom they are shared, it is
difficult to see how they would be empowered to determine an expiry date in relation to
that information.74 Nevertheless, if it were incumbent upon APP Entities or, more broadly,
those with control over the online publication of personal information to set an expiry
date in relation to certain data, the overall effect would be to overcome (or partially
overcome) the problem of persistence. Mayer‐Schönberger has suggested that the
‘perfect memory’ of the internet in fact impedes the ability of individuals to change
themselves and that ‘by recalling forever each of our errors and transgressions, digital
memory rejects our capacity to learn from them, to grow and to evolve.’75 As such, the
permanence of online publication of unwanted images can cancel out what might
otherwise be positive developmental implications of such publication. By building in tools,
backed up with regulatory measures, that ensure data — or certain categories of data —
are deleted after a period of time, one of the reasons why the unwanted publication of
images is so potentially harmful to development is removed.
In terms of the impact of Mayer‐Schönberger’s code solution on the rights and freedoms
of others, this would depend on how the solution was designed and implemented. Mayer‐
Schönberger himself envisages both a ‘weak system’, with only minimal protection against
digital remembering, and a stricter system, which would operate more as a purpose
limitation in respect of personal information. The stricter system would certainly have an
impact on the economic interests of businesses (for example, by requiring them to delete
information after the stipulated period) as well as on other interests, such as government
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Viktor Mayer‐Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton University Press,
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security.76 Nevertheless, Mayer‐Schönberger is of the view that digital expiry dates, unlike
digital abstinence, ‘embrace participation in digital culture and global networks.’77
Moreover, individuals would be able to rely on expiration dates to achieve a measure of
control without having to fight ‘costly and time‐consuming battles in court’.78
2 Conclusion as to the Efficacy of this Option
Although Mayer‐Schönberger’s code solution is certainly worth further consideration in
so far as it offers some solution to the problem of digital persistence, it goes only part of
the way to addressing the problem with which this thesis is concerned. That is, digital
persistence is only one of the reasons why the online publication or use of an image poses
a risk to a child’s development. Moreover, Mayer‐Schönberger himself cautions that
expiration dates cannot solve entirely the problem of digital remembering, neither are
they intended to.79
E

A Property‐Rights Approach to Personal Information

A number of scholars have considered whether a property‐rights approach to personal
information might provide individuals with greater control, or self‐determination, in
relation to their personal information generally,80 or their image in particular.81 Purtova,
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for example, has suggested that ‘a property‐rights regime combined with non‐property
regulation not only deserves a second look but might even capture, and hence channel,
new and otherwise difficult to control relationships with regard to personal data.’82 She
suggests that personal information could be treated in a way that is similar to the English
system of real rights in land. That system allows for the protection and interaction of
different rights and interests in the same subject matter. For example, in the case of real
property the fee simple can be limited but not undermined by narrower rights (such as
leases). An important benefit of the particular property‐rights approach described by
Purtova is that it would ensure the same degree of accountability for everyone dealing
with the personal information, by virtue of the ergo omnes effect of the right.83 The ergo
omnes effect, as Purtova explains, means that ‘property rights have an effect against
everyone by imposing negative obligations on an unidentifiable number of people without
their consent.’84 Purtova gives the following example, which is particularly pertinent to
this thesis:
By way of example, imagine yourself walking down the street and seeing your face on a
billboard advertising, say, a local rehab for drug and alcohol addicts. After recovering from
the shock you vaguely remember the party where that not flattering picture of you could
have been taken, a series of e‐mails to everyone who attended the party circulating this
and other photos of you, and your cousin posting the photo on his profile at the social
network site. Who is responsible for the public appearance of the photo is not clear.
However, it is not your burden to discover how the picture made it to the billboard. Due
to the erga omnes effect of your property right in your image, anyone involved with the
photo is accountable for its unauthorised use. Therefore, you approach the advertising
agency, or the owner of the billboard — whoever is easy to establish as an involved
party.85

In relation to images, a number of jurisdictions do adopt a property‐rights approach. The
right of publicity in the United States is one example. That right protects the commercial
value of identity as a form of personal property.86 In Europe, too, certain jurisdictions
consider ‘image rights’ a form of property, or at least as a right protecting patrimonial
interests.87 In response to the problem of the non‐consensual distribution of intimate
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images in the United States, Bambauer has advocated a property rights solution, arguing
for the insertion of a new provision into US copyright law that would allow any person
represented in an intimate image88 to prevent distribution and display of the image.89 This
right would act as a limitation on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder to distribute
or display the image, and would be available in respect of private as well as public
displays.90 Bambauer has also suggested that this right could be non‐alienable and, to that
extent, would resemble the ‘moral rights’ of attribution and integrity under the relevant
provisions of the US Copyright Act.91
1 Key Benefits
The property‐rights approach to personal information in general and images in particular
has many appealing aspects. Certainly, a property‐rights approach to images could form
the basis of a solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned.
Even if a property‐right in personal information, or images, is adopted, however, that right
needs to be realised in practice through the implementation of one or more legal
mechanisms. For example, a property‐rights approach could form the basis of
requirements that individuals consent to the distribution or display of information about
them, or images of them.92 It might form the basis of a right to require the deletion of
personal information or images, or a right to be compensated for the use of that
information or image in certain circumstances.93
Consideration would need to be given as to how any property‐rights approach could be
reconciled with existing intellectual property laws and the public interest in allowing the
free use and exchange of information. In the case of images, for example, the default
An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona’(1998) 18 (3) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 511,
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position in Australian law is that the person responsible for capturing the image is the
owner of the copyright in it.94 There are also unresolved complexities where an image
contains personal information about more than one person, for example, in a group
photograph.
Accordingly, the benefits of a propertisation approach need to be assessed not in abstract,
but by evaluating the particular benefits or drawbacks of legal mechanisms that are based
on or can be said to implement that approach. A broader question is whether a property‐
rights model is appropriate in respect of a resource (personal information), which —
unlike real property and other forms of intellectual property — is not scarce nor one in
respect of which individuals need to be incentivised to create.95 This is not to say that
these tensions and complexities could not be resolved or that a property‐rights approach
in relation to personal information in general, or images in particular, is not an option that
should be considered further. However, the question of whether a property‐rights
approach is appropriate or desirable in respect of personal information generally, or
images in particular, is not within the scope of this thesis, which limits itself to
consideration of whether children need greater control of their image in the online
environment.
2 Conclusion as to the Efficacy of this Option
A property‐rights approach to personal data offers a number of benefits in terms of
forming the basis for a legal response to the problem with which this thesis is concerned.
However, the approach in itself is only as effective as the regulatory mechanisms by which
it is implemented and the net benefit of such an approach cannot, therefore, be fully
evaluated in abstract, but only through an analysis of those mechanisms.
F

A Take‐Down Scheme for Images of Children

The removal of unwanted images from the internet or from publication in a particular
context is one option that could reduce the extent to which children are vulnerable to
developmental harm attendant on the unwanted online publication of an image or its
subsequent use. The removal of images from online publication is often referred to as
‘take‐down’. For the purpose of this chapter, however, the expression ‘take‐down’ is given
a broader meaning and applies to the removal of an image from online publication as well
as its removal from other contexts.
The take‐down of images can be achieved by way of a formalised take‐down ‘scheme’.
However, the take‐down of images can also be incidental. In the Australian context, take‐
down schemes already exist in relation to certain online content. Chapter Three referred
to the scheme operated by the e‐Safety Commissioner under the Online Safety Act in
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relation to cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child. A take‐down scheme
also exists under schedules 5 and 7 of the BSA in relation to material that is ‘prohibited’
or ‘potentially prohibited’ in line with Australian’s National Classification scheme.96 In
addition, courts have the power to order the take‐down of material or its withdrawal from
publication by a person who is charged with an offence under division 5 of the Copyright
Act 1968 (Cth).
The take‐down of certain material can also occur as an incidence of particular laws and
regulations. For example, part V, division 2AA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) sets out a
‘safe‐harbour’ scheme, which is designed to limit the remedies available against carriage
service providers97 for infringements of copyright.98 Reliance on the scheme is subject to
a carriage service provider meeting a number of conditions, which depend, in turn, on the
category of infringing activity. Some of those conditions require a carriage service provider
to take‐down or remove access to infringing material upon receipt of notification or upon
becoming aware of material that is infringing or of facts and circumstances that ‘make it
apparent that material is likely to be infringing’.99 These safe harbour provisions therefore
act as an incentive for carriage service providers to take down certain material when they
become aware of the nature of the material in question. In this sense, the take down of
material is an incidence of the existence of the safe harbour scheme.
In the absence of legal consequences for the publication or use of content, however, there
is little incentive for those publishing or using that content to remove it. In the case of
internet intermediaries, for example, Moore and Clayton note that ISPs are ‘reluctant to
be drawn into acting as the plaintiff’s agent against their own customers — and at the
very least demand recompense for their efforts, along with immunities where errors are
made.’100 For this reason it has been said that incentives are central to the effectiveness
of all take‐down schemes, being even more important than the nature of the material
involved or the legal framework for removal.101 Nevertheless, intermediaries may be
96
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incentivised to remove certain content on the basis that it offends their own terms of
service, and there may even be ‘public relations’ value in acting expeditiously to remove
certain content.102
As earlier noted, a number of internet content hosts, such as Facebook and YouTube,
make available their own mechanisms for the removal of certain content, where it violates
another’s rights or otherwise contravenes the host’s own terms and conditions. For
example, and as discussed in Chapter Three, Facebook’s terms state that it has the right
to remove material that breaches its terms and standards — this includes images that
have been ‘altered to degrade private individuals’ and ‘photos or videos of physical
bullying posted to shame the victim’.103 Some social media providers, including Facebook,
make available tools for individuals to report abusive or problematic content.104 However,
as also noted in Chapter Three, while such providers reserve to themselves the right to
remove such content, they are generally under no obligation to do so. Given this, and
given some of the difficulties that have been expressed by or on behalf of those seeking
the removal of content that violates terms or service, 105 the faith that some young people
have expressed in the reporting mechanisms available on major social media websites106
may be misplaced.107
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Aside from safe harbour provisions or other ‘public relations’ reasons that incentivise the
removal of images from online publication, the incidental take‐down of unwanted images
is unlikely in Australia. One option, therefore, is to create a formalised take‐down scheme
that would require certain individuals or organisations to remove images upon receipt of
a request to do so, even where the publication of such images would not otherwise be
unlawful or prohibited nor attract legal sanction.108 This is similar to the approach taken
under the Online Safety Act, which does not create new offences for the hosting of
cyberbullying material, but which does impose sanctions on certain social media services
for failing to comply with a removal notice. A take‐down scheme for images could take
various forms. However, the following section of this part of the chapter explains one form
that the take‐down scheme could take.
1 The Form of a Take‐Down Scheme for Images
The scheme proposed here is one that allows for the issuance of a take‐down notice
whenever publication or use of an image of a child is against the ‘reasonable interests’ of
that child. In order to be as effective as possible, and to ensure that all Australian children
are treated consistently, as well as to address jurisdictional issues (discussed further in
Part Four below), the scheme should be enacted in Commonwealth legislation. Such a
scheme is explained in more detail below and its application to the scenarios in the case
studies is then considered.
(a) When is Ongoing Publication or Use of an Image against a Child’s ‘Reasonable
Interests’?
The starting point of a reasonable interests test would be to determine whether the on‐
going publication or use of the image is contrary to the ‘best interests’ of the image
subject. It will be recalled that Chapter Two advanced and supported two propositions:
namely that an image subject who is a child can be harmed by the publication of an image
or its subsequent use, (1) even where that publication or use is not ill‐intentioned and (2)
regardless of whether or not the image can be described, objectively, as harmful. One of
the reasons for this is that unwanted publication of an image can act, more or less directly,
on an individual’s self‐esteem as well as upon their relationships. On that basis, a
presumption could operate such that any online publication or use of an image of a child,
where that publication or use is unwanted by the child depicted, could be considered
contrary to the best interests of the image subject. A best interests test would also allow
a regulator to determine whether publication or use of an image was contrary to a child’s
content complaints’. But see, eg, AIMIA Digital Policy Group, Submission to Department of Communications,
Australian Government, Enhancing Online Safety for Children, Discussion Paper, 7 March 2014, 9 querying
whether reporting systems developed by large social media companies are inadequate or whether there is
a lack of public knowledge about where to go if there are concerns (although note that membership of this
group includes, inter alia, Facebook and Google).
108
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best interests even when the image subject was not aware of the publication or specific
use of the image in question. For example, it will be recalled that in the scenario presented
in Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly), Lilly was not aware of the use of her image to illustrate
a newspaper article about obesity. However, on application from an appropriate
individual on Lilly’s behalf, a regulator could nevertheless decide whether publication of
the photograph was in Lilly’s best interests or not. Here the wishes of Lilly’s parent or
parents on her behalf should be taken into account, but other considerations might
include the nature of the image, the likelihood of actual harm to Lilly in the future, and
the experience and wishes of the other image subjects (in this case, her brother Tyger).
Although a presumption would be made that publication or use of an image, where that
is unwanted by the image subject who is a child, is contrary to the child’s best interests it
is possible that this presumption could be rebutted in an appropriate case. This chapter
does not seek to outline all of the conditions that could allow for rebuttal of that
presumption but one such condition might be where the publication has been made by
or with the consent of a parent on behalf of the child. The question of the extent to which
(if any) a parent’s wishes should be allowed to prevail over a child’s wishes is, however,
an extremely difficult one. It is relevant to note, in this regard, that under the CRC the best
interests of a child in any given case must not be assessed in isolation. Rather,
consideration must be given to the other rights under the CRC and, as Tobin writes, ‘a
decision cannot be said to be in a child’s best interests where the outcome would be
contrary to other rights.’109 One of the other rights under the CRC is the right of the child
‘who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in
all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance
with the age and maturity of the child.’110 However, as UNICEF points out in its overview
of CRC rights, although Article 12 gives the child the right to express an opinion and have
that opinion taken into account, this does not mean that children have authority over
adults.111 Moreover, Article 12 specifically recognises that ‘the level of a child’s
participation in decisions must be appropriate to the child’s level of maturity. Children’s
ability to form and express their own opinions develops with age and most parents adults
will naturally give the views of teenagers greater weight than those of a pre‐schooler,
whether in family, legal or administrative decisions.’112 Furthermore, under Article 18 of
the CRC, there is recognition that parents or legal guardians have the primary
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child.113 Therefore, where a
parent believes that an image should be published or used in a particular context and the
child does not agree, a regulator would be required to make an assessment both as to the
109
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capacity of the child to decide for themselves whether or not the image should be
published or used and the appropriateness (or otherwise) of the parent’s wishes that it
should be.114
Even when the on‐going publication or use of an image is determined to be contrary to a
child’s best interests, this would only be a starting point. Although a child’s best interests
should always be a primary consideration, in line with the best interests principle in the
CRC, this does not mean that the child’s interests should necessarily prevail over other
rights and interests, including the public interest in free expression.115 In its submission to
the government’s public consultation on Enhancing Online Safety for Children, the
Australian Human Rights Commission welcomed the fact that the consultation paper
recognised that ‘if measures proposed have the potential to impact on freedom of
expression, then it is important that they are reasonable and proportionate to the
intended policy goal of improving the online safety of Australian children.’116 To ensure
that a take‐down scheme in relation to images of children does not constitute an
unreasonable and disproportionate limitation on free expression or the interests of other
stakeholders (including other image subjects) and other matters of public interest, the
best interests of the image subject need to be balanced against any competing interests.
One way of striking a balance between the best interests of a child and other interests
could be by providing for exemptions for media organisations that meet certain
conditions. As discussed earlier in this thesis, media organisations are exempt from the
Privacy Act in relation to acts done or practices occurring in the course of journalism, and
on condition that the media organisation is publically committed to observe certain
standards.117 In the context of a take‐down scheme for images of children, the application
of a similar exemption would go some way to protecting the public interest in freedom of
the media. In context of the case studies in Chapter Four, such an exemption would mean
that Tyger and Lilly (Case Study Five) might not be able to request the removal of their
image from the news story on obesity (unless the media organisation that published the
story was not publically committed to relevant standards). Likewise, Ben (Case Study Six)
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would be unable to request the removal of his image from a news website — but could
possibly succeed in having the image removed from his friends’ social media pages.118
On the other hand, as noted in the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Media and
Media Regulation119 (‘the Finkelstein Review’), ‘the news media can cause wrongful harm
to individuals and organisations by unreliable or inaccurate reporting, breach of privacy,
and the failure to properly take into account the defenceless in the community.’120 The
Finkelstein Review also noted that the current systems of self‐regulation of the press and
co‐regulation of broadcast media have not worked satisfactorily.121 This is one reason why
the Finkelstein Review recommended a system of ‘enforced self‐regulation’ whereby an
independent statutory body, the News Media Council, would oversee the enforcement of
standards of news media.122 Were the recommendations of the Finkelstein Review to
come into effect,123 images published by news media over which the News Media Council
has jurisdiction could be exempt from the take‐down scheme. If a system of enforced self‐
regulation is not enacted, however, there is an argument that the take‐down scheme
should apply to images published by news media.
Aside from the public interest in a free media, however, other matters of public interest
would also need to be balanced against an image’s subject’s best interests. In its report
Serious Invasions of Privacy, the ALRC lists a number of public interest matters that should
be specifically taken into consideration by a court in striking a balance between an
individual’s privacy interests and other countervailing interests, although the list is not
intended to be exhaustive.124 That list includes freedom of expression, ‘particularly
political communication and artistic expression’ and ‘freedom of the media, particularly
to responsibly investigate and report matters of public concern and importance.’125
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Similarly, a non‐exhaustive list of public interest matters that should be considered by a
regulator in striking the balance between a child’s best interests and countervailing
interests could be included in the statute implementing a take‐down scheme for images
in order to provide guidance.126
In some cases striking the balance between the best interests of the image subject and
any countervailing interests will be straightforward. For example, in relation to Case Study
One (Jackie) there are clearly no public interest reasons that justify overriding Jackie’s best
interests— not least because the publication of Jackie’s photograph is, in any event, illegal
and would constitute a breach of Jackie’s civil rights. In other cases, striking a balance
between competing interests would necessarily be more complex and would likely involve
an intense focus on the facts of the case at hand. It may involve placing countervailing
interests on a spectrum, much as the European Data Protection Working Party (‘Working
Party’) has suggested be done when determining, for the purpose of the right of erasure
in the proposed European Data Protection Directive, whether a data controller has
legitimate and compelling grounds sufficient to override the interests of a data subject in
the protection of their personal information.127 That is, the Working Party has suggested
that the interests of a data controller (and presumably those of any third party upon
whom a data controller is relying for the processing of data) could range from ‘insignificant
to somewhat important, to compelling’.128 Alternatively, the approach adopted by the
Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the recent case of Weller, the facts of which have
been set out previously, might be followed. Here the court, having determined that the
children who were subjects of an image had their rights to a private life under Article 8 of
ECHR129 engaged in relation to the capture and publication of an image of them, went on
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to consider how those rights should be balanced against the countervailing right to
freedom of expression in Article 10 of the ECHR. The court noted, in this regard, that:
although a child’s right is not a trump card in the balancing exercise, the primacy of the
best interests of a child mean that, where a child’s interests would be adversely affected,
they must be given considerable weight. It might require very powerful article 10 rights
(for example, exceptional reasons in the public interest) to outweigh a child’s article 8
rights where publication would be harmful to the child.130

The court also went on to cite with approval the judgment of Ward LJ in K v News Group
Newspapers Ltd,131 a section of which also seeks to place a particular value on different
forms of expression in the context of balancing one person’s Article 8 rights with another’s
Article 10 rights:
Here there is no political edge to the publication. The organisation of the economic, social
and political life of the country, so crucial to democracy, is not enhanced by publication.
The intellectual, artistic or personal development of members of society is not stunted by
ignorance of the sexual frolics of figures known to the public. As Lord Hope said of Miss
Campbell (paragraph 120 of Campbell v MGN Ltd), ‘it is not enough to deprive Miss
Campbell of her right to privacy that she is a celebrity and that her private life is
newsworthy.’132

That some types of expression should be regarded as more ‘deserving of protection’ than
others was also recognised by Baroness Hale in Campbell, who observed that political
speech was ‘top of the list’.133 It will be recalled that the ALRC’s list of public interest
matters (although not exhaustive) refers specifically to free expression, especially political
and artistic expression; however, commercial expression is not specifically mentioned.
Therefore, in determining where to strike a balance between the best interests of a child
who is an image subject and any countervailing interests, it is arguable that commercial
expression should rarely be considered an exceptional reason in the public interest to
justify overriding the child’s best interest. Moreover, there is some precedent for
regarding commercial expression as of ‘lower value’ than other forms of expression.134 On
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this basis, it could be concluded that where images are used for commercial purposes the
image subject’s reasonable interests in removing the image should prevail. Thus, in the
context of Case Study Three, Alison Chang’s reasonable interests would favour the
removal of the photograph from Virgin’s advertising campaign.135 If the photograph of the
schoolboy rowers (Case Study Seven) is used in a commercial context (for example, if the
voyeuristic website is accessible only to paying viewers) then, again, that commercial
expression would not justify overriding the best interests of the boys.
Where an image is not used for commercial purposes and where the publication or use of
the image is not otherwise illegal or contrary to an image subject’s civil or equitable rights,
it is likely to be more difficult to establish whether the public interest in permitting
ongoing publication and use outweighs the image subject’s best interests. In such cases
the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in Aubry136 is informative. The case was an
appeal by Les Éditions Vice‐Versa Inc, the publishers of an arts magazine that had
published a photograph of the respondent sitting on a steps in front of a building in
Montreal. The photograph was taken in a public place and without the consent of the
respondent. At the time the photograph was taken the respondent was 17 years old.137
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the right to one’s image was an element of
the right to privacy under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, a right that,
in this case, conflicted with another right guaranteed under the Charter, namely the right
to freedom of expression. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the
artistic expression of the photograph, which was alleged to have served to illustrate
contemporary urban life, cannot justify the infringement of the right to privacy it entails.
It has not been shown that the public’s interest in seeing this photograph is
predominant.138

Referring to the balancing exercise that needs to be undertaken whenever a person’s right
to privacy is in conflict with other rights, the majority expressed their view that ‘the
balancing of the rights in question depends both on the nature of the information and on
Expression and Tobacco in Canada’ (2008) 39 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 343, 363. In
Canada (Attorney‐General) v JTI‐MacDonald Corp [2007] 2 SCR 610 [47] the Supreme Court of Canada noted
that ‘When commercial expression is used, as alleged here, for the purposes of inducing people to engage
in harmful and addictive behaviour, its value becomes tenuous.’ It will be recalled from Chapter Four that
in the context of Google (Court of Justice of the European Communities, C‐131/1213 May 2014) [81], the
European Court of Justice regarded Google’s interests in processing personal information for the purposes
of its search engine as ‘merely economic’ and, as such, insufficient to justify an interference with a data
subject’s personal information — the court did not specifically the question as to whether these economic
interests would count as a form of ‘commercial expression’ cf Google, Case C‐131/12, Opinion of AG
Jääskinen [120], [122], [132].
135
A different (and anterior) question in respect of that scenario, however, is whether the take‐down
scheme should apply to images used in an offline context: that question is explored further below [Cross
REF].
136
Aubry [1998] 1 SCR 591.
137
Ibid [40] (L’Heureux‐Dubé, Bastarache, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ).
138
Ibid [62].

331

the situation of those concerned. This is a question that depends on the
context.’139 Similarly, Lamer CJ stated that ‘the content of the concept of public interest
depends on the nature of the information conveyed by the image and on the situation of
the parties involved.’140
This approach contains a clue as to how the balancing exercise in the context of a take‐
down scheme for unwanted images of children could be approached; that is, regard must
be had to the nature of the image and the situation as a whole. On this basis, where the
image in question is clearly harmful (in the sense of likely to cause psychological harm or
place the image subject in danger), or is (when considered objectively) embarrassing or
humiliating or where it depicts nudity or partial nudity, the public interest will be more
readily struck in favour of the child’s interests. However, the situation of the parties will
also be relevant, as will the context as a whole. Where there is more than one image
subject, the interests of the other image subjects need to be factored in, and where the
photographer is a child, those interests may result in the balance being struck in favour of
the photographer. Consent should also be a relevant factor, as should the forum of
publication — for example, whether the photograph was made available to a limited
audience, and whether the image formed part of news coverage — and whether or not
the child appears only incidentally in the image rather than being its intended subject.
When factoring in these other interests, however, it needs to be remembered that one
purpose of a take‐down scheme is to protect the freedom of expression of an image
subject who is a child.141 In other words, a regulator needs to take into account the right
to freedom of expression of the complainant (his or her right to choose whether and, if
so, how to present themselves), on the one hand, and the freedom of expression of any
other image subjects and the photographer and/or publisher, on the other. .
Applying that content and context test, it is possible to reach a view that Tim (Case Study
Two) should succeed in getting the image removed because it depicts partial nudity and,
judged objectively, might be considered embarrassing. Although the photographer was
also a child (who’s best interests need to be considered), the image is published on a
publically accessible Facebook page and without Tim’s consent. In addition, Tim’s
interests in freedom of expression should also be factored into the equation — if Tim has
no ability to secure removal of this image he may become more self‐conscious about how
he appears, even before his friends.
In relation to Case Study Four (Shabeeha), the fact that the image had been manipulated
to present Shabeeha in a false light suggests that the balance should be struck in
Shabeeha’s favour. The photograph has been taken by another young person (whose best
interests need to be considered), and might be considered an example of artistic
139
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expression. However, taking account of the situation as a whole, the potential impact of
the photograph on Shabeeha’s standing among family and friends may be another reason
to strike the balance in Shabeeha’s favour. The photograph also depicts another young
person, Matt, whose interests would also need to be taken into account. However, there
is nothing in the facts of the case study to suggest that Matt would object to the image
being removed.
In terms of Case Study Five (Tyger and Lilly), the photograph has been used to illustrate a
story about obesity on a news website. Although importance should be attached to
freedom of the media, the use of that particular photograph to illustrate the news story
is not a matter of public concern and importance. This is particularly the case because the
story about obesity does not relate to the children themselves — it has been chosen
merely as an illustration. Moreover, no attempt was made to obscure the identity of the
children, which, arguably, could easily have been done without compromising the overall
‘impact’ of the image. The photograph was not used with the consent of the children nor,
so far as is able to be ascertained, the consent of the children’s mother.142 In terms of the
content of the image, it depicts partial nudity and could, objectively, be described as
embarrassing. The fact that Tyger’s friends have seen the photograph and teased him
about being a ‘junk food addict’ (the photograph having been illustrated with the caption
‘Even very young children are addicted to junk food’) suggests that there is real harm
connected to the use of the photograph to illustrate the news story. In Weller, the Court
of Appeal referred, with approval, to a section of the judgment in the case of K in which
Ward LJ ‘concluded (without evidence) that the children in that case were “bound to be
harmed” because the invasion of privacy “would undermine the family as a whole and
because the playground is a cruel place”’.143 Therefore, unless a take‐down scheme
included carve‐outs for the media (as discussed above) a reasonable interests test would
likely result in the image being removed.
In relation to Case Study Six (Ben), the airing of footage depicting Ben in the aftermath of
a car accident would be regarded as an incidence of freedom of the media, and involves
reporting on a matter of public concern. Unlike the situation involving Tyger and Lilly (Case
Study Five), the footage is directly relevant to the story and not merely illustrative. In
terms of the content, there is nothing necessarily embarrassing (judged objectively) about
the content, although it is no doubt distressing for Ben to view it. There is a question as
to whether the reporting itself is sufficiently sensitive. Although it is not clear from the
case study whether the media organisation that aired the footing is committed to apply
the same editorial standards to its online footage as to footage that is broadcast on TV,
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being a commercial broadcaster the content of footage aired by the station will be
governed by standards in the Commercial Television Code of Practice. As already noted in
Chapter Four, that code provides that licensees must ‘exercise special care before using
material relating to a child’s personal or private affairs in the broadcast of a report of a
sensitive matter concerning the child’.144 The code also provides that licensees must
‘exercise sensitivity in broadcasting images of or interviews with bereaved relatives and
survivors or witnesses or traumatic incidents.’145 If the footage itself contravenes the code
this could therefore be a reason for striking the balance in favour of Ben’s interests and
removing the footage (assuming, of course, that the scheme does not include carve outs
for the media). However, this is certainly not clear‐cut. Reasons that count against the
take‐down of the content include the fact that the footage depicts several other children
who, it is said, are not concerned about appearing in the footage — although this is not
to say they would object to it being taken‐down. Considering the interests of the other
image subjects who are children would, however, be crucial in making a determination as
to where the balance should be struck. One possible way to factor in the interests of the
other image subjects could be by requiring that the footage of Ben’s face is pixelated. The
anonymisation or de‐identification of personal information was discussed in Section C
above. Although it was concluded that the inclusion of such requirements in the Privacy
Act would be of limited efficacy, the use of such mechanisms as an alternative to the take‐
down of an image could achieve a balance between competing interests. That said, given
that Ben would still be recognisable to many from the context of the footage, it is possible
that pixilation would do little to relieve Ben’s distress.
Case Study Seven (Schoolboy Rowers) involves an image that is not offensive or
objectionable but which has been used in the context of a voyeuristic website. If the
website is operated for commercial gain there is an argument — already advanced above
— that this will not constitute sufficient public interest to override the best interests of
the rowers in having the image removed. Even so, it is unlikely that there is any
‘exceptional public interest’ to override the boys’ best interests. The lack of consent to
the use and the context of publication, coupled with the real potential for distress on the
part of the image subjects and the fact that it sexualises the boys, would be sufficient to
strike the balance in favour of taking‐down the image. Of course, the fact that the image
is published offshore may make it difficult in practice for such take‐down notices to be
enforced — but this is a separate issue addressed later in this section. In addition, there
is the possibility (discussed earlier in this thesis) that the content of the image could, given
the context in which it has been published, constitute prohibited content according to the
criteria in the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), the
National Classification Code and the Guidelines for the Classification of Films and
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Computer Games 2005.146 If so, this would be another reason to strike the balance in
favour of the withdrawal of the image from publication.
Finally, in relation to Case Study Eight (Harry) there is nothing about the content of the
image (Harry standing at the bus stop) that could be considered (judged objectively)
harmful or embarrassing. Although Harry has not consented to the capture and use of his
image, there is public interest in free expression, which would include the interest of the
photographer (also a child) in taking and publishing the photograph. In this case, then,
although the on‐going publication of the photograph can be considered contrary to
Harry’s best interests, the balance would probably come down in favour of the best
interests of the photographer and the public interest in freedom of expression.
The illustrations above have shown that a take‐down scheme based on a ‘reasonable
interests’ test would allow for the take‐down of images in a range of situations, but would
not be automatic. In order to determine the reasonable interests of the image subject,
various criteria could be taken into account, as outlined above. It is not proposed,
however, that the above criteria are exhaustive. Indeed, the regulator charged with
overseeing the take‐down could be given broad discretion to take into account any
relevant consideration in determining whether a particular image should be taken down.
(b) Would a Take‐Down Scheme Apply to Offline Images?
A take‐down scheme could be limited to the removal of online images, or could also apply
to images published in more traditional media such as in print versions of newspapers and
magazines, on television, in books and on billboard advertisements. Broadening the
scheme in this way would, however, raise a number of issues. One issue is that the
removal of images that have been published in traditional media will often be impractical
or even impossible, such as where books and newspapers have already been distributed
and are no longer under a publisher’s control. However, this issue could be resolved by
requiring a publisher or content host to delete images only in circumstances where they
maintain sufficient control over the place in which the image in question is published.147
Another issue is that deletion of images from print media, even where practical, would
likely entail greater costs for the publisher. For example, if Virgin Mobile were required to
remove the image of Alison Chang from its billboard advertisements, there would be costs
associated with this — not only the physical costs of removing material but the cost of
replacing the advertisements with something else. These costs are not peculiar to the
removal of images from print, but given the nature of the print medium, are likely to be
greater than the costs incurred in removing and replacing images in a digital medium.
Arguably, however, these costs can be avoided altogether if organisations ensure they
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have an image subject’s consent to the use of their image (on the assumption, of course,
that the provision of consent would preclude an image subject from subsequently calling
for the removal of an image — as discussed above ).
Another issue with extending a take‐down scheme to images published or used in ‘offline’
media, is that many of these other forums are already regulated in other ways. Content
broadcast on TV and radio is subject to co‐regulation, whereby most aspects of program
content are covered by industry codes developed in consultation with ACMA.148 ACMA
also has a role in handling complaints and, where warranted, imposing sanctions on
broadcasters.149 By contrast, print media is largely self‐regulated,150 as is the content of
advertisements.151 Regulation of content in books, films and computer games is subject
to direct regulation by government.152 Extending a take‐down to all these forums would
entail complexity and raise numerous issues in terms of the interaction between the
existing forms of regulation and the take‐down scheme.
On the other hand, the current environment is one of media convergence153 and it is
arguably unrealistic to restrict a take‐down scheme to content based purely on the forum
in which material is published. The ALRC, for example, has noted that media convergence
has had a ‘transformational impact on media and communications industries’ in response
to which ‘radical changes to the policy framework’ are required.154 In response to the
transformations brought about by media convergence, a number of submissions to the
ALRC Classification — Content Regulation and Convergent Media inquiry highlighted the
necessity of a more ‘platform‐neutral approach to media content regulation and
classification’.155 Ultimately, this chapter recognises that there are important questions as
to whether a take‐down scheme should be limited to online content or should apply more
generally, and as to whether there should be exemptions related to the type of forum on
which content is hosted. This thesis does not seek to resolve those questions, as the focus
has been on the harms attendant on online publication of images. However, it is
recommended that further research be conducted into the effects of the use of images of
children in whatever medium they are published, which could inform the resolution of
these questions.
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(c) Who Would a Take‐Down Scheme Apply to?
A take‐down scheme in respect of images could be more or less limited. It could, for
example, only apply to individuals who are directly responsible for the posting of images:
in the context of the regime established under the Online Safety Act these individuals are
referred to as end‐users. However, given what has been said about the speed and extent
of dissemination in the online environment in particular, limiting the scheme to end‐users
would be of limited efficacy. Moreover, it is not always possible for an image subject to
easily identify who is responsible for initial publication. In order to be effective, then, the
scheme would require the removal of material by internet content hosts. In the online
environment, the scheme could be limited to social media providers, as is the case with
respect to the take‐down regime established under the Online Safety Act. There are
advantages in limiting a scheme to participating internet content hosts. As discussed in
the section on ‘enforcement and implementation‘ in Part Four below, having a
participatory scheme overcomes jurisdictional obstacles in relation to the removal of
online content. It is also likely to reduce the costs incurred by the government in enforcing
such a scheme. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why a take‐down scheme should be
limited to social media services, in the same way that the scheme established under the
Online Safety Act is. Although it is true that social media services represent a prevalent
means of communication between children, this thesis has argued that the unwanted
online publication of images of children or their subsequent use where that is also
unwanted exposes children to the risk of harm regardless of the forum of communication.
There is no reason in principle to exclude from a take‐down scheme images used to
illustrate websites and blogs that are not considered social media services.156
As to whether the scheme should be extended to material published offline, this has
already been discussed above.
(d) Would Requests be Mediated by a Court or a Regulator?
A take‐down scheme in relation to images of children, based on a ‘reasonable interests
test’, could require take‐down requests to be addressed to the end‐user and any others
responsible for publication directly. In the event that the publisher or host refused to
comply with the request, the person making the request could take legal action through
the courts, or could complain to a statutory officer or ombudsman who would then be
empowered to investigate. Alternatively, a scheme could require such requests to be
addressed, in the first instance, to a court or other regulator.
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As to whether end‐users (where readily identifiable) should be approached directly by an
image subject before complaint is made, there are arguments for and against this. It is
possible that addressing take‐down requests directly to end‐users would result in the
successful removal of an image without necessitating any involvement by regulators.
However, some young people may be reluctant to approach the end‐user in the first
instance.157 Therefore, it is suggested that if a young person has not requested the end‐
user to remove the image in the first instance, they be required to state their reasons for
this when applying to the regulator.
It will be recalled that the scheme established by the Online Safety Act requires requests
to be addressed to social media service providers, who then have a short period of time
to take‐down the material before a complaint is addressed to the e‐Safety Commissioner.
One advantage of this approach is that in those cases where the social media service
agrees to remove the content, it omits entirely the time, expense and inconvenience of
the involvement of a regulator. However, one difference between that scheme and a
broader take‐down scheme for images proposed here is that the former scheme applies
to cyberbullying material, the posting of which is likely contrary to the terms of service of
the applicable internet content hosts, and often considered to contravene social norms.
There is therefore some ‘intrinsic motivation’ for those content hosts to remove the
content themselves. In the case of a broader take‐down scheme for images of children,
the posting of many images will not be contrary to the terms and conditions of the content
hosts (who in fact want to encourage users to post images of others). Neither is the
posting of images of others necessarily contrary to social norms. Accordingly, internet
content hosts are unlikely to ‘voluntarily’ remove such material, absent direction from a
regulator, and would likely regard the non‐mandated removal of such images as highly
unpopular with end‐users.
A scheme that required application to be made to a court of law in the first instance would
be a significant barrier to young people for reasons already discussed above, and would
render the scheme largely ineffective. It would also represent a significant burden for the
taxpayer. It is suggested, therefore, that a regulator, rather than the courts, should play a
mediating role in deciding whether images should be taken‐down, based on the
‘reasonable interest’ test. This would undoubtedly raise concerns that a regulator is not
as qualified as the courts to make a determination between the best interests of image
subject and countervailing public interests. However, detailed guidance for a regulator
could be developed within the statute implementing the take‐down scheme.
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2 Key Benefits
A scheme that provided children with a mechanism to facilitate the remove of online
images, or the removal of a particular image from publication, would give children greater
control over the online publication of their image, or its use in a particular context, than
they currently enjoy. As illustrated in the previous section, a reasonable interests test
could operate in favour of all of the image subjects in the case studies set out in Chapter
Four, with the exception of Case Study Eight (Harry). Nevertheless, this part of the chapter
only considers a take‐down scheme applicable to online content, which would rule out its
availability to Alison (Case Study Three). Should the scheme be extended to offline
content, Alison is likely to satisfy the reasonable interests test — for reasons previously
outlined.
The nature of a take‐down scheme is such that it operates only after the event of
publication. Therefore, it is ineffective as a way of preventing unwanted publication and
is also unlikely to have the same deterrent effect as a civil remedy vis‐a‐vis unauthorised
publication; this is because there would generally be no ‘penalties’ for or recompense
payable by the person responsible for publishing the image — unless that person refused
to comply with a take‐down request. For this reason, the option is also less likely to
influence social norms around the publishing of images of children.
A take‐down scheme that was supported by a regulator complaints mechanism would
overcome some of the access to justice issues that arise when a person is required to take
formal legal action. Nevertheless, it would be important to ensure that the availability of
such a scheme was sufficiently socialised among the scheme’s most important
stakeholders: namely, children and young people.158 It is also important to be clear about
the complaints process and whether others should be entitled to complain on behalf of a
child. The Online Safety Act does permit complaints and take‐down requests to be
addressed to the e‐Safety Commissioner by a person on behalf of a child.159 Without
expressing a final view on that issue, it is suggested here that there would be facility for
take‐down requests to be issued on behalf of an image subject who is a child. In that case,
consideration would then need to be directed to the question of whether removal of the
image is in the best interests of the image subject on whose behalf the request is being
made.
Practical considerations relating to the enforcement and implementation of a take‐down
scheme are discussed further below. In addition, consideration would need to be given to
how an image subject would be able to establish to a regulator and any internet content
host that it is they who are depicted in any given image — this might be difficult if an
image has been doctored to make the image subject appear differently to the way they
158
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appear in reality. For example, although an individual might be able to recognise
themselves in an image even when it is shot from a distance, the likelihood of others
recognising the image subject may be lower. Some guidance can be obtained here from
the way in which images are determined to be ‘personal information’ (or not) for the
purposes of the Privacy Act but further consideration would need to be given to such
issues.
Another practical issue relates to the fact that images, even once removed from
publication, can always be re‐posted. If this occurs the image subject would then have to
repeat the process of issuing a take‐down notice and could, potentially, be trapped in an
endless cycle of issuing take‐down requests. The ability to issue an end‐user notice,
requiring an end‐user to remove a particular image and refrain from reposting that image
or similar images, would go some way to mitigating this problem, particularly if it was
backed up with consequences for a failure to comply.160 However, it is not always possible
for an image subject to identify who is responsible for posting an image. It is possible, also,
that a ‘code’ solution might be found to this problem, such as that discussed in relation to
the problem of individuals posting and re‐posting images removed from publication
pursuant to the Privacy Act.
A take‐down scheme that facilitated the removal of unwanted images, subject to a
reasonable interests test, would certainly impact upon other rights and freedoms,
particularly freedom of expression and the rights of copyright owners in respect of images
in which they own copyright. However, given that the test requires the image subject’s
interests to be balanced with countervailing interests, including the public interest in free
expression, these interests would be taken into account. That said, if it is for end‐users or
internet content hosts to decide whether to take‐down images upon request in the first
instance, there is an argument that the public interest and countervailing interests would
be in danger of being overlooked. That is, internet content hosts may be disposed to
remove content upon receipt of a request rather than incur the time and costs necessary
to make a determination between the image subject’s interests and countervailing
interests.
The impact of a take‐down scheme on the rights and interests of others is also necessarily
limited, by its nature. Firstly, it is limited to images, rather than to information generally.
Secondly, it is limited to images that depict a child (or children) and only applies where
that child (or children) does not want the image to be published or used in a particular
way (or where it is otherwise established that publication is contrary to a child’s best
interest). A scheme that did not in itself impose liability in respect of the publication of

160

As is the case under the Online Safety Act s 48, which provides that non‐compliance with an end‐user
notice can result in an injunction.

340

images would be unlikely to have a chilling effect on expression, as it would not deter the
capture or publication of images.
3 Conclusion as to the Efficacy of this Option
A take‐down scheme has certain limitations, such as the fact that it would not be effective
to prevent or deter the unwanted publication of images, and would need to be designed
in such a way that it enabled the reasonable interests of an image subject to be
determined. Such a scheme would also need to address a number of practical
considerations. Nevertheless, a take‐down scheme could significantly reduce children’s
vulnerability to harm arising from unwanted on‐going publication. A take‐down scheme
specifically and directly addresses the problem with which this thesis is concerned — that
is, it provides for the take‐down of unwanted images and does so by assessing whether
the image subject has a reasonable interest in removal of the image, rather than focusing
on the motives or behaviour of a third party in taking or publishing the image. While it has
been argued that the take‐down of an image should not depend entirely upon an image
subject’s wishes, the scheme nevertheless allows for consideration of those wishes and
recognises that an image subject may (legitimately) object to the publication of an image
even though, objectively speaking, the image may be considered benign. Such a scheme
also recognises that image subjects may suffer harm even where the image in question is
considered ‘benign’161 and that ongoing harm can occur as a result of the continued
publication of an image, beyond any harm that may be suffered on initial publication.
G

Summary of this Part

This part of the chapter evaluated a number of possible law reform options in overview
and considered the net benefit of each. With the exception of a take‐down scheme in
relation to images of children, none of the options discussed is designed to specifically
address the problem with which this thesis is concerned, and none of them is limited to
children. Although each of the options would give children greater control over the online
publication or their image or its subsequent use than they currently enjoy, the only option
that offers any sort of effective solution to the particular problem with which this thesis
is concerned is the introduction of a take‐down scheme, albeit one that is subject to a
reasonable interests test. The following part of this chapter therefore analyses in more
detail the costs and benefits associated with the introduction of such a scheme.
IV

MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF A TAKE‐DOWN SCHEME

The first section of this part considers the extent to which there is public mandate for a
take‐down scheme for images of children, as outlined in Part Three, Section F of this
chapter. This part then analyses some of the costs related to the introduction of a take‐
down scheme for images of children: specifically fiscal costs and enforcement and
161
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implementation difficulties. A full costs/benefit analysis is, of course, beyond the scope of
this thesis, not least because it would need to include economic analysis of likely costs to
society (and savings to government).
A

Public Mandate in Respect of a Take‐Down Scheme

An obvious benefit of any regulatory option is public support for that option.162 Naturally,
where there is public support for a particular option there is a greater chance that the
government will be prepared to legislate to introduce it. Public support is also important
in securing enforcement and compliance. When referring to the ‘public’ mandate,
however, it is important to bear in mind that there are various sections of the public
whose interests will not necessarily coincide. For example, the views of those who would
be required to comply with any new laws, perhaps at some cost, would likely differ from
the views of those who stand to benefit most from the laws. The views of a diverse range
of stakeholders therefore need to be considered: an exercise which, in practice, involves
extensive public consultation on the various options presented.
Given that this thesis is concerned with children and takes a child rights‐based approach
to the issue of unwanted online publication of images or their use, an essential
component of any option adopted should be that it gives due weight to the views of
children.163 Taking account of children’s views is also central to the concept of children as
digital citizens, whereby children as active participants in the digital world are seen as
having both rights and responsibilities in relation to accessing, creating and sharing
content.164 However, as is noted below, there is a paucity of research on the views of
children and young people regarding online publication of images or their use. Therefore,
further research in this area is one of the key recommendations to come out of this thesis.
Any proposal to introduce a take‐down scheme for images of children would need to be
subject to public consultation. However, given some of the submissions made to the
government’s consultation on its Enhancing Online Safety for Children proposals, there is
likely to be significant opposition to such a scheme from a number of quarters.
In 2014 the Australian Government undertook a process of public consultation on its
proposals to enhance online safety for children by, among other things, the institution of
a rapid removal scheme for ‘harmful’ content targeted at an Australian child.165 A number
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of submissions were opposed to the scheme on various grounds, including that it would
represent a serious threat to freedom of expression,166 would be ineffective167 and would
be unrealistic168 or unnecessary.169 That proposed scheme was intended to be limited to
the takedown of ‘harmful’ material, which was not defined in the consultation paper but
which was apparently intended to apply to ‘cyberbullying material’ (indeed the scheme
actually introduced is limited to ‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australian child’).
As such, it can be assumed that there would be even greater opposition to a take‐down
scheme not limited to cyberbullying material but which took the position, as is suggested
here, that the ongoing publication or use of images of a child, where that is unwanted by
the child in question, is presumed to be contrary to the child’s best interests. A scheme
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that did not provide exemptions for media would also be strongly objected to by media
interests, and this would add to the challenge of enacting relevant legislation.
On the other hand, many of the loudest voices in opposition to the rapid removal scheme
proposed by the Enhancing Online Safety for Children consultation were raised
(unsurprisingly) by industry groups representing the interests of those would be likely to
incur costs in implementing any take‐down requests. That is, they were raised by internet
intermediaries and internet content hosts such as Facebook, Google and lobby groups
representing the interests of these stakeholders. It is possible that if these interests are
put to one side, a broader social mandate for the introduction of a take‐down scheme for
images, in one or other of the forms referred to, might be discernible. It has been
observed in the context of consultation on the Enhancing Online Safety for Children
proposals that although ‘industry is opposed to heavy handed regulation’, child protection
organisations and education bodies had ‘advocated strongly’ for such a scheme. 170
Importantly, in determining any social mandate the views of children themselves are
fundamental and must be taken into consideration. In this regards, Chapter Five has
already referred to the fact that there appears to be general support among young people
for greater control over their images in the online environment, including support for the
ability to take‐down an image where the image subject has not consented to its posting.
Nevertheless, it is clear that more research would be needed as to the views of young
people specifically vis‐a‐vis an image take‐down scheme,171 as well as to the views of the
broader society.
B

Burdens

In terms of the burdens of any regulatory options considered, this chapter limits itself to
considering two areas: fiscal costs, and the difficulties of implementation and
enforcement. Each of these areas is expanded upon below.
1 Fiscal Costs
In accordance with the Australian Government’s Guide to Regulation, the ‘Regulatory
Burden Measurement Framework’ is to be used to quantify the likely regulatory costs on
business, individuals and community organisations imposed by any new regulations or
changes to existing regulations.172 The Regulatory Burden Measurement Framework, as
outlined in a Guidance Note to the Framework, requires that consideration be given to
the various types of regulatory costs, namely compliance costs and delay costs.173
Compliance costs are further divided into substantive compliance costs, defined as those
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which are ‘incurred to deliver the regulated outcomes being sought’, and administrative
costs, which are those ‘incurred primarily to demonstrate compliance with the
regulation’.174
Examples of substantive compliance costs are costs associated with staff training, the
purchase or maintenance of plant and machinery, costs associated with providing
information to third parties, operational costs and the costs of any professional services
that are required to ensure compliance (for example, legal and accounting advice).175
Examples of administrative costs are those associated with making, keeping and providing
records and notification to government, conducting tests, making applications and any
compliance costs associated with financial costs, for example, the time taken to pay a
licence fee, as well as costs relating to time spent to demonstrate compliance.176
Delay costs are expenses and any loss of income incurred by a regulated entity and that
are associated with delays related to submitting an application or awaiting approval
before a particular operation can commence.177 It is not anticipated that a take‐down
scheme for images would entail delay costs. This is because none of the reform options
presented makes the commencement of a particular activity or process contingent upon
any application or approval process. Therefore, delay costs are not considered further in
the context of undertaking a cost/benefit analysis of the take‐down scheme outlined
above.
A number of costs are excluded from the Regulatory Burden Measurement Framework.
Without listing here all excluded costs, they include opportunity costs (‘the value of
opportunities that cannot be realized because of the regulatory intervention’)178 and taxes
and charges payable to government as a result of regulation being introduced or
amended.179 Also excluded are any costs of non‐compliance, including fines and legal and
process fees.180 For that reason, these costs are also not considered here.
Actual costing of the take‐down scheme proposed in this chapter is beyond the scope of
this thesis. Nevertheless, it is important to provide a brief overview of the types of costs
that will be incurred as a result of the implementation and enforcement of this option,
and to consider who will bear the burden of these.
A take‐down scheme would potentially entail significant additional costs for content hosts
and publishers subject to the scheme, in order to ensure compliance. As already noted in
the previous section, costs associated with taking‐down content might include the ‘cost’
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of staff time in locating and removing relevant material, as well as costs related to the
institution of systems and processes. There may well be indirect costs, such as
‘reputational’ damage and even loss of business if a content host is seen to favour other’s
interests over those of their users or customers. This is particularly a risk if images are
removed upon receipt of a take‐down request from (or on behalf of) the image subject
rather than upon direction from a regulator. The scope of any take‐down scheme would
impact the extent to which reputational damage was incurred and business lost. Limiting
the scheme to large social media sites, for example, could result in a migration of accounts
to smaller services.
Content hosts might also need to develop tools to allow for the reporting of images, as
well as to assist with verification of the identity of the image subject. It is possible that
services hosting the content of others, such as social media platforms, would need to incur
costs in amending terms and conditions of service. For example, while social media sites
often reserve to themselves broad discretion to remove content that violates their terms
and conditions, the posting of ‘benign’ images of others would not necessarily constitute
a violation of those terms and conditions. 181
The scope of any take‐down scheme naturally influences the costs associated with
compliance. A scheme that allowed the take‐down of material on the basis of an image
subject’s reasonable interests would potentially entail a relatively high volume of
requests. In addition, a non‐participatory scheme, or one that applied to a broad range of
content hosts, would be more expensive. In the Regulation Impact Statement that forms
part of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Enhancing Online Safety for Children Bill
2015, it is noted that the costs of a participatory take‐down scheme, with incentives for
participation, would be less than those associated with a non‐participatory scheme. This
is because social media sites that choose to participate would already have systems and
procedures in place to deal with the investigation and implementation of removal
requests.182 Likewise, a participatory take‐down scheme modelled on similar lines to the
rapid removal scheme set up under the Online Safety Act, or one limited to large social
media sites, would probably entail fewer costs, given that social media sites already have
processes in place for taking‐down material. Additionally, large social media sites have
already made significant investments in reporting tools that allow users to report content,
181
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and would likely be better placed than other content hosts to verify the age and identity
of complainants.183
In terms of the cost to the Australian economy, the introduction of a broad‐ranging take‐
down scheme for images could deter content hosts from establishing an Australian
presence.184 Moreover, Australian participants may be unduly disadvantaged.185 This is
directly related to challenges of enforcement, which are discussed below. There are also
societal costs involved in establishing the regulatory processes around a take‐down
scheme — this would include funding a regulator to issue or moderate take‐down
requests. However, some of these costs would be reduced if additional functions were
given to an existing office holder — such as the e‐Safety Commissioner.
2 Enforcement and Implementation Difficulties
One of the biggest challenges of a take‐down scheme for images would be the challenges
of enforcement of such a scheme vis‐a‐vis individuals or entities not located in Australia.
This was recognised by the ALRC in its 2014 report on Serious Invasions of Privacy, in which
the ALRC acknowledged that a take‐down mechanism may have limited effect where
material is hosted overseas.186 The challenges of enforcement in relation to material
hosted overseas were also noted by the government in its discussion paper on Enhancing
Online Safety for Children: ‘where a social media site is not located, or does not have a
sufficient presence in Australia, enforcement of the … regulatory measures is likely to be
more difficult.’187 A number of submissions made to that discussion paper touched on
enforcement issues. The Australian Federal Police, for example, explains that it relies on
the cooperation of international companies in support of law enforcement operations.188
ACMA has noted that:
Global supply chains and the enhanced capacity of citizens to create and distribute
content can result in complex cross‐border regulatory problems that often require the
involvement of an expanded set of participants across industry sectors to contribute to
market‐based and regulatory solutions.189

In a submission to the ALRC, ACMA notes the existence of formal mechanisms both in
Australia and internationally to ensure the rapid removal of illegal content.190 However,
the majority of images subject to a proposed take‐down scheme would neither be ‘illegal’
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nor contrary to social norms — either in Australia or overseas. In this context offshore
enforcement is even more problematic.
One way to increase the enforceability of regulations relating to online content hosted
overseas is through international treaties or agreements. In the field of copyright, for
example, established treaties and agreements underpin regulatory strategies.191
Developing new international agreements with respect to the protection of children
against harm in relation to the internet and digital media is something that has been
canvassed by some. For example, in the context of its submission to the Australian
Government’s consultation on enhancing protection for children in the online
environment, BoysTown commented as follows:
There is currently international concern about cyber‐bullying and other cyber‐risks to
children and young people. Consequently there may be scope to develop an international
treaty to respond to this issue.
One practical option to advance this matter would be through a review of the current
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This Convention was originally endorsed by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1989 prior to the widespread adoption of information
technology. The Australian Government through its United Nations representatives could
propose that the Convention be reviewed in light of advancements with Information
Technologies and our contemporary understanding of impacts on children from cyber
malpractices. Possibly an Addendum to the current Convention could be developed in
respect to cyber related issues. Signatories to the Convention which includes most
countries would then be responsible for developing domestic legislation to give effect to
any new provision of the Convention.192

The possibility of adopting a new Optional Protocol, or even a new CRC on digital media
and children’s rights, was also addressed during the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s
2014 day of general discussion on ‘Digital Media and Children’s Rights’. In response to this
proposal, however, a number of participants cautioned that new legal instruments could
create uncertainties, and that building upon existing norms and standards, and ensuring
their effective implementation, was preferable.193 However, the importance of applying a
‘digital‐age specific interpretation of every article, adapted to today’s realities’ was
stressed.194 Ultimately, then, greater international consensus on the publication of images
of children would assist in developing appropriate and enforceable legal responses. At
present, the lack of in‐depth research on the effects of non‐consensual publication of
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images of children and young people on development is a barrier to developing that
consensus.
Aside from the difficulties associated with the enforcement of a take‐down scheme
outside of Australia there are difficulties inherent in any regulation of online information.
Thierrer has outlined five unique problems for information control efforts: (1) media and
technological convergence; (2) decentralised, distributed networking; (3) unprecedented
scale of networked communications; (4) an explosion in the overall volume of
information; and (5) unprecedented information sharing through user‐generation of
content and self‐revelation of data.195 In the present context, the first of these problems
is essentially concerned with the fact that an image, once online, can be reproduced
across various platforms and media, often instantaneously. For example, an image from
one Facebook page can be republished on a news service website, be tweeted and
retweeted, find its way into printed press, be used to illustrate a blog and so on. The
second of these problems notes the ‘mercurial nature’ of information in digital form.196
The other problems are self‐explanatory. It is clear that these problems would certainly
present challenges to the operationalisation of a take‐down scheme in relation to images.
At the same time, many of them contribute to the potential harm that can arise due to
the unwanted online publication of an image or its subsequent use. Thierrer posits that
due, in part, to these challenges, it makes more sense to consider alternative, less
restrictive approaches, such as education, awareness‐building and empowerment
strategies.197 While it is agreed that such strategies are indeed necessary, it is here
submitted that a regulatory approach in the form of a take‐down scheme should not be
ruled out on the basis that its efficacy may be limited. This is echoed in the ALRC’s
response to concerns raised about enforcement of a take‐down scheme for privacy‐
invasive material, where the ALRC expressed the view that the ‘possibility of the
mechanism having limited effect in some cases is not, in itself, a reason not to make the
mechanism available in those cases where it may be effective.’198 The words of the Hon.
Michael Kirby, albeit in relation to protection of privacy, are also worth recalling: ‘I do not
pretend that it is easy to safeguard privacy in the current age. But surrendering the
endeavour as just too difficult to achieve is not an option.199
The constitutionality of a take‐down scheme such as that described above is not likely to
be an issue. The Commonwealth has power under section 51(v) of the Australian
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Constitution in respect of ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services’. This
power has been relied upon, for example, to make provisions in respect of the
classification of online and mobile content.200 The Commonwealth could also rely on the
external affairs power in section 51(xxix) if such legislation is designed to recognise
Australia’s international obligations under the CRC. Any legislation implementing a take‐
down scheme would, however, need to contain constitutional safeguards — such as by
providing that it would not apply to the extent that it would impinge on the constitutional
doctrine of implied freedom of political communication and would not be exercised in
such a way as to prevent the exercise of the powers, or the performance of functions of a
government of a state or territory.201
C

Net Benefit

In summary, a take‐down scheme could provide children or possibly their representatives
with the ability to call for the removal of their image from publication in the online
context, or generally. A scheme accessible to children based upon a child’s reasonable
interests could significantly reduce children’s vulnerability to harm arising from unwanted
publication. However, a take‐down scheme cannot entirely solve the problem with which
this thesis is concerned, given that it would not prevent the publication of images in the
first place.
Given that the justificatory basis of any law reform options presented in this chapter is
the child’s right to development, a scheme that took no account of competing public
interests, including interests in freedom of expression, is clearly unsupportable. In this
regard, there is inherent tension between the rights and interests of those publishing,
sharing, hosting and accessing images and those who are the subject of an image. There
is also the potential for tension between the interests of image subjects themselves —
where there is more than one. Striking an appropriate balance between these competing
interests would be essential to the design of any take‐down scheme. One way to strike a
balance, as discussed above, is to limit a take‐down scheme to images that are contrary
to an image subject’s ‘reasonable interests’. As to what those interests are in a given case,
a non‐exhaustive list of criteria, such as those enumerated in Part Three, Section F could
be taken into account. Such a scheme could provide important protection for children,
although exceptions could apply for images used in a media context.
This section considered a take‐down scheme limited to online material, rather than one
that would apply to offline images. It was noted that the discussion in this thesis cannot
support a scheme that applies to images published offline, even if the image was initially
published online. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to justify treating offline publication
of images taken from the internet differently to the offline publication of images taken
200
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from a different source. The broader question as to whether a take‐down scheme should
apply in respect of any unwanted publication of an image, regardless of the medium of
publication and the source of the image, is therefore an important one; one that is not
resolved in this thesis, but should be examined more closely in future research.
There are significant costs associated with any take‐down scheme, as well as practical
issues associated with enforcement and implementation. While the challenges of
enforcement are not easily surmountable, this is not necessarily a reason to reject
outright a scheme that would still have some impact. Ultimately, whether the benefits of
such a scheme would be worth the associated costs and enforcement challenges would
need to be considered further. In this regard, it is essential to obtain greater insight into
and evidence of the long‐term risks and harm associated with the online publication of
images. Hence it is a key recommendation of this thesis that further research needs to be
undertaken into the developmental implications of the unwanted online publication of
images or their subsequent use.
Having determined that a take‐down scheme is the only option among those presented
that is likely to be effective in solving the problem with which this thesis is concerned, the
following part of the chapter offers some general conclusions.
V

CONCLUSIONS

A take‐down scheme for images of children, in the form outlined in Part Three, Section F
of this Chapter, is the only option from those presented that addresses the problem with
which this thesis is concerned directly rather than incidentally. As such, the option can be
tailored to address that problem in a way which achieves the best balance between the
interests, rights and freedoms of an image subject who is a child against the interests,
rights and freedoms of others affected by the removal or threat of removal of an image.
It is submitted that a reasonable interests test achieves this balance. It has been argued
that a take‐down scheme should not be limited to the removal of material from social
media services. Whether any such take‐down scheme should be limited to the removal of
images from an online medium or media, however, is an important question that could
be resolved through further consultation and the use of evidence as to the extent of harm
arising from publication in ‘offline’ contexts. It was noted that the arguments made in this
thesis have focused on the developmental harm arising from online publication. There are
also important questions as to whether certain publishers or information providers such
as the media should be exempt from any such take‐down scheme.
In concluding that a take‐down scheme is the best option, it is necessary to bear in mind,
however, that not all information necessary to properly evaluate each option is available.
As noted in the previous part of the chapter, there has been no public consultation on the
introduction of a take‐down scheme in relation to images of children. Neither has there
been any significant public consultation in respect of other options canvassed (other than
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the introduction of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy and, to a far lesser
extent, the introduction of an APP requiring the deletion of personal information in
certain circumstances). Moreover, a full cost/benefit analysis of each option has not been
undertaken in this chapter.
It is also important to realise that a take‐down scheme cannot offer a complete solution
to the problem. This is for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that the mere
existence of a legal mechanism that provides an image subject with greater control over
their image does not ensure that the mechanism can or will be accessed. There may be
practical or other issues that affect an individual’s ability or willingness to access the
relevant legal tools. For example, the cost and complexity of legal processes can represent
real barriers to children and young people in accessing the legal tools that would
otherwise give them greater control. Moreover, even when legal remedies exist,
enforcement might be difficult and the efficacy of such a scheme is also constrained by
the unique problems of regulating online information that were discussed in Part Four,
Section B above. Another reason why a take‐down scheme cannot offer a complete
solution is because there is a need to balance the interests, rights and freedoms of
children who are the subject of an image or images with the interests, rights and freedoms
of those who capture and share images, as well as those who use them or make available
the means by which others are able to publish them (for example, social media providers
that make it possible for people to upload images and share them with others). In
particular, given that this thesis advocates a child‐rights approach to the problem of the
unwanted publication of online images of children, the rights and freedoms of other
children and young people must be respected. Therefore, it is necessary to recognise the
fact that neither the right to development, nor the right to privacy, nor any other right set
out in the CRC that provides the basis for a legal response to the problem with which this
thesis is concerned, is absolute.
A take‐down scheme also has inherent limitations — most fundamentally, perhaps, the
difficulties of enforcement.
Although this option is likely to be more costly than many of the other options considered,
some of those costs can be offset by utilising the existing framework created by the rapid
removal provisions of the Online Safety Act.
Reaching the conclusion that a take‐down scheme is the option best suited to address the
problem with which this thesis is concerned is not to say that such a scheme should be
implemented to the exclusion of the other law reform options presented in this chapter.
Rather, it is suggested here that this option should be viewed as one tool among the
various regulatory and non‐regulatory tools that would be needed to provide an adequate
response to the risks of harm outlined in this thesis. Some of the other options discussed
are also important tools in providing this response. A cause of action for invasion of
privacy has been recommended by the ALRC to fill gaps in Australian law and to more fully
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implement into Australian domestic law the right to privacy enshrined in Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.202 Widespread consultation with a
diverse range of stakeholders has been undertaken in respect of that option and, it is
submitted, the failure to enact legislation giving effect to it represents continued failure
on the part of the Australian Government to fully respect and protect a fundamental right
in accordance with its international obligations to do so. Former High Court Justice the
Hon Michael Kirby recently described Australia’s lack of adequate privacy protection as
‘unacceptable’.203
Further consideration should also be given to the insertion in the Privacy Act of a
requirement on the part of APP Entities to delete data in certain circumstances. The ALRC
has observed that the current APPs may not offer individuals a ‘simple mechanism to
request the destruction or de‐identification’ of personal information. A right to delete has
been described as a crucial weapon against data vulnerability and the promotion of
individual autonomy,204 and the importance of such a right to delete has long been
recognised in Europe, and is enshrined in the current Data Protection Directive as well as
in the Proposed Data Protection Regulation.
A requirement to anonymise or de‐identify images could, in many circumstances,
represent a useful compromise between the rights of an image subject and the rights of
third parties or other image subjects, particularly if this was used in conjunction with a
take‐down scheme, achieving a better balance between competing rights and interests
than the take‐down of images alone.
Although Mayer‐Schönberger’s code solution to the persistence of personal information
is unlikely to address the problem with which this thesis is concerned, code solutions to
the problem may ultimately prove to be the most effective, particularly if they are able to
overcome the problems of enforcement that are inherent in any solution designed to
regulate publication of material in the online environment.205
Finally, while this chapter has considered that that a property‐rights approach to personal
information may be desirable, it was noted that there is still a need to consider the
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mechanisms by which this right could be realised. As such, a property‐rights approach
should not be viewed as a potential law reform option in itself, but rather as a particular
approach to regulation that could underpin various concrete law reform options.
Having considered a number of law reform options and determined which among them
offers the greatest net benefit in terms of addressing the problem with which this thesis
is concerned, the following chapter summarises the research in this thesis on a chapter
by chapter basis and sets out the key findings and recommendations arising from it.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
I

INTRODUCTION

The central proposition of this thesis is that Australian law should be reformed to give
children greater control over their image in the online environment than they currently
enjoy. In arguing for that proposition this thesis identified the problem to which a solution
is sought, explained why government action is needed and proposed a solution or partial
law reform solution to the problem, having evaluated a number of options. The approach
taken in this research has been based around most of the RIS questions contained in the
Australian Government’s Guide to Regulation,1 and enumerated in Chapter One. This
allowed the thesis to adopt an applied approach, bearing in mind that, as noted in Chapter
One, policy research is, essentially, pragmatic.2 The RIS framework itself also serves as a
reminder that ‘regulation necessarily carries with it its own costs’.3 The RIS approach also
provides a useful and ‘robust’ framework to evaluate regulatory proposals.4
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to briefly summarise the previous chapters,
articulate key findings and offer some recommendations to address the problem with
which this thesis is concerned. The structure of the remainder of this chapter follows the
RIS framework so that Part II refers back to and summarises Chapters Two to Six, thus
restating the problem with which this thesis is concerned, explaining why government
action is necessary and proposing and evaluating law reform solutions. Part III then
highlights a number of key findings from the research before moving on, in Part IV, to
outline a number of recommendations and finally, in Part V, to offer some concluding
statements.
II

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ONE TO SIX
A

Restating the Problem

Chapter One noted that images, in all forms, are powerful and while they often appear to
evidence reality, they can be easily manipulated. The nature of photographs and videos
provides a broader context for a particular moment and can allow for ‘ongoing
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objectification of the subject, and therefore ongoing harm.’5 This is particularly so when
an image is disseminated online. This chapter noted that ‘the ubiquity of the internet and
the level of exposure afforded by online publication means that an image which, in the
past, may have resided in relative obscurity is now potentially able to be viewed by
millions for an indefinite period of time.’6
Chapter Two considered other factors that make children vulnerable to harm from the
online publication of an image, or the use of an image online. That chapter critically
evaluated research relating to the effect on child development of the use or publication
of an image and, in particular, the online publication of an image or its subsequent use
(research objective (1)). The chapter noted that literature was clear that bullying in the
form of unwanted publication and use of images was a particularly impactful form of
bullying but that the reasons for this were not explored in the literature on cyberbullying.
The chapter therefore sought to offer an explanation as to why images are so impactful
and, in doing so, explored some of the developmental implications for an image subject
of unwanted online publication or use of images by others. It was noted that there is a
risk of harm to self‐esteem and relationships due to the unwanted publication or use of
online images. Where that harm eventuates, there are implications for a child’s
development. It was noted that the unwanted online publication of an image of a child or
its subsequent use is not necessarily negative. However, there is a need for great caution
in suggesting that the potentially harmful repercussions of the unwanted online
publication or distribution of images are outweighed by the potential benefits vis‐a‐vis a
particular individual. Nevertheless, the chapter noted that any response to the problem
of unwanted online publication of images of children or their subsequent use, must
consider the net impact on children’s development, which includes, but is not limited to,
their right to freedom of expression.
In particular, Chapter Two drew two findings from an analysis of the literature. The first
finding was that a detrimental effect on development can occur even when the
publication or use of an image of a child or young person is not ill‐intentioned. The second
finding was that detriment can occur regardless of whether or not an image can be
described, objectively, as harmful. These findings have important implications for the
design of any legal response to the problem of the unwanted online posting or use of
images. They are discussed further in Part Three below.
Chapters Three and Four identified and illustrated the extent to which Australian law gives
children the ability to control the use or publication of their image, particularly in the
online context (research objective (2)). These chapters also considered and illustrated the
extent to which the use or publication of an image of a child or young person, particularly
5
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in the online context, is regulated by codes of conduct and other forms of self‐ or co‐
regulation (research objective (3)).
Taken together, Chapters Three and Four demonstrated that the extant legal framework
provides children with very limited redress in relation to the unwanted publication of an
image online or its subsequent use. In this sense, it is possible to conclude that the risk of
harm outlined in the thesis is not adequately addressed by that legal framework.
In summary, Chapters One to Four all contributed to illustrate the central problem with
which this thesis concerned: that the unwanted online publication of an image, or the
unwanted use of such an image, exposes children to the risk of developmental harm. One
important factor that contributes to that vulnerability is the fact that children have
insufficient control, in a legal sense, over the publication and use of online images of
themselves.
The following part of this chapter explains, by reference to Chapter Five of this thesis, why
government action is needed to address this problem.
B

Why Government Action is Needed

Although a partial solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned can be
found through law reform, it is necessary to consider why a legal solution as opposed to
a non‐legal solution is necessary, and on what basis it can be justified. Other and even
better solutions might be found through other forms of ‘regulation’. As noted in Chapter
Five, Lessig identified four regulators of cyberspace: the market, social norms, the
architecture of the internet (or ‘code’) and the law. Chapter Five considered whether
these regulators, other than law, could provide a solution to the problem identified in this
thesis, and concluded that they could not.
Given the imperfections of three of Lessig’s four regulators of cyberspace, Chapter Five
concluded that a legal response was required (research objective (5)). A justificatory basis
for that response (research objective (6)) was then considered. In this respect the
Australian Government’s obligations to children under the CRC were examined (research
objective (4)). Particular rights and principles under the CRC were discussed, specifically
the core principles of the right of the child to be heard and the best interests principle.
The rights to privacy, development and freedom of expression were also discussed. The
chapter concluded that the right to development in the CRC can provide a justificatory
basis for a regulatory response to the problem of the unwanted online publication of
images of children or their subsequent use. This conclusion is discussed further in Part III
below.
In summary, Chapter Five illustrated that government action is needed, in the form of law
reform, due to the failure of the market, social norms and the architecture of the internet
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(its code), to address the problem that the unwanted online publication of an image, or
the unwanted use of such an image, exposes children to the risk of developmental harm.
C

What is the Best Regulatory Response to the Problem?

In light of the problem identified and illustrated in Chapters One to Four and the need for
government action identified in Chapter Five, Chapter Six proposed a number of law
reform options. The efficacy of each of those options in addressing the problem that the
unwanted online publication of an image, or the unwanted use of such an image, exposes
children to the risk of developmental harm was considered. This chapter concluded that
only one of the options — a statutory take‐down scheme in respect of the online
publication of images of children — would be at all effective, albeit that none of the
options could entirely solve that problem. Recognising that further consultation would be
needed on the form and scope of that take‐down scheme, the chapter did, however,
recommend that the scheme be enacted in Commonwealth legislation, that it be overseen
by a regulator in the first instance, and that it would be based around the reasonable
interests of the child or children the subject or subjects of the image. A cost/benefit
analysis of a statutory take‐down scheme in that form was then undertaken.
This chapter concluded that a take‐down scheme that provides for the removal of online
images of children and young people could offer a partial solution to the problem with
which this thesis is concerned. The exact form and reach of the scheme would need to be
determined through further consultation, but a scheme that considers the reasonable
interests of a child would be appropriate. This conclusion is discussed further in Part III
below.
III

KEY FINDINGS

This part of the chapter sets out some of the key findings and conclusions arising this
research, followed by a brief discussion of each.
A

Summary of Findings

The key findings of this research are as follows:
1. There are gaps in the research on the impact of bullying in the form of unwanted
publication and use of images.
2. Even ‘benign’ images and those posted without ill‐intent can be harmful.
3. The risk of harm to child development due to the unwanted publication or use of
images is not adequately addressed by the extant Australian legal framework (‘the
problem’).
4. A regulatory response to this problem is required.
5. The right to development in the CRC provides a justificatory basis for the regulatory
response to the problem.
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6. A statutory take‐down scheme for images offers the best solution to the problem,
albeit only a partial solution.
7. There is a paucity of research on the views of children and young people regarding
attitudes to privacy in general, and to the publication of images or their use in
particular.
Each of these findings is now discussed in more detail.
B

Discussion of Findings

1 There are Gaps in the Research on the Impact of Bullying in the Form of Unwanted
Publication and Use of Images
Although it is known that the unwanted publication or use of images can be a particularly
impactful form of bullying, there are significant gaps in the literature as to why this is.
There are also gaps in the research as to the developmental implications for an image
subject of the online publication or use of images by others, where that publication or use
is unwanted.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the literature around bullying, including cyberbullying,
devotes surprisingly little attention to examining the differential impact upon victims of
different forms of bullying or victimisation, including that which takes the form of the
distribution and sharing of images.7 Although bullying in this form has been described in
a few studies as particularly impactful, why this is has not been explored. In particular,
research on bullying generally does not delve into any developmental implications for
victims of specific forms of bullying, including that which involves the publication or
distribution of images of the victim. Even outside of the context of studies on bullying or
victimisation, there is a dearth of literature considering the developmental implications
for an image subject of the unwanted online publication or use of images. This finding is
key because it is far from clear that this gap has even been acknowledged and yet, unless
and until it is and until further research into the developmental impact of the unwanted
publication of images of children and young people is conducted, responses (whether
regulatory or otherwise) to the problem of bullying may be inadequate, and other risks to
children and young people arising from the practice of the unwanted online publication
of images may not be clearly articulated and addressed.
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2 Even ‘Benign’ Images and Those Posted without Ill‐Intent Can be Harmful
Two other important findings were reached in Chapter Two. Firstly, the publication or use
of an image of a child or young person can have a detrimental effect on the image
subject’s development, even where the publication or use is not ill‐intentioned. Secondly,
a detrimental impact on an image subject can occur regardless of whether an image can
be described, objectively, as harmful.
Chapter Two noted that an individual’s self‐esteem and relationships are fundamental to
development. It was noted that in developmental literature the development of self‐
concept and self‐esteem is often considered key to the construction of ‘identity’. Identity
has, in turn, been described as one of the key developmental goals of adolescence.8
Moreover, an individual’s relationships with others are central to what has been identified
as the goals of adolescence: identity formation, autonomy, intimacy and the development
of the sexual self.9
Chapter Two identified and explained that the unwanted existence or use of an image
online can have a detrimental effect on an image subject’s self‐esteem, as well as on an
individual’s sense of autonomy and relationships — thus on their development. It was
8
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terms of self‐concept as a facet of identity (see, eg Berk, at 600 who explains that identity construction
involves ‘defining who you are, what you value, and the directions you choose to pursue in life’), suggesting
that self‐definition and value‐definition entail self‐concept but that directions one chooses to pursue relate
to an ‘ideal self’ or a ‘possible self’; others see self‐concept and identity as separate albeit related
phenomena (see, eg, Foddy and Finighan, at 4: ‘An identity, then, involves an individual’s idea of the type
of person he wants to be in the eyes of others, whereas his sense of self involves his perceptions of how he
is seen by others. Clearly the two concepts are related but they do not just refer to the same phenomenon.’).
9
See, eg, Peter and Valkenberg, above n 8. See also Kaveri Subrahmanyam and Patricia Greenfield, ‘Online
Communication and Adolescent Relationships’ (2008) 18(1) The Future of Children 119, 124 drawing on John
Hill’s claim that adolescent behaviour is best understood in terms of the four key developmental tasks of
adolescence: identity, autonomy, intimacy and sexuality.
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noted that self‐esteem can be adversely affected where a person experiences negative
feedback from others on their appearance as well as by a person’s purely subjective
response to their own appearance. This is because an individual’s response to their own
appearance is influenced by that individual’s perception as to how others might see them.
This is one reason why the publication or use of an image of a child or young person can
have a detrimental effect on the image subject, regardless of whether the image itself can
be considered, objectively, as harmful and regardless of the intention of the person
posting the image.
Chapter Two discussed the role of impression management, or self‐presentation, to the
development of positive self‐esteem. It was noted that individuals generally aim to create
favourable (although not necessarily unrealistic) impressions of themselves, as well as
impressions that are consistent with their various identity claims. Relevant to this is
‘context collapse’, a term used to explain the fact that in the online environment,
particularly in the context of social media, discrete audiences are often merged so that
information is distributed to all those with access to the online material. The phenomenon
of context collapse can make it more difficult for an individual to manage impressions of
themselves in an online environment. One consequence of this is that an individual’s self‐
esteem can be lowered if they have created an unfavourable impression of themselves
with regards to a particular audience, or even if they just believe they have done so. This
is another reason why the publication or use of an image of a child or young person can
have a detrimental effect on the image subject, regardless of whether the image itself can
be considered, objectively, as harmful and regardless of the intention of the person
posting the image.
Chapter Two also noted a link between self‐esteem and autonomy and the fact that an
individual’s self‐esteem can be affected by the extent to which they are able to control
the presentation of self and regulate interpersonal boundaries. An individual’s sense of
control over how they are represented visually is potentially compromised whenever
others make decisions about how they are represented, such as by publishing or sharing
images of that individual without their consent. An individual’s sense of control is also
potentially compromised when they have no capacity to remove an image from
publication or prevent it from being further distributed or shared with a particular
audience. Crucially, an individual may experience a lack of control even when others are
well‐intentioned in their decision to post or share images of that individual, or when the
images are not inherently embarrassing, harmful and so on.
It was also argued in Chapter Two that the online publication or sharing of an image
without the image subject’s consent — particularly where that image conflicts with an
individual’s identity claims — can negatively affect an individual’s relationships. The effect
on relationships can be more or less direct. It is direct when another person reacts to a
particular image in a way that affects the image subject’s sense of belonging and feelings
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of relatedness with others. The effect is less direct where it occurs due to the impact of
publication of an image on the image subject’s self‐esteem. This is because consequences
for an individual’s relationships and their sense of connection with others can ensue when
self‐esteem is negatively impacted. Therefore, the unwanted publication of an image or
its subsequent use can impact upon the child or young person’s development even where
the image itself might not be judged, objectively, as harmful and even where the person
publishing or using the image had no ill‐intent.
3 The Risk of Harm to Child Development Due to the Unwanted Publication or Use of
Images is not Adequately Addressed by the Extant Australian legal framework
Chapters Three and Four illustrated that the risk of harm outlined in the thesis is not
adequately addressed by extant laws.
Detailed examination of the Australian legal framework in Chapter Three demonstrated
that the availability of a private law cause of action in relation to the unwanted publication
of an image or its subsequent use is limited. An action will lie where the image reveals
something that can be judged, objectively, to be private or confidential, or communicates
something that is objectively detrimental to a person’s reputation or standing. This
limitation is significant given that Chapter Two found that a detrimental impact on an
image subject can occur regardless of whether an image can be described, objectively, as
harmful. In so far as intent is often an element of the causes of action discussed in Chapter
Three, it is also relevant to recall that Chapter Two found that the publication or use of an
image of a child can also have a detrimental effect on that child’s development even
where the publication or use was not ill‐intentioned. A cause of action will also lie where
it is established that the image was captured in breach of a legal or equitable right, or a
contractual obligation owed to the image subject. However, in a wide range of situations,
including those illustrated in the hypothetical case studies included in Chapter Four, the
image was not captured in breach of a right of or obligation owed to the image subject.
Chapter Three also noted that none of the causes of action discussed were designed to
protect a person’s autonomy, in terms of providing them with a choice as to whether or
not or when, how and to whom a particular image of themselves should be published, or
whether an image, once posted online, will remain online. This is also significant if choice
and control are considered to be aspects of privacy.
Chapter Three outlined the rapid removal scheme introduced by the Online Safety Act. It
was noted that the scheme only applies to material that meets the definition of
‘cyberbullying material targeted at an Australia child’ — that is, material that is seriously
intimidating, threatening, harassing or humiliating. The scheme does not apply to material
that is ‘merely offensive or insulting’.10 This is significant given that, as demonstrated in
10

Office of the Children’s e‐Safety Commissioner, How Does the Commissioner Decide if Something Is Serious
Cyberbullying Material? Cyberbullying Complaints FAQs, < https://www.esafety.gov.au/complaints‐and‐
reporting/cyberbullying‐complaints/cyberbullying‐complaints‐faqs>.
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Chapter Two, developmental harm is possible even with the publication or sharing of an
image of a child or young person that cannot be described, objectively, as harmful.
A number of limitations of the regimes established under the Privacy Act and the BSA
were also noted in Chapter Three. Not the least of these limitations is that they do not
create private causes of action for individuals. Neither do individuals have standing to
pursue breaches of the Privacy Act or the making available of content that should be
prohibited directly against the entity responsible for the same. Instead, individuals must
rely upon addressing a complaint to the body overseeing the relevant regime.
Additionally, neither the regime under the Privacy Act nor that created by the
Broadcasting Services legislation impacts directly upon the conduct of private individuals.
Finally, as noted in Chapter Three, although criminal offences do play some role in
deterring or punishing the unauthorised publication of images, they are of limited utility
in giving individuals the ability to control how or whether their images are published. This
is because individuals have limited ability to participate directly within the criminal
process.
The scenarios presented and discussed in Chapter Four further illustrated the limitations
of Australian law in giving a child or young person control over their image, in the sense
of having a private law action or other avenue of redress open to them. It was found that
this was the case even where an image has been captured or used without the image
subject’s consent, and where the publication of the image online or its use in a particular
context is unwanted and even harmful. The case studies also illustrate the fact that
despite qualitative differences between the scenarios presented, for the image subject
the outcome is generally the same. With the exception of Case Study One (Jackie), an
image that has been manipulated to purportedly depict something that did not occur is
treated (all things being equal) in the same way as an image that does depict reality. Again,
all things being equal, an image used in a commercial context is treated in the way as an
image used on a social media page or a gay voyeuristic website.
The lack of control — in the broad sense of the lack of legal redress or a legal avenue —
can therefore be seen as a factor that contributes to the vulnerability of children to the
risk of harm from unwanted publication of images. In this sense, the lack of control can
be seen as part of the problem. Of course it is not the only factor, but only one of many;
however, it is an important factor. Law can be used as a way of directly addressing the
risks to development posed by unwanted publication. Legislation could, for example, give
children greater ‘autonomy’ and reduce the risk that unwanted publication has on self‐
esteem and relationships by making it unlawful to capture or to publish images of
children, either in general or in respect of certain types of images, at least without express
consent. Legislation could provide a mechanism allowing for the removal of unwanted
images. Law can also play a role in indirectly addressing the risks of development, for
example, laws can deter others from taking or publishing images of children, or certain
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types of images, and can influence the creation of new social norms around the capturing
and publishing of images. Thus, while the lack of legal ‘control’, in the broad sense used
above, can be seen as part of the problem, law reforms that provide greater ‘control’
should be seen as part of the solution.
4 A Regulatory Response to this Problem is Required
Chapter Five found that a regulatory response to the problem of unwanted online
publication of an image of a child or its subsequent use is needed.
Having determined in Chapters Three and Four that the problem of the unwanted online
publication or use of images of children was not adequately addressed by the current
Australian legal framework, Chapter Five considered whether the problem was sufficiently
addressed by other means. In particular, the chapter considered Lessig’s other non‐legal
regulators of the internet — social norms, the market and the architecture of the internet
(or code).
In terms of the market it was found that the advertiser‐funded business model of a
number of platforms suggests that the market is more likely to encourage users to share
personal information, including images, about themselves and others (albeit within limits)
rather than refrain from doing so. Chapter Five noted that there is little incentive for the
market to provide a means of redress, prevention or mitigation in respect to the risk of
harm to children in the absence of either laws or social norms that constrain the sharing
and unauthorised online posting of images.
In terms of social norms, Chapter Five considered that it can be difficult to identify any
‘fixed’ or ‘entrenched’ social norms around the online disclosure of information, including
images, about others. This is due to the relative novelty of the technology and information
flows under consideration. However, it was observed that social norms are in a period of
transition and may gradually be changing to reflect the realities of the digital world and
the prevalence of internet use. Chapter Five noted that much has been written about the
younger generation appearing to be more open and less concerned with privacy;11
therefore, it was argued, if the posting of images of others is seen as being in line with
developing informational norms, those norms will not operate to prevent the potential
developmental harms outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Five noted that there is also some
evidence that informational norms developing around the taking and online posting of
images of others might be related to a mistaken assumption that those who do not
consent to their image being online can obtain adequate redress via the reporting
mechanisms of social networking sites (in other words that ‘the market’ itself offers an
effective solution). The chapter argued that where social norms are developing rather

11

See Chapter Five, Part Three, Section A.
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than entrenched, as seems to be the case in the online context, law is an important factor
in influencing what norms develop.
Chapter Five considered whether the development of code, or the architecture of the
internet, could offer a solution to or mitigation of the problem with which this thesis is
concerned. The chapter noted that while it is technically possible for code to offer a
solution to or a means of mitigating the problem, it was unlikely to do so. This is because
the architecture of internet platforms is often initiated and shaped by the commercial
interests behind them.12 Thus, for the same reason that the market is an imperfect
regulator vis‐a‐vis the problem identified, code is also imperfect. Nevertheless, it was also
noted that any legal reforms that are initiated to prevent, mitigate or provide redress for
the developmental harms outlined in Chapter Two would almost certainly need to be
supported by code in order to have practical effect.
5 The Right to Development in the CRC Provides a Justificatory Basis for the
Regulatory Response to the Problem
Chapter Five found that the right to development in the CRC provides a justificatory basis
for a regulatory response to the problem of the unwanted online publication of images of
children or their subsequent use.
Chapter Five discussed the fact that, although the right to privacy in the CRC can provide
a justificatory basis for laws that sought to give children more control over the online
publication of their image, there are inherent difficulties in giving content to that right. It
was suggested, therefore, that the right of development could provide an alternative
justificatory basis for law reforms in this space. The right to development is one of four
principles that should guide interpretation of all of the other rights in the CRC, which
include, among others, the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression.
6 A statutory take‐down scheme for images offers the best solution to the problem,
albeit only a partial solution
A take‐down scheme that provides for the removal of online images of children and young
people would offer a partial solution to the problem with which this thesis is concerned.
The exact form and reach of the scheme would need to be determined, but arguably a
scheme that considers the reasonable interests of a child would be appropriate.
However, in recognition of the fact that a take‐down scheme is not a perfect response to
the problem, the scheme should form part of a multi‐pronged approach.

12

Although code may also be shaped and instituted due to legal constraints upon those organisations. Of
course, depending on the platform, individuals and groups quite separate from the platform host may have
a degree of control over the information posted, for example, individuals who have their own blog or social
networking profile make decisions about what to display and what to remove.
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A take‐down scheme could permit the take‐down of an image by reference purely to the
subjective wishes of an image subject or it could allow for the removal of images where
their continued publication online was contrary to the reasonable interests of the image
subject. Chapter Six noted that there would be difficulties in determining what those
‘reasonable interests’ should be in any given case, and that this could give rise to
uncertainty. However, a reasonable interests test could provide a measure of control over
images for children, without going so far as to create an image right. This was the only
option from among those evaluated that addressed the problem with which this thesis is
concerned directly rather than incidentally. As such, the option could be tailored to
address the problem in a way that was able to achieve the best balance between the
interests, rights and freedoms of an image subject who is a child and the interests, rights
and freedoms of others affected by the removal or threat or removal of an image.
Nevertheless, a statutory take‐down scheme can only offer a partial solution. This is not
least because of inherent problems around enforcement of Australian law in the context
of the ‘borderless internet’.13 There would also be significant complexities in a scheme
that applied to both online images and those used in an offline context.
In other words, there is no ‘silver bullet’ that can deal with the problem with which this
thesis is concerned. In fact, although a take‐down scheme in relation to images offers the
most direct solution to the problem, a multi‐pronged response involving both regulatory
and non‐regulatory options is likely to offer the only realistic opportunity to address the
problem.
7 There is a Paucity of Research on the Views of Children and Young People
Regarding Attitudes to Privacy in General, and to the Publication of Images or
Their Use in Particular.
Chapter Six noted the paucity of research on the views of children and young people
regarding online publication of images or their use.
The views of children and young people on privacy in general have been sought in a
number of different ways. In its inquiry into Australian Privacy Law and Practice, the ALRC
undertook a process of consultation with children. Workshops organised by the ALRC for
children and young people gave participants the opportunity to express their views on a
number of issues related to the inquiry.14 The ALRC also developed a website that sought
to engage young people and encourage them to send comments to the ALRC inquiry.15
Prior to the ALRC’s inquiry, a survey on the attitudes of young people to privacy had been
13

Dan Jerker B Svantesson wrote in 2006 that ‘Since its “birth” approximately 15 years ago, the World Wide
Web (‘www’) has been viewed as borderless …’: Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘The Not So ‘Borderless’ Internet:
Does it Still Give Rise to Private International Law Issues?’ July 2006, Bond University e‐Publications
<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/law_pubs/96/>.
14
ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 3, 2231 [67.29].
15
Ibid [67.27].
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conducted in South Australia. The majority of the participants in that study were actually
young adults, but just under 10% were between the ages of 15 and 17 and 0.6% (2
respondents) were under 15. Researchers in various fields, such as computer mediated
communication, child psychology and child wellbeing, have considered the views of
children and young people to privacy in general. Despite this, research seeking the views
of children and young people on their attitudes to privacy is limited, and one of the
recommendations to come out of the ALRC’s report was that a longitudinal study of the
attitudes to privacy of Australians, particularly young Australians — and, specifically, to
include those under the age of 1816 — should be funded by the Australian Government.17
Something of the views of children and young people on the publication and use of images
can be gleaned through submissions by organisations representing children to various
inquiries.18 In addition, some views on this have been expressed in the course of the
consultations undertaken by the ALRC, and referred to above. In making submissions to
the SCAG Inquiry, Unauthorised Use of Photographs on the Internet and Other Ancillary
Privacy Issues, the NSW Commission for Children and Young People specifically sought the
views of children and young people.19 More recently children did express views on the use
of images of themselves or others in the course of the High School Forum held to inform
the JSCCS’ report on cyber‐safety.20 As discussed in Chapter Two, researchers looking at
bullying and cyberbullying have consulted children with regards to the impact on them of
the use of images as a form of cyberbullying. Otherwise, the researcher is aware of very
little research in this area. Indeed, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its report
on the 2014 Day of General Discussion on Digital Media and Children’s Rights, noted that
the participants had ‘stressed the lack of data on children and digital media as a key
concern’ and had agreed that ‘further research and data collection, including comparative
research, was necessary in order to better understand how children engage with ICTs and
what their needs and concerns are.’21
Having discussed each of the key findings made in this thesis, the following part of the
chapter offers a number of recommendations arising from this research.

16

Ibid [67.96].
Ibid 2249 [Recommendation 67‐1].
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For example, Youth Affairs Council of Victoria Inc, Submission No PR 172 to ALRC, For Your Information:
Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 5 February 2007; New South Wales (‘NSW’) Commission for Children
and Young People, Submission to SCAG Discussion Paper, Unauthorised Photographs of the Internet and
Ancillary Privacy Issues, October 2005, 3 [5.2].
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NSW Commission for Children and Young People, above n 18, 1 [2.2].
20
See further, Chapter 1.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2014 Day of General Discussion: ‘Digital Media and
Children’s Rights’, 2014, 11 [50].
17

367

IV

RECOMMENDATIONS

This part of the chapter sets out the recommendations coming out of this research. The
recommendations are as follows:
1. Australian law should be reformed to give children greater control over the online
publication or use of their image, where that publication is unwanted, and a
Commonwealth statutory take‐down scheme for images should be considered for
this purpose.
This recommendation arises from findings two to six above. The take‐down scheme
recommended in this research is a statutory scheme that would be enacted in
Commonwealth legislation. The scheme would be administered by a regulator rather than
the courts, although would be backed up by court enforceable sanctions. Although such a
scheme could take various forms, the form recommended here is one that allows for the
issuance of a take‐down notice whenever publication or use of an image of a child is
against the ‘reasonable interests’ of that child. As to what those interests are in a given
case, a non‐exhaustive list of criteria could be specified as criteria that should be taken
into account.
2. Consultation should be undertaken on the form and scope of the take‐down scheme.
Although this thesis has recommended a regulator administered take‐down scheme
based around the ‘reasonable interests’ of a particular child, public consultation involving
all stakeholders, particularly children, should be undertaken on the exact form and scope
of the scheme. In particular, as noted above and discussed in more detail in Chapter Six,
there are important questions as to whether a take‐down scheme should be limited to
online content or should apply more generally, and as to whether there should be
exemptions related to the type of forum on which content is hosted. Further
consideration should also be given to whether the scheme would apply to content posted
on social media sites, or more widely, and whether it should be a participatory scheme
along the lines of that established by the Online Safety Act. The further research
recommended in recommendation four below would partly inform the answer to some
of these questions.
3. Further research is required on the impact of the unwanted publication and use of
images on child development.
This recommendation arises from the first two findings outlined above, namely that there
are gaps in the research on the impact of bullying in the form of the unwanted publication
and use of images and that even ‘benign’ images and those posted without ill‐intent can
be harmful. However, it is recommended here that research should consider the impact
of unwanted publication and use of images not only on those domains of child
development considered in this thesis (specifically self‐esteem and relationships), but
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upon other domains of development. The research should consider the impact of online
publication and use, as well as ‘offline’ publication and use, and whether there is a
difference.
4. More research is needed on the views of children and young people regarding their
attitudes to the privacy in general, and to the online publication of images or their
use in particular.
This recommendation arises from the seventh finding discussed above. As explained in
Chapter Five, children have a right to express their views and have them accorded due
weight. However, and as also noted above, there is a paucity of research on the views of
children and young people regarding their attitudes to privacy in general, and their
attitudes to the publication or use of images in particular. Further research in this area
will also help to inform the development of the take‐down scheme recommended above.
Although ‘point in time’ research is valuable and necessary, a longitudinal study will also
serve to illustrate any changes in these attitudes over a period of time. The need for a
longitudinal study on privacy attitudes, particularly those of young people, was
highlighted by the ALRC.22
5. A multi‐pronged and multi‐stakeholder approach to the problem identified in this
thesis is required.
For reasons explained in Chapter Six, there is no perfect solution to the problem outlined
in this thesis. Although a Commonwealth statutory take‐down scheme, in the form
recommended, would go some way to addressing the problem, other law reforms are also
important. In particular, Australia should enact a statutory right of action for serious
invasions of privacy. A cause of action for invasion of privacy has been recommended by
the ALRC to fill gaps in Australian law and to more fully implement into Australian
domestic law the right to privacy enshrined in Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.23 A number of other law reforms were canvassed in Chapter Six
and further consideration should be given to enacting these. In particular, the right to
delete information, including images, or restrict its processing in certain circumstances
should be considered for inclusion in the Privacy Act: this is one way to mitigate some of
the longer‐term harm relating to the persistence of data.
A multi‐pronged approach to the problem also requires non‐legal responses. As noted by
Katz et al, albeit in the context of dealing with cyberbullying, legal and social responses
need to be integrated.24 Those authors also note findings that a legislative approach,
without support for education campaigns and resources in school, was in fact
22
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counterproductive.25 Likewise, in dealing with the issues presented by the unwanted
online publication or use of images of children, a purely legal response is not sufficient
and may produce unintended consequences.
The development of social‐norms and social protocols are fundamental to bringing about
change in the control that individuals have and feel that they have in relation to their
image in the online environment. To this end, more could be done in schools to teach
children about the etiquette of uploading images of others to the internet. Education
campaigns targeted at adults are also important — even parents sometimes upload
images of their children without awareness of the potential long‐term consequences of
doing so. This is particularly important given that social norms around the capture,
publication and use of images are developing rather than entrenched, as seems to be the
case particularly in the online context. However, as explained in Chapter Five, there is an
interrelationship between norms and law, so that without a legal response norms may be
unlikely to change.
Chapter Six also noted that a code solution to the problem presented in this research may
be possible. One example of a code solution was Mayer‐Schönberger’s built in expiry
dates for certain data. A similar solution — but one that is, unlike Mayer‐Schönberger’s,
driven by the interests of the market rather than concern for the subjects of information
or images — is represented by the social platform, Snapchat. Snapchat allows users to
send messages and images to each other that automatically ‘self‐destruct’ after 10
seconds.26 This mitigates one of the harms associated with the unwanted online
publication of images — the persistence of data. However, the solution is far from perfect,
as recipients of images are able to save a particular image permanently to their device —
and forward it to others or post on a different platform, such as by using a third party
‘application’.27 Nevertheless, it is possible that young people themselves may drive even
greater demand for platforms that provide ‘self‐destruct’ services due, in part, to their
wish for greater control over their image.
In short, while a legal response is required and has been proposed in this research, a legal
response should always be part of a multi‐pronged approach to the problem and involve
a diverse range of stakeholders, including, among others, governments, industry, young
people, schools, parents, and NGOs.
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V

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

As noted throughout, the unauthorised use of an image is an issue of public concern,28
one which has attracted government attention29 and one in respect of which there are
acknowledged gaps in Australian law.30 This research therefore contributes to the debate
on this issue, which is likely to become even more important as time goes by. This research
has also moved the discussion about unwanted use of image beyond its traditional realm
of personality rights and the discourse on privacy. Importantly, this thesis has identified
gaps in research on cyberbullying, as well as in relation to the developmental implications
of unwanted publication and use of images of children. These areas have been identified
here as ripe for further research.
This thesis has argued that young people should have some control over how they are
represented — by way of their visual image — on the internet, and certainly more control
than they currently have. The research has shown that the unwanted online publication
of images or unwanted use of online images of children poses a risk to their development.
While recognising that the ‘wholesale elimination of risk is neither feasible nor desirable’31
this thesis has submitted that, in order to fulfil its commitments to children’s rights under
the CRC, Australia should do more by way of a regulatory response to address this risk. In
order to provide children with greater control over the online publication of their image,
this research has recommended the introduction of a statutory take‐down scheme for
images. It has also canvassed other law reform options that should be considered in
addition to the introduction of the take‐down scheme. However, the need to situate a
legislative response within a broader package of social and educational initiatives has also
been recognised.
Ultimately the problem of unwanted online publication of images and their subsequent
use is complex and one to which there is no perfect solution. Nevertheless, to place the
problem in the ‘too hard basket’ and to neglect the development of any legal response to
it is to shirk from the task of translating children’s rights from theory to reality.
28
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